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Part 1: Introduction 
1.1 Structure of the report 
The Commonwealth Department of Treasury (Commonwealth Treasury) on behalf of Consumer Affairs 
Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ) has engaged the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) to 
conduct a comparative review of international consumer policy frameworks.  
The principal jurisdictions identified for the purposes of the comparison are the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, and Singapore.  
This comparative analysis identifies emerging issues and key developments in consumer policy and 
possible alternative approaches for providing consumer protection. It highlights where the chosen 
jurisdictions adopt different approaches to Australia, but does not identify best practice models in other 
jurisdictions. 
The following four principal issues are considered in this review: 
Issue 1: Approaches to unconscionable or highly unfair trading practices  
(Professor Stephen Corones, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology) 
The first issue for analysis is: 
• Approaches to unconscionable or highly unfair trading practices: 
– punitive fees included in contracts that exceed the cost base (for example, regulating contract 
terms where transparency may not be enough); 
– the effectiveness of controls to limit pyramid schemes; and 
– the scope of unsolicited selling laws overseas and the approach to direct selling. 
Issue 2: Approaches to regulation of e-commerce and peer-to-peer transactions 
(Professor Sharon Christensen, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology) 
The second issue for analysis is:  
• How consumer laws have responded to the challenges of e-commerce and peer-to-peer 
transactions: 
– online payments and disclosure of prices in online transactions e.g. drip pricing; 
– regulatory approaches that are flexible enough to accommodate technical solutions to the 
problem being regulated and not inhibit innovation or protect existing business models; and  
– challenges with obtaining a remedy for breaches of the law overseas/ international reach of 
domestic consumer protection laws. 
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Issue 3: Institutional structures relating to the administration and enforcement of 
consumer laws  
(Professor Justin Malbon, Faculty of Law, Monash University and Mr Allan Asher) 
The third issue for analysis is: 
• Institutional structures relating to the administration and enforcement of consumer laws (e.g. 
breadth of regulator powers; whether it is an enforcement model, administrative model or judicial 
model). 
Issue 4: Measures to facilitate access to justice  
(Associate Professor Jeannie Marie Paterson, Melbourne Law School, University of 
Melbourne) 
The fourth issue for analysis is: 
• Measures to facilitate access to justice, including  
– early intervention and consumer empowerment,  
– support for consumers in accessing dispute resolution, and  
– institutional support (e.g. from regulators or other third party advocates). 
The structure of the report is to consider each issue in a separate Part. Within each part the relevant 
Australian law that applies to the issue identified is considered. Next, the laws of the principal 
comparator jurisdictions applicable to the issue are considered .Finally, the respective laws are 
compared and contrasted and similarities and differences are identified. 
1.2 Consumer protection legislation in Australia 
Under the Australian Constitution, legislative power in relation to consumer protection is divided 
between the Commonwealth and the State and Territory parliaments. The method adopted to achieve 
this for the ACL was to use the ‘application model’. Under this model, new legislation to apply 
universally throughout Australia is enacted by a lead legislator — in this case the Commonwealth, with 
the text of the ACL set out in Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). This text is 
made the law of the Commonwealth and of each State and Territory law by their individual applications 
laws — laws that apply the Schedule within each particular jurisdiction. 
Although the principal provisions of the ACL only came into effect on 1 January 2011, many of these 
provisions are not novel. Instead, they are based on the consumer protection provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), albeit in revised language. Other provisions, of the ACL are new at the 
Commonwealth level, but they have been modelled on provisions previously contained in State, 
Territory, or overseas legislation.  
1.3 ACL as a National Uniform law 
In the case of the Commonwealth, the application law is contained in Pt XI of the CCA. This restricts the 
application of Sch 2 by reference to the limits imposed on Commonwealth legislative power by the 
Australian Constitution and by reference to the policy decision to leave the regulation of financial 
services and products to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2011 (Cth) (ASIC 
Act).  
Section 131(1) of the CCA applies Sch 2 as a law of the Commonwealth only to ‘the conduct of 
corporations, and in relation to contravention of Chapters 2, 3 or 4 of Schedule 2 by corporations.’ 
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Part 2: Executive summary  
2.1 Approaches to unconscionable or highly unfair trading practices 
2.1.1 General and specific protections 
The comparative review reveals high levels of convergence between the consumer policy frameworks of 
Australia and the jurisdictions chosen for comparison. Most jurisdictions adopt a combination of general 
and specific protections in relation to unconscionable and highly unfair trading practices. 
Table 1: Comparison of general protections 
General protections Australia UK US Canada Singapore 
Unfair commercial practice No Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
 Business to consumer No Yes Yes  Yes 
 Business to business No No Yes  No 








 Business to consumer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Business to business Yes No No No No 











 Business to consumer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Business to business Yes No No No No 
Unfair terms 










No No No No 
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Table 2: Comparison of Specific Highly Unfair Trading Conduct 
Specific highly unfair trading 
conduct 
Australia UK US Canada Singapore 
Punitive fees in contracts 
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2.2 Misleading conduct  
While s 18 of the ACL (and s 52 of the TPA) have been used to promote the interests of consumers by 
improving the conduct of businesses in relation to their advertising, selling practices and promotional 
activities generally, and by prohibiting them from engaging in sharp practices when dealing with 
individual consumers, their greatest use has been in connection with disputes of a commercial nature 
between competitors who are not consumers. In this regard s 52 the TPA was influenced by s 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), and US law. 
There is considerable scope for overlap between the general protection for misleading or deceptive 
conduct in s 18 of the ACL and s 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce’. According to the three-limb test set out in the FTC’s 1983 Policy Statement on 
Deception, an act or practice is deceptive if it involves:  
1. ‘a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer’; 
2. ‘a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances’; and  
3. the representation, omission, or practice is material to the consumer’s choice of or conduct 
regarding a product or services. 
The second limb requires the FTC to consider the act or practice from a reasonable consumer’s 
perspective. 
In the EU, the second test of unfairness found in art. 5(4)(a) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
(UCPD) states that a commercial practice will be unfair if found to be misleading as set out in Articles 6 
and 7. The ‘average consumer’ test in Art 6(1) of the UCPD has much in common with the ‘ordinary or 
reasonable consumer’ test adopted in Australia in relation to s 18 of the ACL. However, unlike 
Australia’s misleading conduct provisions remedies under the UCPD are only available in relation to 
business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions, not business-to-business transactions (B2B).  
2.3 Unfair/unconscionable conduct 
The UCPD takes a three-tiered approach which consists of a first tier general prohibition of unfair 
commercial practices, second tier prohibitions against misleading and aggressive practices, and a third 
tier blacklist of specific practices that are prohibited in all circumstances.  
A significant difference between Australia and the EU/ UK position is that Australia does not have a first 
tier general prohibition of unfair commercial practices similar to art 5(2) of the UCPD, or a third tier 
black list of specific practices that are prohibited in all circumstances. It has been argued that the 
standard of ‘unfairness’ in the UCPD is lower than the standard of statutory unconscionable conduct, 
and that the adoption of the UCPD general prohibition of unfair commercial practices in Australia would 
increase the overall level of consumer protection.  
The standard of ‘unfair conduct’, rather than ‘unconscionable conduct’, is also adopted in s 5(1) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act in the United States. The test for ‘unfairness’ under the FTC Act was first 
expressed in the 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness and later codified into the FTC Act in 1994 as 15 
U.S.C. § 45(n).  
An act or practice will be considered by the FTC to be unfair if: 
1. it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers;  
2. that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition; and  
3. that cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers. 
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2.4 Role of codes of conduct in unfair/unconscionable conduct 
In the EU the first tier test of unfairness in Art 5(2) of the UCPD requires that the practice must be 
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence. Article 2(h) defines professional diligence as ‘the 
standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards 
consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the 
trader’s field of activity’.  
In some EU Member States codes of conduct are used to set standards of good business behaviour in a 
particular sector. Well- established codes of conduct could reflect good business practice and be used to 
identify the requirements of professional diligence in concrete cases. 
In Australia, assessing whether conduct meets the standard of statutory unconscionable conduct in s 21 
of the ACL, is an evaluative task to be understood by taking into account the values and norms that 
Parliament considered relevant when it identified the non-exhaustive list of factors in s 22 of the ACL, 
and s 12CC of the ASIC Act. One of the factors listed in s 22(1)(g) and (2)(g) of the ACL that a court may 
have regard to is the requirements of any applicable industry code. In this regard the EU concept on an 
‘unfair commercial practice’ and statutory unconscionable conduct under s 21 of the ACL are similar. 
2.5 Unfair terms and the requirement of good faith 
The definition of an unfair term in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 United Kingdom has an additional 
requirement that the term must be ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’ which is not present in 
the definition of an unfair term in s 24 of the ACL. Despite the absence of the requirement of good faith 
in the Australian definition of unfair term Australia’s general protection appears to overlap its UK 
equivalent. The UTCCD requirement of good faith requires ‘an overall evaluation of the different 
interests involved’. The unfair terms regime in the ACL already imposes such a requirement. In applying 
the test of unfairness s 24(2)(b) of the ACL requires the court to consider the term in the context of the 
contract as a whole. 
2.6 Inclusion of punitive fees in contracts 
The EU and UK adopt a grey list includes ‘a term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer 
who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in 
compensation’.  
The Australian grey list of unfair terms includes ‘a term that penalises, or has the effect of penalising, 
one party (but not another party) for a breach or termination of the contract’. 
Both Australia and the UK exclude terms relating to the main subject matter and setting the upfront 
price of goods or services, but this would not extend to cover default fees or termination fees.  
The consumer policy framework in the United States with regard to the inclusion of punitive fees in 
contracts provide for a general protection and a number of industry-specific protections. General 
protection is provided by the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which prohibits ‘unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’.  
In Canada, the regulation of punitive fees in contracts by way of general consumer legislation appears to 
occur at the province and territory-level. As such, federal laws, which deal with punitive fees in 
contracts, tend to focus on specific industries, such as the banking and aviation sectors.  
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2.7 Pyramid schemes 
In the EU, the UCPD blacklist includes the establishment, operation or promotion of a ‘pyramid 
promotional scheme’ which is defined as a scheme ‘where a consumer gives consideration for the 
opportunity to receive compensation that is derived primarily from the introduction of other consumers 
into the scheme rather than from the sale or consumption of products’. In the UK, the CPR blacklist 
includes the establishment, operation or promotion of a pyramid scheme ‘where a consumer gives 
consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation that is derived primarily from the 
introduction of other consumers into the scheme rather than from the sale or consumption of 
products’. 
In all jurisdictions there is a degree of uncertainty in applying the test and distinguishing between a 
legitimate multilevel marketing scheme and an illegal pyramid scheme. 
2.8 Unsolicited selling and cooling off periods 
Most jurisdictions adopt a combination of general and specific protections in relation to unsolicited 
selling all provide for a ‘cooling off’ period in which the consumer can withdraw from a contract entered 
into away from the seller’s permanent business location, including a consumer’s home, which varies 
between three and 14 days in length. 
2.9 Approaches to regulation of e-commerce and peer-to-peer 
transactions 
2.9.1 Summary 
Common regulatory approaches to consumer protection issues in e-commerce have been adopted in 
the reviewed jurisdictions in relation to product quality, misleading pricing practices, fake reviews and 
fraud. While regulators acknowledge the different challenges presented by online transactions the 
common approach is to modify existing regulatory frameworks rather than adopting a different model 
for e-commerce. The most significant differences in approach appear in the combined regulations of the 
UK and EU which specifically regulate consumer issues for digital content, information asymmetry in 
online transactions and false online reviews.  
The main differences in approach are summarised below. 
2.9.2 Product quality  
The ability of a consumer to verify the quality or description of the products or services purchased is a 
common problem in all forms of online transaction. Most jurisdictions continue to use existing legal 
frameworks to impose warranties or guarantees of acceptable quality in the context of online 
transactions. Only the UK has specifically addressed quality for digital content other than computer 
software. No jurisdiction has reviewed the desirability of excluding sales by auction from guarantees of 
quality where consumers purchase goods via online auctions. Only those jurisdictions with distance 
selling regimes (United Kingdom (EU) and Canada) have imposed additional information disclosure 
requirements on businesses selling online.  
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2.10 Unfair pricing 
There is a high level of similarity in the regulatory policies and approaches to drip pricing and surge 
pricing. Most jurisdictions, including Australia continue to apply general protections for unfair, 
deceptive or misleading practices to drip pricing or surge pricing in e-commerce. However, the ACL 
general protections are potentially narrower than the prohibitions on ‘unfair commercial practices’ in 
the United Kingdom and United States. No jurisdiction has enacted specific provisions dealing with drip 
pricing but in Singapore surge pricing by taxis using online booking services is regulated.  
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2.11 Fake reviews 
Australian regulatory approach to fake or false review is comparable with other jurisdictions. 
Consumers appear to obtain the most effective protection and support in the case of online reviews 
from a regulatory approach that consists of general protections, specific protections for misleading 
testimonials, broad enforcement powers, guidelines and consumer education. These elements are 
present in the Australian approach. The only are which may warrant further inquiry is whether liability 
or responsibility should be attributed to platform providers in peer to peer transactions. 
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Australian regulatory approach to fake or false review is comparable with other jurisdictions. The 
Federal Trade Commission, UK regulator and Canadian regulator have focussed attention on 
international consumer protection issues arising from the use of the Internet and various platforms 
contained on it. This is the same approach Australia has adopted having recognised the increasing 
importance of such inter-agency cooperation to achieve positive outcomes in this area.1 This approach 
should be fostered and improved to ensure consumer fraud is enforced not only domestically, but also 
at an international level. 
  
                                                          
1  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission No 46 to House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Communications, Inquiry into cyber crime, July 2009, 2. 
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2.13 Peer-to-peer transactions 
The rapid growth of the sharing economy through peer to peer platforms presents different challenges 
for existing regulatory models. Regulators in most jurisdictions are yet to adopt clear policies in relation 
to the sharing economy and have generally resorted to existing consumer protection provisions when 
problems arise. Jurisdictions have to date focussed on other consumer issues in the context of peer to 
peer platforms relating to licensing regimes, consumer safety, privacy and insurance. Particular 
emerging issues include whether platform operators should bear responsibility for the conduct of users, 
extension of consumer warranties to consumer to consumer transaction and the adaptability of existing 
regulatory approach to future disruptive technology 
2.14 Institutional structures relating to the administration and 
enforcement of consumer laws 
2.14.1 Summary and key observations  
 This Part compares international institutional structures for the administration and enforcement of i)
consumer laws in five jurisdictions: Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Singapore and the 
United Kingdom. 
 The key institutions responsible for administering and enforcing consumer laws are identified and ii)
their mandates and operating methodologies are described. Some of the reviewed countries have 
state or regional agencies or actors. These are described as ‘other actors’, and include sectoral 
regulators and non-profit consumer groups. 
 Any significant changes to the law or administration in a jurisdiction over the last five years are iii)
described, along with the relevant government’s rationale for change.  
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 This Part attends to the following topics: iv)
– digital purchasing and digital products, with attention to developments in e-commerce and 
cross-border cooperation for consumer law enforcement 
– developments in institutional design and focus, together with innovative new programs, 
particularly those that arise in e-commerce  
– progress of ECC–net, which is a project on best practices for consumer redress, which is being 
undertaken for the UN Commission on Trade and Development  
– the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015  
– the revised UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection and Sustainable Development Goals. 
2.15 Jurisdictional comparisons 
2.15.1 Comparison of main institutions for consumer protection 
In the United States, consumer protection policy places emphasis on enabling consumers to protect 
their own self-interest. Law enforcement is overwhelming private-party based and relies heavily on the 
judicial system. The Federal Trade Commission and national and state governments tend to take a 
non-interventionist approach, although they are active in encouraging businesses to deal fairly with 
consumers. There is however growing evidence of a more interventionist tendency as a result of the 
creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. It has a substantial budget and a strong 
enforcement mandate. The Bureau engages in consumer research, education monitoring and 
enforcement.  
Canada, in common with its southern neighbour, employs a regulatory model that places strong 
emphasis on using the judicial system for enforcing consumer legal rights. Also in common with the US, 
it places policy emphasis on promoting an environment for well-informed and confident consumers, 
and seeks to provide consumers with tools for protecting their own interests. The Office of Consumer 
Affairs provides generous financial support to not-for-profit consumer and voluntary organisations to 
attain these goals. 
Institutional approaches to administration and enforcement of consumer law in New Zealand remained 
largely unchanged for some time. However, significant reforms that will change the role of government 
in consumer law enforcement have been implemented in more recent times.  
In Singapore, the administration of consumer protection laws involves a high degree of self-regulation, 
mediation and small claims deliberations, and contracted out enforcement. The Ministry for Trade and 
Industry has entered into a commercial arrangement with a voluntary consumer group, the Consumers 
Association of Singapore (CASE), to investigate and mediate complaints on behalf of consumers, 
including tourists to Singapore. 
2.15.2 Legislation and jurisdictional comparisons 
The US has implemented laws and regulations dealing with credit card chargeback, class actions and 
fraud and identity theft. The US also places a strong emphasis on promoting consumer awareness, to 
enable consumers to protect their own interests. 
In Canada, responsibility for consumer protection is divided between federal and provincial 
governments. Under the Department of Industry Act, the Minister of Industry is mandated to promote 
and protect consumer interests throughout Canada. There are, in addition, extensive Provincial laws 
and agencies to administer them. 
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In New Zealand, the Fair Trading Act which commenced operation in 2013 sets a new policy and 
direction. Similarly, new laws and directions are in place in the United Kingdom.  
2.15.3 Comparative issues in policy and practice 
The US places strong emphasis on promoting consumer awareness, to enable consumers to protect 
their own interests. There is however growing evidence of a more interventionist tendency as a result of 
the creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. It has a substantial budget and a strong 
enforcement mandate. The Bureau engages in consumer research, education monitoring and 
enforcement.  
The strategic direction of consumer policy in Canada is similar to other reference countries, with a focus 
on protecting vulnerable consumers and building confidence in the electronic marketplace. Canada has 
identified educating and equipping consumers to deal with sustainable consumption as a key strategic 
goal. In New Zealand, policy now requires government agencies to work with businesses, employees 
and consumers to assist them participate effectively in the marketplace. The consumer marketplace 
regulator, the Commerce Commission, focuses its activities on the provision of advice, information and 
education services. Much of the major law reform that occurred during 2013 harmonises New Zealand 
law with the Australian Consumer Law.  
An interesting feature of consumer policy in Singapore is the extensive promotion of trust marks. The 
awarding of the ‘trustSG’ is widely seen as a powerful consumer protection measure and business 
advancement tool.  
The UK has an extensive ADR network and places considerable reliance on these as a means for dispute 
resolution, rather than upon the traditional judicial system. The Government commissioned a major 
review of consumer legislation in 2015.  
Of particular interest are the newly introduced laws on the supply of services to consumers and the 
introduction of a range of novel remedies, including the capacity to deem a trader’s spoken or written 
statement a binding contractual term. The updating of the 1977 Contract Terms Act is also an issue of 
considerable interest. The application of consumer law principles to digital content is another 
noteworthy development. 
2.16 The revised United Nations guidelines for consumer protection 
In November 2015 the UN General Assembly adopted a revised version of the UN Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection. The Guidelines, which will be accompanied by extensive implementation manual, 
is the first major revision in 30 years and addresses new forms of consumer detriment, and provides 
guidelines for strengthening international cooperation and the growth of cross-border and digital 
commerce. The new Guidelines provide guidance on the regulation of financial services and public 
utilities, and on good business practices and international cooperation.  
2.17 United Nations sustainable development goals 
Following the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the post 2015 development agenda, the UN 
General Assembly agreed to a plan of action to attain global sustainable development by 2030. Much of 
the document is directed at poverty alleviation and appropriate measures for developing countries. Of 
future relevance is the national, regional and global mechanisms for follow-up and review, which are 
embodied in the document. 
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2.18 Digital purchasing and digital products  
The significant growth in consumer online purchasing of goods and services is presenting new 
enforcement and administration challenges. The enforcement of consumer rights for cross-border 
purchases is particularly challenging. In September 2015, the European Commission published the 
results of extensive consumer surveys that questioned consumer participants about the barriers they 
believed they faced when purchasing online. Data protection and payment security were key concerns, 
while worries about the difficulties in replacing or repairing a faulty product also rated as a significant 
barrier. As expected, concerns about cross-border e-commerce are primarily linked to delivery issues, 
including shipping costs and long lead times in product delivery. The difficulty of obtaining redress was 
also seen as a problem. A third of the shoppers surveyed stated they have experienced problems with 
cross-border online shopping. 
2.19 Other interesting developments 
This section contains a number of recent consumer protection innovations and proposals. The 
developments include: 
• chargeback and the limitations of this remedy if a trader refuses to provide a refund where it is 
warranted 
• a Pan-European Trust Mark 
• the first 10 years of operation of EEC-Net  
• the review of Best Practices of Consumer Redress undertaken by Dr Ying Yu from the University of 
Oxford for UNCTAD 
• the European Union Online Disputes Resolution platform  
• the European e-Justice Portal 
• the Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, which tracks the situation and behaviour of consumers 
across the EU. The tool enables policymakers to identify the need and plan for interventions if 
necessary, or discontinue interventions if they are no longer necessary. 
The EU commissions from time to time impact studies to better understand the progress and 
achievements of consumer and market integration polices. This Part outlines the results of a study 
commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
(IMCO), which was undertaken by Civic Consulting between July and September 2014. The study 
reviews achievements in promoting the European single market and consumer protection. 
2.20 Measures to facilitate access to justice  
2.20.1 Summary 
Access to justice is integral to the success of any statutory regime in providing fair and effective 
consumer protection. However no one measure can ensure that consumers are able to enforce their 
legal rights as provided under this legislation. What is required is a combination of strategies. These 
strategies must be assessed from the perspectives of both traders and consumers.  
A vertically tiered system of measures to facilitate access to justice is necessary to respond 
to the different levels of trader wrongdoing that may be implicated in consumer disputes. 
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Consumer-trader disputes may arise because of trader ignorance of their obligations under 
the law. These disputes may be easily resolved through negotiation. At the other end of the 
spectrum rogue traders may have set out systematically to exploit consumers. Such traders 
may stubbornly refuse to negate with consumers who attempt to assert their legal rights. In 
these types of cases access to justice may only be secured by the intervention of regulators.  
Access to justice measures must be designed in response to the diverse needs of consumers 
and in particular the needs of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers. These are 
the consumers who may be least able to access information about and then take measures 
to enforce their rights under the ACL. Off the shelf support, information and advice services 
may simply fail to address the needs of those consumers who, for reasons such as age, 
geographical location, language barriers or disability, may be particularly vulnerable in 
consumer transactions.  
What follows is a summary of the measures commonly taken to promote access to justice in the 
consumer protection context, focusing on measures covering: 
• The form and content of legislation 
• Information and education 
• Assistance and advice 
• Alternative dispute resolution 
• Regulatory oversight and enforcement. 
This part also identifies considerations that should guide strategies to facilitate access to justice and 
innovative new measures from other jurisdictions that may be worthy of further consideration in the 
Australian context.  
Measures to facilitate access to justice: new initiatives  
 Australia [3
8.1] 

















No  No Yes 
(through 
the EU)  
[39.2] 
No 
2.21 The form of and content of legislation 
Consumer protection clearly promotes consumer access to justice by providing consumers with 
substantive legal right. The very form in which legislation is expressed may also have a role in promoting 
access to justice. When dealing with consumer protection, simple, clear legislation can have significant 
advantages in promoting access to justice over more complicated or ambitious schemes. Clear 
legislation is more likely to be used by consumers in themselves asserting their rights than legislation 
that requires the expertise of a lawyer to interpret and apply. Legislation may also contribute to access 
to justice by publicly affirming the value of consumer rights. 
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2.22 Information and education  
Information and education initiatives can assist consumers in making better purchasing decisions and in 
understanding their rights and obligations under the ACL. Thus, information and education strategies 
can promote access to justice by preventing disputes from arising in the first place and empowering 
consumers themselves to resolve any disputes that do arise.  
To be effective in promoting access to justice, information and education initiatives need to be properly 
targeted to reach a wide range of community groups not merely urban, online and middle class 
consumers. Proactive education strategies and use of a variety of different forms of media are likely to 
be important in ensuring that all consumers have the opportunity to benefit from these kinds of 
strategies.  
Some level of coordination between information and education providers would be useful to 
consumers, particularly in reducing the difficulties associated with information overload. For example, 
in the Canadian context, a Consumer Handbook collates consumer resources available to consumers in 
one source.  
It must also be recognised that the inherent limitations on the ability of all individuals to use 
information in informing their decision making mean that information and education initiatives must be 
complemented by other strategies in order genuinely to promote access to justice.  
2.23 Assistance and advice 
In the event that a dispute between a trader and its consumers cannot be resolved by private 
negotiation in the light of the ACL, legal assistance and advice is an important means of ensuring 
consumers are able to access justice and vindicate their legal rights. Once again advice services need to 
be carefully tailored to ensure that they cater for vulnerable, disadvantaged and otherwise marginalised 
consumers. 
In most jurisdictions legal aid will not be available for assisting consumers to pursue claims in court. This 
reality underlines the importance of relatively inexpensive and informal forums for dispute resolution 
and of active and engaged regulators. 
2.24 Alternative dispute resolution 
Informal and inexpensive opportunities for dispute resolution outside of courts, such as mediation, 
tribunals and ombudsman services, are important mechanisms for promoting access to justice. The 
challenge is to ensure that these forums remain responsive to the needs of consumers while still 
providing fair and consistent decisions that accord with the law enacted for the benefit of consumers in 
the ACL.  
Ombudsman services are widely used in Australia in particular industries, such as banking, insurance, 
telecommunications and energy. Generally, ombudsman services are an independent body funded by 
the relevant industry, which is required by legislation to provide ADR to its customers. The attractions of 
these services are that they provide low cost, non-legalistic and proactive dispute resolution that can 
reach a wide range of consumer groups. Australia might accordingly consider the introduction of a 
general Consumer Ombudsman, as recently initiated in the United Kingdom and in South Africa.  
One area where Australia lags behind some other countries in facilitating access to justice is in online 
dispute resolution. Online dispute resolution offers the opportunity for cost effective, consistent and 
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yet individualised resolution of consumer disputes. Australian regulators should monitor developments 
overseas with these types of initiatives, in particular the Online Civil Resolution Tribunal being trialled in 
British Columbia and the Online Dispute Resolution platform being introduced in the United Kingdom. 
The risk to be guarded against in these types of initiatives is perpetuating a digital divide between the 
consumers who have and do not have easy access to technology and the Internet.  
2.25 Regulatory oversight and enforcement 
Regulatory enforcement action promotes access to justice by pursuing cases that may not be justified or 
affordable from the perspective of individual consumers yet have a widespread impact on consumers. 
Enforcement action by regulators sends a clear message about the risks of non-compliance to the 
business sector and allows uncertain or controversial aspects of the law to be considered and developed 
by courts. Australian regulators haves shown a relatively coordinated and vigilant approach to 
enforcement and the national regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has set 
out a compelling and responsive set of enforcement priorities. The importance of regulatory oversight 
should not be overlooked in considering other, lower cost, methods of dispute resolution and access to 
justice measures. 
Any strategy that genuinely seeks to extend and protect access to justice to all consumer groups will 
require careful and coordinated planning by all stakeholders. A rigorous program of research and review 
is also important in ensuring that access to justice initiatives are both efficient and effective in achieving 
their objectives.  
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Part 3: Approaches to unconscionable or highly unfair 
trading practices  
Issue 1: Approaches to unconscionable or highly unfair trading practices  
(Professor Stephen Corones, Faculty of law, Queensland University of Technology)2 
The first issue for analysis is: 
• Approaches to unconscionable or highly unfair trading practices: 
– punitive fees included in contracts that exceed the cost base (e.g., regulating contract 
terms where transparency may not be enough); 
– the effectiveness of controls to limit pyramid schemes; and 
– the scope of unsolicited selling laws overseas and the approach to direct selling. 
3.1 Legislative approaches to regulating unconscionable or highly 
unfair trading practices 
There are a number of possible legislative approaches to regulate unconscionable or highly unfair 
trading practices. One approach is to prohibit specific types of conduct, which are defined 
(rule-based regulation). This approach has the advantage of clarity and certainty, but it also allows 
for unscrupulous traders to take advantage of consumers by devising trading practices that fall 
outside the definition of the banned practice. Another approach is to adopt a general prohibition 
expressed in terms of a standard of behaviour that is prohibited, such as ‘misleading conduct’, 
‘unconscionable conduct’, or ‘unfair terms’, sometimes referred to as safety-net regulation.3  Under 
this approach it is not necessary to fit the practice within a restrictively defined banned practice. 
Some jurisdictions adopt both general and specific approaches. The approach adopted in Australia is 
to provide for three general protections in the ACL, which are supplemented by more prescriptive 
protections in relation to specific conduct such as pyramid selling, door-to-door or unsolicited sales, 
and undue harassment or coercion. 
This part of the Comparative Analysis will consider first the policy objects and then the operative 
provisions of the consumer protection laws in Australia in relation to punitive fees, pyramid schemes 
and unsolicited selling. It will then consider the policy objects and the operative provisions adopted 
in the EU, UK, USA, Canada and Singapore in relation to punitive fees, pyramid schemes and 
unsolicited selling. The final part will identify any significant differences between the approaches 
adopted by Australia, and the comparator jurisdictions.  
                                                          
2  I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance provided by Juliet Davis in the preparation of Part 3. 
3  These objects derive from Recommendation 3.1 made by the Productivity Commission in its Review of Australia’s 
Consumer Policy Framework, Final Report (Canberra, 2008), 41-42. See also Jeannie Marie Paterson and Gerard 
Brody, ‘Safety Net Consumer Protection: Using Prohibitions on Unfair and Unconscionable Conduct to Respond to 
Predatory Business Models’ (2015) 38 Journal of Consumer Policy 331, 332-3. 
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3.2 General protections in Australia 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law, entered into by all the 
Australian Governments in 2009, adopted in its recitals the objects for the national consumer policy 
framework that gave rise to the ACL.4 They indicate what the Governments were seeking to achieve 
through the new law. 
Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law 
(2009) provides: 
The objective of the new national consumer policy framework is to improve consumer 
wellbeing through consumer empowerment and protection, to foster effective 
competition and to enable the confident participation of consumers in markets in which 
both consumers and suppliers trade fairly. 
This overarching object is supported by six operational objects: 
• to ensure that consumers are sufficiently well-informed to benefit from and stimulate effective 
competition; 
• to ensure that goods and services are safe and fit for the purposes for which they were sold; 
• to prevent practices that are unfair; 
• to meet the needs of those consumers who are most vulnerable or are at the greatest 
disadvantage; 
• to provide accessible and timely redress where consumer detriment has occurred; and 
• to promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement. 
The policy object actually prescribed for itself by the CCA is set out in s 2 of the Act. It provides: 
• the object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of 
competition and fair-trading and provision for consumer protection. 
In Australia, there are three general protections in the ACL and the ASIC Act that regulate 
unconscionable or highly unfair trading practices: 
• misleading conduct 
• unconscionable conduct  
• unfair terms. 
                                                          
4  These objects derive from Recommendation 3.1 made by the Productivity Commission in its Review of Australia’s 
Consumer Policy Framework, Final Report (Canberra, 2008), 41-42. See also Jeannie Marie Paterson and Gerard 
Brody, ‘Safety Net Consumer Protection: Using Prohibitions on Unfair and Unconscionable Conduct to Respond to 
Predatory Business Models’ (2015) 38 Journal of Consumer Policy 331, 332-3. 
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3.2.2 General protections in Australia — misleading conduct 
The first general protection is contained in s 18(1) of the ACL, which provides that: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
This prohibition does not substantively change compared to s 52(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth) (TPA), and the State and Territory equivalents in their Fair Trading Acts (FTA). The equivalent 
provision in the ASIC Act is s 12DA, which prohibits misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to 
financial products and financial services.  
In relation to s 52 of the TPA Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) 
Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd observed: 
… the evident purpose and policy underlying Pt V, which includes s 52, recommends a 
broad construction of its constituent provisions, the legislation being of a remedial 
character so that it should be construed so as to give the fullest relief which the fair 
meaning of its language will allow.5 
Their Honours also observed that s 52 imposes a ‘norm of conduct’,6 and the role of the courts was 
to apply it to a wide range of circumstances involving businesses as well as consumers. The policy 
object of s 52 of the TPA was to operate as a catch-all provision that could apply to objectionable 
conduct that might otherwise escape liability, on technical grounds, under the more specific 
provisions of the Act. 
In determining whether conduct is misleading or deceptive under s 18 of the ACL, an important 
consideration will be the nature of the audience at whom it was directed. Early in the history of s 52 
of the TPA it was held that conduct will be regarded as misleading or deceptive only if it misled or 
deceived (or is likely to mislead or deceive) reasonable members of that audience. 
In Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd, Gibbs CJ stated: 
Although it is true, as has often been said, that ordinarily a class of consumers may 
include the inexperienced as well as the experienced, and the gullible as well as the 
astute, the section must in my opinion by [sic] regarded as contemplating the effect of 
the conduct on reasonable members of the class. The heavy burdens, which the section 
creates, cannot have been intended to be imposed for the benefit of persons who fail to 
take reasonable care of their own interests.7 
These principles were confirmed by the High Court in Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike 
International Ltd: 
It is in these cases of representations to the public … that there enter the ‘ordinary’ or 
‘reasonable’ members of the class of prospective purchasers. Although a class of 
consumers may be expected to include a wide range of persons, in isolating the 
‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ members of that class, there is an objective attribution of 
certain characteristics.8 
                                                          
5  Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470, 503. 
6  Ibid 505. 
7  Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191, 199. See also Miller & Associates 
Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357, 371 [22] (French CJ and Kiefel J). 
8  Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45, 85 [102] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (citations omitted). 
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In Telstra Corp Ltd v Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd, Goldberg J thought that the ‘[t]he extremely stupid, 
and perhaps the gullible may well be excluded from the class’.9 The class does not include those who 
fail to take reasonable care of their own interests.10 Reasonable members of the class would take 
reasonable steps to look after their own interests.  
However, while s 18 of the ACL (and s 52 of the TPA) have been used to promote the interests of 
consumers by improving the conduct of businesses in relation to their advertising, selling practices 
and promotional activities generally, and by prohibiting them from engaging in sharp practices when 
dealing with individual consumers, their greatest use has been in connection with disputes of a 
commercial nature between competitors who are not consumers. In this regard s 52 the TPA was 
influenced by s 5 of the United States Federal Trade Commission Act and US law.11 
There is considerable scope for overlap between the specific protections under the ACL regulating 
punitive fees, pyramid schemes and unsolicited selling and the general protection for misleading 
conduct in s 18(1) of the ACL. 
3.2.3 General protections in Australia — unconscionable conduct 
In relation to unconscionable conduct, the policy object is to prevent practices that are unfair, and 
‘to meet the needs of those consumers who are most vulnerable or are at the greatest 
disadvantage’. The first interpretative principle inserted as part of the 2011 amendments recognises 
that it was Parliament’s intention that the protection provided by s 21 of the ACL is wider that the 
equitable concept of unconscionable conduct, just how much wider is a matter of considerable 
debate and uncertainty.12 
Since 1 January 2012, the following general protections apply in relation to unconscionable conduct: 
• ACL, s 20 is a general prohibition of unconscionable conduct within the meaning of the 
unwritten law (ASIC Act, s 12CA) 
• the news 21 unified the old sections 21 and 22 to create a single, general, prohibition of 
unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services (or 
possible supply or acquisition) other than to or from, respectively, a listed public company 
within the meaning found in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (statutory unconscionable 
conduct). It is designed to confer the same level of protection on consumers and businesses, 
except where the business is conducted through a listed public company. 
• the new s 22 sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be taken into account by a court 
in deciding whether s 21 has been contravened. This list replicates the list of 12 matters that 
previously applied under the old s 22 to transactions involving business consumers. 
                                                          
9  Telstra Corp Ltd v Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd [2001] FCA 1478, [23]. 
10  See Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45 at 85 [105]; Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v 
Valcorp Fine foods Pty Ltd  (2002) ATPR ¶41-856 (Lindgren J) [35]-[36]. 
11  See R M Dietrich, ‘Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection’(1973) 1 Australian Business Law Review 204 
and G Q Taperell, R B Vermeesch and D J Harland, Trade Practices and Consumer Protection (3rd ed, Butterworths, 
1983) at [1406], 604-5. 
12  See the first interpretative principle in ACL, s 21(4)(a). 
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3.2.4 Different interpretations of statutory unconscionable conduct 
Section 21(1) of the ACL provides: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with: 
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person (other than a listed public 
company); or 
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a person (other than a 
listed public company); 
(c) engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. 
Two lines of authority have developed around the interpretation of s 21 of the ACL. According to the 
first line of authority, statutory unconscionable conduct is targeted at commercial conduct involving 
a ‘high level of moral obloquy’, and the moral or normative standard for statutory unconscionable 
conduct is higher than unfairness.13 This line of authority is intended to strike a balance between 
certainty and flexibility, and to ensure that s 21 of the ACL is not allowed to be used by one party to 
undermine certainty and the sanctity of contract. This judicially imposed requirement of a ‘high level 
of moral obloquy’ has been applied in other cases of statutory unconscionable conduct.14 
According to the second line of authority, statutory unconscionable conduct does not necessarily 
require a ‘high level of moral obloquy’ and the statutory language needs to be given its ‘ordinary and 
natural interpretation’. In ACCC v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd, the Full Federal Court held that conduct is 
‘unconscionable’ for the purposes of s 21 of the ACL if it is ‘not done in good conscience’.15 Statutory 
unconscionable conduct is an evaluative standard to be understood by taking into account the 
values and norms that Parliament considered relevant when it identified the non-exhaustive list of 
factors in s 22 of the ACL, and s 12CC of the ASIC Act. 16 It is to be applied according to the particular 
context of the case by asking: what is the current moral or ethical standard in relation to the conduct 
at issue?  
The Full Federal Court in ACCC v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd stated: 
The task of the Court is the evaluation of the facts by reference to a normative standard 
of conscience. That normative standard is permeated with accepted and acceptable 
community values. In some contexts, such values are contestable. Here, however, they 
can be seen to be honesty and fairness in the dealing with consumers. The content of 
those values is not solely governed by the legislature, but the legislature may illuminate, 
elaborate and develop those norms and values by the act of legislating, and thus 
standard setting.17 
                                                          
13  Attorney General (NSW) v World Best Holdings Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 557, 583 [121] (Spigelman CJ). 
14  See CIT Credit Pty Ltd v Keable  [2006] NSWCA 130 (Spigelman CJ, with whom Giles JA and Gzell J agreed); Canon 
Australia Pty Ltd v Patton (2007) 244 ALR 759; Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Scully (No. 3) (2013) 303 ALR 
168 (Neave, Osborn and Santamaria JJA); DPN Solutions Pty Ltd v Tridant Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 511 (Hargrave J) and 
Sgargetta v National Australia Bank Limited [2014] VSCA 159 (Whelan and Santamaria JJA).  
15  See ACCC v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90, [41] (Allsop CJ, Jacobson and Gordon JJ). Leave to appeal to the 
High Court was refused. See [2014] HCASL 55.  
16  Ibid [23]; see also Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2015] FCAFC 50 [262] (Allsop CJ) in relation 
to statutory unconscionable conduct in s 12CB of the ASIC Act. 
17  ACCC v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90 [23]. 
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The two lines of authority as to the requirement of moral obloquy or moral tainting are difficult to 
reconcile and in the absence of legislative intervention the matter must ultimately be determined by 
the High Court. The High Court has granted special leave to hear an appeal from the decision of the 
Full Federal Court in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group,18 and the issue may be 
resolved in that appeal. 
In Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Allsop CJ provided a useful summary of the 
values and norms recognised by the statute that are relevant in evaluating business behaviour to 
determine whether it warrants the characterisation of unconscionable: 
The working through of what a modern Australian commercial, business or trade 
conscience contains and requires, in both consumer and business contexts, will take its 
inspiration and formative direction from the nation’s legal heritage in Equity and the 
common law, and from modern social and commercial legal values identified by 
Australian Parliaments and courts. … It is an evaluation which must be reasoned and 
enunciated by reference to the values and norms recognised by the text, structure and 
context of the legislation, and made against an assessment of all connected 
circumstances. The evaluation includes a recognition of the deep and abiding 
requirement of honesty in behaviour; a rejection of trickery or sharp practice; fairness 
when dealing with consumers; the central importance of the faithful performance of 
bargains and promises freely made; the protection of those whose vulnerability as to the 
protection of their own interests places them in a position that calls for a just legal 
system to respond for their protection, especially from those who would victimise, 
predate or take advantage; a recognition that inequality of bargaining power can (but not 
always) be used in a way that is contrary to fair dealing or conscience; the importance of 
a reasonable degree of certainty in commercial transactions; the reversibility of 
enrichments unjustly received; the importance of behaviour in a business and consumer 
context that exhibits good faith and fair dealing; and the conduct of an equitable and 
certain judicial system that is not a harbour for idiosyncratic or personal moral judgment 
and exercise of power and discretion based thereon.19 
3.2.5 General protections in Australia — unfair terms 
The third general protection in the ACL and the ASIC Act that regulates highly unfair trading practices 
concerns unfair terms in contracts. 
Unfair terms in contracts were previously regulated in Australia by Pt 2B of the Fair Trading Act 1999 
(Vic) which took effect in 2003. Attempts by the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs (MCCA) to 
devise national legislation along the lines of the Victorian model stalled when the Regulatory Impact 
Statement (RIS) did not meet the required standard providing only anecdotal evidence of detriment 
from the use of unfair terms.20 
In 2008 the Productivity Commission (PC) recommended that unfair terms should be regulated by 
the ACL.21 The PC acknowledged that the regulation of unfair terms by the unconscionable conduct 
provisions of the ACL was ‘costly, slow and uncertain’.22 Two principal rationales were advanced by 
the PC for such a scheme — one ethical and the other economic. The PC was of the view that such a 
                                                          
18  [2015] HCATrans 229. 
19  Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2015] FCAFC 50 [296]. 
20  See Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework (Final Report, 2008 Canberra), 
vol 2, 149. 
21  Ibid 168-169, Recommendation 7.1. 
22  Ibid 154. 
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scheme could be justified as an extension of ethical principles about fairness in contracts, the aim of 
the proposed law being to cover terms that appear to be manifestly unfair.23 The scheme could also 
be justified on economic grounds, in that markets do not operate efficiently on the basis of 
sub-optimal risk assessments by consumers.24 
The PC in its Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework expressed the view that the aim of 
the proposed law regulating unfair terms was only to cover terms that are manifestly unfair.25 The 
Productivity Commission was cognisant of the fact that ‘[w]hatever their immediate benefits, barring 
unfair contract terms is likely to have some adverse knock-on impacts for consumers through higher 
prices (or lower quality goods and services),’26 and that regulatory action should only take place 
where net benefits are likely.27 
Section 23 of the ACL provides: 
(1) A term of a consumer contract or small business contract is void if: 
(a) the term is unfair; and 
(b) the contract is a standard form contract. 
(2) The contract continues to bind the parties if it is capable of operating without the unfair 
term. 
(3) A consumer contract is a contract for: 
(a) a supply of goods or services; or 
(b)  a sale or grant of an interest in land; 
(c) to an individual whose acquisition of the goods, services or interests is wholly or 
predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. 
Section 23 was extended to small business contracts by the Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small 
Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 (Cth). The provisions apply to small business contracts 
entered into or amended or renewed after 12 November 2016. In the case of application to small 
businesses, one party to the contract must be a business within the definition contained in s 23(4) 
which provides: 
(4) A contract is a small business contract if: 
(a) the contract is for a supply of goods or services, or a sale or grant of an 
interest in land; and 
(b) at the time the contract is entered into, at least one party to the contract is a 
business that employs fewer than 20 persons; and 
(c) either of the following applies: 
(i) the upfront price payable under the contract does not exceed $300,000; 
(ii) the contract has a duration of more than 12 months and the upfront 
price payable under the contract does not exceed $1,000,000. 
                                                          
23  Ibid 151, 413-414. 
24  Ibid 151, 414-423. 
25  Ibid 151, 413-414. 
26  Ibid 155. 
27  Ibid 157. 
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In 2015, the general protection against unfair terms was extended to small business by the Treasury 
Legislation Amendment (Small Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 (Cth). The new law 
received Royal Assent on 12 November 2015 and takes effect 12 months after that date in order to 
allow businesses time to implement system changes and contract amendments to ensure 
compliance. The unfair terms prohibitions will only apply to small business contracts entered into or 
renewed, or terms of existing contracts that are varied, after 12 November 2016. 28 It will not apply 
to small business contracts entered into before this date. The object of the extending unfair contract 
term protections to small businesses is set out in the Decision Regulation Impact Statement: 
… to promote fairness in contractual dealings with small businesses with regard to 
standard form contracts. This will reduce small business detriment and have positive 
impacts on the broader economy by increasing small business certainty and confidence, 
and providing for a more efficient allocation of risk. Small businesses, in dealing with other 
businesses through standard form contracts, should have confidence that the contract 
they are offered is fair and reasonable and that the risks are allocated efficiently.29 
The test of what is ‘unfair’ is the same for consumers and small businesses. The test falls into four 
parts. The first part of the test requires the court to consider the term at issue itself.30 The second 
part of the test requires the court to consider contextual matters surrounding the formation of the 
contract containing the term.31 The third part of the test requires the court to consider whether the 
term was transparent.32 The fourth part of the test requires the court to consider the term at issue in 
the context of the contract as a whole.33 In determining whether each of the elements of unfairness 
is satisfied the court may be guided by the indicative ‘grey’ list in s 25 of the ACL.  
Section 24(1) of the ACL provides that a term of a consumer contract or small business contract will 
be ‘unfair’ if: 
(a) it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract; and 
(b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would 
be advantaged by the term; and 
(c) it would cause detriment (whether financial or otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or 
relied on. 
In ACCC v Chrisco Hampers Australia Limited,34 (‘Chrisco case’), the Federal Court had to consider 
whether the HeadStart term inserted by Chrisco Hampers Australia Ltd (‘Chrisco’) into its lay-by 
contracts with consumers was unfair within the meaning of s 24 of the ACL. The HeadStart term 
allowed Chrisco to continue to take payments by direct debit from the consumer’s bank account 
even after the consumer had made full payment for the lay-by order. The term would apply unless 
the consumer opted out of it. The money withdrawn from the consumer’s bank account would then 
be used for any future order made by the consumer. If the consumer did not place an order and 
requested a refund of the money paid, the money would be refunded without interest.  
                                                          
28  CCA s 290A. 
29  Consumer Affairs Australia and New Zealand, ‘Decision Regulation Impact Statement, Extending Unfair Contract Term 
Protections to Small Businesses’ (2015) 11. 
30  ACL s 24(1). 
31  ACL s 24(2). 
32  ACL s 24(2)(a). 
33  ACL s 24(2)(b). 
34  ACCC v Chrisco Hampers Australia Limited [2015] FCA 1204. 
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Edelman J said: 
The legislative concept of ‘unfairness’ in s 24, with elaboration through the three 
elements of unfairness, might be described as a guided form of open-ended legislation.35 
Each element of unfairness focuses on the term itself and appears to preclude consideration of any 
additional matters such as the circumstances surrounding its exercise, or the conduct of the parties 
during pre-contractual negotiations. While some contract terms may be intrinsically unfair in all 
circumstances, other terms may only be unfair when they are exercised in an inappropriate way. 
While s 24(1) appears to require that the assessment as to whether a particular term is unfair is to 
be made without consideration of the surrounding circumstances, s 24(2) provides that in 
determining whether a term of a consumer contract is unfair under s 24(1), a court may take into 
account ‘such matter that it thinks relevant’. This allows a court to consider the context in which the 
term was exercised, and may convert a term that is unobjectionable on its face into an unfair term. 
3.2.6 General protections in Australia — excluded terms 
Section 26 of the ACL provides: 
(1) Section 23 does not apply to a term of a consumer contract to the extent, but only to the 
extent, that the term: 
(a) defines the main subject matter of the contract; or 
(b) sets the upfront price payable under the contract; or 
(c) is a term required, or expressly permitted, by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a 
Territory. 
(2) The upfront price payable under a consumer contract is the consideration that: 
(a) is provided, or is to be provided, for the supply, sale or grant under the contract; and 
(b) is disclosed at or before the time the contract is entered into; 
(c) but does not include any other consideration that is contingent on the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of a particular event. 
As regards the meaning of the term ‘the main subject matter of the contract’, the Second 
Explanatory Memorandum states: 
The exclusion of terms that define the main subject matter of a consumer contract 
ensures that a party cannot challenge a term concerning the basis for the existence of 
the contract. 
Where a party has decided to purchase the goods, services, land, financial services or 
financial products that are the subject of the contract, that party cannot then challenge 
the fairness of a term relating to the main subject matter of the contract at a later stage, 
given that the party had a choice of whether or not to make the purchase on the basis of 
what was offered. 
The main subject matter of the contract may include the decision to purchase a 
particular type of good, service, financial service or financial product, or a particular piece 
of land. It may also encompass a term that is necessary to give effect to the supply or 
grant, or without which, the supply or grant could not occur.36 
                                                          
35  Ibid [40].  
36  Second Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010, 
[5.59]-[5.61]. 
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Section 26(1)(a) implies that a distinction can be drawn between terms that define the main subject 
matter of the contract and incidental or ancillary terms. If a term relates to the main subject matter 
it is excluded from consideration under s 23(1) of the ACL. If a term relates to incidental subject 
matter it may be assessed under s 23(1) of the ACL. 
The Productivity Commission in its Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework gave the 
following reasons for excluding terms setting the upfront price from the unfair terms law: 
The argument for exclusion rests on the fact that prices are clearly visible to consumers 
and, unlike many other terms, cannot legitimately be seen as surprises veiled by a 
complex contract. Unless there are major barriers to effective competition, consumers 
can elect to avoid contracts with unfair prices. And where there are such barriers, 
competition policy is the more appropriate vehicle for achieving efficient prices rather 
than the discretionary use of unfair contracts law to impose de facto price controls.37 
As regards the meaning of the term ‘the upfront price’, the Second Explanatory Memorandum 
states: 
The upfront price payable under a consumer contract is consideration that is: 
• provided, or is to be provided, for the supply, sale or grant under the contract; and 
• is disclosed at or before the time the contract is entered into, but does not include any 
other consideration that is contingent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of a 
particular event.38 
The exclusion of ‘any other consideration that is contingent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of 
a particular event’ from the term ‘upfront price’ would mean that the following provisions will be 
subject to scrutiny under the unfair terms provision of the ACL: 
• a term providing that additional amounts are payable in the event of default or untimely 
payment;39 
• a term providing for early termination fees;40 
• a term providing for capitalisation of interest;41 and 
• a term providing for a unilateral power to vary the upfront price payable under the contract.42 
A price escalation clause may be assessed for unfairness. It is included in one of the examples of 
terms included in the grey list that may be unfair depending on the particular circumstances.43 Such 
a clause may be unfair because it allows the price to increase without giving the consumer or small 
business the right to terminate the contract. Whether it is unfair in the circumstances will depend on 
the size of the increase. It may be that a small increase is not unfair. 
                                                          
37  Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework (Final Report, 2008 Canberra) vol 2, 
161-2. 
38  Second Explanatory Memorandum [5.62]. 
39  Andrews v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd  (2011) 288 ALR 611. 
40  See ASIC, Early Termination Fees for Residential Loans: Unconscionable Fees and Unfair Contract Terms, Regulatory 
Guide 220 (2010). 
41  PSAL Ltd v Kellas-Sharpe  [2012] QSC 31. 
42  Jeannie Marie Paterson, Unfair Contract Terms in Australia (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2012) 47-48 [4.130]-[4.170]. 
43  ACL s 25(1)(f). 
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3.3 Punitive fees in contracts 
3.3.1 Australia 
Punitive fees included in contracts that exceed their cost base, are sometimes referred to as 
‘exploitative pricing’, ‘monopolistic price setting’ or ‘unethical overcharging’. They may be charged 
as the upfront price payable for goods or services. They may also be charged as default fees which 
are contingent on the performance of some act of default on the part of the consumer, or 
termination fees, in which case they do not from part of the upfront price. Under the CCA there are 
no specific prohibitions against punitive fees, although the Competition and Consumer Amendment 
(Payment Surcharges) Act 2015, establishes a legislative and regulatory framework to ban surcharges 
imposed in respect of particular payment methods that exceed the cost of acceptance for those 
payment methods. 
The inclusion of punitive fees in contracts may be associated with other misleading conduct, or 
unconscionable conduct. There are also specific provisions that prohibit false or misleading 
representations in relation to the supply of goods or services.  
3.3.2 Application of statutory unconscionable conduct to punitive fees  
In deciding whether the inclusion of punitive fees in contracts constitutes statutory unconscionable 
conduct the courts have taken into account the size of the disparity between the level of fees and 
the costs that would be sustained by the fee events. In PSAL Limited v Kellas-Sharpe,44 Applegarth J 
was required to decide whether the capitalisation of interest over an 18-month period on a 
short-term loan of 2-months contravened s 12CC of the ASIC Act and s 51AC of the TPA. It was 
argued by the defendants that the provisions of the contract went beyond what was reasonably 
necessary to protect PSAL’s legitimate interests, because PSAL had been provided with substantial 
security for the loan. 
Applegarth J was not persuaded that the 7.5% standard rate that applied when the loan went into 
default was an exorbitant rate, having regard to PSAL’s potential loss on a defaulting loan. An 
interest rate of 7.5% was consistent with commercial rates at the time and was not shown to be 
unreasonable considering the costs and losses that result from default.45 However, the election by 
the lender to capitalise the interest on a monthly basis was unconscionable. Applegarth J stated:  
I do not find that the rate of interest of 7.5 per cent per month was unconscionable for 
the original term of the loan, and it would not have been unjust for that higher or default 
rate to be charged for a period of a few months during which time the borrowers were 
given a reasonable opportunity to refinance. However, continuing to charge that rate of 
interest, capitalised monthly, for the long period during which interest was charged at 
the default rate was unconscionable in circumstances in which costs associated with the 
default were added to the loan balance and attracted interest at that rate. By mid-2010 
the loan had ceased to be a short term loan and the capitalisation of interest at such a 
high rate imperilled any prospect that the borrowers had of being able to pay out the 
loan balance. To continue to capitalise interest at such a rate for a period of months and 
years is irreconcilable with what is right and reasonable.46 
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45  Ibid [103]. 
46  Ibid [115]. 
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However, in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group,47 Allsop CJ stated that the fact 
that a fee is extravagant or exorbitant relative to the cost of the fee event: 
… does not necessarily lead to a conclusion of statutory unconscionability … Their 
characterisation as the product of unconscionable conduct would depend upon the 
broader considerations of the statute. The question might be seen to be whether … the 
conduct was the imposition of an oppressive burden on a weaker party by the 
unconscientious use of power by a stronger party.48 
The Full Federal Court confirmed the decision of the primary judge, Gordon J, that ANZ’s late 
payment fees were not unconscionable within the meaning of s 12CB of the ASIC Act. The Court 
would not intervene solely on the basis that ANZ’s late payment fees were said to be too high unless 
there were other indicators that demonstrated ‘… the imposition of an oppressive burden on a 
weaker party by the unconscientious use of power by a stronger party’.49 There was evidence that 
other banks charged similar fees to the ANZ bank. Equivalent financial services were available from 
other financial institutions (banks and non-banks).50 ANZ’s customers had a choice and could move 
to other financial institutions if they thought ANZ’s fees were too high. ANZ’s fees could not be seen 
as ‘a form of predation on the weak or poor’.51 
In Australia, a fee that is extravagant or exorbitant does not breach the statutory unconscionable 
conduct provisions s 21 of the ACL or s 12 CB of the ASIC Act by that fact alone. There must be 
additional evidence of other conduct such as: ‘predation on the weak or the poor’; ‘real vulnerability 
requiring protection’; financial or personal compulsion or pressure’; or ‘secrecy, trickery or 
dishonesty’.52  
3.3.3 Application of unfair terms to punitive fees in contracts 
Section 26 of the ACL excludes from consideration as an unfair term, a term that sets the upfront 
price payable under the contract. Section 25(1)(c) includes in the indicative grey list of terms that 
may be unfair ‘a term that penalises, or has the effect of penalising, one party (but not another 
party) for a breach or termination of the contract’. 
According to Paterson: 
Default fees are contingent on an act of the consumer (default) and, accordingly… would 
not be included in the category of exempted terms that set the upfront price and would 
therefore be subject to review for unfairness under the [ACL].53 
Similarly, termination fees which impose a fee if the contract is terminated early do not set the 
upfront price and would also be subject to review for unfairness under the ACL.54 
                                                          
47  Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2015] FCAFC 50. 
48  Ibid [341]. 
49  Ibid [342]. 
50  Ibid [343]. 
51  Ibid [345]. 
52  Ibid [347]. 
53  Jeannie Marie Paterson, Unfair Contract Terms in Australia (Lawbook Co, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2012) 47 [4.130]. 
54  Ibid 48 [4.160]. 
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3.3.4 Competition and Consumer Amendment (Payment Surcharges) Act 
2015 
On 22 February 2016, Parliament passed the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Payment 
Surcharges) Bill 2015, and upon receiving royal assent will establish a legislative and regulatory 
framework to ban surcharges imposed in respect of particular payment methods that exceed the 
cost of acceptance for those payment methods. It is stated in the Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying the Bill that: 
The amendments contained in this Bill will enhance transparency for consumers and 
improve price signals on payment method costs, helping consumers to understand the 
costs of competing payment methods and encouraging the use of the most efficient 
pricing methods.55 
The Act inserts a new Pt IVC into the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). It does not form 
part of the ACL. 
Section 55 of the Act states that the object of the new Pt IVC is: 
… to ensure that payment surcharges: 
(a) are not excessive; and 
(b) reflect the cost of using the payment methods for which they are charged. 
A ‘payment surcharge’ is defined broadly in s 55A to mean: 
(a) an amount charged, in addition to the price of goods or services, for processing payment for the 
goods or services; or 
(b) an amount (however described) charged for using one payment method rather than another. 
Section 55B(1) provides that: 
A corporation must not, in trade or commerce, charge a payment surcharge that is 
excessive.  
Whether a charge is excessive will be determined by reference to a standard to be published by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia or the regulations. Section 55B(2) provides that a payment surcharge is 
‘excessive’ if: 
(a) the surcharge is for a kind payment covered by: 
(i) a Reserve Bank standard; or 
(ii) regulations made for the purposes of this subparagraph; and 
(a) the amount of the surcharge exceeds the permitted surcharge referred to in the Reserve 
Bank standard or the regulations. 
The relevant payments covered are likely to be payments made by the MasterCard, VISA, and 
American Express Card Scheme systems, and designated debit card systems such as EFTPOS.  
                                                          
55  Explanatory Memorandum, Competition and Consumer Amendment (Payment Surcharges) Bill 2015 [1.9]. 
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Section 55G provides that if the ACCC has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has 
contravened s 55B, it may issue an infringement notice. The penalty will be $108,000 (600 penalty 
units) for a listed corporation, or $10,800 (60 penalty units) for a body corporate other than a listed 
corporation, or $2,160 (12 penalty units) for a person not being a body corporate. If the merchant 
fails to pay the penalty the ACCC is likely to bring proceedings for the imposition of a penalty under 
s 76 of the CCA. Civil remedies, such as damages and injunctions, will also be available for a 
contravention of s 55B(1). 
3.3.5 European Union 
3.3.5.1 Introduction 
The consumer policy framework in the European Union with regard to the inclusion of punitive fees 
in contracts is to provide for a general protection and a number of industry-specific protections. The 
inclusion of punitive fees in contracts is governed by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
(UCPD), adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in 2005, and, 
more specifically, by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCCD), adopted in 1993.  
The UTCCD is protective legislation, which seeks to safeguard consumers against abuses of power by 
traders or suppliers, notably with regard to ‘one-sided standard contracts and the unfair exclusion of 
essential rights in contracts’.56 The drafters considered that the adoption of uniform legislation 
regarding unfair terms in consumer contracts would provide ‘more effective’ consumer protection 
and facilitate the creation of the internal European market.57 
The central aim of the UCPD is to promote the proper function of the internal market and to provide 
a ‘high level of consumer protection’ against the economic harm caused by unfair commercial 
practices.58 Marked differences in the laws of the Member States regarding unfair commercial 
practices was seen as causing uncertainty regarding cross border activities, increasing business costs 
and undermining confidence in the internal market.59 The UCPD was intended to provide 
harmonised rules, which, amongst other things, established a general prohibition on unfair 
commercial practices affecting consumers and for the first time at Community level, regulate 
aggressive commercial practices.60  
Financial services fall within the scope of the UCPD. Prior to the adoption of the UCPD, the 
Commission Staff Working Paper on Retail Financial Services of 22 September 2009 detailed a 
number of problematic practices taking place in the financial sector, including non-transparent bank 
fees and insufficient pre-contractual information.61 Such anti-consumer actions/omissions were 
intended to be dealt with by the UCPD under the provisions prohibiting misleading commercial 
practices.62 
The implementation choices made by Member States regarding the Directives are largely dependent 
on whether laws regulating unfair commercial practices already existed in the Member States. With 
regard to the UCPD for instance, some Member States adopted new national laws which transposed 
the UCPD practically verbatim (UK, Portugal, Romania, Hungary, Cyprus, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
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Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania and Greece) whilst others incorporated it into 
existing legislation: consumer codes (France, Italy, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Malta), civil codes (the 
Netherlands), acts against unfair competition (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Spain) or specific existing 
laws (Belgium, Finland and Sweden).63 
3.3.6 General protection — punitive fees  
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) regulates punitive fees under its ‘unfair 
commercial practice’ doctrine. ‘Unfair commercial practices’ between businesses and consumers are 
prohibited under the UCPD.64  
The UCPD is limited to business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. Business-to-business transactions 
(B2B) have been excluded from the Directive. Recital 6 of the Directive states that the UCPD does 
not cover unfair commercial practices which harm only competitor’s economic interests or 
transactions between traders. 
The test for determining whether a practice constitutes an ‘unfair commercial practice’ under art 5 
of the UCPD is multi-layered. Article 5(2) provides that a commercial practice will be unfair if:  
• it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, 
and 
• it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the 
product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of the average 
member of the group when a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of 
consumers.65 
Article 2(h) defines professional diligence as ‘the standard of special skill and care which a trader 
may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market 
practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity’. According to 
Abbamonte:  
The concept of professional diligence is broader than subjective good faith since it 
encompasses not only honesty but also competence on the part of the trader. For 
example, the behaviour of an honest but incompetent antique dealer who sells fakes, 
believing them to be originals, would not be inconformity with the requirements of 
professional diligence … Professionals are expected to comply with good standards of 
conduct and approved practices. It is a measure of diligence above that of an ordinary 
person or non-specialist.66 
The phrase ‘to materially distort the economic behaviour of consumers’ is defined in Article 2(e) to 
mean: ‘using a commercial practice to appreciably impair the consumer’s ability to make an 
informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to make a transactional decision that he would not 
have taken otherwise’. This requirement tests whether the practice is likely to cause market failure 
by distorting consumer preference or freedom of choice.67 
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Where an identifiable group of consumers is especially vulnerable to a commercial practice due to 
their age, credulity, or infirmity, in a way, which was reasonably foreseeable to a trader, an 
assessment of the fairness/unfairness of the commercial practice will be taken from the perspective 
of an average member of that group.68  
The second test of unfairness, found in art 5(4), states that a commercial practice will be unfair if 
found to be:  
(a) misleading as set out in Articles 6 and 7, 
or 
(b) aggressive as set out in Articles 8 and 9.69 
The provisions on misleading or aggressive practices make no reference to the concept of 
professional diligence because misleading consumers or being aggressive towards them is 
considered to be contrary to professional diligence. The test of professional diligence only has to be 
satisfied under the general prohibition. 
The first limb of the second test, misleading commercial practices, is most relevant with respect to 
punitive fees. Article 6(1) of the UCPD relevantly considers a commercial practice to be misleading if 
it contains false information, or deceives/is likely to deceive the average consumer, regarding certain 
elements, which causes/likely causes the consumer to make a transactional decision that they would 
not otherwise make.70 Deception can still be found to occur even where the information provided is 
factually correct, including in respect of the product or service’s overall presentation.71 A misleading 
commercial practice may be found in situations where deceptive information is given concerning the 
following elements for example: the product’s nature or existence,72 the main characteristics of the 
product including its benefits and risks,73 and the product’s price or method of price calculation.74 It 
is also misleading under the Directive to omit ‘material information that the average consumer 
needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is 
likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken 
otherwise’.75 Examples of such material information include: the main features of the product76 and 
the price of the product inclusive of taxes or the means of price calculation.77 A misleading omission 
will also occur where a trader hides material information or provides it in an unintelligible, unclear, 
untimely or ambiguous manner.78  
Article 5(5) puts forward a third means by which a commercial practice may be found to be unfair: a 
‘blacklist’, found in Annex I, of commercial practices which are to be considered unfair in all 
circumstances. This list is to be applied by all Member States without modification.79 There are no 
specific practices contained in Annex I that pertain to the inclusion of punitive fees in contracts.  
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However, unlike Australia’s misleading conduct provision in s 18 of the ACL (and s 52 of the TPA) 
remedies are only available in relation to business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions, not 
business-to-business transactions (B2B).  
Member States have some limited flexibility in the choice of means by which they enforce the 
provisions of the UCPD, provided that those means are ‘adequate and effective’ in combating unfair 
commercial practices. However, it is prescribed that one of these means must include legislation 
under which persons or organisations, regarded under the Member State’s national law as having a 
‘legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practice, including competitors’, may take legal 
action and/or bring the matter before a competent administrative authority to either initiate legal 
action or decide complaints.80 
3.3.7 Specific protection — punitive fees 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCCD) provides specific direction on how 
Member States should define and counteract unfair terms in consumer contracts. The Directive puts 
forward both general and specific tests to determine whether a contractual term is unfair.  
Article 3 provides that a term that has not been negotiated individually will be determined to be 
unfair ‘if contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment to the consumer’.81 
Article 3(3) further provides a ‘grey list’, found in the Annex to the Directive, which contains ‘an 
indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair’.82 Regarding the 
inclusion of punitive fees in contracts, the ‘grey list’ relevantly contains contractual terms, which 
have the object or effect of ‘requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in compensation’.83  
Article 4 states that a contractual term’s unfairness is to be assessed by ‘taking into account the 
nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to 
all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent’.84 Terms relating 
to the definition of the contract’s main subject matter, or the actual price of the goods and services, 
are not subject to assessment on unfairness grounds provided that they are in plain and intelligible 
language.85 
The Directive obliges Member States to prescribe in their national law that unfair terms used in a 
consumer contract by a supplier or seller will not be binding on the consumer.86 Additionally, 
Member States will put in ‘adequate and effective’ measures to prevent the ongoing use of unfair 
terms in consumer contracts.87 Such measures must include legal provisions that allow a person or 
organisation with a legitimate interest in consumer protection, to seek a decision before a court or 
competent authority as to whether a standard contractual term is fair.88  
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3.4 United Kingdom 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The consumer policy framework in the United Kingdom with regard to the inclusion of punitive fees 
in contracts is to provide for a general protection and specific protections. The inclusion of punitive 
fees in contracts is governed by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
(‘CPR’) and, more specifically, by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Consumer Rights (Payment 
Surcharges) Regulations 2012. 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive of the European Parliament and Council (UCPD) was 
enacted as a law of the United Kingdom, by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 (CPR). The CPR came into force in 2008.89 The central aim of the UCPD is to 
promote the proper function of the internal market and to provide a ‘high level of consumer 
protection’ against the economic harm caused by unfair commercial practices.90 The UK government 
declared its support for the UCPD on the basis that the Directive would improve consumer 
protection and foster cross-border trade. In particular, the legislature referred to research 
conducted by the Office of Fair Trading in 2001 which indicated that consumer detriment caused by 
defective goods, poor information and inadequate redress, constituted over £8 billion a year, and 
that low-income consumers suffered disproportionate welfare loss as a result of unfair consumer 
practices.  
Whilst legislators recognised that these problematic commercial practices were already the subject 
of existing UK legislation, it was considered that the principles-based approach and broad scope of 
the UCPD would improve enforcers’ ability to act effectively.91 The CPR transposed the provisions of 
the UCPD into UK law almost verbatim. In order to avoid duplication and simplify the UK’s consumer 
protection legislative framework, 23 consumer protection laws were either partially or wholly 
repealed by the CPR.92  
The Consumer Rights Act (‘CRA’) was enacted in 2015 for the purpose of protecting the rights and 
interests of consumers and enforcing the regulation of traders.93 In doing so, the legislature sought 
to resolve the overly complex nature of consumer law in the UK, which had developed in a 
piecemeal manner by way of court decisions, UK legislation and EU directives. By consolidating UK 
consumer legislation, drafters sought to: clarify the law by removing inconsistencies and 
discrepancies and using more plain English, improve awareness of the rights, obligations and 
remedies of consumers and traders, enhance flexibility and assist business growth.94 Amongst 
others, the CRA implements, or replaces earlier UK legislation which implemented, the Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.95 
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3.4.2 General protection — punitive fees 
The CPR regulates the inclusion of punitive fees in contracts under the prohibition of ‘unfair 
commercial practice’.96 The test for determining whether a practice constitutes an ‘unfair 
commercial practice’ pursuant to regulation 3 is multi-layered. The first general test for unfair 
commercial practice states that a commercial practice will be determined to be unfair if it:   
• contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and 
• materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average 
consumer with regard to the product.97 
Where an identifiable group of consumers is especially vulnerable to a commercial practice due to 
their age, credulity, or infirmity, in a way which was reasonably foreseeable to a trader, and where 
the practice is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of only that group, reference to 
‘the average consumer’ is to be taken to refer to the average member of that group.98 
The second test of unfairness, also found in r 3, states that a commercial practice will be unfair if 
found to be:  
• a misleading action under r 5; 
• a misleading omission under r 6; or 
• aggressive under r 7.99 
The prohibition of misleading actions and omissions is of particular relevance with respect to the 
inclusion of punitive fees in contracts. Regulation 5(1) of the CPR relevantly considers a commercial 
practice to be misleading if it contains false information, or deceives/is likely to deceive the average 
consumer, regarding certain matters, which causes/likely causes the consumer to make a 
transactional decision that they would not otherwise make.100 Deception can still be found to occur 
even where the information provided is factually correct, including in respect of the product or 
service’s overall presentation.101 A misleading commercial practice may be found in situations where 
deceptive information is given concerning certain matters including: the product’s nature or 
existence,102 the main characteristics of the product including its benefits and risks103 and the 
product’s’ price or method of price calculation.104 
It is also misleading under the CPR to omit ‘material information that the average consumer needs, 
according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely 
to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken 
otherwise.105 Examples of such material information include: the main features of the product106and 
the price of the product inclusive of taxes or the means of price calculation.107 A misleading omission 
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will also occur where a trader hides material information or provides it in an unintelligible, unclear, 
untimely or ambiguous manner.108 
Regulation 3(4)(d) puts forward a third means by which a commercial practice may be found to be 
unfair: a ‘blacklist’, found in Schedule I, of specific commercial practices which are to be considered 
unfair in all circumstances. There are no specific ‘blacklisted’ practices contained in Schedule I that 
pertain to the inclusion of punitive fees in contracts. 
A trader is guilty of an offence if they engage in an unfair commercial practice as determined by the 
CPR.109 Upon being found guilty of engaging in an unfair commercial practice, a trader is liable, on 
summary conviction, to be fined, and on indictment, to be fined and/or imprisoned for a maximum 
of two years.110 
In 2014, the CPR were amended to include a consumer right to civil redress, in circumstances where, 
amongst other things: 
(a) the consumer entered into a contract with the trader for the supply or sale of a product; and 
(b) the trader engaged in misleading action under r 5 or is aggressive under r 7.111  
This consumer right to civil redress includes the right to: 
1. unwind a consumer contract if the consumer communicates to the trader that they reject the 
product within 90 days of the contract being signed, or the goods being delivered amongst 
other things, whichever is the later. At the time of rejection, the product must not be fully 
consumed.112 
2. receive a percentage discount on a consumer contract if the contract has not been rejected and 
there are still payments owing on the contract, where the percentage reduction is determined 
by having regard to the seriousness of the prohibited practice;113 
3. receive damages if the consumer has incurred financial loss, or suffered distress, alarm or 
physical discomfort or inconvenience, that they would not have incurred or suffered if the 
relevant prohibited practice had not occurred.114  
3.4.3 Specific protection — punitive fees 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (‘CRA’) provides consumers with statutory protection against unfair 
terms. Section 62 provides that an unfair term is not binding on a consumer. 115A term will be 
determined to be unfair ‘if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the 
consumer’.116 Section 62 further states that a contractual term’s unfairness is to be assessed by 
taking into account the contract’s subject matter, the other terms of the contract and all of the 
existing circumstances at the time.117 Terms relating to the definition of the contract’s main subject 
matter, or the actual price of the goods and services, are not subject to assessment on unfairness 
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grounds provided that they are in plain and intelligible language.118 This exception does not however 
apply to the ‘grey list’ terms contained in Part 1 of Schedule 2.119 
Section 63 provides for a ‘grey list’, found in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the CRA, which contains ‘an 
indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms of consumer contracts that may be regarded as unfair’.120 
Regarding the inclusion of punitive fees in contracts, the ‘grey list’ relevantly contains ‘a term which 
has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract 
to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation’.121 
The Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012 came into force on 6 April 2013 
implementing article 19 of the EU Directive on Consumer Rights. 122The Payment Surcharges 
Regulation makes it an offence for a trader to charge consumers any payment or fees that exceed 
the cost borne by the trader for the use of that good or service.123 While the language in regulation 4 
is drafted quite broadly, the explanatory notes to this regulation indicate that its main focus is on 
surcharges relating to particular payment methods rather than surcharges generally. Surcharges in 
breach of the regulation are unenforceable.124 
3.5 United States 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The consumer policy framework in the United States with regard to the inclusion of punitive fees in 
contracts to provide for a general protection and a number of industry-specific protections. General 
protection is provided by the Federal Trade Commission Act (‘FTC Act’), which prohibits ‘unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’. As banks, savings and loan institutions, and 
Federal credit unions are exempted under the FTC Act, other specific federal acts, such as the Truth 
in Lending Act, the Truth in Savings Act, and Title 15 of the US Code, regulate the financial industry 
with respect to the inclusion of punitive fees in contracts. In addition, certain industries, such as civil 
aviation, are subject to specific codes, which refer to punitive fees.  
The FTC Act125 was enacted in 1914 to end the deceptive, unfair, and anticompetitive behaviours of 
monopolistic corporations.126 The Truth in Lending Act, implemented by Regulation Z, is intended to 
protect consumers from unfair and inaccurate credit card and credit billing practices and to enable 
consumers to make informed decisions with respect to loan products.127 The Truth in Savings Act, 
implemented by Regulation DD, requires depository institutions to make uniform disclosures 
regarding their products to allow consumers to make informed decisions.128  US Code provisions 
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s 1639b and 1639c, in Title 15, aim to ensure that consumers are offered residential mortgages that 
are comprehensive and not deceptive, unfair or abusive, thus enhancing economic stabilisation.129 
3.5.2 General protection — punitive fees 
The FTC Act relevantly declares unlawful ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce’ and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent persons from using such 
acts or practices.130 Depending on the circumstances, the imposition of punitive fees may be 
regarded as deceptive or unfair for the purposes of the FTC Act. 
According to the three-limb test set out in the FTC’s 1983 Policy Statement on Deception, an act or 
practice is deceptive if it involves:  
(1) ‘a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer’; 
(2) ‘a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances’; and  
(3) the representation, omission, or practice is material to the consumer’s choice of or conduct 
regarding a product or services.131 
Under the first limb of this test, the FTC must consider whether the act or practice was ‘likely to 
mislead’ the consumer. This element can be met where a company is found to have undertaken a 
deceptive act or practice; actual consumer harm does not have to take place. The second limb 
requires the FTC to consider the act or practice from a reasonable consumer’s perspective. In 
considering the ‘reasonableness’ of the ordinary consumer’s reaction, the FTC will consider, amongst 
other things, the clarity of the representation, whether qualifying information is conspicuous, the 
importance of any omitted information (and whether such information is available elsewhere), and 
the familiarity of the public with the product or service. If a particular consumer group is targeted, 
such as the elderly or children, the FTC will take the perspective ‘of an ordinary, reasonable member 
of that group’. Thirdly, the FTC must determine whether the deceptive representation, omission, or 
practice was ‘material’. The FTC considers a misrepresentation or practice to be ‘material’ if it is 
‘one, which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding a product’.132  
The test for ‘unfairness’ under the FTC Act was first expressed in the 1980 Policy Statement on 
Unfairness and later codified into the FTC Act in 1994 as 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).133  
An act or practice will be considered by the Commission to be unfair if: 
(1) it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers  
(2) that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition and  
(3) that cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers. 
The first limb, the likelihood of substantial injury, is also the most important. This factor will usually 
be satisfied by a finding that financial harm was suffered by the consumer; it may also be sufficient 
to show that a large number of consumers each suffered a small amount of harm. The second limb 
of the unfairness test expresses the Commission’s understanding that the provision or omission of 
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product information involves balancing the costs and benefits to sellers and consumers. Thirdly, the 
unfairness test requires that the injury could not have been avoided by consumers acting 
reasonably. The Commission considers the market to be self-correcting and believes that consumers 
can generally be relied upon to make their own decisions effectively without regulatory 
assistance.134 The Commission will however intervene when ‘certain types of sales techniques … 
prevent consumers from effectively making their own decisions’.135 
The Commission enforces its consumer protection authority by way of both administrative and 
judicial processes136 and is allowed to seek a number of equitable remedies including restitution or 
redress for consumers, injunctive relief, and a freezing of assets.  
3.5.3 Financial regulation 
The rules pertaining to penalty rates in the financial services industry appear to be largely regulated 
with respect to specific financial instruments. With regards to residential mortgage loans, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authority to prohibit or regulate terms, practices or acts 
that the Bureau considers deceptive, unfair or predatory.137 Disclosure requirements are employed, 
including that the term ‘finance charge’ must be disclosed more clearly and conspicuously than 
other terms or data provided as part of the transaction.138 Additionally, a residential mortgage loan 
generally must not contain terms requiring the payment of a pre-payment penalty when a consumer 
pays all or part of the principal after the consummation of the loan.139 Where such a term is allowed 
for certain residential mortgage loan products, a creditor must not offer a product with pre-payment 
penalty terms without also offering the consumer a product which does not contain such a terms.140  
The Truth in Lending Act, which is implemented by Regulation Z, provides that the dollar amount of a 
penalty fee imposed on credit card holders in respect of a violation must represent ‘a reasonable 
proportion of the total costs incurred by the card issuer as a result of that type of violation’.141 
Accordingly, a card issuer must not impose a penalty fee when there is no dollar amount loss 
connected to the violation, such as account inactivity or the closure of an account.142 An issuer is 
also required to obtain the express consent of the consumer before the issuer can impose an 
overdraft fee for allowing an extension of credit, which exceeds the consumer’s credit limit.143  
Similarly, the Truth in Savings Act, which is implemented by Regulation DD, imposes a number of 
disclosure requirements concerning the imposition of fees, including that fees must be disclosed in 
periodic disclosure statements144 and that overdraft services require additional disclosure regarding 
fees.145 
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3.5.4 Industry Specific Regulation 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Regulations provides that it is an unfair and deceptive 
practice within the meaning of 49 US Code 41712 for an air carrier, foreign air carrier or ticket agent 
to fail to disclose fees for ‘optional services’ and baggage fees.146 Provision 49 CFR 41712, which 
deals with aviation programs, states that the Secretary of Transportation will order an air carrier, 
foreign air carrier or ticket agent to stop a practice or method that it considers to an unfair or 




The regulation of punitive fees in contracts by way of general consumer legislation appears to occur 
at the province and territory-level. As such, federal laws, which deal with punitive fees in contracts, 
tend to focus on specific industries, such as the banking and aviation sectors.  
The Bank Act, enacted in 1991, is intended to provide a legislative framework which allows banks to 
compete productively and remain resilient in a dynamic marketplace, whilst taking into account the 
interests and rights of consumers of banking services and providing clear and comprehensive 
national standards, thus contributing to the strength of the national economy.149 The Cost of 
Borrowing (Banks) Regulations were enacted pursuant to the Bank Act in 2001. The Canada 
Transportation Act, enacted in 1996, deals with unfair or unreasonable fees and penalties with 
respect to air transportation as part of its regulation of the transportation industry. 
3.6.2 Banking Industry 
The Bank Act puts forward a number of disclosure requirements with respect to borrowing. A bank 
must not make a loan to a natural person unless the cost of borrowing, which has been calculated 
pursuant to the Act, is disclosed to the borrower in a written disclosure statement.150 Additionally, a 
bank must disclose to the borrower whether they have a right to pre-pay the loan before its maturity 
date and whether, in the event that the borrower exercises this right, they will be subject to a 
pre-payment penalty, and how this penalty is to be calculated.151 The bank must also disclose to the 
borrower the existence of any charges or penalties for a failure to pay, or late payment of, the 
loan.152 Where a bank issues a credit card to a natural person, it must disclose, amongst other things, 
the costs of borrowing and the applicability of any charges or penalties arising from late payment or 
a failure to pay.153 Similar disclosures apply to lines of credit.154  
The Cost of Borrowing (Banks) Regulations expressly exclude overdraft charges and prepayment 
penalty charges from the cost of borrowing for a loan.155 A bank, which issues a fixed interest loan 
for a fixed amount, a line of credit, or a credit card, must provide the borrower with a disclosure 
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statement that includes information on the nature and amount of any non-interest charge.156 
Regulation 17 provides that a borrower who prepays the outstanding balance of a fixed credit 
agreement will not be subject to a pre-payment charge and is entitled to a refund or credit with 
respect to the proportional amount of non-interest charges paid by the borrower. 157 If a borrower 
fails to make a payment when due or does not comply with another obligation in the credit 
agreement, the bank may impose, in addition to interest, charges for the sole purpose of recovering 
costs reasonably incurred in retaining legal services in an effort to collect the debt, realizing on a 
security interest or processing a dishonoured cheque.158 
The Canada Transportation Act provides that a carrier must display its tariffs, including the terms 
and conditions of carriage, at its business offices and online sales sites. 159  Any fare, charge or term, 
which has not been properly displayed, cannot be applied by the carrier.160 If on complaint in writing 
by any person, the Canadian Transportation Agency finds that a carrier has applied unreasonable or 
unduly discriminatory terms or conditions of carriage, the Agency may disallow or suspend those 
terms or conditions and replace them with other terms and conditions.161 
3.7 Singapore 
Section 6 of the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act originally enacted in 2003, provides that a 
consumer who has entered a consumer transaction involving an unfair practice may commence an 
action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the supplier. The Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act takes a multi-layered approach to determining whether an act or omission constitutes 
an unfair action.  
Section 4 of the Act states that it is an unfair practice for a supplier of goods and services, in relation 
to a consumer transaction: 
(a) to do or say anything, or to omit to do or say anything, if as a result a consumer might 
reasonably be deceived or misled; 
(b) to make a false claim; 
(c) to take advantage of a consumer if the supplier knows or ought reasonably to know that the 
consumer: 
(i) is not in a position to protect his own interests; or 
(ii) is not reasonably able to understand the character, nature, language or effect of the 
transaction or any matter related to the transaction … 
Section 5(3)(a) states that when determining whether a person has engaged in an unfair practice, 
the reasonableness of their actions in the circumstances is to be considered. An unfair practice may 
consist of a single act or omission and can occur at any time during, before or after a consumer 
transaction.162 A person will be deemed to be responsible for the act or omission of an employee or 
agent if the act or omission occurred in the employee’s course of employment or the scope of the 
agent’s actual or apparent authority.163 
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Additionally, section 4(d) puts forward a black list of activities that, without limiting the generality of 
paragraphs 4(a),(b) and (c), constitute an unfair practice. This ‘black list’ is situated in the Second 
Schedule of the Act. A relevant ‘blacklisted’ act is ‘Taking advantage of a consumer by including in an 
agreement terms or conditions that are harsh, oppressive or excessively one-sided so as to be 
unconscionable’ contained in s 11 of the Second Schedule.  
This appears to be broad enough to catch the inclusion of punitive fees in contracts. 
3.8 Pyramid selling  
3.8.1 Australia 
In Australia, the marketing of pyramid selling schemes may be caught by the general protections for 
misleading conduct164 and/ or unconscionable conduct.165 There are also specific provisions that 
prohibit false or misleading representations in relation to the supply of goods or services.166 The 
principal specific provision prohibiting pyramid selling schemes is contained in s 44 of the ACL. 
Pyramid selling is a form of a multi-level marketing scheme, which is similar to referral selling in that 
they both hold out the prospect of future benefits in order to induce a person to participate in the 
scheme. In Australian Communications Network Pty Ltd v ACCC the Full Court held: 
The real vice inherent in pyramid selling schemes appears to be that the rewards held 
out are substantially for recruiting others, who in turn get their rewards substantially for 
recruiting still more members, and so on. If there is no underlying genuine economic 
activity the scheme must ultimately collapse and many people will have been induced to 
pay money for nothing. We see the purpose of the legislation as directed at proscribing 
schemes where the real or substantial rewards held out are to be derived substantially 
from the recruitment of new participants, as distinct from rewards for genuine sales of 
goods or services.167 
3.8.2 Specific protection — pyramid selling 
Section 44 of the ACL provides: 
(1) A person must not participate in a pyramid scheme. 
(2) A person must not induce, or attempt to induce, another person to participate in a 
pyramid scheme.  
(3) To participate in a pyramid scheme is: 
(a) to establish or promote the scheme (whether alone or together with another person);  or 
(b) to take part in the scheme in any capacity (whether or not as an employee or agent of a 
person who establishes or promotes the scheme, or who otherwise takes part in the 
scheme). 
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Section 44(1) and (2) are based on s 65AAC(1) and (2) of the respectively. They separately prohibit 
participating in a pyramid scheme, and inducing or attempting to induce another person to 
participate in a pyramid scheme. The jurisprudence surrounding the concepts in ss 65AAC, 65AAD 
and 65AAE of the TPA is also relevant to ss 44, 45 and 46 of the ACL.168 
3.8.3 Meaning of ‘pyramid scheme’ 
Section 45 of the ACL defines a pyramid scheme: 
(1) A pyramid scheme is a scheme with both of the following characteristics: 
(a) to take part in the scheme, some or all new participants must provide, to another 
participant or participants in the scheme, either of the following (a participation payment): 
(i) a financial or non-financial benefit to, or for the benefit of, the other 
participant or participants; 
(ii) a financial or non-financial benefit partly to, or for the benefit of, the other 
participant or participants and partly to, or for the benefit of, other 
persons; 
(a) the participation payments are entirely or substantially induced by the 
prospect held out to new participants that they will be entitled, in relation 
to the introduction to the scheme of further new participants, to be 
provided with either of the following (a recruitment payment): 
(i) a financial or non-financial benefit to, or for the benefit of, new 
participants; 
(ii) a financial or non-financial benefit partly to, or for the benefit of, new 
participants and partly to, or for the benefit of, other persons. 
Section 45 is based on s 65AAD of the TPA. The word ‘scheme’ is not defined in the ACL. In ACCC v 
Wordplay Services Pty Ltd, 169 Finn J in relation to s 66AAD of the TPA applied the meaning given to 
the word by Mason J in Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v Attorney General (NSW); Ex rel 
Corporate Affairs Commission, 170 namely ‘some programme, or plan of action’. In ACCC v Jutsen 
(No 3), Nicholas J referred to the Macquarie Dictionary definition of the word ‘scheme’ which is ‘a 
plan or design to be followed’. 171 His Honour was satisfied that TVI Express System was a ‘scheme’ 
because it required prospective members to pay a membership fee to other participants in the 
scheme if they were to take part in it. It contains three elements: a participation payment; a 
recruitment payment; and a requirement of inducement. Section 45(1)(a) provides that participants 
make a payment (participation payment); and s 45(1)(b) provides that the participation payment is 
entirely or substantially induced by the prospect held out to new participants that they will be 
entitled to a payment (recruitment payment) ‘in relation to’ the introduction to the scheme of 
further new participants. 
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In ACCC v Lyoness Pty Limited,172 the ACCC brought proceedings against Lyoness in respect of alleged 
breaches of s 44 of the ACL. Lyoness operated a website which offered consumers a range of 
different shopping opportunities and discounts in relation to goods and services purchased from 
Loyalty Merchants by becoming Members or Premium Members of the scheme. Loyalty Merchants 
were retailers and service providers which had agreed with Lyoness to promote their products on its 
website and to provide discounts to Members. The ACCC alleged that the only way a consumer could 
become a Member or Premium Member was by making a down-payment, which it characterised as 
a ‘participation payment’ to join a pyramid scheme.  
Flick J found that even if there was a ‘participation payment’ that fell within s 45(1)(a), any 
‘recruitment payment’ was not a payment in relation to the introduction to the scheme of further 
new participants as required by s 45(1)(b): 
On the facts of the present case, the mere introduction of a new Member did not result 
in the existing Member receiving any benefit. Any entitlement to receive a benefit was 
occasioned — not by the introduction of the new Member — but from the pursuit of 
shopping activity by that new (Direct) Member or Members and the shopping activities 
of (Indirect) Members who, in turn, may have been introduced by such new Members.173 
Flick J concluded that the ACCC failed to discharge its onus of making good the allegation that a 
person could become a Member in Australia only by making a Down Payment’: 
Although many people did in fact become Members in that manner, no conclusion can 
safely be drawn that making a ‘Down Payment’ was the ‘only’ way in which a person 
could become a Member in Australia prior to April 2012. It is not to the point, with 
respect, for the Commission to contend that there was no evidence ‘the other way’.174 
3.8.4 Meaning of ‘entirely or substantially’ 
The words ‘entirely or substantially’ have been held to mean ‘the predominant inducement’. In ACCC 
v Wordplay Services Pty Ltd, Finn J considered the word ‘substantially’ in relation to s 66AAD of the 
TPA and said that it must be considered in its context and is coloured by the proximity of the word 
‘entirely’. His Honour stated: 
The use of the composite formula in s 65AAD recognises that there may be a number of 
inducements to make a participation payment, and if such be the case, their relative 
significance must be considered. A participation payment could, for example, be induced 
substantially by the s 65AAD ‘prospect’ held out while another and lesser inducement 
was the use or enjoyment of the goods or services being provided. Where multiple 
prospects are held out, if a particular prospect is to be characterised as the substantial 
inducement, it must be the predominant inducement …175 
3.8.5 Meaning of ‘in relation to’ 
A critical element of the definition of a pyramid selling scheme in s 45, is the scope of the words ‘in 
relation to’ in s 45(1)(b) of the ACL and the precise nature of the link between the participation 
payment and the recruitment payment. It is not sufficient that there is an indirect link between the 
two payments; there must be a material connection between the two payments in the sense that 
the inducement for making the participation payment must be the prospect of consideration or 
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reward for the introduction of further new participants. In Australian Communications Network Pty 
Ltd v ACCC,176 the ACCC instituted proceedings against Australian Communications Network Pty Ltd 
(ACN) alleging that ACN participated in a pyramid selling scheme. ACN provided retail 
telecommunications services and adopted a multi-level marketing structure. It resold Telstra and 
Optus fixed and mobile phone services through networks of independent representatives (IRs). An IR 
paid $499 to ACN to join the scheme (a ‘participation payment’), which was used by ACN to cover 
marketing expenses. An IR ACN provided four different forms of remuneration for IRs: 
(1) personal commissions on the revenue received by ACN from telecommunications customers 
introduced by an IR; 
(2) bonus promotional payments for signing up a minimum number of customers; 
(3) customer acquisition bonuses (CABs) for assisting ‘downstream IRs’ to introduce new 
customers; and 
(4) residual override commissions on revenue received by ACN from customers introduced by 
‘downstream IRs’. 
(5) Independent representatives (IRs) could create ‘organisations’ by sponsoring new IRs referred 
to as ‘downstream IRs’. 
The trial judge, Selway J, held that the bonus promotional payments and residual override 
commissions were ‘recruitment payments’ as they were bonuses received as a consequence of 
introducing new IRs. In allowing the appeal the Full Court held: 
In the present case, there is not present the requisite relationship between the payments 
in question (CABs and residual override commissions) and the introduction of further 
new IRs. The receipt of any payments by IRs is dependent on the activities of IRs 
themselves, and/or of the IRs downstream of them signing up customers for ACN and 
those customers acquiring ACN’s telephone services. If an IR does no more than recruit 
other IRs there is no entitlement to any payment. The quantum of remuneration 
essentially turns on the volume of customers’ business with ACN regardless of whether 
those customers have been signed up by an IR or a downstream IR.177 
Leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was refused on 2 June 2006.178 
In deciding whether participation payments were induced by a prospect of recruitment payments 
being made ‘in relation to’ the introduction to the scheme of further new participants for purposes 
of s 45(1)(b), it is necessary to consider s 46. Section 46 provides: 
To decide, for the purpose of this Schedule, whether a scheme that involves the 
marketing of goods or services (or both) is a pyramid scheme, a court must have regard 
to the following matters in working out whether participation payments under the 
scheme are entirely or substantially induced by the prospect held out to new participants 
of entitlement to recruitment payments: 
• whether the participation payments bear a reasonable relationship to the value of 
the goods or services that participants are entitled to be supplied with under the 
scheme (as assessed, if appropriate, by reference to the price of comparable goods 
or services available elsewhere); 
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• the emphasis given in the promotion of the scheme to the entitlement of 
participants to the supply of goods or services by comparison with the emphasis 
given to their entitlement to recruitment payments. 
Subsection (1) does not limit the matters to which the court may have regard in working 
out whether participation payments are entirely or substantially induced by the prospect 
held out to new participants of entitlement to recruitment payments. 
Section 46(1)(a) focuses on the participation payments. In applying s 46(1)(a) it will be necessary to 
determine first the value of the goods or services that participants are entitled to under the scheme, 
and then whether the participation payments bore a ‘reasonable relationship’ to the value of the 
goods or services. In ACCC v Jutsen (No 3) those who wished to participate in the scheme were 
required to pay an up-front membership fee of $330. A person who paid the fee received a ‘travel 
certificate’ and the opportunity to receive commission payments for recruiting new members. 
Nicholas J found that the travel certificates were of little or no value since the scheme was 
‘… operated in a way that makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for people to redeem their 
travel certificate for the purpose of taking such a holiday’. 179 
3.9 European Union  
3.9.1 Introduction 
Establishing, operating or promoting a ‘pyramid promotional scheme’ is specifically prohibited by 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD), adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union in 2005. 
The central aim of the UCPD is to promote the proper function of the internal market and to provide 
a ‘high level of consumer protection’ against the economic harm caused by unfair commercial 
practices.180 Marked differences in the laws of the Member States regarding unfair commercial 
practices were seen as causing uncertainty regarding cross border activities, increasing business 
costs and undermining confidence in the internal market.181 The UCPD was intended to provide 
harmonised rules, which, amongst other things, established a general prohibition on unfair 
commercial practices affecting consumers, and for the first time at Community level, regulated 
aggressive commercial practices.182 
The implementation choices made by Member States regarding the Directives are largely dependent 
on whether laws regulating unfair commercial practices already existed in the Member States. With 
regard to the UCPD for instance, some Member States adopted new national laws which transposed 
the UCPD practically verbatim (UK, Portugal, Romania, Hungary, Cyprus, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania and Greece) whilst others incorporated it into 
existing legislation: consumer codes (France, Italy, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Malta), civil codes (the 
Netherlands), acts against unfair competition (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Spain) or specific existing 
laws (Belgium, Finland and Sweden).183 
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3.9.2 General protection — pyramid selling 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive regulates pyramid schemes under its ‘unfair commercial 
practice’ doctrine. ‘Unfair commercial practices’ are prohibited under the UCPD.184The test for 
determining whether a practice constitutes an ‘unfair commercial practice’ under art 5 of the UCPD 
is multi-layered. The first general test for unfair commercial practice states that a commercial 
practice will be determined to be unfair if:  
• it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, 
and 
• it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the 
product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of the average 
member of the group when a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of 
consumers.185 
Where an identifiable group of consumers is especially vulnerable to a commercial practice due to 
their age, credulity, or infirmity, in a way which was reasonably foreseeable to a trader, an 
assessment of the fairness/unfairness of the commercial practice will be taken from the perspective 
of an average member of that group.186  
The second test of unfairness, also found in art. 5, states that a commercial practice will be unfair if 
found to be:  
• misleading as set out in Articles 6 and 7, 
or 
• aggressive as set out in Articles 8 and 9.187 
Whilst this test does not specifically target pyramid selling schemes, certain scheme practices may 
fall within the test. Article 6(1) of the UCPD relevantly considers a commercial practice to be 
misleading if it contains false information, or deceives/is likely to deceive the average consumer, 
regarding certain elements, which causes/likely causes the consumer to make a transactional 
decision that they would not otherwise make.188 These relevant elements include:  the product’s 
nature or existence,189 the nature of the sales process and the commercial practices motives,190 and 
the product’s price or method of price calculation.191 Certain omissions are also held to be 
misleading.192 
Article 8, which concerns aggressive commercial practices, states that a commercial practice will be 
deemed to be aggressive if, on the facts and taking account all of the surrounding circumstances, 
harassment, undue influence or coercion, including the use of physical force, is used which 
significantly impairs, or is likely to significantly impair, the average consumer’s freedom of conduct 
or choice regarding the product, thereby causing them, or being likely to cause them to make a 
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transaction decision that they would otherwise not have made.193 In determining whether a 
commercial practice employs harassment, coercion or undue influence, certain elements may be 
taken into account, including the location, timing, nature or persistence of the commercial practice 
and whether the trader knowingly exploits a ‘specific misfortune’ or a circumstance that is so grave 
as to impair the judgement of the consumer in order to influence their decision regarding the 
product.194  
3.9.3 Specific protection — pyramid selling 
Article 5(5) puts forward a third means by which a commercial practice may be found to be unfair: a 
‘blacklist’, found in Annex I, of commercial practices which are to be considered unfair in all 
circumstances. This list is to be applied by all Member States without modification.195 Relevantly, the 
UCPD blacklists the establishment, operation or promotion of a ‘pyramid promotional scheme’ 
which is defined as a scheme ‘where a consumer gives consideration for the opportunity to receive 
compensation that is derived primarily from the introduction of other consumers into the scheme 
rather than from the sale or consumption of products’.196 
Member states have some limited flexibility in the choice of means by which they enforce the 
provisions of the UCPD, provided that those means are ‘adequate and effective’ in combating unfair 
commercial practices. However, it is prescribed that one of these means must include legislation 
under which persons or organisations, regarded under the Member State’s national law as having a 
‘legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practice, including competitors’ may take legal 
action and/or bring the matter before a competent administrative authority to either initiate legal 
action or decide on complaints.197 
3.10 United Kingdom  
3.10.1 Introduction 
The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPR), which introduced the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive of the European Parliament and Council (UCPD) into the law of the 
United Kingdom, came into force in 2008.198 The central aim of the UCPD is to promote the proper 
function of the internal market and to provide a ‘high level of consumer protection’ against the 
economic harm caused by unfair commercial practices.199 The UK government declared its support 
for the UCPD on the basis that the Directive would improve consumer protection and foster 
cross-border trade. In particular, the legislature referred to research conducted by the Office of Fair 
Trading in 2001 which indicated that consumer detriment caused by defective goods, poor 
information and inadequate redress, constituted over £8 billion a year, and that low-income 
consumers suffered disproportionate welfare losses as a result of unfair consumer practices.  
Whilst legislators recognised that these problematic commercial practices were already the subject 
of existing UK legislation, it was considered that the principles-based approach and broad scope of 
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the UCPD would improve enforcers’ ability to act effectively.200 The CPR transposed the provisions of 
the UCPD into UK law almost verbatim. In order to avoid duplication and simplify the UK’s consumer 
protection legislative framework, 23 consumer protection laws were either partially or wholly 
repealed by the CPR.201  
3.10.2  General protection — pyramid selling 
The CPR regulates ‘pyramid promotional schemes’ under their prohibition of ‘unfair commercial 
practice’.202 The test for determining whether a practice constitutes an ‘unfair commercial practice’ 
under regulation 3 is multi-layered. The first general test for unfair commercial practice states that a 
commercial practice will be determined to be unfair if it:   
• contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and 
• materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average 
consumer with regard to the product.203 
Where an identifiable group of consumers is especially vulnerable to a commercial practice due to 
their age, credulity, or infirmity, in a way which was reasonably foreseeable to a trader, and where 
the practice is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of only that group, reference to 
‘the average consumer’ is to be taken to refer to the average member of that group.204 
The second test of unfairness, also found in r 3, states that a commercial practice will be unfair if 
found to be:  
• a misleading action under r 5; 
• a misleading omission under r 6; or  
• aggressive under r 7.205 
Whilst this test does not specifically target pyramid promotional schemes, certain scheme practices 
may fall within the test. Regulation 5(1) of the CPR relevantly considers a commercial practice to be 
misleading if it contains false information, or deceives/is likely to deceive the average consumer, 
regarding certain matters, which causes/likely causes the consumer to make a transactional decision 
that they would not otherwise make.206 These relevant matters include: the product’s nature or 
existence,207 the commercial practices motives,208 the nature of the sales process,209 and the 
product’s price or method of price calculation.210 
With regard to aggressive commercial practices, r 7 states that a commercial practice will be deemed 
to be aggressive if, on the facts and taking account all of the surrounding circumstances, harassment, 
undue influence or coercion, including the use of physical force, is used which significantly impairs, 
or is likely to significantly impair, the average consumer’s freedom of conduct or choice regarding 
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the product, thereby causing them, or being likely to cause them to make a transaction decision that 
they would otherwise not have made.211  In determining whether a commercial practice employs 
harassment, coercion or undue influence, certain elements may be taken into account, including the 
location, timing, nature or persistence of the commercial practice and whether the trader knowingly 
exploits a ‘specific misfortune’ or a circumstance that is so grave as to impair the judgement of the 
consumer in order to influence their decision regarding the product.212  
3.10.3  Specific protection — pyramid selling 
Regulation 3(4)(d) puts forward a third means by which a commercial practice may be found to be 
unfair: a ‘blacklist’, found in Schedule I, of specific commercial practices which are to be considered 
unfair in all circumstances. Relevantly, the CPR blacklists the establishment, operation or promotion 
of a pyramid scheme ‘where a consumer gives consideration for the opportunity to receive 
compensation that is derived primarily from the introduction of other consumers into the scheme 
rather than from the sale or consumption of products’.213 
A trader is guilty of an offence if they engage in an unfair commercial practice as determined by the 
CPR.214  Upon being found guilty of engaging in an unfair commercial practice, a trader is liable, on 
summary conviction, to be fined, and on indictment, to be fined and/or imprisoned for a maximum 
of two years.215 
In 2014, the CPR were amended to include a consumer right to civil redress, in circumstances where, 
amongst other things: 
• the consumer entered into a contract with the trader for the supply or sale of a product; and 
• the trader engaged in misleading action under r 5 or is aggressive under r 7.216  
This consumer right to civil redress includes the right to: 
• unwind a consumer contract if the consumer communicates to the trader that they reject the 
product within 90 days of the contract being signed, or the goods being delivered amongst 
other things, whichever is the later. At the time of rejection, the product must not be fully 
consumed.217 
• receive a percentage discount on a consumer contract if the contract has not been rejected and 
there are still payments owing on the contract, where the percentage reduction is determined 
by having regard to the seriousness of the prohibited practice;218  
• receive damages if the consumer has incurred financial loss, or suffered distress, alarm or 
physical discomfort or inconvenience, that they would not have incurred or suffered if the 
relevant prohibited practice had not occurred.219 
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3.11 United States of America 
3.11.1 Introduction 
There is no specific federal legislation, which targets pyramid selling schemes in the United States. 
Instead, pyramid schemes are prohibited at the federal level under a range of laws which employ 
differing characterisations of the illegal act. The Federal Trade Commission is authorised to prevent 
pyramid schemes under the Federal Trade Commission Act’s broad prohibition of ‘unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’.220 This prohibition is fundamentally protective 
as a pyramid scheme is regarded as a zero sum game wherein ‘[f]or each person who substantially 
profits from the scheme, there must be many more losing all, or a portion, of their investment to 
fund those winnings’.221  
Another federal agency that pursues pyramid schemes is the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which acts against ‘financial distribution networks’ which sell unregistered ‘securities’ under the 
Securities Act 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 1934.222 Pyramid schemes may also be 
prosecuted criminally by the Department of Justice, with the assistance of investigative agencies 
such as the US Postal Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 and money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1957.223 
Pyramid schemes are also prohibited under state laws, which may be general or specific in nature. 
Certain states, such as Georgia, ban pyramid schemes under laws concerning commerce and trade 
that regulate multi-level marketing.224 More broadly, Illinois characterises pyramid schemes as 
criminally deceptive acts aimed against property and California classifies such schemes as ‘endless 
chains’ and criminalises them under its laws banning illegal lotteries.225 
3.11.2  General protection — pyramid selling 
Given the general and multitudinous nature of federal and state legislation, which deals with 
pyramid selling schemes, and the key role played by the Federal Trade Commission, regard will only 
be given to the operation of the FTC Act in this section.  
The FTC Act relevantly declares unlawful ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce’ and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (the Commission) to prevent persons from 
using such acts or practices.226 Depending on the circumstances, a pyramid scheme may be regarded 
as deceptive or unfair for the purposes of the FTC Act. 
In Webster v Omnitrition International, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir) approved the 
FTC’s test for determining whether a multilevel marketing (MLM) business is a pyramid scheme: a 
pyramid scheme is ‘characterized by the payment by participants of money to the company in return 
for which they receive (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the right to receive in return for 
recruiting other participants into the program rewards which are unrelated to sale of the product to 
ultimate users’. 227 
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In Federal Trade Commission v BurneLounge, Inc, the United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir) applied 
the two limbs of the FTC’s test confirmed the finding of the District Court that BurnLounge was an 
illegal pyramid scheme. BurnLounge participants joined the scheme by buying packages, which 
included a BurnPage — a readymade customised web page through which participants sold music 
and merchandise. Participants earned rewards by recruiting others to join the scheme, i.e., by 
recruiting new participants to buy packages. In each case, the participants sold something (inventory 
or packages), but the rewards the participants received in return were largely for recruitment, not 
for product sales. 
The Court held: 
We agree with the district court that the FTC provided sufficient evidence to prove that 
BurnLounge’s focus was recruitment and that the rewards it paid, in the form of cash 
bonuses, were primarily for recruitment rather than for sales of merchandise. Recruiting 
was built into the compensation structure in that recruiting led to eligibility for cash 
rewards, and more recruiting led to higher rewards.228 
BurnLounge argued that the second limb of the Omnitrition test required recruitment rewards to be 
completely unrelated to product sales. The Court rejected this contention: 
This test does not require that rewards be completely unrelated to product sales, and 
BurnLounge provides no support for its argument that the test should be interpreted this 
way. 
The Commission enforces its consumer protection authority by way of both administrative and 
judicial processes229 and is allowed to seek a number of equitable remedies including restitution or 
redress for consumers, injunctive relief, and a freezing of assets.230  
3.12 Canada  
3.12.1  Introduction 
Pyramid selling schemes are illegal under both the Competition Act 1985 and the Criminal 
Code 1985. 
The Competition Act aims to encourage and maintain competition in Canada in order to promote 
economic efficiency and provide consumers with product choices and competitive prices.231 The 
prohibition of pyramid selling schemes stems from the recognition that such schemes are inherently 
unstable and inevitably collapse due to the finite number of potential recruits, causing the majority 
of participants to lose their investment.232 
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3.12.2  Specific protection — pyramid selling 
Section 55.1(2) of the Competition Act prohibits a person from establishing, operating, advertising or 
promoting a scheme of pyramid selling.233 A ‘scheme of pyramid selling’ is defined in the Act as a 
‘multilevel marketing plan’, itself defined in section 55(1), whereby: 
(a) a participant in the plan pays for the right to receive compensation for recruiting other 
participants into the plan; 
(b) a participant in the plan must purchase a specified amount of a product as a condition for 
entering into the plan, other than a specified amount of the product bought at cost price for the 
sole purpose of facilitating sales(e.g. a starter kit); 
(c) a person knowingly ‘inventory loads’, that is supplies a commercially unreasonable amount of 
the product to a participant in the plan; 
(d) a plan participant who is supplied with the product: 
(i) is not given a buy-back guarantee which is able to be exercised on reasonable commercial 
terms or a right to return the product in saleable condition on reasonable commercial terms, 
or 
(ii) is not informed of the existence of the guarantee or right.234 
For the purposes of determining whether a ‘commercially unreasonable’ amount of product has 
been provided under section 55(2)(c), consideration may be given to matters such as: the product 
type; the price of the product; the market size; the number of participants and competitors; and the 
product’s sales history.235 
A person who establishes, operates, advertises, or promotes a scheme of pyramid selling contrary to 
section 55.1(2) is guilty of an offence and is liable, on summary conviction, to a maximum fine of 
$200,000 and/or imprisonment for a maximum term of 1 year and, on indictment, to a fine fixed at 
the discretion of the court and/or imprisonment for a maximum term of 5 years.236 
The Canadian Criminal Code prohibits pyramid selling schemes as part of its regulation of lotteries 
and games of chance. Section 206(1) of the Criminal Code states that a person is guilty of an 
indictable offence if they conduct, manage or are a party to ‘any scheme contrivance or any 
operation of any kind by which any person, on payment of any sum of money, or the giving of any 
valuable security, or by obliging himself to pay any sum of money or give any valuable security, shall 
become entitled under the scheme, contrivance, or operation to receive from the person conducting 
or managing the scheme, contrivance or operation, or any other person, a larger sum of money or 
amount of valuable security than the sum or amount paid or given, or to be paid or given, by reason 
of the fact that other persons have paid or given, or obligated themselves to pay or give any sum of 
money or valuable security under the scheme, contrivance or operation’.237  
This definition aligns with the first limb of section 55.1(2) of the Competition Act, which also 
prohibits schemes where a participant in the plan pays for the right to receive compensation for 
recruiting other participants into the plan. If found guilty of this offence under the Criminal Code, the 
offender is liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of two years.238 
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3.13 Singapore  
3.13.1  Introduction 
The Multi-level Marketing and Pyramid Selling (Prohibition) Act was enacted in 1973 in order to 
outlaw the practice of pyramid selling. The Singaporean legislature concluded that the undesirable 
features of pyramid selling, including the financial loss and hardship suffered by franchise holders, 
were sufficiently objectionable to call for a complete ban, rather than regulation, of the practice.239 
It was further considered that the undesirable features of pyramid selling schemes, despite being 
tainted with possible fraud and dishonesty, did not fall easily within existing criminal and civil laws. 
As such, it was determined that specific legislation was required to deal with the practice.240 
The drafters were confronted with the difficult task of clearly distinguishing harmful pyramid 
schemes from inoffensive multi-level marketing practices. The definition of a pyramid selling scheme 
or arrangement thus took on a primary importance, as the legislature sought to clearly and 
effectively pinpoint the objectionable elements of such a scheme or arrangement, without capturing 
lawful schemes and arrangements within an overly-expansive scope.241   
Dissatisfaction with the Act’s definition prompted its amendment in 2000, on the grounds that the 
Act’s original definition of pyramid selling and multi-level marketing was too narrow.242 
Amendments were made in order to capture all businesses that were multi-level in nature within the 
Act’s prohibitive scope. Section 2 of the Act was amended to include a general definition of pyramid 
selling and multi-level marketing. This was intended to remove rigidities in the original definition of 
pyramid selling, such as that a participant in a pyramid scheme must share their commission with 
another participant.243  
However, as not all multi-level schemes are offensive, the Minister was given the power to order the 
exclusion of legitimate multi-level arrangements and schemes from the Act’s ambit.244 In June 2000, 
concurrent with the Act’s amendments, the Minister enacted the Multi-Level Marketing and Pyramid 
Selling (Excluded Schemes and Arrangements) Order (Exclusion Order), which excludes a number of 
specific kinds of multi-level arrangements and schemes from the Act. 
3.13.2  Specific protection — pyramid selling 
Section 2 of the Act gives the amended definition of ‘pyramid selling scheme or arrangement’ as 
meaning ‘any scheme or arrangement for the distribution or the purported distribution of a 
commodity whereby: 
(a) a person may in any manner acquire a commodity or a right or a licence to acquire the 
commodity for sale, lease, licence or other distribution; 
(b) that person receives any benefit, directly or indirectly, as a result of: 
(i)  the recruitment, acquisition, action or performance of one or more additional participants 
in the scheme or arrangement; or 
(ii)  the sale, lease, licence or other distribution of the commodity by one or more additional 
participants in the scheme or arrangement; and 
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(c) any benefit is or may be received by any other person who promotes, or participates in, the 
scheme or arrangement (other than a person referred to in paragraph (a) or an additional 
participant referred to in paragraph (b))’. 
The definition expressly excludes from the Act’s ambit ‘such schemes or arrangements for the sale, 
lease, licence or other distribution of a commodity, or any class of such schemes or arrangements’ 
that are the subject of the Exclusion Order.245  
The Exclusion Order was issued in 2000 to specifically exclude from the Act’s prohibition of 
multi-level schemes: financial advisory services, master franchise schemes and insurance companies 
that met certain conditions.246 In 2002, this was extended to generally exclude direct selling 
companies which meet certain criteria. In order to meet the general test in section 2(c) of the 
Exclusion Order, a direct selling scheme or arrangement must satisfy the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. a person wishing to participate in the scheme or arrangement must not be required to provide 
any benefit or buy any good to enter other than a sales kit at cost price;  
2. any benefit received by a recruiter or participant in the scheme or arrangement must not come 
from the recruitment of additional scheme participants but rather from the sale, lease, licence 
or other distribution of a commodity;  
3. a promoter of the scheme or arrangement must not make representations regarding the 
benefits of the scheme apart from those deriving from the sale, lease, license or other 
distribution of a commodity;  
4. the promoter must keep fair and accurate records as to the benefits that have accrued under 
the scheme or arrangement and must not knowingly make false or misleading representations 
or omissions, or engage in false or misleading conduct, regarding the commodity or the scheme 
or arrangement or use fraud, coercion, harassment, or unconscionable or unlawful means in 
promoting the scheme, arrangement or commodity; and  
5. a clearly stated refund or buy back guarantee should exist for every participant on reasonable 
commercial terms.247  
It is unlawful for any person to promote or participate in a multi-level marketing or pyramid selling 
scheme or arrangement, or hold out that they are promoting or participating in such an 
arrangement.248 It is also unlawful to register a business, which is designed to promote a multi-level 
marketing or pyramid selling scheme or arrangement249 or incorporate or register under the 
Companies Act any company, which proposes to promote a multi-level marketing or pyramid selling 
scheme or arrangement250. Any person who contravenes these provisions is guilty of an offence and, 
on conviction, will be liable to a maximum fine of $200,000 and/or imprisonment for a maximum 
term of 5 years.251 Where a company commits an offence under the Act, any individual who at the 
time of the offence was an officer of the company concerned in the company’s management, or 
purporting to act in such a capacity, including specifically a director, general manager, manager and 
secretary, as well as the company, will be deemed guilty of the offence and liable to prosecution and 
punishment.252 
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Where a person is convicted of the offence of promoting or participating in a multi-level marketing 
scheme or arrangement or a pyramid selling scheme or arrangement under section 3(3), the court 
may impose an additional penalty if the person has received an assessable benefit, such as a sum of 
money, either directly or indirectly, as a result of committing the offence. 253 This penalty, 
recoverable as a fine, should not exceed the amount, or as the court determines, the value of the 
benefit received.254 In determining the penalty to be paid by the person, the court may take into 
account any benefit that the person may have paid for the right to participate in the scheme or 
arrangement, as well as any loss they may have occurred as a result of their participation.255 
3.14 Unsolicited selling laws  
3.14.1  Australia 
Under the CCA, unsolicited selling may be caught by the general protections for misleading 
conduct256 and/ or unconscionable conduct.257 There are also provisions that prohibit false or 
misleading representations in relation to the supply of goods or services.258 However, the principal 
specific protection against unsolicited selling is contained in Pt 3-2, Div 2 of the ACL. 
According to the Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) set out in the Second Explanatory 
Memorandum: 
The objective of regulation in this area is to promote the operation of fair and efficient 
markets by providing appropriate consumer protection in situations where the consumer 
is subject to an added vulnerability or disadvantage due to the nature of the sales 
process. This is achieved by giving consumers additional rights and protections that are 
not available in other retail contexts and providing specific obligations for businesses 
engaged in these sales practices. This may be warranted where aggressive selling 
techniques (such as high pressure sales) are employed in a non-retail environment, 
especially where consumers do not have the option of walking away from the situation, 
such as in their own home, and may feel threatened to agree to an offer simply to put 
the situation at an end, or where it is unclear that they are entering into a contract, as 
can occur over the phone.259 
The unsolicited sales practices regulations are premised on the view that consumers are more 
vulnerable when confronted by sales representatives who door-knock households to sell products or 
services or telephone consumers to sell products or services, and may make purchases that, in a 
cooler or more rational state, they would not make. Mandating a cooling-off period gives consumers 
an opportunity for rational re-consideration to overcome the influence of impulsive choice. 
However, while the ACL regulates unsolicited sales and makes provision for the manner in which 
consumers may be approached, disclosure obligations, and mandating express consumer rights such 
as cooling-off periods, these provisions do not apply to in-home sales where the consumer invites 
the sales person into their home. 
The evidence of consumer detriment that results from unsolicited selling practices is considered in 
the RIS.260 On 17 August 2012 the ACCC released a comprehensive research report into the 
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door-to-door sales industry in Australia, which provides further evidence of significant consumer 
detriment arising from unsolicited selling practices.261 
3.14.2  General protections — unsolicited selling laws  
Unsolicited selling practices are regulated through the operation the general protections for 
misleading conduct and/ or unconscionable conduct. In ACCC v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd,262sales 
representatives of the respondent made door-to-door sales of vacuum cleaners to three elderly 
women. The respondent required its representatives to contact potential customers by telephone, 
offering to conduct a ‘free maintenance check’ of their existing vacuum cleaner. This offer was a ruse 
to gain entry to their home. Once there, having conducted a maintenance check, the representative 
would persuade them that their existing machine needed to be replaced by a new one, which they 
would then sell to the occupant. On the three occasions in question the sales representative 
contravened Commonwealth or State legislation governing ‘direct selling’ (door-to-door selling).  
At issue in these proceedings was whether their conduct was also unconscionable under s 51AB of 
the TPA (for two sales occurring in 2010), or the original s 21 of the ACL (for a sale occurring in 2011). 
The application failed at first instance; the ACCC appealed to the Full Court, which held that Lux had 
contravened the statutory unconscionable conduct provisions. The ACL proscribes various unethical 
business practices including certain door-to-door selling practices; bait advertising, pyramid selling, 
and asserting a right to payment for unsolicited goods. The prior existence of these laws in relation 
to door-to-door selling was of considerable assistance to the Full Federal Court in finding that the 
conduct at issue in Lux Distributors was unconscionable.263  
However, in relation to business-to-business conduct, the normative standard to be applied in cases 
of statutory unconscionable conduct is contestable. At what point does the application of pressure 
by a stronger party in a business relationship become the application of illegitimate pressure? 
In ACCC v Australian Power and Gas Company Limited,264 the Federal Court imposed a penalty of 
$200,000 for a contravention of s 21 of the ACL in the context of door-to-door sales conduct that 
breached the ACL, when its sales representatives dealt with a non-English speaking customer. 
Similarly, in ACCC v Origin Energy Electricity Limited, 265 the Federal Court imposed a total penalty of 
$600,000 on Origin Energy Electricity Limited (Origin) for a contravention of s 21 of the ACL in the 
context of unlawful door-to-door selling when its sales representatives dealt with a non-English 
speaking customer. 
3.14.3  Specific protection — unsolicited selling 
The principal specific protection against unsolicited selling in Australia is contained in Pt 3-2, Div 2 of 
the ACL. The term ‘unsolicited consumer agreement’ is defined in s 69(1) of the ACL. 
Unsolicited consumer agreements may result from: 
• door-knocking households to sell products or services, or to ask consumers to switch to a 
different service provider 
• telephoning consumers to sell products or services 
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• approaching consumers in the common area of a shopping mall centre to sell products or 
services. 
The third element requires that the consumer did not invite the dealer to come to that place, or to 
make a telephone call, for the purposes of entering into negotiations relating to the supply of those 
goods or services.266 In relation to civil proceedings, s 70 creates a rebuttable presumption that an 
agreement or proposed agreement is an unsolicited consumer agreement. 
Section 74 imposes three duties on a dealer who calls on a person for the purpose of negotiating an 
unsolicited consumer agreement: 
1. to clearly advise the consumer at the outset of an approach that their purpose is to seek the 
person’s agreement to the supply of goods or services;267 
2. to clearly advise the person that the dealer is obliged to leave the premises immediately on 
request; and 
3. to display or produce identification containing information prescribed by the regulations.268 
Regulation 82 of the ACL Amendment Regulations requires a dealer to provide their name and 
address. A dealer may provide a post office box, business or workplace address. If the dealer is not 
the supplier of the goods or services, the dealer must provide the supplier’s name and address (not 
being a post office box). A supplier is not permitted to use a post office box address, to ensure that a 
consumer, or a consumer law enforcement agency, is able to readily contact a supplier in the event 
that a problem arises with goods or services supplied under an unsolicited consumer agreement. 
In ACCC v Neighbourhood Energy Pty Ltd,269 Neighbourhood Energy, as a supplier of retail electricity 
was held liable under s 77 of the for contraventions of s 74(a), (b) and (c) of the by its dealers. 
Section 75(1) imposes a duty on the dealer to leave a consumer’s premises on request.270 
Section 75(2) provides that if such a request is made by the consumer, the consumer must not be 
contacted for a similar purpose for at least 30 days after the request was made.271 In ACCC v AGL 
Sales Pty Ltd,272 the ACCC was successful in its argument that a ‘do not knock’ sticker can constitute 
a request to leave the customer’s premises under the ACL.  
A dealer must not make an unsolicited consumer agreement without first disclosing certain matters. 
Section 76(a) imposes a duty on the dealer to inform the consumer prior to making the agreement 
of their rights to terminate the agreement, and such other matters as are prescribed by the 
regulations.273 
Regulation 83 ACL Amendment Regulations provides that a consumer must be provided with 
information about the 10 day cooling off period prohibition provided for by s 86 of the ACL. 
Regulation 83 does not prescribe the exact words that must be used, to provide businesses with 
flexibility about the way in which they comply. 
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Section 76(d) provides that the form in which, and the way in which, the person is given the 
information must comply with the regulations. 
Regulation 84 ACL Amendment Regulations provides that the information given in writing must be: 
1. attached to the agreement or agreement document for the goods or services; 
2. transparent, that is, it is expressed in reasonably plain language, legible and presented clearly; 
and 
3. in text that is the most prominent text in the document other than the text setting out the 
dealer’s or supplier’s name or logo. 
Regulation 84 ACL Amendment Regulations does not prescribe the exact words that must be used to 
provide businesses with flexibility about the way in which they comply. 
Sections 78(1) and (2) impose duties on the dealer to provide the consumer with a copy of the 
agreement: 
• if the agreement was made in person, a copy of the agreement after it has been signed by the 
consumer; or 
• if the agreement was made by telephone, a copy within five business days after the agreement 
was made. 
Sections 79, 80 and 81 set out the formal requirements for a valid agreement arising from a supplier 
approaching a consumer by telephone or otherwise, including a termination notice (containing 
prescribed information) and supplier information. A valid agreement will need to comply with clarity 
requirements and will need to be given to the consumer. 
The ACL provides for the following express rights and obligations. 
The unsolicited consumer agreement provisions deal with situations in which a consumer may 
otherwise succumb to unacceptable pressure-selling tactics employed by a supplier. This risk is the 
greatest when a consumer is approached by a supplier and is not provided with sufficient time (in 
particular, time spent away from the influence of the seller) to consider whether to purchase the 
goods or services offered. Section 82(1) of the ACL provides for a 10 day cooling off period during 
which the consumer may cancel the contract. 
3.14.4  European Union 
3.14.4.1 Introduction 
Unsolicited selling in the European Union is governed broadly by the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (UCPD), adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in 
2005, and, more specifically, by the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD), adopted in 2011. 
3.14.4.2 General protection — unsolicited selling 
The UCPD regulates unsolicited selling under its ‘unfair commercial practice’ doctrine. ‘Unfair 
commercial practices’ are prohibited under the UCPD.274The test for determining whether a practice 
constitutes an ‘unfair commercial practice’ under art 5 of the UCPD is multi-layered. The first general 
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test for unfair commercial practice states that a commercial practice will be determined to be unfair 
if:  
• it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, 
and 
• it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the 
product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of the average 
member of the group when a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of 
consumers.275 
Where an identifiable group of consumers is especially vulnerable to a commercial practice due to 
their age, credulity, or infirmity, in a way, which was reasonably foreseeable to a trader, an 
assessment of the fairness/unfairness of the commercial practice will be taken from the perspective 
of an average member of that group.276  
The second test to determine whether a commercial practice is unfair, also found in art. 5, states 
that a commercial practice will be unfair if found to be:  
• misleading as set out in Articles 6 and 7, 
or 
• aggressive as set out in Articles 8 and 9.277 
The second limb of this test, concerning aggressive commercial practices, is of most relevance when 
considering unsolicited selling. Article 8 states that a commercial practice will be deemed to be 
aggressive if, on the facts and taking account all of the surrounding circumstances, harassment, 
undue influence or coercion, including the use of physical force is used which significantly impairs, or 
is likely to significantly impair, the average consumer’s freedom of conduct or choice regarding the 
product, thereby causing them, or being likely to cause them to make a transaction decision that 
they would otherwise not have made.278 In determining whether a commercial practice employs 
harassment, coercion or undue influence, certain elements may be taken into account. For the 
purposes of unsolicited selling, this includes the practice’s location, timing, nature and 
persistence.279  
Article 5(5) puts forward a third means by which a commercial practice may be found to be unfair: a 
‘blacklist’, found in Annex I, of commercial practices which are to be considered unfair in all 
circumstances. This list is to be applied by all Member States without modification.280 Two 
‘blacklisted’ practices relevant to unsolicited selling include: making personal visits to the 
consumer’s home in contravention of the consumer’s request to leave or not return281 and making 
‘persistent and unwanted solicitations’ by email, telephone, fax or other remote means.282 However, 
such acts will be exempted from the ‘blacklist’ in Annex I if they are legally justifiable for the 
enforcement of a consumer’s contractual obligation.283 
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Member States have some limited flexibility in the choice of means by which they enforce the 
provisions of the UCPD, provided that those means are ‘adequate and effective’ in combating unfair 
commercial practices. However, it is prescribed that one of these means must include legislation 
under which persons or organisations, regarded under the Member State’s national law as having a 
‘legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practice, including competitors’ may take legal 
action and/or bring the matter before a competent administrative authority to either initiate legal 
action or decide on complaints.284 
3.14.4.3 Specific protection — unsolicited selling 
The Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) is concerned with consumer transactions that occur outside of 
business premises and at a distance. An ‘off-premises contract’ is defined, amongst other things, as 
any contract between the consumer and the trader which is concluded in a place that is not the 
trader’s business premises with both the consumer and the trader in physical attendance.285 
The CRD does not apply to, amongst other things, contracts for financial services286 the sale of real 
property,287 and the rental of residential property.288 Member States may also choose not to apply 
the Directive to off-premises contracts with a value of less than EUR 50, or a lesser amount if they 
wish.289 
Article 9 of the CRD provides a 14 day ‘cooling off’ period in which the consumer can withdraw from 
an off-premises contract without providing any reason or incurring any costs beyond certain 
reasonable costs associated with the return of the goods to the trader.290 The withdrawal period 
ends 14 days after the consumer obtains physical possession of the goods for sales contracts, and 14 
days after the contract is concluded in the case of service contracts.291 However, if the trader fails to 
provide the consumer with information concerning the withdrawal period, as required by articles 6 
and 7 of the CRD, the withdrawal period will be extended to 12 months after the end of the initial 14 
day withdrawal period.292 
3.14.5  United Kingdom 
3.14.5.1 Introduction 
Unsolicited selling in the United Kingdom is governed broadly by the Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and more specifically by the Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. 
The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPR), which introduced the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive of the European Parliament and Council (UCPD) into the law of the 
United Kingdom, came into force in 2008.293 The central aim of the UCPD is to promote the proper 
function of the internal market and to provide a ‘high level of consumer protection’ against the 
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economic harm caused by unfair commercial practices.294 The UK government declared its support 
for the UCPD on the basis that the Directive would improve consumer protection and foster 
cross-border trade. In particular, the legislature referred to research conducted by the Office of Fair 
Trading in 2001 which indicated that consumer detriment caused by defective goods, poor 
information and inadequate redress, constituted over £8 billion a year, and that low-income 
consumers suffered disproportionate welfare losses as a result of unfair consumer practices.  
Whilst legislators recognised that these problematic commercial practices were already the subject 
of existing UK legislation, it was considered that the principles-based approach and broad scope of 
the UCPD would improve enforcers’ ability to act effectively.295 The CPR transposed the provisions of 
the UCPD into UK law almost verbatim. In order to avoid duplication and simplify the UK’s consumer 
protection legislative framework, 23 consumer protection laws were either partially or wholly 
repealed by the CPR.296  
The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (CCR), 
which came into force in June 2014, implement most provisions of the EU Consumer Rights 
Directive, which aims to achieve a ‘high level of consumer protection’ and facilitate the proper 
functioning of the European internal market by regulating contracts concluded between traders and 
consumers.297 The CCR seek to fundamentally reform UK consumer rights, ensuring that consumers 
and traders are aware of information requirements, cancellation rights and hidden cost measures. 
The drafters anticipated that an improved awareness of rights and responsibilities between traders 
and consumers would contribute to more effective markets and a rise in economic growth.298 
3.14.6  General protection — unsolicited selling 
The CPR regulates unsolicited selling under their prohibition of ‘unfair commercial practice’.299 The 
test for determining whether a practice constitutes an ‘unfair commercial practice’ under 
regulation 3 is multi-layered. The first general test for unfair commercial practice states that a 
commercial practice will be determined to be unfair if it:   
• contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and 
• materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average 
consumer with regard to the product.300 
Where an identifiable group of consumers is especially vulnerable to a commercial practice due to 
their age, credulity, or infirmity, in a way which was reasonably foreseeable to a trader, and where 
the practice is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of only that group, reference to 
‘the average consumer’ is to be taken to refer to the average member of that group.301 
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The second test of unfairness, also found in r 3, states that a commercial practice will be unfair if 
found to be:  
• a misleading action under r 5; 
• a misleading omission under r 6; or 
• aggressive under r 7.302 
When considering unsolicited selling, the third limb of this test, concerning aggressive commercial 
practices, is of most relevance. Regulation 7 states that a commercial practice will be deemed to be 
aggressive if, on the facts and taking account all of the surrounding circumstances, harassment, 
undue influence or coercion, including the use of physical force, is used which significantly impairs, 
or is likely to significantly impair, the average consumer’s freedom of conduct or choice regarding 
the product, thereby causing them, or being likely to cause them to make a transaction decision that 
they would otherwise not have made.303 In determining whether a commercial practice employs 
harassment, coercion or undue influence, certain elements may be taken into account. For the 
purposes of unsolicited selling, this includes the practice’s location, timing, nature and 
persistence.304  
Regulation 3(4)(d) puts forward a third means by which a commercial practice may be found to be 
unfair: a ‘blacklist’, found in Schedule I, of specific commercial practices which are to be considered 
unfair in all circumstances. Two ‘blacklisted’ practices relevant to unsolicited selling include making 
personal visits to the consumer’s home in contravention of the consumer’s request to leave or not 
return305 and making ‘persistent and unwanted solicitations’ by email, telephone, fax or other 
remote means.306 However, such acts will be exempted from the ‘blacklist’ in Schedule I if they are 
legally justifiable for the enforcement of a consumer’s contractual obligation.307 
A trader is guilty of an offence if they engage in an unfair commercial practice as determined by the 
CPR.308  Upon being found guilty of engaging in an unfair commercial practice, a trader is liable, on 
summary conviction, to be fined, and on indictment, to be fined and/or imprisoned for a maximum 
of two years.309 
In 2014, the CPR were amended to include a consumer right to civil redress, in circumstances where, 
amongst other things: 
(a) the consumer entered into a contract with the trader for the supply or sale of a product; and 
(b) the trader engaged in misleading action under r 5 or is aggressive under r 7.310  
This consumer right to civil redress includes the right to: 
(1) unwind a consumer contract if the consumer communicates to the trader that they reject the 
product within 90 days of the contract being signed, or the goods being delivered amongst 
other things, whichever is the later. At the time of rejection, the product must not be fully 
consumed.311 
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(2) receive a percentage discount on a consumer contract if the contract has not been rejected and 
there are still payments owing on the contract, where the percentage reduction is determined 
by having regard to the seriousness of the prohibited practice;312 
(3) receive damages if the consumer has incurred financial loss, or suffered distress, alarm or 
physical discomfort or inconvenience, that they would not have incurred or suffered if the 
relevant prohibited practice had not occurred.313  
3.14.7 Specific protection — unsolicited selling 
The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (CCR) 
are concerned with consumer transactions that occur outside of business premises and at a 
distance. An ‘off-premises contract’ is defined, amongst other things, as any contract between the 
consumer and the trader which is concluded in a place that is not the trader’s business premises 
with both the consumer and the trader in physical attendance.314 
The CCR do not apply to, amongst other things, contracts for financial services315 the sale of real 
property,316 and the rental of residential property.317 
Regulation 29 of the CCR provides a 14 day ‘cooling off’ period in which the consumer can withdraw 
from an off-premises contract without providing any reason or incurring any costs beyond certain 
reasonable costs associated with the return of the goods to the trader.318 The withdrawal period 
ends 14 days after the consumer obtains physical possession of the goods for sales contracts, and 14 
days after the contract is concluded in the case of service contracts.319 However, if the trader fails to 
provide the consumer with information concerning the withdrawal period, as required by regulation 
10 and 12 of the CCR, the withdrawal period will be extended to 12 months after the end of the 
initial 14 day withdrawal period.320 
It is an offence for a trader to enter into an off-premises contract without providing the consumer 
with notice of their right to cancel the contract.321 A person who has been found guilty of this 
offence is liable to be fined on summary conviction.322   
3.14.8  United States 
3.14.8.1  Introduction 
Unsolicited selling with respect to ‘door-to-door sales’ is governed in the United States by the Rule 
Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other Locations (Cooling-Off 
Rule) and the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 (FTC Act). The Telemarketing Sales Rule prohibits 
any seller or telemarketer from engaging in deceptive or abusive telemarketing acts or practices.323 
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3.14.8.2  General protection — unsolicited selling 
The FTC Act324 was enacted in 1914 to end the deceptive, unfair, and anticompetitive behaviours of 
monopolistic corporations.325 The FTC Act relevantly declares unlawful ‘unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce’ and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (the Commission) 
to prevent persons from using such acts or practices.326 
3.14.8.3  Specific protection — unsolicited selling 
The Cooling-Off Rule is a piece of protective consumer legislation which is designed to prevent unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in sales that take place away from the seller’s permanent business 
location, including a consumer’s home.327 The specific regulation of door-to-door sales stems from a 
desire to prevent misleading or aggressive sales tactics such as the use of deception to enter a 
consumer’s home, misrepresentation as to the price, quality or nature of the product, high pressure 
sales practices, and the nuisance caused to consumers of having a salesperson in their home 
uninvited.328 Legislators felt that consumers were potentially more vulnerable to the ‘hard sell’ of 
door-to-door salespeople due to a misplaced sense of hospitality to their ‘guest’ and the fact that 
the consumer could not leave the sales location, unlike a permanent business location’.329 As such, 
the Cooling-Off Rule is intended to provide consumers with confidence that they can change their 
minds about products that they bought at the front door. 330 
The majority of U.S. states also have separate statutes that regulate door-to-door contracts and 
provide for customer rescission of such contracts. Whilst the drafters of the Cooling-Off Rule 
recognised that the operation of many, often inconsistent, laws aimed at protecting consumers in 
door-to-door sales may impose a significant burden on door-to-door sellers, they considered that 
joint and coordinated efforts by the Federal Trade Commission and state authorities were required 
in order to ensure that all consumers had access to a unilateral right to rescind door-to-door sales 
without penalty.331 As such, the Federal Cooling-Off Rule does not pre-empt state laws that regulate 
door-to-door sales, except where such laws are directly inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Cooling-Off Rule.332 
The Telemarketing Sales Rule gives effect to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 
Prevention Act. Amongst other things, the Rule provides consumers with improved privacy 
protections and safeguards against unprincipled telemarketers.333  
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3.14.8.4  Door-to-door sales 
The Cooling-Off Rule provides consumers with a general right to rescind a ‘door-to-door sale’ within 
three business days of entering into the transaction.334 A ‘door to door’ sale is relevantly defined in 
the Cooling-Off Rule as a sale, rental or lease of consumer goods or services where the seller 
personally solicits the sale and the buyer’s offer or agreement to purchase is made in a location 
other than the seller’s business place, such as the buyer’s residence.335 The purchase price of the 
sale must be at least $25 for a sale at the buyer’s residence, or at least $130 for a sale made at 
another temporary location.336 The term ‘door-to-door sale’ specifically does not include, amongst 
other things, a sale which is entirely conducted and concluded by telephone.337  
Other transactions which are not subject to the Cooling-Off Rule include the sale of insurance and 
securities, and the sale or rental of real property.338 Also exempt from the Cooling-Off Rule are 
sellers of motor vehicles sold at auction and other temporary places, provided that the seller has a 
permanent place of business, and sellers of arts and crafts at fairs and similar locations.339 
The Cooling-Off Rule puts forward a number of acts or practices that, when undertaken by a seller in 
connection with any door-to-door sale, will constitute an unfair or deceptive practice.340 Such 
practices include: 
(a) Failing to provide the consumer with a receipt or sales contract in the same language as the oral 
sales presentation which, amongst other things, states the consumer’s right to cancel the sale at 
any time within 3 business days of the date of the transaction;341 
(b) Failing to provide the consumer, at the time of the sale, with a completed notice of cancellation 
form which advises the consumer, in the same language as the contract, of their right to cancel 
the sale, and the manner in which this must be done;342 
(c) Failing to verbally inform the consumer, at the time of signing the contract or purchasing the 
goods or services, about their right to cancel;343 
(d) Misrepresenting the consumer’s right to cancel;344 
(e) Failing or refusing to honour a consumer’s valid notice of cancellation.345 
The FTC Act relevantly declares unlawful ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce’ and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (the Commission) to prevent persons from 
using such acts or practices.346 The Commission enforces its consumer protection authority by way 
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of both administrative and judicial processes347 and is allowed to seek a number of equitable 
remedies including restitution or redress for consumers, injunctive relief, and a freezing of assets.348 
3.14.8.5  Telemarketing sales 
The Telemarketing Sales Rule prohibits any seller or telemarketer from engaging in deceptive or 
abusive telemarketing acts or practices.349 For the purposes of unsolicited selling, the Telemarketing 
Sales Rule’s prohibition of abusive telemarketing is of most relevance. For example, it is an abusive 
act or practice for a telemarketer to: 
(a) Telephone a person continuously or repeatedly, with intent to annoy, harass, or abuse any 
person at the called number;350 
(b) Prevent or interfere with a person’s right to be placed on a ‘do not call register’;351 
(c) Telephone a person who has previously stated that they do not wish to be telephoned by the 
seller, or has their number on a ‘do not call’ register;352 
(d) Telephone a person’s residence outside of the hours of 8:00am and 9:00pm.353 
3.14.9  Canada 
3.14.9.1 Introduction 
Direct selling is primarily regulated in Canada by province and territory-level legislation. As such, the 
scope of consumer protection differs between jurisdictions. All such legislation does however 
contain a uniform ten day cooling off period in respect of direct sale contracts due to the Direct 
Sellers Harmonization Agreement which was formally completed by the Consumer Measures 
Committee.354 The Consumer Measures Committee was established under Chapter Eight of the 
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) in 1995 to provide a federal-provincial-territorial cooperative 
framework aimed at improving consumer protection in the marketplace through the harmonisation 
of laws. 355The AIT identified direct selling as a key focus of the proposed harmonisation efforts, 
which were to be completed by July 1, 1996 but were later extended to allow compliance.356  
Unsolicited telemarketing is dealt with generally under the federal Telecommunications Act 1993 
(the Act) and more specifically under The Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules, which were first 
established by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission in 2007 as 
authorised by the Act and subsequently modified.  
3.14.9.2 Specific protection — unsolicited selling 
The Direct Sellers Harmonization Agreement provides consumers with an absolute right to cancel a 
direct sales contract any time within the 10 day period after the consumer receives a copy of the 
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contract or, in the absence of a written contract, the seller provides the consumer with a statement 
of cancellation rights.357 The cancellation period may be extended to a year where the seller does 
not comply with legislative requirements concerning licensing and registration or the seller does not 
provide a statement of cancellation rights to the consumer.358 No specific form of cancellation is 
prescribed; it is sufficient if the consumer’s intention to cancel the contract is indicated.359 In the 
event of cancellation, the direct seller must refund the consumer all money received under the 
contract within 15 days of the cancellation.360 On receipt of the refund, the consumer must return 
the goods to the seller.361 
The Telecommunications Act provides that the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission may, by order, regulate or prohibit a person’s use of a Canadian carrier’s 
telecommunications facilities for unsolicited telecommunications where the Commission deems it 
necessary to prevent unwarranted inconvenience or nuisance, subject to the considerations of 
freedom of expression.362 The Act also creates a legislative framework for a Canada-wide ‘do not 
call’ list.363 
The Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules regulate telemarketing in Canada. Relevantly, they 
require that a telemarketer not telephone a consumer who is on the national ‘do not call’ list364 or 
has previously informed the telemarketer that they do not wish to be contacted.365 Additionally, the 
Rules restrict telemarketing telecommunications to the hours between 9:00 am and 9:30 pm on 
weekdays and 10:00 am and 6:00 pm on weekends.366 
3.14.10Singapore 
3.14.10.1 Introduction 
The Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (Act), enacted in 2003 and amended in 2009, is 
protective consumer legislation intended to safeguard ‘small consumers who lack the expertise and 
resources to fend for themselves against unfair practices’. 367 The decision to provide consumers 
with an avenue for civil redress, rather than criminalise unfair practices, was prompted by the 
legislature’s view that the ‘more serious offences’, such as intimidation and cheating, were already 
covered in existing legislation, as well as their aversion to ‘over-regulat[ing] and add[ing] to business 
costs’.368 Instead, the legislation was intended to empower consumers to take action against 
unscrupulous traders, promoting ‘greater consumer responsibility and pro-activity’.369370 Legislators 
also regarded the Act as a means of improving transparency in the Singaporean marketplace, which 
in turn would ‘encourage more bona fide businesses to enter the marketplace’ and ‘boost 
confidence among consumer, especially tourists, who come from countries where Fair Trading Act 
exists [sic] such as the UK, US, Australia or New Zealand’.371 
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The Singaporean legislature, responding to specific complaints regarding high pressure sale tactics 
for direct (door-to-door) sales, also anticipated the creation of a ‘cooling off’ period for such 
consumer transactions by way of regulations made under the Act.372 
Unsolicited selling is regulated both generally under the ‘unfair practice’ doctrine in the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Act and specifically with regard to direct sales under the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) (Cancellation of Contracts) Regulations 2009.  
3.14.10.2 General protection — unsolicited selling 
The Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act takes a multi-layered approach to determining whether 
an act or omission constitutes an unfair action.  
Section 4 of the Act states that it is an unfair practice for a supplier of goods and services, in relation 
to a consumer transaction: 
(a) to do or say anything, or to omit to do or say anything, if as a result a consumer might 
reasonably be deceived or misled; 
(b) to make a false claim; 
(c) to take advantage of a consumer if the supplier knows or ought reasonably to know that the 
consumer: 
(i) is not in a position to protect his own interests; or 
(ii) is not reasonably able to understand the character, nature, language or effect of the 
transaction or any matter related to the transaction … 
Section 5(3)(a) states that when determining whether a person has engaged in an unfair practice, 
the reasonableness of their actions in the circumstances is to be considered. An unfair practice may 
consist of a single act or omission and can occur at any time during, before or after a consumer 
transaction.373 A person will be deemed to be responsible for the act or omission of an employee or 
agent if the act or omission occurred in the employee’s course of employment or the scope of the 
agent’s actual or apparent authority.374 
Additionally, section 4(d) puts forward a black list of activities that, without limiting the generality of 
paragraphs 4(a),(b) and (c), constitute an unfair practice. This ‘black list’ is situated in the Second 
Schedule of the Act. A relevant ‘blacklisted’ act for the purposes of direct sales, ‘[t]aking advantage 
of a consumer by exerting undue pressure or undue influence on the consumer to enter into a 
transaction involving goods or services’, is found in section 12 of the Second Schedule. 
A consumer ‘who has entered a consumer transaction involving an unfair practice’ has the right to 
commence a civil action against the supplier.375  The consumer need only enter into a transaction 
‘involving’ an unfair practice. It is unclear whether this requires that the unfair practice was the 
reason that the consumer entered into the contract. The Act does not provide any criminal sanctions 
in respect of unfair practices. 
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3.14.10.3 Specific protection — unsolicited selling 
In 2009, the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Cancellation of Contracts) Regulations (Regulations) 
were made under the Act to regulate direct sales contacts.376 A ‘direct sale contract’ is relevantly 
defined in the Regulations as a ‘consumer transaction, which is entered into during an unsolicited 
visit by a supplier to the place of residence of the consumer; the place of residence of another 
person; or the place of business of the consumer’.377  
The Regulations expressly do not apply to, amongst other things, any lease of residential property,378 
contracts for the supply of goods and services for business use,379 consumer contracts that do not 
exceed $50,380 and any contract for the supply of financial services or financial products which are 
subject to a statutory cancellation period as administered by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore381.  
The Regulations provide that a direct sale contract may not be enforced against a consumer prior to 
the elapse of five business days from the date that the contract was entered into, or the date that 
the consumer information notice was brought to the consumer’s attention if this was done after the 
date of the contract.382 A consumer has the right to cancel the direct sales contract at any time 
during the five day ‘cooling off period’ 383 and the contract will cease to be enforceable upon 
cancellation.384 The consumer information notice, amongst other things, must advise the consumer 
of their right to cancel the contract within the ‘cooling off period.385 
3.15 Comparing and contrasting 
3.15.1  Introduction 
This Part of the Report will compare and contrast the general and specific protections in relation to 
punitive fees in contracts, pyramid selling and unsolicited sales in the jurisdictions chosen for 
comparison. It will identify the similarities and differences between them. There is a high level of 
convergence between the consumer policy frameworks of Australia and those jurisdictions. Most 
jurisdictions adopt a combination of general and specific protections in relation to unconscionable 
and highly unfair trading practices. 
3.15.2 General protections 
The Australian consumer policy framework has most in common with the EU, the UK and the US 
consumer policy frameworks. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive of the European Parliament 
and Council (UCPD) takes a three-tiered approach which consists of a first tier general prohibition of 
unfair commercial practices, second tier prohibitions against misleading and aggressive practices, 
and a third tier blacklist of specific practices that are prohibited in all circumstances. The first tier 
general prohibition defines the conditions for determining whether a commercial practice is unfair. 
Article 5(2) provides that a commercial practice will be unfair if:   
                                                          
376  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Cancellation of Contracts) Regulations 2009 (Singapore) r 1. 
377  Ibid r 2 [see r 2 for full definition of direct sales contract]. 
378  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Cancellation of Contracts) Regulations 2009 (Singapore), r 3(b). 
379  Ibid r 3(c). 
380  Ibid r 3(d). 
381  Ibid r 3 (h). 
382  Ibid r 4(1). 
383  Ibid 4(2). 
384  Ibid r 5(1)(a). 
385  Ibid Schedule 1.  
Part 3 — Approaches to Unconscionable or Highly Unfair Trading Practices 
Comparative analysis of overseas consumer policy frameworks Page 72 
• (it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, 
and 
• it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the 
product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of the average 
member of the group when a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of 
consumers.386 
Article 2(h) defines professional diligence as ‘the standard of special skill and care which a trader 
may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market 
practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity’.  
According to Abbamonte,  
The general prohibition has an autonomous regulatory function in the sense that a 
practice which is neither misleading nor aggressive can still be captured by the general 
prohibition if it meets its criteria.387 
The UCPD was enacted as a law of the United Kingdom, by the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 (CPR). The UK regulator enforces the CPR by relying on the second tier 
prohibitions of aggressive and misleading practices rather than the first tier general prohibition of 
unfair commercial practices.388   
A significant difference between Australia and the EU/ UK position is that Australia does not have a 
first tier general prohibition of unfair commercial practices similar to art 5(2) of the UCPD, which 
some have suggested would be a useful addition to the ACL regime,389 or a third tier black list of 
specific practices that are prohibited in all circumstances.  
Since most unfair commercial practices are either misleading or aggressive, there is considerable 
overlap between the level of consumer protection in Australia, the EU and the UK. There may, 
however, be some unfair commercial practices that are neither misleading nor aggressive that will 
be prohibited in the EU and the UK if they meet the general criteria of the first tier general 
prohibition in art 5(2) of the UCPD. 
3.15.3 Misleading conduct: reasonable consumer v average consumer 
There is considerable scope for overlap between the general protection for misleading or deceptive 
conduct in s 18 of the ACL and the second tier test of unfairness in the EU Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive. The second test of unfairness found in art. 5(4)(a) of the UCPD states that a 
commercial practice will be unfair if found to be misleading as set out in Articles 6 and 7. 390 
Article 6 specifies the misleading actions that will be unfair. Article 7 specifies the misleading 
omissions that will be unfair. The courts are required to apply an objective test, namely, whether the 
commercial practice is likely to mislead the ‘average consumer’, and whether the average consumer 
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is likely to be harmed by it. Where an identifiable group of consumers is especially vulnerable to a 
commercial practice due to their age, credulity, or infirmity, in a way, which was reasonably 
foreseeable to a trader, an assessment of the fairness/unfairness of the commercial practice will be 
taken from the perspective of an average member of that group.391  
The ‘average consumer’ test has much in common with the ‘ordinary or reasonable consumer’ test 
adopted in Australia in relation to s 18 of the ACL. However, the ‘ordinary or reasonable consumer’ 
test does not protect the ‘[t]he extremely stupid, and perhaps the gullible may well be excluded 
from the class’.392 The class does not include those who fail to take reasonable care of their own 
interests.393 Reasonable members of the class would take reasonable steps to look after their own 
interests.  
The UCPD was enacted as a law of the United Kingdom, by the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 (CPR). The second test of unfairness, found in r 3, states that a commercial 
practice will be unfair if found to be:  
(a) a misleading action under r 5; or 
(b) a misleading omission under r 6. 394 
While s 18 of the ACL (and s 52 of the TPA) have been used to promote the interests of consumers 
by improving the conduct of businesses in relation to their advertising, selling practices and 
promotional activities generally, and by prohibiting them from engaging in sharp practices when 
dealing with individual consumers, their greatest use has been in connection with disputes of a 
commercial nature between competitors who are not consumers. In this regard s 52 the TPA was 
influenced by s 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), and US law. 
There is considerable scope for overlap between the general protection for misleading or deceptive 
conduct in s 18 of the ACL and s 5 of the FTC Act which prohibits ‘unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce’. According to the three-limb test set out in the FTC’s 1983 Policy 
Statement on Deception, an act or practice is deceptive if it involves:  
(1) ‘a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer’; 
(2) ‘a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances’; and 
(3) the representation, omission, or practice is material to the consumer’s choice of or conduct 
regarding a product or services.395 
Under the first limb of this test, the FTC must consider whether the act or practice was ‘likely to 
mislead’ the consumer. This element can be met where a company is found to have undertaken a 
deceptive act or practice; actual consumer harm does not have to take place. The second limb 
requires the FTC to consider the act or practice from a reasonable consumer’s perspective. In 
considering the ‘reasonableness’ of the ordinary consumer’s reaction, the FTC will consider, amongst 
other things, the clarity of the representation, whether qualifying information is conspicuous, the 
importance of any omitted information (and whether such information is available elsewhere), and 
the familiarity of the public with the product or service. If a particular consumer group is targeted, 
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such as the elderly or children, the FTC will take the perspective ‘of an ordinary, reasonable member 
of that group’. Thirdly, the FTC must determine whether the deceptive representation, omission, or 
practice was ‘material’. The FTC considers a misrepresentation or practice to be ‘material’ if it is 
‘one, which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding a product’.396  
3.15.4  Statutory unconscionable conduct v unfair commercial practice 
The scope of the protection afforded by the prohibition of statutory unconscionable conduct in s 21 
of the ACL is unclear. According to one line of judicial authority that has developed around the 
interpretation of s 21 of the ACL, and equivalent provisions in other statutes, statutory 
unconscionable conduct involves a ‘high level of moral obloquy’ and is not to be equated with 
unfairness. According to another line of judicial authority there is no such requirement. In Paciocco v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Allsop CJ stated that in applying s 12CB of the ASIC Act 
what is required is: 
… an evaluation of business behaviour (conduct in trade or commerce) as to whether it 
warrants the characterisation of unconscionable, in the light of the values and norms 
recognised by the statute. The task is not limited to finding ‘moral obloquy’; such may 
only divert the normative inquiry from that required by the statute, to another, not tied 
to the words of the statute. 397 
It has been argued that the standard of ‘unfairness’ in the UCPD is lower than the standard of 
statutory unconscionable conduct, and that the adoption of the UCPD general prohibition of unfair 
commercial practices in Australia would increase the overall level of consumer protection.398  
In Australia, the general protection provided by statutory unconscionable conduct may be harder to 
satisfy that the first tier general protection for unfair commercial practice although the approach to 
be adopted in relation to each has much in common. In Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group, Allsop CJ observed: 
Although it can be accepted that unjustness and unfairness are of a lower moral or 
ethical standard than unconscionability … The characterisation of unjustness or 
unfairness is, of course, evaluative and a task to be carried out with a close attendance to 
the statutory provisions.399  
According to Paterson and Brody, 
… the general prohibition on unfair commercial practices appears capable of catching the 
(mis) selling of unsuitable consumer credit insurance to inexperienced and low-income 
consumers … The sale of products that are patently unsuitable for those who are 
purchasing them might well be considered inconsistent with the level of ‘skill and care’ 
that a business may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers and certainly 
distorts the ‘economic behaviour’ of the target group. These concepts might even extend 
to sanction the conduct of payday lenders who extend credit to consumers already in 
debt and highly unlikely to be able to repay the loan without financial hardship.400 
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3.15.5  Role for codes of conduct 
According to the OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit, ‘[c]odes of conduct … are tools that can be used by 
governments and/or industry to help establish and consolidate god business practices’.401 
In the EU the first tier test of unfairness in Art 5(2) of the UCPD requires that the practice must be 
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence. Article 2(h) defines professional diligence as 
‘the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise 
towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of 
good faith in the trader’s field of activity’.  
In some EU Member States codes of conduct are used to set standards of good business behaviour 
in a particular sector. According to Abbamonte,  
… well established codes of conduct could reflect good business practice and be used to 
identify the requirements of professional diligence in concrete cases.402 
In Australia, assessing whether conduct meets the standard of statutory unconscionable conduct in s 
21 of the ACL, is an evaluative task to be understood by taking into account the values and norms 
that Parliament considered relevant when it identified the non-exhaustive list of factors in s 22 of 
the ACL, and s 12CC of the ASIC Act.403 One of the factors listed in s 22(1)(g) and (2)(g) of the ACL that 
a court may have regard to is the requirements of any applicable industry code. Mandatory and 
voluntary industry codes of conduct are regulated by Pt IVB of the CCA, and do not form part of the 
ACL. They are generally concerned with protecting small business owners rather than consumers. In 
ACCC v South East Melbourne Cleaning Pty Ltd (in liq)404 Murphy J observed that the Franchising 
Code provides a normative standard of conscience for the purposes of assessing whether conduct is 
unconscionable. 
In this regard the EU concept on an ‘unfair commercial practice’ and statutory unconscionable 
conduct under s 21 of the ACL are similar.  
3.15.6  Aggressive commercial practices 
The second tier test of unfairness in art 5(4)(b), of the UCPD states that a commercial practice will be 
unfair if found to be: aggressive as set out in Articles 8 and 9.405Article 8 of the UCPD states that a 
commercial practice will be deemed to be aggressive if, on the facts and taking account all of the 
surrounding circumstances, harassment, undue influence or coercion, including the use of physical 
force, is used which significantly impairs, or is likely to significantly impair, the average consumer’s 
freedom of conduct or choice regarding the product, thereby causing them, or being likely to cause 
them to make a transaction decision that they would otherwise not have made.406  
Article 9 provides that in determining whether a commercial practice employs harassment, coercion 
or undue influence, certain elements may be taken into account, including the location, timing, 
nature or persistence of the commercial practice and whether the trader knowingly exploits a 
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‘specific misfortune’ or a circumstance that is so grave as to impair the judgement of the consumer 
in order to influence their decision regarding the product.407  
In the United Kingdom, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPR), the 
second test of unfairness, found in r 3, states that a commercial practice will be unfair if found to be 
aggressive under r 7.408 With regard to aggressive commercial practices, r 7 states that a commercial 
practice will be deemed to be aggressive if, on the facts and taking account all of the surrounding 
circumstances, harassment, undue influence or coercion, including the use of physical force, is used 
which significantly impairs, or is likely to significantly impair, the average consumer’s freedom of 
conduct or choice regarding the product, thereby causing them, or being likely to cause them to 
make a transaction decision that they would otherwise not have made.409  In determining whether a 
commercial practice employs harassment, coercion or undue influence, certain elements may be 
taken into account, including the location, timing, nature or persistence of the commercial practice 
and whether the trader knowingly exploits a ‘specific misfortune’ or a circumstance that is so grave 
as to impair the judgement of the consumer in order to influence their decision regarding the 
product.410  
The standard of ‘unfair conduct’, rather than ‘unconscionable conduct’, is also adopted in s 5(1) of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act in the United States. The test for ‘unfairness’ under the FTC Act 
was first expressed in the 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness and later codified into the FTC Act in 
1994 as 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  
An act or practice will be considered by the FTC to be unfair if: 
• it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers;  
• that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition; and that 
cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers. 
3.15.7  Unfair terms and the requirement of good faith 
The definition of an unfair term in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 United Kingdom has an additional 
requirement that the term must be ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’ which is not present 
in the definition of an unfair term in s 24 of the ACL. Does the absence of the requirement of good 
faith in the Australian definition of unfair term make Australia’s general protection narrower or 
broader that it’s UK equivalent?  
One of the purposes of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 was to give effect in the UK to the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCCD). The preamble to the UTCCD states that the 
purpose of the requirement that the term must be ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’ is to 
ensure that the fairness assessment includes: 
… an overall evaluation of the different interests involved; whereas this constitutes this 
constitutes the requirement of good faith; whereas , in making an assessment  of good 
faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining position of the 
parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the 
goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; whereas 
the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where  he deals 
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fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into 
account.411 
One difficulty with adopting a similar requirement in Australia is that: 
… it has been overtly recognised for centuries across many different legal contexts, and 
across both the civil law and common law, it is a principle that can mean different things 
in different contexts.412  
In Mineralogy v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) Edelman J observed: 
In the context of a contractual clause which empowers one party to act to the detriment 
of another, the content of the norm of good faith has often been described as requiring 
‘reasonableness’ in the exercise of the power, or, in more detail, ‘to act reasonably and 
with fair dealing having regard to the interests of the parties (which will, inevitably, at 
times conflict) and to the provisions, aims and purposes of the contract, objectively 
ascertained’: Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited  [2015] FCAFC 
50 [288] (Allsop CJ citing Renard Constructions, Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Trustees of the 
Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney  (1993) 31 NSWLR 91, Burger King 
Corporation v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd  [2001] NSWCA 187; (2001) 69 NSWLR 558, and 
Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella [1998] NSWSC 483; (1998)44 NSWLR 349.413 
The UTCCD requirement of good faith requires ‘an overall evaluation of the different interests 
involved’. The unfair terms regime in the ACL already imposes such a requirement. In applying the 
test of unfairness s 24(2)(b) of the ACL requires the court to consider the term in the context of the 
contract as a whole. Some contractual terms that appear to be unfair when viewed in isolation, 
might be considered to be fair in the context of the agreement as a whole: a harsh term may be 
necessary to ensure that the consumer obtains the goods or services at a lower price. The lower 
price is the trade-off for the harsh term. 
3.15.8  Inclusion of punitive fees in contracts 
The EU and UK include a grey list include ‘a term which has the object or effect of requiring a 
consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum 
in compensation’ which is included in the UK grey list. 414 
The Australian grey list includes ‘a term that penalises, or has the effect of penalising, one party (but 
not another party) for a breach or termination of the contract’.415 
Both Australia and the UK exclude terms relating to the main subject matter and setting the upfront 
price of goods or services, but this would not extend to cover default fees or termination fees.  
The consumer policy framework in the United States with regard to the inclusion of punitive fees in 
contracts to provide for a general protection and a number of industry-specific protections. General 
protection is provided by the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) , which prohibits ‘unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’.  
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In Canada, the regulation of punitive fees in contracts by way of general consumer legislation 
appears to occur at the province and territory-level. As such, federal laws, which deal with punitive 
fees in contracts, tend to focus on specific industries, such as the banking and aviation sectors.  
3.15.9  Pyramid Schemes: promoting retail sales over recruitment 
In the EU, the UCPD blacklist includes the establishment, operation or promotion of a ‘pyramid 
promotional scheme’ which is defined as a scheme ‘where a consumer gives consideration for the 
opportunity to receive compensation that is derived primarily from the introduction of other 
consumers into the scheme rather than from the sale or consumption of products’.416 
In the UK, the CPR blacklist includes the establishment, operation or promotion of a pyramid scheme 
‘where a consumer gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation that is derived 
primarily from the introduction of other consumers into the scheme rather than from the sale or 
consumption of products’.417 
In both Australia and the US, there is a degree of uncertainty about how to distinguish between a 
legitimate multilevel marketing scheme and an illegal pyramid scheme.  
In Australia, s 46(1)(b) of the ACL focuses on the recruitment payments and whether the emphasis in 
the promotion of the scheme was given to the entitlement to receive recruitment payments as 
opposed to earning money through the volume of business transacted in terms of selling goods or 
services. In some cases this may be relatively clear cut. In ACCC v Jutsen (No 3) Nicholas J found that 
the respondents placed ‘great emphasis’ in the promotion of the scheme on the ability of a member 
to earn income from the recruitment of new members, rather than on earning income from the sale 
of goods or services.418  
In the United States, the Omnitrition test of an illegal pyramid scheme requires two limbs to be 
satisfied: (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the right to receive in return for recruiting other 
participants into the program rewards which are unrelated to sale of the product to ultimate users. 
The Court of Appeals (9th Cir) in Federal Trade Commission v BurneLounge, Inc, stated that in order to 
fall within the Omnitrition test of an illegal pyramid scheme it is not necessary that the recruitment 
rewards be completely unrelated to product sales. However, the Court did not decide the degree to 
which recruitment rewards would need to be unrelated to product sales. 
In Canada, income from an illegal pyramid scheme is derived primarily from recruitment payments 
and not from the retail sale of products. 
At one end of the spectrum, if rewards are earned simply from product sales it will be characterised 
as a legitimate multilevel marketing scheme. At the other end of the spectrum if rewards are earned 
from recruiting others to join the scheme it will be characterised as an illegal pyramid scheme. If 
rewards earned from recruiting new participants to buy products for retail sales it may be an illegal 
pyramid scheme depending on the focus or emphasis of the scheme. To avoid a finding of an illegal 
scheme, the scheme must have rules promoting retail sales over recruitment.  
                                                          
416  Directive 2005/29/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 11 May 2005 concerning Unfair 
Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market [2005] OJ L 149/22 annex I, pt 14. 
417  Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK) no. 1277, schedule 1 para 14. 
418  ACCC v Jutsen (No 3) (2011) 206 FCR 264, [116]. 
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3.15.10  Unsolicited selling and cooling off periods 
Most jurisdictions adopt a combination of general and specific protections in relation to unsolicited 
selling all provide for a ‘cooling off’ period in which the consumer can withdraw from a contract 
entered into away from the seller’s permanent business location, including a consumer’s home. All 
jurisdictions recognise that consumers are more vulnerable to aggressive sales tactics when 
confronted at their own home, since they cannot leave the sales location, unlike a permanent 
business location. 
In the EU, the blacklist includes two practices relevant to unsolicited selling include: making personal 
visits to the consumer’s home in contravention of the consumer’s request to leave or not return419 
and making ‘persistent and unwanted solicitations’ by email, telephone, fax or other remote 
means.420 However, such acts will be exempted from the ‘blacklist’ in Annex I if they are legally 
justifiable for the enforcement of a consumer’s contractual obligation.421 
 In the UK, the blacklist includes two practices relevant to unsolicited selling include making personal 
visits to the consumer’s home in contravention of the consumer’s request to leave or not return422 
and making ‘persistent and unwanted solicitations’ by email, telephone, fax or other remote 
means.423 However, such acts will be exempted from the ‘blacklist’ in Schedule I if they are legally 
justifiable for the enforcement of a consumer’s contractual obligation.424 
All jurisdictions provide for provide for a ‘cooling off’ period in which the consumer can withdraw 
from a contract. In the US the Cooling-Off Rule provides consumers with a general right to rescind a 
‘door-to-door sale’ within three business days of entering into the transaction.425 
In Australia, s 82(1) of the ACL provides for a 10 day cooling off period during which the consumer 
may cancel the contract.  
In Canada, the Direct Sellers Harmonization Agreement provides consumers with an absolute right to 
cancel a direct sales contract any time within the 10 day period after the consumer receives a copy 
of the contract or, in the absence of a written contract, the seller provides the consumer with a 
statement of cancellation rights.426   
In the EU, Article 9 of the CRD provides a 14 day ‘cooling off’ period in which the consumer can 
withdraw from an off-premises contract without providing any reason or incurring any costs beyond 
certain reasonable costs associated with the return of the goods to the trader.427 
In the UK, Regulation 29 of the CCR provides a 14 day ‘cooling off’ period in which the consumer can 
withdraw from an off-premises contract without providing any reason or incurring any costs beyond 
certain reasonable costs associated with the return of the goods to the trader.428 
 
                                                          
419  Directive 2005/29/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair 
Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market [2005] OJ L 149/22 annex I, pt 25. 
420  Ibid annex I, pt 26. 
421  Ibid annex I, pts 25-26. 
422  Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK) no 1277, schedule I, para 25. 
423  Ibid schedule I, para 26. 
424  Ibid para 25 & 26. 
425  16 CFR § 429.1. 
426  Consumer Measures Committee, Direct Sellers Harmonization Agreement, 1.  
427  Directive 2011/83/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council of 25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights [2011] 
OJ L 304/64, art 9(1). 
428  Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (UK) no 3134, r 29. 
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Part 4: Approaches to regulation of e-commerce and 
peer to peer transactions 
Issue 2: Professor Sharon Christensen, Faculty of law, Queensland University 
of Technology∗ 
The second issue for analysis is how consumer laws have responded to the challenges of 
e-commerce and peer-to-peer transactions.  
4.1 Introduction — regulatory approaches to e-commerce 
Transactions that take place over the Internet and through application-based platforms raise a 
number of consumer issues that do not arise in face-to-face transactions. The expanding digital 
economy has many benefits for consumers such as increased choice and improved customer 
service as well as expanded opportunities for small business. The absence of a physical business 
and face to face transaction alters the nature of the business to consumer interaction and creates 
opportunities for new unfair practices to emerge. Despite the changed business model most 
jurisdictions have continued to use existing general and specific consumer protection mechanisms 
supplemented by codes and guidelines to provide consumer protection and redress for online 
commercial activities.  
This report compares the current and proposed regulatory approaches to consumer protection in 
Australia, United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Singapore for online transactions and 
emerging consumer issues in the sharing economy.  
The report focuses on the specific consumer issues identified by regulators and commentators, 
which are within the ambit of the Australian Consumer Law:  
1. Product quality  
The ability of a consumer to verify the quality or description of the products or services purchased 
is a common problem in all forms of online transaction. Generally existing legal frameworks impose 
warranties or guarantees of acceptable quality and fitness for purpose which are applicable to 
products purchased online, but there are two emerging issues. First the online or digital products 
may not fall easily within traditional concepts of ‘goods and services’ resulting in uncertainty in the 
application of these standards. Secondly, consumers in online transactions are more reliant on 
information about the product and may have regard to customer reviews, comparison website, 
product ratings and review tools. The increase in these types of information websites raises the 
probability of inaccurate and unreliable data or information. Thirdly, jurisdictional differences allow 
suppliers to avoid warranties or guarantees by exclusion clauses or electing to be bound by laws of 
low regulatory jurisdictions. 
2. Misleading information and practices 
Misleading practices can occur in any type of transaction whether face to face or online. Greater 
reliance upon information provided by suppliers on their website and information provides via 
other comparison website, consumer reviews and social media increase the probability of 
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inaccurate information and other misleading or unfair practices developing. Particular practices 
emerging as common problems in an online environment are: 
• Misleading pricing practices (drip pricing and surge pricing),  
• Fake online reviews or comparisons;  
• Consumer Fraud (eg. fake listings); 
3. Sharing economy 
The rapid growth of the sharing economy429 through peer to peer platforms430, such as Uber and 
Airbnb, presents different challenges for the existing regulatory model. In addition to the issues of 
product quality and misleading practices, questions about the application and suitability of existing 
business to consumer (B2C) regulatory frameworks arise. The report considers the following issues: 
• Should regulation treat all suppliers of goods or services, whether a large corporation or an 
inexperience individual, in the same way? Does the variation in the market between sharing of 
assets by individuals via peer to peer platforms and business to business transactions431 mean 
there is too much complexity for a one size fits all regulatory model? 
• Should the regulatory model include some protection for consumers transacting with other 
consumers? Minimum standard or quality or minimum information disclosure requirements?   
• What is the role of the platform provider in the transaction? Should the platform provider 
bear responsibility for the conduct of suppliers using the platform?  
Online transactions also create problems for dispute resolution between consumers across 
jurisdictions. This aspect is considered in Parts 5 and 6 of the report.  
4.2 Product quality in e-commerce 
4.2.1 Issues 
Consumers in online transactions generally do not have an opportunity to inspect goods and need 
to rely upon the description of the item available on the website. Evidence also suggests that 
consumers place significant reliance upon the supplier’s online reputation, customer reviews, 
independent comparison websites and rating tools.432 A buyer will rarely have the means to verify 
that the description on the website is accurate or that the customer reviews are a true reflection of 
the seller’s business or the product.433  
Consumer complaints about fitness for purpose or acceptable quality and correspondence with 
description are not unique to online transactions. As a consequence the majority of the reviewed 
jurisdictions have continued to rely upon the application of existing general protections (misleading 
                                                          
429  Sharing economy has been defined as ‘online platforms that help people share access to assets, resources, time and 
skills. (Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking the Sharing Economy: An Independent Review, (available at….) 
430  Peer to peer platforms are examined at [29.2]. 
431  Some examples are BrandGathering (online platform that connects businesses to undertake joint marking and 
branding activities helping to save money) and Nimber (sharing of logistics). 
432   Issues with the reliability of online reviews and recommendations is examined at [27] of this report. 
433  There is growing evidence that customers reviews are often fake and that customers are reluctant to leave negative 
reviews. See Aisha Gani ‘Amazon sues 1,000 ‘fake reviewers’’, The Guardian (online), 18 October 2015 
www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/18/amazon-sues-1000-fake-reviewers and Benjamin G Edelman and 
Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate CompaniesLike Airbnb and Uber? 
(1 October 2015) Ben Edelman 22 www.benedelman.org/publications/efficiencies-and-shortcuts-2015-11-24.pdf. 
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or unfair practices) or specific protections (consumer warranties or guarantees). Most of the 
jurisdictions recognise the benefits of maintaining the same regulatory framework for consumer 
transactions online or face to face although regulators acknowledge differences in the opportunity 
for consumers to inspect goods and verify description and quality. While there are parallels 
between online sales of goods and services and the traditional face to face model, the different 
nature of digital products and the changing business models within the digital and sharing 
economies raise a number of emerging issues for regulators: 
(1) Online or digital products may not fall easily within traditional concepts of ‘goods’ or ‘services’ 
resulting in uncertainty about the application of consumer guarantees. This can arise in a 
number of situations: 
i. Some common products, such as refrigerators now may also include the acquisition of 
software connecting the fridge to the internet. Is this a purchase of goods or services or 
both?  
ii. Case law has struggled with the legal characterisation of digital content supplied through a 
download from the internet. The definition of ‘goods’ in the ACL includes computer 
software, which means that software provided by way of a disc or a download is included 
as ‘goods’. Despite this there is a potential lack of clarity about the nature of data, such as 
music, information or advice, downloaded via the internet, which does not include 
software. If this type of information does not fall within the definition of goods guarantees 
of acceptable quality will not apply. 
iii. Transactions occurring via peer to peer platforms434 need careful consideration. The nature 
of the supply may vary depending upon whether a person is supplying a product (such as 
selling their car on Gumtree); selling by ‘auction’ on a shared marketplace or ‘sharing’ their 
car via ride sharing platform or a car sharing platform. What guarantees of quality is the 
consumer entitled to expect?   
The only jurisdiction to enact specific legislation to regulate product quality for digital 
content is the United Kingdom. 
(2) Consumers are often dealing with suppliers who are unknown to the consumer: Should online 
suppliers be required to provide additional or more detailed information to consumers about 
their products, the contract terms or their business? 
(3) Increased reliance is placed by consumers on the description of products on supplier websites, 
consumer reviews, ‘independent’ comparison websites, and other online tools raising the 
need to consider if laws regulating misleading conduct and other unfair practices are 
sufficiently broad and adaptable so as to apply to new online selling and advertising 
practices.435 Increased provision of professional advice through cognitive digital platforms also 
raises issues about how to regulate the quality of the advice and the underlying algorithms.436  
(4) The increasing global operation of many online businesses and platforms raises jurisdictional 
issues for enforcement. Businesses operating in low regulatory jurisdictions, but supplying 
goods or services within high regulatory jurisdictions will attempt to exclude the operation of 
warranties or guarantees by choosing the law of another country as the applicable law. 
Jurisdictions have attempted to counter this behaviour by prohibiting contracting out, 
broadening extra territorial application of laws and ensuring harmonisation of laws at least 
nationally and in some cases within regions.  
                                                          
434  The issue of consumer-to-consumer transactions and peer-to-peer platforms is examined at [29] Peer to Peer 
Transactions and the Sharing Economy. 
435  False or fake reviews and endorsements are considered separately at [27]. 
436  ASIC has recently released a consultation paper proposing a new regulatory guide for providing digital financial 
product advice to retain clients. As the cognitive ability of computing improves the provision of a range of different 
types of professional advice through cognitive digital platforms will increase. 
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The various approaches of Australia, United Kingdom, United States (at a Federal level), Canada (at 
a Federal level) and Singapore to product quality in e-commerce are explained and compared. The 
review focuses on: 
(1) the guarantees or warranties of acceptable quality applicable in each jurisdiction for ‘goods’ 
and ‘services’ purchased online and whether these apply to the different transactions 
conducted online and digital content; 
(2) whether additional information disclosure requirements have been implemented for online 
transactions; and 
(3) the application of unfair conduct or misleading conduct provisions to transactions conducted 
online between parties in different jurisdictions.  
4.2.2 Australia 
Under the Australian Consumer Law consumers purchasing online or in face to face transactions 
are provided with both general and specific protections in relation to the quality of goods and 
services. General protections are provided for misleading conduct occurring in trade or 
commerce437 and unconscionable conduct in the supply of goods and services in trade or 
commerce.438 Specific protection is provided by statutory guarantees applying to goods and 
services. In 2006 the Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce were issued with the purpose 
of enhancing consumer confidence in electronic commerce by providing guidance for business to 
consumer transactions. The guidelines do not alter the provisions of the Australian Consumer Law. 
Both the statutory guarantees and general misleading conduct provisions are technology neutral 
and purport to apply to both face to face and online transactions. There are no specific provisions 
in the ACL directed to the quality of digital products or services. This section of the report focusses 
on the operation of the general misleading conduct provisions and the statutory guarantees in the 
context of online transactions.  
4.2.2.1 General protections — misleading conduct 
Section 18(1) of the ACL which prohibits a person from engaging in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive was outlined previously.439 The section applies to conduct engaged in by persons or 
corporations in the course of trade or commerce that is apt to lead another person into error. 
The main issue arising in an application of the misleading conduct provisions is whether these 
provisions apply to international sellers located outside of Australia. Many disputes and 
enforcement actions in relation to online transactions will involve suppliers or customers who are 
in different states or more commonly, different countries. Many of the enforcement or civil penalty 
actions by the ACCC involve allegations of misleading conduct by suppliers440 or potentially peer to 
peer platform operators who are domiciled in other countries.  
                                                          
437  Australian Consumer Law, s 18 and s 29 (false and misleading representations in relation to goods and services).  
438  Australian Consumer Law, ss 20-22. 
439  See Part 3.  
440  See for example Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hewlett-Packard Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 
653; ACCC v Valve Corp [2016] FCA 196. 
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The ACL as a law of the Commonwealth441 applies to the conduct of corporations. A corporation 
according to s 4(1) Competition and Consumer Act 2010 includes a ‘foreign corporation’ which is 
defined by reference to the corporation’s power in s 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution. Most 
corporations operating in online markets that are not Australian corporations will fall within this 
definition. 
The second requirement in s 18 ACL is that the corporation must be acting in trade or commerce, 
which is defined as meaning ‘trade or commerce within Australia or between Australia and places 
outside Australia’ (s2 ACL). 
Section 5 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 extends the operation of the ACL to ‘conduct 
engaged in’ outside Australia by: 
(1) bodies corporate incorporated or carrying on business within Australia; or  
(2) Australian citizens; or 
(3) persons ordinarily resident within Australia. 
The effect of these provisions is that a foreign corporation engaging in conduct in Australia or 
carrying on business in Australia is subject to the misleading conduct provisions of the ACL. 
Conduct in the form of representations will be characterised as occurring in Australia where the 
representation occurs in the course of a transaction with an Australian consumer or is directed 
toward an Australian consumer.442 engaged in by a corporation Carry on business usually requires 
the corporation to carry on activities of a commercial nature with customers within Australia. There 
is no requirement for the corporation to have a physical presence in Australia.443 The combined 
effect of these provisions is that a corporation supplying goods or services to a consumer in 
Australia via an online website will usually be subject to the misleading conduct provisions of the 
ACL, even if the website is located on a server outside of Australia. 
These type of conduct provisions are applicable to misleading claims by suppliers about product 
quality or assertions by suppliers that guarantees of quality in the ACL do not apply. In the absence 
of this type of conduct a consumer will only be able to claim a remedy for defective or faulty goods 
if the statutory guarantees in the ACL apply. 
4.2.2.2 Specific protections — statutory guarantees 
Under the Australian Consumer Law, a consumer of goods is provided with a number of statutory 
guarantees concerning the title to the goods and the quality of the goods.444 The purpose of the 
guarantees is to provide minimum standards and obligations on the suppliers of goods or services 
to consumers.445 There is a difference between the guarantees applicable to goods and services. 
Guarantees for ‘goods’ are: 
(1) the suppler has the right to dispose of the goods (s 51); 
(2) the supplier has the right to undisturbed possession (s 52); 
                                                          
441  The ACCC as a Commonwealth Regulator. The ACL as a law of different state jurisdictions can be enforced by a State 
regulator. 
442  ACCC v Valve Corp [2016] FCA 196, [180]. 
443  ACCC v Valve Corp [2016] FCA 196, [199] — [205]. 
444  The statutory guarantees apply to goods or services supplied after 1 January 2011. 
445  The guarantees are in similar terms to the consumer guarantees in the New Zealand Consumer Guarantee Act 1993 
(NZ). 
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(3) the goods are free from undisclosed securities (s 53); 
(4) goods supplied in trade or commerce, other than by way of auction, are of acceptable quality 
(s 54); 
(5) goods supplied in trade or commerce are fit for a disclosed purpose or any purpose 
represented by the supplier (s 55); 
(6) goods supplied in trade or commerce by description to a consumer, other than by way of sale 
by auction, correspond with the description s 56); and  
(7) goods supplied in trade or commerce, other than by way of sale by auction, by reference to 
sample or demonstration model correspond to that sample or model (s 57). 
Guarantees for ‘services’ are: 
(1) the services supplied in trade or commerce are rendered with due care and skill (s 60); 
(2) the services are fit for the purpose made known to the supplier at the time of supply (s 61); 
(3) the services will be completed within a reasonable time (s 62).  
The statutory guarantees apply regardless of the terms of the contract and cannot, except in some 
limited cases, be contracted out of.446 A failure to comply with the statutory guarantees may allow 
a consumer to replace goods, repair goods or obtain a refund. Consumer remedies are 
supplemented by an enforcement power vested in the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) to commence an action against a supplier. Usually this power will be used if 
there is evidence of systemic failure to honour guarantees. As part of this action the ACCC can seek 
penalties up to $1.1 million against bodies corporate and $220,000 against individuals. 
Key issues for application of the statutory guarantee provisions to online transactions are: 
• Do statutory guarantees apply to digital products and services? 
• Should statutory guarantees apply to the supply of all goods or services provided online, 
irrespective of the type of transaction or identity of the seller? This issue is considered in detail 
under Peer to Peer.  
• Do statutory guarantees apply to transactions with international sellers? Can sellers opt out of 
the guarantees under the terms of the contract? 
The application of statutory guarantees products and services purchased online; particularly where 
digital products are supplied depends on a number of threshold issues. First does the particular 
type of online transaction fall within the threshold requirements and secondly, if the statutory 
guarantee provisions apply, will the acceptable quality and fitness for purpose provisions be 
effective in the event of a defect in the product. 
4.2.2.3 Application of statutory guarantees in e-commerce 
Statutory guarantees in the ACL apply where: 
(1) a person supplies;  
(2) goods or services to a consumer; and  
(3) the supply is in trade or commerce. 
                                                          
446  Australian Consumer Law ss 64-64A. A supplier is only able to limit liability where the services are not of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal or domestic use. 
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1. ‘Supply’ 
A person will supply goods to another person where the goods are supplied (including re-supplied) 
by way of ‘sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire-purchase’.447 Notably, the definition requires that 
some consideration be paid in exchange for the goods and, therefore, statutory guarantees will not 
generally apply to the supply of goods by way of gift.448 A supply of services occurs where the 
services are ‘provided, granted or conferred’.  
Clearly an online transaction in the following form is a supply: 
• sale, lease or hire of traditional goods (books, watches, appliances etc) via an online site; 
• a provision of services via an online medium (eg cloud computing services, IT help services, 
digital professional advice) 
• sale of software provided by wave of a disc or USB is a supply of goods, due to the inclusion of 
computer software in the definition of goods. 
There is a lack of clarity about: 
• Sharing or exchange via a peer to peer platform. Whether the person is ‘supplying’ goods or 
services may depend on the form of the interaction. The view taken by a court may be 
influenced by whether consideration is paid or operates in a commercial context. For example 
the sharing of household items449 between individuals while resembling a lease or hire 
arrangement, may not be a supply if not money is paid. In contrast, a person who provides 
ride sharing services through Uber in exchange for payment will probably be considered by a 
court as supplying a service. Clarity about whether the transaction is for goods or services is 
relevant to the applicable guarantees.  
• Online auctions: It should also be noted that a number of the statutory guarantees (ss 54-59 
ACL) do not apply to goods sold by auction. The phrase sale by auction is defined as, ‘in 
relation to the supply of goods by a person, means a sale by auction that is conducted by an 
agent of the person (whether the agent acts in person or by electronic means).’ The rationale 
for this approach is based upon the ability of a consumer for an auction to evaluate the value 
of the goods prior to auction. The continued application of this rationale to an online auction 
should be reconsidered. Whether an online auction, such as those that occur through eBay is 
actually an auction in accordance with the definition is also unclear.450 Unlike a face to face 
auction, eBay does not actually sell the goods as agent for the seller, but merely provides an 
online platform for the seller to obtain bids from consumers and facilitates acceptance of a 
price.451 On this basis a seller via eBay or similar website may not be engaged in a sale by 
auction.452  
                                                          
447  Supply is defined in s 2 of the Australian Consumer Law. 
448  Note s 5 Australian Consumer Law which provides a ‘donation’ of goods or services is not a supply unless for 
promotional purposes and s 266 of the Australian Consumer Law which applies where a consumer who acquires 
goods gives them to a third party. The third party will be able to enforce the statutory guarantees in relation to 
those goods as if it were the consumer of the goods. 
449  Gumtree, Etsy, The Clothing Exchange, TuShare. 
450  For an examination of this issue refer to Kate Tokeley, Towards a New Regulatory Regime for New Zealand Online 
Auctions [2011] New Zealand Law Review 91. The exception for auctions was removed from the New Zealand 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 in 2013. 
451  Smythe v Thomas [2007] NSWSC 844. Whether particular online auction sites fall within the definition will depend 
in each case on the role of the auction website in the transactions. 
452  Malam v Graysonline, Rumbles Removals and Storage [2012] NSWCTTT 197. 
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2. ‘Goods’ and ‘services’ 
The characterisation of digital content or products as ‘goods’ or ‘services’ it important for 
determining the standard of quality the product must meet. Goods obtain the benefit of the 
guarantee of ‘acceptable quality’ (s 54 ACL). There is no equivalent for services which are instead 
required to be fit for the implied or express purpose made known by the consumer (s 61 ACL). 
Acceptable quality is a broader concept and will require the goods to be fit for all purposes for 
which the goods would ordinarily be used. Goods that are not fit for one of the purposes for which 
they are normally used, will not be of acceptable quality.453 Appearance and finish, being free from 
inherent defects, design defects, manufacturing defects or instructional defects and being safe to 
use are all attributes of acceptable quality.  
Goods and services are both defined widely in s 2 of the ACL.  
The definition of ‘goods’ in s 2 ACL includes various goods, chattels, vehicles, minerals and crops as 
well as ‘computer software’. Computer software was added to the definition in 2010 due to 
uncertainty about whether software fell within the ordinary meaning of ‘goods’.454   
‘Services’ is also broadly defined in s 2 ACL so that any item not categorised as ‘goods’ will be 
services.455  
It is important to note that a supply of goods cannot also be a supply of services. The two are 
mutually exclusive and if the product supplied comes within both definitions it will be a supply of 
goods. It is possible however for one transaction to include separate supplies of goods and services. 
This approach has been applied by courts in the case of computer software supplied by way of a 
computer disc or USB.456 
On the basis of the current definitions computer software provided on a disc or USB or downloaded 
from the internet will fall within the definition of goods in the ACL. On the other hand digital data 
that does not contain executable code, such as pictures or music is unlikely to fall within the 
definition. The issue was recently considered in the decision of ACCC v Valve Corporation. Valve 
Corporation is a computer game developer and supplier which is incorporated, and based, in the 
State of Washington in the United States. Valve Corporation operates and controls: 
(1) a website located at http://store.steampowered.com (the Steampowered Website); 
(2) an online computer game delivery platform called ‘Steam’ which is an application that a 
consumer can download from the Steam Website to install on to a computer or electronic 
device; and 
(3) an online support assistance service known as ‘Steam Support’ accessible from Steam or the 
Steampowered Website. 
The ACCC alleged misleading conduct on the part of Valve constituted by representations on their 
website about the applicability of statutory warranties to their products. The ACCC alleges that a 
‘good’ was supplied by Valve Corporation either because software is supplied, or because Valve 
                                                          
453  Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1969] 2 AC 31, 78-79. 
454  In the case of State Sale of Goods Acts software downloaded from the internet to a computer was not a supply of 
‘goods’ under the Act.454 In contrast in Goldiwood Pty Ltd t/as Margaret Franklin & Associates v ADL (Aust) Pty Ld 
t/as Adviser Logic [2014] QCAT 238 web-based software provided for financial planning was held to fall within the 
definition of ‘goods’ in s 2 of the ACL, because of the inclusion of ‘computer software’ in the definition 
455  The definition of services does not include financial services which are regulated under the ASIC Act. 
456  Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 48; St Albans City and District 
Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
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Corporation has bundled software and services, and the definition of ‘goods’ includes computer 
software. Valve Corporation denies that it supplied ‘goods’ within the meaning of ‘consumer goods’ 
in s 2(1) of the ACL. It says that it supplied ‘online access to video games via a subscription service’. 
It says that this is a ‘service’ within s 2(1) of the ACL so that the consumer guarantee of acceptable 
quality in s 54 does not apply. 
The Court concluded that the contract between Valve and the consumers was a contract for the 
supply of goods because the primary supply by Value to its customers was computer software. This 
conclusion was reached after a detailed consideration of the nature of the digital product provided 
by Valve. Even though the predominant supply was computer software it is clear from the 
judgment that other non-executable data, such as music and pictures will not necessarily fall within 
the definition.  
Assuming the analysis in Valve is adopted more widely by Australian courts there are still a number 
of uncertainties that may arise: 
(1) If the software downloaded is ‘goods’ the statutory guarantee of acceptable quality will 
usually only apply if the software is supplied for consideration in trade and commerce. If the 
software is given for free to the user there is no consideration and the question is whether this 
is a ‘supply’. Is the situation distinguishable if the subsequent service (ie downloading data 
using the software) is for a monetary fee? Is it possible to argue the provision of the software 
together with the data was a ‘sale’ for consideration? 
(2) Is the ‘service’ provided by the supplier the right to access the data for the purpose of 
download or the actual downloaded data?  Is the downloaded data actually a different service 
or should it be characterized as ‘goods’ to obtain the benefit of the ‘acceptable quality 
guarantee’ rather than only attracting the benefit of the guarantee in s 61 ACL of fit for the 
consumer’s implied or express purpose. In Valve the structure of the transaction and the close 
connection between the software and the data resulted in the whole of the transaction being 
characterised as a supply of goods. If the predominant supply is instead digital data or the 
supply is a subscription service which does not require software a different conclusion may be 
reached? 
(3) As technology changes the methods for delivery and access to digital data will change. It is 
foreseeable that computer software may not need to be provided as part of the supply of the 
data. For example, a subscription service to stream movies to a computer does not usually 
include the provision of software to the consumer by the supplier. This will mean the supply is 
more likely a supply of services to which the guarantee of acceptable quality does not apply.  
3. ‘Consumer’ and ‘Trade or Commerce’ 
The final two threshold requirements are for the supply to be to a consumer in the course of trade 
or commerce. An examination of these requirements is relevant to whether a supply to a consumer 
from a person who is not acting in trade or commerce should be entitled to the same guarantee of 
quality or fitness for purpose. The risk to a consumer is that it will be difficult to distinguish in an 
online environment between a person acting in trade and commerce and one that is not. In some 
cases it will be clear, such as buying a used car on Gumtree, but in other cases such as on EBay it is 
not necessarily obvious whether the sale is with a trader or an individual merely selling household 
items.  
This issue is particularly relevant in peer to peer transactions. 
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4. Extraterritorial operation 
The application of the statutory guarantees may be impacted by rules governing choice of law 
clauses in contracts. The purpose of s 67 of the ACL is to limit the circumstances in which statutory 
guarantees can be displaced by a choice of law clause in a contract choosing another jurisdiction as 
the appropriate law. Section 67 provides: 
If: 
(a) the proper law of a contract for the supply of goods or services to a consumer would be the law 
of any part of Australia but for a term of the contract that provides otherwise; or 
(b) a contract for the supply of goods or services to a consumer contains a term that purports to 
substitute, or has the effect of substituting, the following provisions for all or any of the 
provisions of this Division: 
(i) the provisions of the law of a country other than Australia; 
(ii) the provisions of the law of a State or a Territory; 
the provisions of this Division apply in relation to the supply under the contract despite that term. 
In ACCC v Valve Corporation the court held that the effect of s 67 was to ensure that the statutory 
guarantees in the ACL apply to a contract where there is a supply of goods or services to an 
Australian consumer or by an Australian company. Section 67 will be effective to override any 
provision of the contract to the contrary and any substitution of a law of another country as the 
law of the contract. 
4.2.3 United Kingdom 
The UK engaged in a review of their consumer protection legislation in 2011 with the aim of 
creating a simple and modern framework for the UK. The review included a range of issues, but 
relevant to this Report purports to set out a consistent framework for consumer rights in relation 
to goods, services and digital content. Application of consumer protection laws to digital content 
was an important aspect of the review due to the uncertainty raised in case law about application 
of the Sale of Goods Act to digital products.457 
4.2.3.1 General Protections — unfair commercial practices 
The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK) SI 2008/1277 (‘CPR’) 
consolidates consumer protection legislation in the UK and implements the EU Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive (2005/29/FC). They apply to unfair commercial behaviour that occurs before, 
during and after a contract is made.458  The CPRs are principle-based legislation cast in broad terms. 
The overall objective of enacting the CPRs was to improve consumer redress for unfair commercial 
practices and to harmonise the UK laws with the EU to improve consistency of consumer 
protection. The CPR adopted verbatim the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The general 
operation of these provisions was considered at [7.1] in relation to punitive fees. 
The provisions may apply to unfair practices including the giving of false information or insufficient 
information about a product similar to the operation of the misleading conduct provisions of the 
Australian Consumer Law examined at [25.2.1]. 
                                                          
457  Southwark LBC v IBM [2011] EWHC 549 cf St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1997] 
FSR 251 where the sale of software fell within the scope of the Sale of Goods Act because it was provided on disc. 
458  Explanatory Memorandum, The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and the Business 
Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008, 16. 
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4.2.3.2 Specific protections — Consumer Rights Act 2015 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 consolidates and brings consistency to consumer protection 
legislation that was previously spread across a range of UK Acts and Regulations.[1]  The CRA also 
gives effect to the remaining provisions of the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) not 
previously enacted in Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012 and the Enterprise 
Act 2002 (Part 8 EU Infringements) Order 2013); Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation 
and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 and  introduces new rules, particularly in relation to 
digital content and consumer remedies. 
The CRA retains protections for ‘goods’ purchased whether face to face or over the internet the 
implied terms of satisfactory quality (s 5), fitness for a particular purpose (s 10) and as described (s 
11) apply. These implied terms are also applicable to the purchase of digital content. Consumer 
remedies for goods and digital content are also harmonized, except that there is no right to reject 
digital content, but rather the remedies include the right to repair or replacement, the right to a 
price reduction and the right to a refund. The implied terms and remedies provided by the Act 
cannot be contracted out of by the trader (s 31). 
Key aspects of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in relation to product quality for good or services 
acquired via the internet: 
Common legal framework for ‘goods’ and ‘digital content’ 
Consumer warranties apply to goods, services and digital content. A new definition of ‘digital 
content’ which is governed by a separate part of the Act is included (‘data produced and supplied in 
digital form’) to ensure transactions for wholly electronic products are protected. The decision to 
expand the CRA to include digital content was borne largely from recommendations made by 
government-funded investigations into the area identifying that existing rights in relation to digital 
content were unclear.459 The definition of ‘goods’ as moveable property is retained on the basis 
this applies to computer software supplied on a disc or other physical device. Instead of including 
digital content in the definition of ‘goods’, the UK parliament elected to include a new Chapter in 
the CRA dealing specifically with digital content. As a result certain rights that apply to the sale of 
tangible goods (refer to the definition of ‘goods’ in section 2(8) of the CRA) do not apply to digital 
content including the guarantee that goods will correspond with a sample (s13 of the CRA).460 
The effect of the CRA is that consumer warranties related to satisfactory quality clearly apply to 
both goods and digital content, irrespective of the medium of purchase. Similarly warranties as to 
fitness for the purpose, satisfactory quality, to be as described and guarantees of title (or in the 
case of digital content the ‘right’ to sell) also apply to both. Similar to the supply of goods the 
provisions apply only to the supply of digital content where the consumer pays for the content. 
Although the implied terms are the same, the relevant criteria related to satisfactory quality are 
altered to accommodate the different nature of digital content. For example, ‘appearance and 
finish’ are relevant to satisfactory quality of goods (s 9(3)(b) but not relevant to digital content 
(s 34).  
                                                          
459  See, for example, Robert Bradgate, ‘Consumer Rights In Digital Products: A Research Report Prepared For The UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (Research Report, Institute for Commercial Law Studies, Sheffield 
and 2010) www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/c/10-1125-consumer-rights-in-digital-products. 
460  See Althaf Marsoof, ‘Digital Content And The Definition Dilemma Under The Sale Of Goods Act 1979: Will The 
Consumer Rights Bill 2013 Remedy The Malady?’ (2014) 9(4) Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology 285, 289 for a useful discussion of this issue. 
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Remedies available to consumers are also consistent except that a consumer is not entitled to 
reject digital content, but can insist on repair or replacement, the right to a price reduction and the 
right to a refund. An additional remedy is provided to a consumer where digital content damages a 
device or other digital content belonging to a consumer (s 46). A consumer is entitled to request 
the trader repair the damage or compensate the consumer for the damage. Importantly s 46 
applies even if the consumer has not paid for the digital content. 
Approach to extra territorial operation 
The CRA applies to all contracts for the supply of goods or digital content to a UK consumer. No 
contracting out provisions are included in s 31 and s 47. This means that consumer agreements 
subject to UK law cannot avoid the operation of the provisions. European Regulation EC 593/2008 
(Rome I Regulation) sets out the rules as to which country’s law (within the EU) applies to 
consumer contracts. Traders are able to choose the law of the contract but where the trader 
pursues or directs it activities to a UK resident, the provisions of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
cannot be contracted out of by the trader.  
UK regulators have similar powers to Australia. Enforcement action can be taken against any trader 
who supplies goods or services to a UK resident in the course of their business. There is no 
requirement for the supplier to carry on a physical business in the UK. 
Harmonisation with EU laws also assists in ensuring the welfare of UK consumers. One of the clear 
policy aims of the UK government is to ensure a consistent approach with other EU member states. 
The CRA takes into account the definitions and measures contained within the Consumer Rights 
Directive (2011/83/EU) and, as far as appropriate, has made the Act consistent with the Directive, 
with the intention of achieving overall a simple, coherent framework of consumer legislation.461  
The CRA applies across England, Wales, Ireland and Scotland and because of consistency with EU 
Directives largely contributes to a harmonized EU position. The harmonisation of laws by the UK 
government with the EU minimized the differences in contractual terms and the likelihood of a 
supplier attempting to contract out of statutory requirements.  
Additional information disclosure requirements  
The CRA incorporates the information required to be given by a trader under the Consumer 
Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 as a term of a 
contracts to which the CRA applies. The 2013 Regulations ensure that consumers and traders are 
clear about the bargain they are making in three main areas: information which traders should 
provide to consumers; cancellation rights and responsibilities; and measures to prevent hidden 
costs. 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 maintains the application of implied warranties to transactions 
between traders and consumers (who are individuals). This fails to take into account that many 
transactions are undertaken between consumers (particularly in peer to peer transactions) or 
between traders and small business. The CRA has been criticized as not adopting a broader 
application as allowed by the EU Directive. 
4.2.3.3 Information Disclosure Internet Contracts 
Specific provision is made in the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional 
Charges) Regulations 2013 for certain information to be provided to consumers purchasing goods 
or service over the internet. The Regulations ensure consumers are provided with clear information 
                                                          
461  Other EU Directives were also incorporated (Directive 99/44/EC on certain aspects of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees). 
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about the main characteristics of the goods or digital content, the total price, delivery charges, 
total cost of a service or subscription over the period of the agreement and the total period of the 
contract. The trader must ensure that consumer, when placing the order, explicitly acknowledges 
that the order implies an obligation to pay. If the order is placed over the internet any button 
activating the order must be clearly labelled. A failure to comply with these requirements will allow 
the consumer to terminate the contract. Together with the Electronic Commerce (EU Directive) 
Regulations 2002462 the Regulations establish legal rules that online retailers and service providers 
must comply with when dealing with consumers in the 27 member countries of the European 
Union (EU). The directive dictates the information that consumers must be provided with in online 
transactions. If a retailer/service provider fails to provide information required by the directive, its 
contract with the consumer may be invalid and it may be in breach of member state retail law. 
The information to be disclosed includes a detailed description of the product as well as 
information about pricing, shipping and contact details. These provisions are examined further at 
below in relation to unfair pricing practices. 
4.2.4 United States 
The regulatory approach in the US relies on the application of existing consumer protection laws to 
internet based transactions and digital products. The US is primarily focused on improving 
information asymmetry through a three pronged strategy: (i) aggressive enforcement of existing 
regulations, (ii) consumer education, and (iii) business education.463  The US is focused on product 
quality through the application of implied warranties applicable to goods sold by traders and the 
enforcement of obligations imposed on traders, including those carrying on business online. There 
is some harmonisation at a Federal level, but application of these provisions within individual states 
requires each state to adopt the provisions. 
The relevant laws are: 
Implied warranties 
• Uniform Commercial Code ss 2-314 — 2-315 (UCC) (imposes an implied warranty of 
merchantability and fitness for particular purpose in relation to goods);464  
• Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 USC Ch 50 (Legal Information Institute (2015)) (regulates 
consumer warranties by amending and complementing the UCC 
Information Disclosure 
• Federal Trade Commission Act (US) (‘FTCA’) (dealing with unfair or deceptive acts or practices);  
• Dot.com disclosure information about online advertising (to provide guidance on the 
application of the FTA to online advertising). 
                                                          
462  These regulations implement the EU ‘E-commerce Directive’ (Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internet Market [2000] OJ L 178/1). 
463  Eileen Harrington, ‘Federal Trade Commission on Consumer Protection in Cyberspace: Combating Fraud on the 
Internet’, Statement prepared for the Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Commerce, 25 June 1998 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission- 
consumer-protection-cyberspace-combating-fraud-internet/test.623.pdf. 
464  Each state has codified its own version of Article 2 of the UCC. 
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4.2.4.1 General protection — Uniform Commercial Code  
Articles 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code imply certain warranties relating to 
merchantability and fitness for particular purpose into contracts of sale between suppliers (known 
as ‘merchants’) who deal in goods of that kind and buyers. A merchant is ‘a person who deals in 
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction’. This means the seller of goods is 
required to be in the business of selling goods of the kind offered for sale. Unlike the UK and 
Australia the party buying the goods may be purchasing them for any purpose and is not required 
to be a consumer. There are no specific provisions applicable to digital products or content. 
Application of the implied warranties to traditional goods and services provided by the internet 
does not present any difficulties, except that traders can contract out of the provisions. 
Regulators continue to rely on existing provisions and are yet to review the UCC for internet 
transactions. A number of points of difference to the UK and Australian positions should be noted: 
(a) These provisions have been held to apply to a sale of goods via the internet, including 
software,465 but the application of the provisions to digital content is doubted.466 Article 2 of 
the UCC applies to ‘transactions in goods’, however, ‘goods’ are defined to include tangible 
personal property that is moveable at the time it is identified to the contract.467 This definition 
does not expressly include intangible goods such as software and electronic applications. 
However, as US courts are willing to include software in the definition of ‘transactions in 
goods’, there has also been a move to expressly exclude such intangibles from the definition in 
article 2 of the UCC. In 2002, the American Law Institute (ALI) approved revisions to article 2 
that sought to exclude many computer information transactions explicitly from its scope. 
However, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws rejected these 
revisions.  
(b) As a result, there remains doubt regarding whether article 2 of the UCC should be applied to 
transactions in downloadable software, absent tangible media.468 
(c) Unlike the UK provisions and the Australian Consumer Law the implied warranties can be 
contracted out of, unless unreasonable (article 2-316).  
(d) The warranty of fitness in s2-314 UCC applies to supplies by all sellers, unlike the warranty of 
merchantability in s2-315 that applies only to professional merchants. The justification for this 
distinction has been the subject of much academic discussion but has concluded that ‘the 
drafters did not draft the merchant restriction because buyers from non-merchant sellers could 
not have reasonable quality expectations’.469 Notwithstanding the lack of rationale for this 
distinction, there is a push amongst academics and practitioners for the distinction to be 
removed so that all sellers will be imposed with a minimum quality responsibility.470 This 
becomes relevant in the context of increased internet sales by seller’s who are not engaged in 
trade or commerce. 
                                                          
465  MA Mortenson Company v Timberline Software Corporation 970 P 2d 305, 310 (Wash. Crt App 2000); Advent 
Systems Ltd v Unisys Corp 925 F 2d 670 (1991). 
466  Michael Seringhaus, ‘E-Book Transactions: Amazon ‘Kindles’ the Copy Ownership Debate’ (2009) 12 Yale JL&Tech 
147. 
467  Jennifer S Martin, ‘Sales’ (2011) 66(4) Business Lawyer 1083.  
468  See, for example, Specht v Netscape Communications Corp, 306 F 3d 17, 30 (2d Cir 2002) where the court declined 
to decide whether article 2 applies to Internet transactions in downloadable products. 
469  Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, ‘The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?’ (1983) Faculty Publications Paper 
972, 769. 
470  Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, ‘The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?’ (1983) Faculty Publications Paper 
972, 807. 
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Daniel Wiig471 argues that Internet-based sellers should be obligated to take additional steps 
including: 
• disclosing their identity, profession and other related experiences so a consumer can 
determine whether the goods they sell are captured by the implied warranties; and 
• most relevantly to this section of the report, to describe the goods with particularity rather 
than using subjective terms such as ‘mint’ condition, ‘rare’, ‘excellent condition’ etc and, when 
such words are used, providing the proper meaning in the description of the good advertised. 
He argues this position on the basis that often sellers on person-to-person sites, such as eBay, are 
merchants who own face-to-face stores as well as Internet-based stores and therefore would fall 
within the definition of merchant for the purposes of the implied warranty of merchantability. But 
for the additional identity disclosure proposed by Wiig, a consumer would not have sufficient 
information to determine whether they are buying goods from a merchant or simply goods from a 
consumer. 
The fact that goods must be clearly described has already been identified as a regulatory issue by 
the US. However, once a seller on a person-to-person site identifies as a merchant then they must 
also comply with the requirements of the FTCA in relation to describing goods and, as Wiig would 
have it, provide proper meanings for the words used to describe the goods on the relevant site.472  
4.2.4.2 General protection — unfair or deceptive commercial practices 
The FTC relies upon the unfair or deceptive practices in commerce provisions of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act 15 USC to take action against traders engaged in unfair practices via the internet. 
The broad provisions allow the FTC to take action for misleading representations or omissions that 
are material to a consumer’s choice of a product; and any inaccurate or false information placed on 
websites, unfair pricing practices, other unfair practices aimed at tricking consumers and consumer 
fraud.473 
Enforcement powers of the FTC are also broadly cast allowing the FTC to bring proceedings against 
any person who has, in their view, breached § 45 of the FTCA and seek orders that the 
advertisement cease or to obtain a temporary restraining order or injunction (§ 53). The court can 
also order penalties for false advertising of not more than $5,000 or 6 months imprisonment (§ 54).  
Although the powers of the FTC as a national regulator are strong the adoption of the FTCA 
provisions within State legislation is inconsistent. Many of the equivalent state provisions are 
viewed as weak due to the many exceptions in the legislation or judicial decisions reading down the 
provisions. Gaps in the state legislation mean there is a low level of harmonization and loop holes 
for suppliers using the internet to avoid liability. 
                                                          
471  ‘Essays: UCC Article 2 Warranties and Internet-Based Transactions: Do The Article 2 Warranties Sufficiently Protect 
Internet-Based Transactions With Unprofessional Internet Merchants?’ (2007) 12(4) Fordham Journal of Corporate 
& Financial Law, 717, 731-732. 
472  See also, Gary Sullivan, ‘Purchasing from Merchants On Ebay and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability: A 
Overview’ (2009) 70(4) Alabama Lawyer 266-272. 
473  Federal Trade Commission Act 15 USC §45 (1) & (2), §52 
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4.2.5 Canada 
The Canadian government’s overall policy approach to e-commerce is to ensure that consumers 
are afforded the same protection whether transacting face to face or online. The Canadian 
government undertook a review of their consumer protection framework to ensure it fosters 
growth in the e-economy and to harmonise Canadian consumer law with best practice 
international approaches.474  
At a Federal level the regulatory approach is based primarily upon improving the quality of 
information provided to consumers. The Competition Act RSC 1985 primarily regulates conduct of 
traders by prohibiting false or misleading representations. This is analogous to the misleading 
conduct provisions of the ACL. Warranties of quality and fitness for purpose are regulated at a 
provincial level under the Sales of Goods legislation. A majority of provinces have also adopted the 
Internet Sales Contract Harmonization Template which supports the Competition Act provisions 
aimed at ensuring consumers are provided with adequate information about the goods being 
purchased, the price and other material terms of the contract. 
4.2.5.1 General Protections — Competition Act 
The relevant law at a federal level is the Competition Act RSC 1985 c C-34. The Act governs the 
conduct and commercial practices of businesses in Canada with the purpose of providing 
consumers with, amongst other things, competitive prices and product choices and, in the context 
of the quality of goods and services, making misleading advertisements unlawful. These provisions 
apply broadly to conduct in commercial situations irrespective of the medium in which the conduct 
occurs.  
In relation to the quality of goods and services, the Competition Act provides that a person who 
makes representations that are false or misleading in a material respect in the course of promoting 
the supply or use of a product engages in ‘reviewable conduct’ (ss 74.01 — 74.02), which can result 
in administrative remedies including orders to cease such conduct and the payment of monetary 
penalties (section 74.1(1)). Such representations are deemed to be made by the person who causes 
the representations to be expressed, unless that person is outside Canada, in which case the 
person who imports the goods will be held responsible (section 74.03(2)). Product is defined to 
include an ‘article’ and a ‘service’. An article is ‘real and personal property of every description.’ 
This definition is wide enough to apply to computer software.475 The provisions are applicable if a 
person makes a misleading representation about goods or services but does not impose a standard 
of acceptable quality for those goods. 
Canada has also implemented the Internet Sales Contract Harmonization Template that has been 
ratified by the federal and provincial governments. The Harmonization Template requires, amongst 
other things, a ‘fair and accurate description’ of the goods or services to be provided 
(section 3(1)a)iv)). For the Template to be effective within a Canadian province it must be formally 
adopted, which has only occurred in six provinces and even in those cases there are a number of 
differences in the legislation particularly related to enforcement across provincial borders.476  
                                                          
474  Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers, ‘Principles of Consumer Protection for Electronic 
Commerce: A Canadian Framework’ (Principles of Consumer Protection, Office of Consumer Affairs of Industry 
Canada, 2009) 2. The Canadian government also considers it important that any Canadian response to drip-pricing 
should be consistent with directions in consumer protection established by international bodies such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
475  PCM Technologies Inc v O’Toole [2012] ONSC 2543 
476  Refer to the summary in the research report by Option consommateurs entitled ‘The Views Of Canadians On The 
Harmonization Of Consumer Protection Standards’ (2015) 
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The provisions of the Competition Act apply to any business operating within Canada and selling to 
Canadian citizens.  
4.2.5.2 Provincial Legislation 
Application of provincial legislation to internet contracts is uneven. Where legislative provisions 
have been enacted to apply to internet or distance contract, focus has been on the information a 
supplier should disclose to a consumer rather than warranties of quality. For example in Ontario 
the Consumer Protection Act regulates abusive business practices both in face-to face transactions 
and those that occur online (known as ‘internet agreements’ and ‘remote agreements’). The Act: 
• requires that suppliers disclose certain prescribed information (including a fair and accurate 
description of the goods and services (including technical requirements)) before the consumer 
enters into a contract;477 and 
• deems certain conditions (in the case of goods) and warranties (in relation to goods and 
services) to apply to the quality of goods and services. The warranties are those already 
existing in the Sale of Goods Act. 
These implied warranties and conditions relating to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose 
of goods supplied under a contract of sale only apply: 
• Where the buyer makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are 
required so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, and the goods are 
of a description that it is in the course of the seller’s business to supply (but this condition 
does not apply in the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name;478  
• Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description 
unless the buyer has examined the goods and such examination ought to have revealed the 
defects;479 
• An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be 
annexed by the usage of trade.480  
The definition of goods is unchanged and means ‘all chattels personal, other than things in action 
and money, and includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming 
part of the land that are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale’. This 
definition is unlikely to apply to computer software or other digital content. A similar position 
exists in British Columbia under the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act and the Sale of 
Goods Act. The emphasis in the provinces, similar to the Federal level, has been on disclosure 
requirements related to description of the goods or services to be supplied under the contract 
including any relevant technical or system specifications.  
There is minimal case law in an internet context applying consumer laws and the existing case law 
related to distance sales contracts has been criticised as showing ‘a worrisome lack of 
understanding on the part of the courts with respect to electronic distance selling.’481 Rather than 
interpreting the unique characteristics of Internet sales contracts, the courts seem to be blindly 
                                                          
477  See, for example, section 38(1) and regulation 32(1) of the Consumer Protection Act Regulations 2002 17/05. 
478  Sale of Goods Act RSO 1990, c S.1, s 15.1. 
479  Ibid c S.1, s 15.2 
480  Ibid c S.1, s 15.3. 
481  Ioana Delapeta and Marcel Boucher, ‘Regulating Distance Contracts: Time to Take Stock’ (Final Report of the 
Research Project, Union des consommateurs, June 2014), 46. 
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transposing the contractual principles applicable to paper contracts and attempting to draw 
analogies between the two (which can be difficult in many cases).482  
4.2.6 Singapore 
Singapore’s primary policy objective is that disclosure should include complete and accurate 
information about the trader’s business, about the goods or services for sale and about how the 
transaction is made. What this means, amongst other things, is that e-customers should have 
enough information to make an informed decision.483 This policy position has been given effect by 
reliance on existing consumer protection regulations within the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) 
Act and the Sale of Goods Act.  
4.2.6.1 General protections — quality of goods 
The Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (CPFTA) (known locally as the Lemon Law) provides the 
legislative framework to safeguard small consumers against unfair practices.  
Unfair practices prohibited by s 4 include misleading or deceiving a consumer, making false claims 
or taking advantage of a consumer who is unable to protect their own interests. These provisions 
would apply to misleading conduct or false claims about the quality of products sold online. 
The CPFTA also responds to the issue of quality and fitness by providing statutory remedies for 
consumers where goods do not conform to the contract at the time of delivery. Goods are deemed 
to not conform to the contract if there is a breach of an express term or a term implied by the Sale 
of Goods Act, s 13, 14 and 15. These sections of the Sale of Goods Act apply to contracts of sale, 
including auctions, for consideration and by virtue of s 14 are subject to an implied condition of 
satisfactory quality484 if purchased from a seller in the course of a business. Goods are defined in 
section 61(1) to include all personal chattels apart from things in action and money. Computer 
software may be included in this definition if provided on a disc or USB, but a digital download is 
unlikely to fall within the provisions. Parties can contract out of the implied conditions unless the 
contract is governed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA). Under s 5 of the UCTA liability for 
loss or damage arising from a defect is goods of a type ordinarily supplied for private use cannot be 
contracted out of. 
The statutory remedies in the CPFTA are only available to a buyer who ‘deals as a consumer’.485 To 
fall within this requirement the buyer must not be purchasing in the court of a business and in the 
case of a sale of goods the good must be of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or 
consumption. Further a buyer purchasing at an auction is not a consumer. The combined effect of s 
s 13 of the CPFTA and s 5 UCTA is that a supplier is unable to contract out of the statutory remedies 
or rights of consumers in the CPFTA.  
                                                          
482  Vincent Gautrais, ‘Le vouloir électronique selon l’affaire Dell Computer: dommage!’ (2007) 37(2) Revue générale de 
droit, 1, 14 quoted in Ioana Delapeta and Marcel Boucher, ‘Regulating Distance Contracts: Time to Take Stock’ (Final 
Report of the Research Project, Union des consommateurs, June 2014), 46. 
483  Allan Asher, ‘Consumer Protection in E-Commerce: Report on OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
Context of Electronic Commerce’ (Paper presented at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Electronic Commerce 
Steering Group Workshop on Consumer Protection, Singapore, 20 July 2000) 2. 
484  This is subject to some exceptions set out in s 14(2C) where defects are specifically disclosed or the buyer examines 
the goods before contract and an examination should reveal the defect. 
485  Defined in the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Singapore), s 12. 
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4.2.7 Comparison of regulatory approaches 
4.2.7.1 Common aspects 
(1) All jurisdictions, including Australia, maintain one common legal framework for regulating 
product quality in online and face to face transactions. The predominant view is that goods or 
digital content purchased over the internet should have the same protections and the value of 
a parallel scheme applicable only to online purchases is not desirable.486 The statutory 
definition of quality concepts such as acceptable quality, merchantable quality, fitness for 
purposes and compliance with description are largely unchanged in each jurisdiction on the 
basis they are broad enough to apply irrespective of the medium used to purchase the goods.  
(2) National and international harmonization of laws is a common goal and viewed as a strategy 
to minimise opting out of warranties or guarantees into low regulatory jurisdictions. At a 
national level in the UK consistent consumer protection provisions across legislative 
instruments, with the intention of achieving overall a simple, coherent framework of 
consumer legislation was a key rationale for the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Harmonisation 
was an important issue for the UK due to the close relationship with the EU and the high 
probability of suppliers choosing to utilize the law of other EU jurisdictions to escape liability 
for defective products. The Canadian government considers it important that any Canadian 
laws relating to the quality of goods and services should be consistent with directions in 
consumer protection established by international bodies such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.487 
(3) In the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Singapore traders in online transactions are 
required to provide additional information to consumers. In the US advertising online must be 
in a clear and conspicuous manner (including disclaimers that must be legible and 
understandable). In Canada online transactions are treated in the same way as distance selling 
transactions, which have additional disclosure obligations due to an inability for the consumer 
to inspect the product. In contrast in Singapore, suppliers only need to disclose sufficient 
information to describe the goods and services, but they do not need to disclose information 
that is not likely to affect a consumer’s decision regarding the acquisition of those goods or 
services.488 This is despite acknowledging that information asymmetry issues exist for 
consumers purchasing online. 489 
Whether greater information disclosure obligations corresponds to more effective consumer 
protection is yet to be determined. In many cases consumers do not read terms and conditions 
before agreeing to them either because they cannot find the terms, or they are written in legalese 
or consumers realise they cannot negotiate and will have to agree to the terms. This highlights the 
importance of having standard warranties related to quality, which suppliers cannot contract out 
of. 
                                                          
486  Ursula Pachl, Agustin Reyna and Christoph Schmon ‘European Commission’s Public Consultation on Contract Rules 
for Online Purchases of Digital Content and Tangible Goods: BEUC Response’ (BEUC Response, Bureau Europeen 
Des Unions de Consummateurs AISBL, 3 September 2015) 1. 
487  Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers, ‘Principles of Consumer Protection for Electronic 
Commerce: A Canadian Framework’ (Principles of Consumer Protection, Office of Consumer Affairs of Industry 
Canada, 2009) 2. 
488  Explanatory Notes, Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Bill [19]. 
489  Consumers Association of Singapore, CPFTA & Lemon Law, (2013) Consumers Association of Singapore 
www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_cpfta.aspx. 
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4.2.7.2 Differences 
(1) No significant change has been made in the United States, Canada, Singapore or Australia to 
the scope of existing consumer warranties. In Australia consumer guarantees have applied to 
‘computer software’ since 2011, but this will not be wide enough to apply to non-executable 
data.490 In contrast the UK has recently reviewed it consumer protection legislation to ensure 
application of consumer warranties of acceptable quality to digital content.491  
(2) Only Australia, the UK and Singapore provide that statutory guarantees and implied 
warranties respectively cannot be contracted out of by the parties. Jurisdictions such as the 
US492 and Canada have only recently considered the issue in the context of online 
transactions. 
(3) There is no additional information disclosure obligation imposed on traders in Australia 
where the transaction takes place online. 
4.2.7.3 Emerging issues 
No reviewed jurisdiction has removed the restriction on application of statutory guarantees to sale 
by auction for the online context493 or imposed warranties of quality for goods sold by individuals 
not engaged in business activities.  
4.3 Unfair or misleading pricing practices 
4.3.1 Issues 
Unfair or misleading pricing practices are problems in all forms of commerce. The prevalence of 
misleading pricing practices, such as drip pricing and surge pricing, appears to increase in online 
transactions. Most jurisdictions have recognised drip pricing and surge pricing as problems and 
varying regulatory approaches have been adopted. In this section we explain drip pricing and surge 
pricing and, compare the policy and regulatory approaches of each jurisdictions to both practices.  
                                                          
490  Refer to the decision of ACCC v Valve Corporation [2016] FCA 196. 
491  For example electronic books, music and other forms of download. Althaf Marsoof, ‘Digital Content and the 
Definition Dilemma Under The Sale of Goods Act 1979: Will the Consumer Rights Bill 2013 Remedy The Malady?’ 
(2014) 9(4) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 285, 288-289; Ioana Delapeta and Marcel 
Boucher, ‘Regulating Distance Contracts: Time to take stock’ (Final Report of the Research Project Submitted to 
Industry Canada’s Office of Consumer Affairs, Union des consommateurs, June 2014) 17). 
492  William S Rogers and Sara A Colb, Survey & Analysis of Modern Warranty Law under UCC ss 2-313-2-316 Day Pitney 
LLP, Boston < http://www.princelobel.com/assets/attachments/212.pdf> 6). (Reese Poyfair and Richards PLLC, 
Understanding the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (2015) MLMLaw.com 
www.mlmlaw.com/library/guides/ftc/warranties/undermag.htm. 
493  The restriction on application of statutory guarantees to a sale by auction were removed from the Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) in 2013. 
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Drip pricing 
The term ‘drip pricing’ is usually used to refer to where a headline price is advertised at the 
beginning of an online purchasing process and additional fees and charges, which may be 
unavoidable, but not mandatory are then incrementally disclosed (or ‘dripped’) to the 
consumer.494 Drip pricing is common in on-line transactions such as airline, car rental and 
accommodation booking websites.  
 
Surge Pricing 
Surge pricing (also known as dynamic pricing) is not a new concept. In fact, it has historically 
been linked to airline ticketing, hotel room pricing and the energy sector.495 More recently (and 
controversially) it has been associated with ridesharing platforms such as Uber. In that context, 
surge pricing occurs when ridesharing platforms add a multiplier (of, in the case of Uber, up to 
900%) on to their standard fares at times of high demand to encourage drivers on to the road to 
meet that demand.496 This is of particular concern in the taxi industry where consumers are 
accustomed to uniform pricing. Most recent policy discussion of surge pricing has occurred in the 
context of riding sharing platforms. 
 
Drip pricing and surge pricing are not new to online transactions. Most jurisdictions recognise drip 
pricing and surge pricing as problems for consumers. Consumer behaviour research suggests in the 
case of drip pricing that:  
• Consumers overspending on products and services (endowment effect): Misleading prices 
may lead to consumers spending more than they need to, buying a product which is not best 
for them, wasting time or suffering annoyance, disappointment or regret.497  The Office of Fair 
Trading has estimated that UK consumers spent £300 million in 2009 on payment 
surcharges.498 Drip pricing was found to have the most egregious effect. 
• Consumers can be misled by cheap headline prices (anchoring): Research suggests that 
consumer purchasing decisions are driven by which supplier is offering the cheapest headline 
prices.499 This occurs where the consumer focusses solely on the most important piece of 
information and disregards other potentially detrimental information. 
• Consumers who start a process are unlikely to walk away (commitment and consistency) 
Surge pricing is also recognised as a consumer problem in online transactions, but have been 
reluctant to regulate against such conduct. Although consumers are vulnerable to price 
exploitation in times of peak demand, research suggests that regulators should aim only to correct 
                                                          
494  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Drip Pricing (2015) ACCC 
www.accc.gov.au/consumers/online-shopping/drip-pricing. 
495  Mark Alston, What Do Hefty Electricity Charges and Uber’s ‘Surge’ Pricing Have In Common? (31 March 2015) 
Supply Management www.cips.org/en-AU/Supply-Management/Opinion/2015/March/What-do-hefty-electricity- 
charges-and-Ubers-surge-pricing-have-in-common/. 
496  Uber, What is Surge Pricing Uber.com https://help.uber.com/h/6c8065cf-5535-4a8b-9940-d292ffdce119. 
497  Refer to Amelia Fletcher, Drip pricing: UK experience (21 May 2012) Federal Trade Commission 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/economics-drip-pricing/afletcher.pdf. 
498  Office of Fair Trading OFT to take action over passenger travel sector payment surcharges (28 January 2011) 
WIREDGOV www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news 1.nsf/0/13A505722AF49487802578BD0049001F?OpenDocument. 
499  Refer to Amelia Fletcher, Drip pricing: UK experience (21 May 2012) Federal Trade Commission 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/economics-drip-pricing/afletcher.pdf. 
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market problems and go no further.500  From an economic perspective surge pricing is a normal 
part of supply and demand in the market. When supply is low and demand is high the price rises so 
as to ration supplies and encourage new supplies. In the case of ride sharing platforms, such as 
Uber, the surge in price is to encourage more drivers to provide services in times of peak demand 
The regulatory approach in each jurisdiction is explained separately below. If available, 
e-commerce case examples are included.  
4.3.2 Australia 
In Australia, there are no specific legislative provisions regulating drip pricing or surge pricing in 
e-commerce. Both of these practices are potentially regulated by general prohibitions of 
misleading conduct or unconscionable conduct. Action can be taken by the ACCC for drip pricing or 
surge pricing either on the basis of misleading conduct or for contravention of single pricing laws in 
s 48 ACL. Non-regulatory guidance is also provided by the ACCC’s Advertising and Selling Guide.501 
The Guide seeks to provide guidance to businesses within their respective jurisdictions about the 
application of relevant ‘drip pricing’ legislation.  
4.3.2.1 General Protections — Drip pricing  
In the case of drip pricing, the ACCC is likely to take action on the basis of misleading conduct 
rather than a breach of s 48. The ACCC considers drip pricing to be where a headline price is 
advertised at the beginning of an online502 purchasing process and additional fees and charges, 
which may be unavoidable (but not mandatory and therefore not in breach of single pricing laws 
including section 48 of the Australian Consumer Law) are then incrementally disclosed (or 
‘dripped’).503   
Action has been taken by the ACCC for drip pricing pursuant to s 18 and s 29 ACL. Section 29 
relevantly provides: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible 
supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the 
supply or use of goods or services: 
….. 
(i) make a false or misleading representation with respect to the price of goods 
or services.  
…… 
The regulatory approach of treating drip pricing as a form of misleading conduct has allowed the 
ACCC to successfully prosecute several persistent offenders and obtain enforceable undertakings 
from others to alter pricing on websites. 
                                                          
500  Nayeem Syed, ‘Regulating Uberification’ (2016) 22(1) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 1, 10. 
501 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Advertising and selling guide (17 April 2014) Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission www.accc.gov.au/publications/advertising-selling. 
502  See also ACCC v AirAsia Berhad Company [2012] FCA 1413 (14 December 2012) where the court found AirAsia had 
also engaged in drip pricing conduct that mislead consumers. 
503Refer to Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Drip Pricing (2015) ACCC 
www.accc.gov.au/consumers/online-shopping/drip-pricing. 
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Case example 
Two recent cases, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd 
[2015] FCA 1263 and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Virgin Australia 
Airlines Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1263, serve as a useful examples of the application of the ACL,s 29 to 
drip pricing. 
In both cases the online booking process imposed a ‘booking and service fee’ ($8.50 and $7.70 
for domestic flights, respectively) on the majority of consumers for payments made by credit or 
debit cards and PayPal. In most cases, this fee was not clearly disclosed until the payment stage 
of the booking process. The Court held the airlines engaged in misleading ‘drip pricing’ practices 
under sections 18(1), 29(1)(i) and 29(1)(m) of the ACL by encouraging consumers to enter their 
online airfare booking system through the promotion of a prominent headline price, and 
progressively ‘dripping’ information (including the booking and service fee) to them later in the 
process. 
 
Enforcement action and undertakings 
The ACCC has also investigated drip pricing in a number of different industries and reached 
enforceable undertakings with those who were found to have engaged in misleading and deceptive 
conduct by failing to disclose mandatory fees prominently on their platforms. Most recently, the 
ACCC has entered enforceable undertakings with both Airbnb Ireland and a competitor, Vacaciones 
eDreams for failing to disclose service and cleaning fees on certain pages of their websites.  
In late 2014, Ticketek and Ticketmaster agreed to improve their online pricing practices by 
including mandatory fees earlier in their booking processes. 
The ACCC has completed a sweep of over 130 websites and mobile apps to determine whether any 
of those traders were engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct. Although the ACCC’s findings 
indicate there has been an improvement in the online booking processes among the travel, tourism 
and leisure sectors, the sweep identified 15 traders for follow-up action.504  
4.3.2.2 General Protections — Surge Pricing  
In the case of surge pricing the only likely action by either consumers or the ACCC is based upon 
the general provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) prohibiting misleading conduct and 
false representations in trade or commerce. Situations in which surge pricing will constitute 
misleading or deceptive conduct or a misleading or false representation are limited. This may occur 
if the supplier were to advertise that prices are high due to high demand, when demand is not in 
fact high.505 There will be no misleading conduct if in fact demand is high. The problem for 
consumers is that a surcharge is being exacted in situations, such as public holidays or special 
events, where the supplier thinks consumers will have little choice but to pay the high fees. The 
fees usually exceed the actual cost to the supplier of increased expenses because of the increased 
demand or special event. 
                                                          
504  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, ‘Internet sweep shows improvements to disclosure in online 
booking processes’ (Media release, MR 258/15, 16 December 2015) 
www.accc.gov.au/media-release/internet-sweep-shows-improvements-to-disclosure-in-online-booking-processes. 
505  Deloitte Access Economics, ‘The Sharing Economy and the Competition and Consumer Act’ (Research Report, 
Deloitte Access Economics, 2015) 27. 
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Although surge pricing is recognised as an issue for consumers no specific regulatory provisions 
have been enacted as part of the ACL. Sections 18 and 29 of the ACL may be relevant if there is any 
misleading conduct associated with the surge in pricing. 
A number of Australian states have considered the regulatory impacts of Uber on existing taxi 
licensing regimes. These review have focusses on issues safety, insurance and whether ride sharing 
services should be regulated in a similar manner to taxi services. Very few have focused on the 
pricing issues. As part of the Western Australian government Green Paper released in July 2015 
consideration was given to regulating both traditional taxi services and ridesharing platforms. As 
part of that paper pricing transparency was considered and it was conceded that if ride sharing was 
allowed to operate current regulation impose caps on fares should be removed.506 The issue of 
surge pricing was not considered. 
4.3.3 United Kingdom 
Similar to Australia, the UK has approached the problem of drip pricing and surge pricing by the 
application of existing consumer protection laws prohibiting misleading conduct. The rationale for 
this approach is based on the view that both drip pricing and surge pricing create issues of 
information asymmetry for consumers limiting their ability to make an informed choice to 
purchase. There are no specific laws regulating drip pricing or surge pricing in an e-commerce 
context. The UK’s policy and legislative response to pricing practices aims to achieve the following 
outcomes: 
(a) ensuring consumers are fully informed of the total cost of the transaction early in the 
transaction; and  
(b) encouraging businesses to take a responsible approach to pricing based on transparent and 
honest pricing practices.507  
This is achieved by application of general consumer protections for misleading conduct in the 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK) SI 2008/1277 (CPR),508 issue of 
guidelines for business to implement fair and transparent pricing practices in accordance with the 
CPR (Pricing Practices Guide (PPG)) and a number of industry specific provisions, consistent with 
the CPR, to regulate industry specific pricing issues. 
4.3.3.1  General Protections — unfair commercial practices 
The CPR consolidates consumer protection legislation in the UK and implements the EU Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/FC). They apply to unfair commercial behaviour that 
occurs before, during and after a contract is made.509  The CPRs are principle-based legislation cast 
in broad terms. The overall objective of enacting the CPRs was to improve consumer redress for 
unfair commercial practices and to harmonise the UK laws with the EU to improve consistency of 
consumer protection. The CPR adopted verbatim the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The 
general operation of these provisions was considered at [7.1] in relation to punitive fees. 
                                                          
506  Western Australia Department of Transport, ‘On-demand Transport: A discussion paper for future innovation’ 
(Discussion Paper, Western Australia Department of Transport, July 2015) 16. 
507  (Chartered Trading Standards Institute, ‘Consultation on the Draft Pricing Practices Guide’ (Draft Guide for 
Consultation, Chartered Trading Standards Institute at the request of the Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills and the Consumer Protection Partnership, October 2015) 3. 
508  These regulations implemented the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
509  Explanatory Memorandum, The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and the Business 
Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008, 16. 
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1. Drip pricing 
The CPR regulates drip pricing practices in e-commerce under the general prohibition of ‘unfair 
commercial practice’ in regulation 3. 
Regulation 3 prohibits unfair commercial practices. A commercial practice is unfair if it distorts or is 
likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the 
product. This provision will apply if the practice causes, or is likely to cause, the average consumer 
to make a different decision. This may occur is a consumer chooses to enter a different shop to 
makes additional ‘clicks’ through an online booking process. 
A commercial practice is also unfair according to Reg 3(4) if the following apply:  
• Regulation 5 — Giving false information to, or deceiving, consumers (misleading actions). This 
regulation applies to drip pricing if it contains false information or the overall presentation is 
likely to deceive an average consumer in relation to price and causes the average consumer to 
take a transactional decision he or she would not have taken otherwise. eg. Advertising a 
product using a headline price and then revealing only during the purchasing process, or 
subsequent to this, that other compulsory charges, such as tax, apply which will increase the 
total price paid.  
• Regulation 6 — Giving insufficient information to consumers (misleading omissions) The 
omission or hiding of material information, or making material information unclear, 
unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely causes the average consumer to take a transactional 
decision he or she would not have taken.eg Failing to disclose the existence of any additional 
charges payable, such as postage and packing, insurance etc, until the point of sale.  
There are also a number of deemed unfair commercial practices (the blacklist) in Schedule 1 but 
drip pricing is not included in the list. 
2. Surge pricing 
Although surge pricing is not expressly regulated the existing provisions prohibiting unfair 
commercial practices in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 may apply 
if the supplier misleads the consumer by acts or omissions about the surge in pricing. A supplier 
who makes clear and transparent disclosure of the surge in pricing is unlikely to offend these 
provisions.  
3. Reviews and enforcement 
Although there is limited case law in this area, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) 
has taken preliminary enforcement and investigatory action utilising the CPR. In 2014 the CMA 
conducted a review of the UK car rental sector to identify the main issues affecting consumers. 
That review identified, amongst other things, drip pricing and a general lack of transparency about 
the total price when making a booking (Consumers complained of additional charges such as a full 
tank of fuel, extra fees for picking up vehicles at premium locations, one-way fees and young driver 
surcharges only being revealed when they arrived at the pick-up desk.510  The CMA initially worked 
closely with the EU’s 5 largest car rental companies to identify and remedy its concerns.511 The 
companies agreed to make changes to their online booking practices to, amongst other things, 
ensure the headline price includes all mandatory charges and that consumers are provided with 
                                                          
510  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Short-term car rental in the European Union’ (Report, Competition and 
Markets Authority, July 2015) 2 and 26. 
511  Avis-Budget, Enterprise Rent-a-Car, Europcar, Hertz and Sixt. 
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clearer information at an early stage of the booking process about optional extras and their prices, 
alongside the ability to purchase or pre-book them online rather than at the pick-up desk.512  
The above changes set a benchmark for others in the industry to follow (including brokers, price 
comparison websites and travel websites) and the CMA has indicated that it intends to share its 
findings with other members of the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network 
(ICPEN) (including Australia, Canada and the United States)513 to assist the regulatory bodies in 
those jurisdictions to adopt similar approaches to drip pricing with short-term car rental 
companies.514 
4.3.3.2 Information disclosure — internet contracts 
Contracts entered into online are subject to particular information disclosure obligations: 
1. Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 
2013515  
The Regulations apply to a contract entered into over the internet between a trader and 
consumer. The purpose of the Regulation is to ensure consumers are provided with clear 
information about the main characteristics of the goods or digital content, the total price, 
delivery charges, total cost of a service or subscription over the period of the agreement and 
the total period of the contract. The trader must ensure the consumer, when placing the 
order, explicitly acknowledges that the order implies an obligation to pay. If the order is 
placed over the internet any button activating the order must be clearly labelled. A failure to 
comply with these requirements will allow the consumer to terminate the contract.  
2. Electronic Commerce (EU Directive) Regulations 2002516  
These Regulations establish legal rules that online retailers and service providers must 
comply with when dealing with consumers517 in the 27 member countries of the European 
Union (EU). The Directive dictates the information that consumers must be provided with in 
online transactions. If a retailer/service provider fails to provide information required by the 
directive, its contract with the consumer may be invalid and it may be in breach of member 
state retail law. Prescribed information includes price, shipping and any other costs. Any 
breach of these requirements is considered a breach of statutory duty. If the consumer is not 
informed of how they can amend errors in an order, the contract can be voided. 
These provisions apply to all UK businesses operating websites irrespective of where their 
website server is located. There is no requirement to comply with the laws of other EU 
members states where the directive is implemented. However this does not apply to the 
consumer law outlined above. A UK business operating a website and selling to consumers in 
other parts of the EU will need to comply with requirements of the UK and any other 
                                                          
512  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Short-term car rental in the European Union’ (Report, Competition and 
Markets Authority, July 2015) 53. 
513  Singapore is not yet a member of ICPEN. 
514  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Short-term car rental in the European Union’ (Report, Competition and 
Markets Authority, July 2015) 66. 
515  Which implements most provisions of the EU Consumer Rights Directive (the remaining provisions are implemented 
in the Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012 and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Part 8 EU 
Infringements) Order 2013. 
516  These regulations implement the EU ‘E-commerce Directive’ (Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internet Market [2000] OJ L 178/1). 
517  Services covered by the directive include paid-for and free online information services provision, and online selling 
of products and services such as advertising, professional services, entertainment, and Internet and telephony 
service provision. 
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member state in which the website is operating. As a result of the consumer contract 
exception, any site selling to, for example, French consumers must provide its terms and 
conditions in French, to comply with French consumer laws (though compliance with all 
French consumer laws will require more than just a translation). 
4.3.3.3 Specific protections — surcharges  
The Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012 came into force on 6 April 2013 
(implementing article 19 of the EU Directive on Consumer Rights).518 The Payment Surcharges 
Regulation makes it an offence for a trader to charge consumers any payment or fees that exceed 
the cost borne by the trader for the use of that good or service (regulation 4). While the language 
in regulation 4 is drafted quite broadly, the explanatory notes to this regulation indicate that its 
main focus is on surcharges relating to particular payment methods and does not capture surge 
pricing. While not directly aimed at drip pricing the regulation limits the amount of a credit card 
surcharge that a supplier may add onto the price of the product supplies. Surcharges in breach of 
the regulation are unenforceable. (Regulation 10) 
4.3.3.4 Industry regulation 
The European Union Air Services Regulation (EC Regulation 1008/2008) was adopted by the UK. 
Article 23 essentially states that all charges, which are unavoidable and foreseeable at the time the 
headline price is displayed, should be included in that price, including taxes, surcharges and fees. 
Optional charges shall be communicated in a clear, transparent and unambiguous way at the start 
of the booking process and their acceptance by the customer will be on an ‘opt-in’ basis.  
These provisions were used by the CMA in 2011 in enforcement action against 14 airlines for drip 
pricing practices.  
4.3.3.5 Pricing Practices Guide (PPG) 
The PPG recommends a set of good practices to traders in providing consumers with sufficient 
information about prices in various situations. Although it has no mandatory force, it clearly 
explains relevant legal obligations and provides recommended practices that are compatible with 
the CPR.519 
4.3.4 United States 
Like the UK and Australia, the US has approached the problem of drip pricing by applying existing 
consumer protection laws in the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) which prohibit ‘unfair or 
deceptive practices’ to protect consumers from drip pricing in e-commerce.520  The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) recognises drip pricing as: 
… a pricing technique in which firms advertise only part of a product’s price and reveal 
other charges later as the customer goes through the buying process. The additional 
charges can be mandatory surcharges or fees for optional add-ons.521 
                                                          
518  Council Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC 
and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ L 304/64, art 19. 
519  Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘Pricing Practices Guide’ (Guide, Department for Business, Innovation 
& Skill, November 2010, 1. 
520  Federal Trade Commission and the Bureau of Consumer Protection, ‘Advertising and Marketing on the Internet: 
Rules of the Road’ (Guidance, Federal Trade Commission, September 2000) 2. 
521  Howard A Shelanski et al, ‘Economics at the FTC: Drug and PBM Mergers and Drip Pricing’ (Report, Federal Trade 
Commission December 2012) 11.  
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In response to behavioural economics research, which indicates consumers are disadvantaged by 
drip pricing practices, the US has focussed on policies that are aimed at addressing information 
imbalances between traders and consumers. General protections in the FTC are used to ensure 
consumers are provided with sufficient information about price prior to embarking upon the 
transaction.522 The general protections are supplemented in the context of e-commerce by the 
Dot.com guidelines. 523  
Surge pricing has not received the same regulatory attention despite the US acknowledging the 
same consumer issues as the UK and Australia. Although there have been a number of attempts to 
regulate a ceiling for surge pricing, primarily in the context of ride sharing, none have succeeded. 
Difficulties arise in balancing the need to protect passengers from outrageous pricing and the 
desire to maintain dynamic pricing and efficient allocation of resources within the market in times 
of scarcity.524   
The general protection for unfair or deceptive practices has been considered sufficient to ensure 
customers are advised of a surcharge prior to deciding to accept the service. Although unfair 
practices that mislead consumers about price or a surcharge are monitored by the FTC there seems 
a reluctance to intervene further in the area of surge pricing, which has occurred primarily in the 
ride sharing market. 
4.3.4.1 General Protections — unfair pricing practices  
The FTCA provides that ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce’ are unlawful and 
empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent persons from using such acts or 
practices.525  Drip pricing or surge pricing practices are potentially unfair or deceptive practices if 
they mislead consumers and the practice is material to the consumer’s choice (acting reasonably) 
of or conduct regarding a product or service.526  The section can be used in the case of online 
transactions irrespective of the location of the fraudulent party if the deceptive practice is likely to 
cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the US or involve material conduct occurring in the US.  
The dissemination of any false advertisement by any means for the purpose of inducing the 
purchase of goods or services is an unfair or deceptive act or practice for the purposes of § 45 
FTCA.527  
The FTC has taken an active role in minimising drip-pricing practices and ensuring that consumers 
are provided with an all-inclusive headline price for the product or service they are purchasing 
(whether that be online or through more traditional media sources). US government agencies have 
taken action against drip pricing practices as unfair or deceptive practices in reliance upon § 52 
FTCA: 
(1) Hotels: In November 2012, the FTC warned 22 hotel operators that their online reservation 
sites may violate the law by providing a deceptively low estimate of what consumers can 
                                                          
522  Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Warns Hotel Operators that Price Quotes that Exclude ‘Resort Fees’ and other 
Mandatory Surcharges May Be Deceptive’ (Media Release, 28 November 2012) 1. 
523  Howard A Shelanski et al, ‘Economics at the FTC: Drug and PBM Mergers and Drip Pricing’ (Report, Federal Trade 
Commission, December 2012) 21. 
524  Will Brunelle and Dana Rubinstein, ‘Bill would ban ‘surge pricing’ by Uber, rideshare services’, Politico New York 
(online), 13 February 2015 
www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2015/02/8562248/bill-would-ban-surge-pricing-uber-rideshare-services. 
525  15 USC § 45(1), (2). 
526  Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Policy Statement on Deception’ (14 October 1983) 
www.ftc.gov/putlci-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception; Further discussion of the unfairness test 
appears at [8.2] under Punitive Fees. 
527  15 USC §52(2)(b). 
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expect to pay for their hotel rooms. Many hotels failed to include mandatory fees for 
amenities such as newspapers, use of onsite exercise or pool facilities or internet access 
(sometimes referred to as ‘resort fees’).528  
(2) Airlines: Following the sudden rise in fuel prices, many airlines started carving out a portion of 
a true airfare by labeling it a ‘fuel surcharge’ and excluding that amount from their price 
promotions and displays. The US Department of Transportation quickly took decisive action to 
outlaw such false price advertising and now requires that airlines include all applicable 
non-optional fees and taxes in its price displays, including those they collect on behalf of 
governmental taxing authorities.529 
(3) Cruise Lines: In 1997, the Florida State Attorney General’s office entered into agreements with 
six large cruise lines to stop drip pricing. Under the agreements, the cruise lines can no longer 
charge customers any fees in addition to the advertised initial ticket price except those fees 
actually passed on by the company to a governmental agency.530  
At the Federal level there is no specific regulation of surge pricing and any action by the FTC would 
be based upon the unfair and deceptive practices provisions of the FTCA. No record of action by 
the FTC in relation to surge pricing was found. This is largely due to the fact surge pricing has arising 
mainly in the taxi and ride sharing context which is viewed within state jurisdiction.  
4.3.4.2 Guidelines — Dot.com Guide 
The Dot.com Guide is a Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’) staff guidance document that explains the 
how businesses should develop advertisements for online media to ensure compliance with the 
FTCA. In the context of drip-pricing, this includes guidance on what constitutes ‘clear and 
conspicuous’ presentation of information and the displaying of disclosures prior to purchase.The 
use of hyperlinks to provide important information, such as cost and any additional expenses, is not 
recommended. 
4.3.4.3  State based protections — Surge pricing 
New York has been active in the area of surge pricing particularly in the ride sharing context. There 
have been two failed attempts to introduce legislative provisions to regulate surge pricing in the 
ride sharing industry. The Bills proposed maximum caps on the amount pricing could increase in 
times of high demand.531 
There are also suggestions that the New York General Business Law passed in 1978-79 in response 
to escalating heating oil prices is potentially applicable to surge pricing in other areas.532  During an 
                                                          
528   Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Warns Hotel Operators that Price Quotes that Exclude ‘Resort Fees’ and other 
Mandatory Surcharges May Be Deceptive’ (Media Release, 28 November 2012) 1. 
529  U.S. Department of Transportation, ‘Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections’ (Docket DOT-OST-2010-0140, 
Department of Transportation, 25 April 2011. 
530  Jill Jordan Spitz, ‘6 Cruise Lines Changing Ads to Settle Dispute’, Orlando Sentinel (online), 6 February 1997 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1997-02-06/business/9702051296_1_cruise-lines-port-charges-carnival-cruise 
and Letter from the Business Travel Coalition to the Honorable Jon Leibowitz (Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission), 27 August 2012, 1. 
531  Erin Durkin, ‘Uber ‘surge pricing’ ban proposed by Brooklyn Councilman’, New York Daily News (online), 
25 November 2014 www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/uber-surge-pricing-ban-proposed-city-councilman 
-article-1.2024118?cid=bitly;531 Assembly Member Felix W Ortiz, A03472 Memorandum in Support of Legislation, 
(23 January 2015) New York State Assembly http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A03472&term=& 
Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Votes=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y 
532  Yoav Gonen, ‘Legislator wants to slam brakes on Uber’s surge pricing’, New York Post (online), 25 November 2014 
http://nypost.com/2014/11/25/legislator-wants-to-slam-brakes-on-ubers-surge-pricing/. 
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abnormal disruption of the market,533 all parties within the chain of distribution of any essential 
consumer goods or services are prohibited from charging ‘unconscionably excessive prices.’534  The 
purpose of this law was to prevent price gouging by suppliers of essential services during period of 
natural disaster, war or other emergencies. Whether it represents appropriate regulatory policy in 
the context of non-essential services in periods of high demand is not clear. 
4.3.4.4 Market and industry intervention  
Market and industry responses to surge pricing in the context of ride sharing have occurred: 
• a new App was released in the US on 10 November 2014 called SurgeProtector 535 that 
identifies the location closest to the user that is not within the ridesharing platform’s surge 
pricing zone. 
• In California, the Los Angeles Board of Taxicab Commissioners has implemented new rules 
requiring that all taxi drivers sign up with a certified e-hail app by 20 August 2015, allowing taxi 
companies to compete directly with ridesharing platforms.536  
• New York taxi drivers have also aligned themselves with similar apps (known as Arro (operates 
with 13,000 of New York’s yellow taxis) and Way2Ride (operates with approximately 14,000 
city taxis).537   
• In 2014, the New York Attorney-General, entered into an agreement with Uber to implement a 
new formula limiting prices to a ‘normal range’ during emergencies and natural disasters. The 
agreement essentially prevents Uber’s ‘surge pricing’ algorithm from operating during 
‘abnormal disruptions of the market’ (adopting the same definition contained in the General 
Business Law) and resulted in Uber adopting the policy at a nationwide level.538 
4.3.5 Canada 
The primary concern in Canada about drip pricing practices is that information about price can be 
difficult for consumers to locate on a website and in some cases is it hidden or consumers can only 
access this information through a series of hyperlinks which may be confusing.539 Consequently, 
Canada continues to rely on statutory prohibitions of misleading advertising (both at a federal and 
provincial level) together with the implementation of the Internet Sales Contract Harmonization 
Template to protect consumers against drip pricing and surge pricing practices. The only exception 
is in the airline industry where the Air Transport Regulations SOR/2012 operate. 
                                                          
533  ‘Abnormal disruption of the market’ is defined as any change in the market, whether actual or imminently 
threatened, resulting from stress of weather, convulsion of nature, failure or shortage of electric power or other 
source of energy, strike, civil disorder, war, military action, national or local emergency, or other cause of an 
abnormal disruption of the market which results in the declaration of a state of emergency by the governor. 
534  Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, ‘A G Schneiderman Announces Agreement With Uber To Cap Pricing During 
Emergencies And Natural Disasters’ (Press Release, 8 July 2014) http://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman- 
announces-agreement-uber-cap-pricing-during-emergencies-and-natural. 
535  See https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/id925613132. 
536  John Schreiber, ‘LA taxis will be required to use e-hail smartphone apps’ MynewsLA.com (online), 19 February 2015 
http://mynewsla.com/government/2015/02/19/l-taxis-now-required-use-e-hail-smartphone-apps/. 
537  David A Arnott, ‘For New York’s yellow taxis, a second e-hail app’, New York Business Journal (online), 14 September 
2015 www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2015/09/14/for-new-yorks-yellow-taxis-a-second-e-hail-app.html. 
538  Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, ‘A G Schneiderman Announces Agreement With Uber To Cap Pricing During 
Emergencies And Natural Disasters’ (Press Release, 8 July 2014) 
http://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-uber-cap-pricing-during-emergencies-and-
natural. A copy of the agreement can be found here: http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Uber_Letter_Agreement.pdf. 
539  Ioana Delapeta and Marcel Boucher, ‘Regulating Distance Contracts: Time to Take Stock’ (Final Report of the 
Research Project, Union des consommateurs, June 2014, 13. 
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Canada has not implemented any laws at a Federal level to regulate surge pricing nor has it 
prosecuted any ridesharing companies under existing regulations for the practice. Any 
consideration of surge pricing has been subsidiary to the issue of whether ride sharing platforms 
should be regulated in the same way as taxi services. Like other jurisdictions Canadian regulators 
are of the view that taxi regulations play an important role in addressing market failures540 any new 
regulation in this area needs to strike a balance between protecting passengers and allowing 
innovation.541  
4.3.5.1 General protections — drip pricing in e-commerce 
The regulatory approach of the Canadian government is similar to the UK and US. Legislative 
provisions prohibiting misleading advertising are used to challenge drip pricing in an online context. 
Unlike the US there is an attempt to harmonise the different provincial jurisdictions through 
standard contract terms and a code for e-commerce. Consumer protection laws at both a Federal 
and provincial level regulate e-commerce transactions in Canada. The report considers the Federal 
laws and examples of different approaches in Ontario and British Columbia. 
Competition Act RSC 1985 (Federal) 
The Competition Act RSC 1985 is a federal law governing business conduct in Canada with the 
purpose of providing consumers with, amongst other things, competitive prices and product 
choices and, in the context of drip-pricing, making misleading advertisements unlawful. The 
misleading advertising provisions of the Competition Act apply equally to new technologies, 
including emerging advertising technologies, such as geo fencing, and mobile devices.542  
Section s 74.01 of the Competition Act RSC 1985 is widely drafted. A person engages in reviewable 
conduct if ‘for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the supply or use of a product or for 
the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, any business interest, by any means whatever (a) 
makes a representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material matter’. A person will 
also engage in reviewable conduct under s 74.011 where the person sends or causes to be sent 
false or misleading representations in the sender information or subject matter information of an 
electronic message. This provision was relied upon by the Competition Bureau to commence an 
action against rental car companies placing misleading headline prices in email communications.  
                                                          
540  Competition Bureau, Modernizing Regulation in The Canadian Taxi Industry (26 November 2015) Competition 
Bureau www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04007.html. 
541  CBC News, ‘Uber’s arrival in BC inevitable, says Transportation Minister Todd Stone’, CBC News British Columbia 
(online), 21 January 2016 www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/uber-s-arrival-in-b-c-inevitable-says- 
transportation-minister-todd-stone-1.3413425. 
542  This approach is consistent with the 2009 updates to the Bureau’s Internet advertising guidelines (Application of the 
Competition Act to Representations on the Internet), which remain its leading statement on advertising on the 
Internet. 
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Short-term car rental industry: The Commissioner of Competition v Aviscar Inc [2016] 
Comp. Trib. 1 
On 10 March 2015, the Competition Bureau brought a misleading advertising application before 
the Canadian Competition Tribunal against Aviscar Inc. and Budgetcar Inc. The Bureau alleges 
that Avis and Budget promote car rentals at prices and discounts that are not attainable because 
customers are required to pay additional fees over the initial advertised rental price in breach of 
sections 74.01(1)(a), 74.05 and 74.011(1) and (2) of the Competition Act. The Bureau further 
alleges that Avis and Budget mischaracterise such non-optional fees as taxes and surcharges that 
car rental companies are required to collect from consumers by governments or third parties, 
when in actual fact Avis and Budget are electing to impose these fees to recoup part of their 
operating costs.  
Although, a decision in this case is not expected until September 2016, of particular interest is 
the Bureau’s reliance on recent amendments to s74.011 designed to address false or misleading 
commercial representations made in the subject line of email communications. It appears as if 
the Bureau will be relying on these amendments moving forward to prosecute companies who 
use misleading email subject lines to attract consumer attention. 
Canada’s implementation and amendment of existing consumer protection laws to cover 
technological advances in line with relevant EU directives demonstrates Canada’s commitment to 
ensuring that consumers are afforded the same protection as more traditional forms of 
commerce. 
 
Consumer Protection Act, SO 2002 (Ontario) 
In Ontario the Consumer Protection Act, SO 2002 regulates business practices in both face-to face 
transactions and online transactions. The Consumer Protection Act includes general prohibitions on 
misleading advertising like the Competition Act RSC 1985, but also imposes an obligation on 
suppliers under internet agreements and remote agreements to disclose certain prescribed 
information to a consumer before the consumer enters into the contract. An internet agreement is 
defined widely as a consumer agreement formed by text based internet communications (s 20), 
which means it will apply to any supply of goods or services to a consumer over $50 (s 37). ‘Goods’ 
is defined as any type of property and ‘services’ is anything that is not goods including a right, 
entitlement or benefit (s 1). Under these broad definitions, any type of computer software or 
digital products or service supplied to a consumer will be subject to the provisions, but the 
obligation will not apply to: 
• a sale to a person or corporation carrying on a business; or 
• purchases by a consumer under $50. 
The information a supplier must provide is detailed in the Consumer Protection Act Regulations, O. 
Reg. 17/05 and includes an itemised list of the all-inclusive price and any taxes or additional 
charges that may apply (s 32 Consumer Protection Act Regulations). If the supplier fails to provide 
the prescribed information a consumer is entitled to terminate the agreement at any time after the 
contract is entered into and before the expiry of 7 days after a copy of the agreement is received 
by the consumer (s 40). 
Part 4: Approaches to Regulation of e-commerce and peer-to-peer transactions 
Comparative analysis of overseas consumer policy frameworks Page 112 
Travel website: Magill v Expedia [2013] ONSC 683 
The Ontario drip pricing case of Magill v Expedia Inc [2013] ONSC 683 was a class action brought 
by 1,500,000 Canadian citizens against Expedia (an online travel company that acts as an 
intermediary between travellers and travel providers around the world) for failing to include a 
tax recovery charge or service fee in the final price for hotel bookings made online between June 
2007 and October 2007 (when the terms of use did not refer to either charge) and October 2007 
and March 2011 (where the terms of use referred to those charged but in a manner that did not 
clearly explain the total amounts).  
Expedia claimed that: 
• the tax recovery rate is an estimate of the taxes that the hotel is required to collect and 
remit on the confidential rate agreed between the hotel and Expedia and so the exact 
amount cannot be determined at the time of booking. Expedia uses the tax recovery rate 
to pay the hotel the taxes charged on the customer’s hotel room after checkout and, if the 
actual charges exceed the tax recovery amount, then Expedia pays the hotel the difference 
without charging the customer; and 
• the service fee is an additional amount retained by Expedia to offset its costs in providing 
hotel content on its websites. The calculation of that fee is a highly confidential trade 
secret. 
A single amount for the tax recovery rate and service fee is included in invoices to customers. 
Expedia argued that it adopts that approach to prevent customers and competitors from 
reverse-engineering the net rate and putting Expedia in a position where it is potentially 
breaching confidentiality agreements with hotels. The plaintiffs claimed Expedia actually profited 
from the combined fee as it was in excess of the combined total of the taxes actually paid and 
the costs actually incurred by Expedia as a service fee. Such conduct was said to breach 
section 14(1) of the Ontario Consumer Protection Act 2002 (‘unfair practice’ by making a false, 
misleading or deceptive representation) and section 38(1)(failing to disclose prescribed 
information).  
Although the case turned on whether it was a class action under the relevant Canadian 
legislation, it was held that Expedia didn’t breach its obligations under the Consumer Protection 
Act 2002 as the total amount was included in the customer invoice. However, in reaching that 
decision Perell J noted that any costs awarded should be modest as the claim might have been 
avoided if Expedia had more thoroughly explained the tax recovery charge and service fee in its 
contract. 
 
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act 2004 (British Columbia) 
The Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act 2004 prohibits unfair business practices. 
Similar to the Federal Competition Act, drip pricing practices may be subject to the general 
deceptive act or practice provisions that apply if there is a false representation about the total 
price of goods or services (s 4(3)). The Act also provides for the disclosure of an itemised price for 
goods or services supply through a ‘distance sales contract’ (s 46). Internet transactions are 
included in the definition of ‘distance sales contract’ which applies to a contract entered into 
between a supplier and consumer where there is no opportunity to inspect the goods before the 
contract is entered into (s 17). Like Ontario the provisions do not apply to sales to persons for 
business purposes. 
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4.3.5.2 Specific protections — Airline industry  
Since late 2012, the Air Transport Regulations SOR/2012 has required Canadian airlines to show the 
full cost of the flight, including mandatory taxes, airport fees and fuel surcharges, in the advertised 
headline price for the flight. The Air Transport Regulations create an appropriate level of 
harmonisation with air price advertising formats found in the United States and European 
markets.543  Clear guidance for compliance with the regulations is provided by the Interpretation 
Note issued by Canada’s Transportation Agency.544  
4.3.5.3 General protections- Surge pricing in e-commerce 
Any challenge to surge pricing practices by the Canadian Competition Bureau may occur on the 
basis of misleading conduct by the supplier or platform operator in contravention of the 
Competition Act RSC 1985, s 74.01. The mere charging of a surge is unlikely to be misleading, other 
misleading conduct about whether and when a surge will be charged would be required.  
4.3.5.4 Codes and guidelines 
In Canada there are two relevant voluntary codes and guidelines. 
(a) The Internet Sales Contract Harmonization Template was approved by Federal, provincial and 
territorial ministers in 2001 with a view to instituting a harmonised approach to consumer 
protection in e-commerce across Canada. The Harmonization Template, It is a common 
template that covers contract formation, cancellation rights, credit card charge-backs and 
information provision and, requires clear and up-front price disclosure for online transactions. 
The template while endorsed by all levels of government requires each jurisdiction to indicate 
the application and scope of the template. 
(b)  The Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce establishes 
benchmarks for good business practice for suppliers conducting commercial activities with 
consumers online. The Code does not alter the provisions under the Competition Act or other 
industry specific codes that may exist. The Code is based on the Principles of Consumer 
Protection for Electronic Commerce: A Canadian Framework, which was approved in August 
1999. The Code is also consistent with the OECD’s Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
Context of Electronic Commerce. The Code was endorsed1 by federal, provincial and territorial 
Ministers in 2004. The Code can be endorsement for use by private sector organisations as 
representing good practice benchmarks for businesses engaging in e-commerce. Relevant to 
pricing practices the Code requires sufficient information to be provided to consumers so as to 
make an informed choice. The information should be conspicuous and easily accessible on a 
website and provided at an appropriate stage of the decision making process. In particular the 
code requires price and any cost of currency exchange, shipping charges and taxes to be 
confirmed to consumers prior to the conclusion of the transaction. 
4.3.6 Singapore 
Singapore, like other jurisdictions, has identified information asymmetry as the fundamental 
consumer issue for drip-pricing. The Singapore government implemented the Consumer Protection 
(Fair Trading) Act to counteract an observable increase in the number of errant traders and 
                                                          
543  Canadian Transportation Agency Q&A: All-inclusive air price advertising (21 May 2014) Canadian Transportation 
Agency www.otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/aspar-q-and-a. 
544  See, Canadian Transportation Authority, ‘Air Transportation Regulations — Air Services Price Advertising: 
Interpretation Note’ (Interpretation Note, Canadian Transportation Agency, 2 October 2015) Appendix II. 
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unethical business practices.545 Like other jurisdictions, the Singapore government also adopts the 
approach that e-commerce transactions should be subject to the same regulatory framework as 
face-to face transactions.  
Singapore’s specifically regulates surge pricing in the taxi industry with the aim of striking a balance 
between protecting passengers from high and unexpected prices and allowing innovation.546 The 
resulting regulation focusses on maximising benefits to consumers and taxi drivers and less on 
protecting a particular business model or existing taxi operators.547 The legislative approach also 
gives effect to Singapore’s policy that e-commerce transactions and face to face transactions 
should be subject to the same regulatory framework.  
4.3.6.1 General protections — Drip pricing 
The Singapore policy position is given effect by reliance on a combination of existing unfair practice 
regulations in the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (‘CPFTA’) together with self-regulation 
under the Singapore Code of Advertising Practice. Singapore’s primary policy objective is that 
consumers should be fully informed of relevant information about a transaction prior to making a 
decision to purchase. This should include complete and accurate information about the trader’s 
business, about the goods or services for sale and about how the transaction is made. What this 
means, amongst other things, is that e-customers should have enough information to make an 
informed decision to purchase goods or services. 548  
Section 4 of the CFTA provides that it is an unfair practice for a supplier in relation to a consumer 
transaction to ‘do or say anything, or omit to do or say anything, if as a result a consumer might 
reasonably be deceived or misled’. This general provision may apply to a situation where a headline 
price advertised by the supplier does not include other mandatory charges which increase the 
price. An unfair practice will also arise if one of the situations listed in the Second Schedule to the 
Act applies. This includes ‘representing that a price benefit or advantage exists respecting goods or 
services where the price benefit or advantage does not exist’ and ‘charging a price for goods or 
services that is substantially higher than an estimate provided to the consumer, except where the 
consumer has expressly agreed to the higher price in advance’. Again these provisions may apply in 
a drip pricing situation if the price represented by the supplier is different to the actual price a 
consumer will have to pay. 
There is very limited case law on the application of section 4(a) to drip or partition pricing. Rather, 
Singapore’s focus has instead been on the most prevalent misleading conduct in that jurisdiction 
namely, misleading labels and advertising generally549 and on the proposed harmonisation of 
e-commerce laws in ASEAN.550  
                                                          
545  Consumers Association of Singapore, CPFTA & Lemon Law, (2013) Consumers Association of Singapore 
www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_cpfta.aspx. 
546  Singapore, Second Reading for Third Party Taxi Booking Service Providers Bill by Minister for Transport, Parliament, 
11 May 2015, para 5 (Lui Tuck Yew). 
547  Ibid. 
548  Allan Asher, ‘Consumer Protection in E-Commerce: Report on OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
Context of Electronic Commerce’ (Paper presented at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Electronic Commerce 
Steering Group Workshop on Consumer Protection, Singapore, 20 July 2000) 2. 
549  Consumers International, ‘Roadmapping Capacity Building Needs in Consumer Protection in ASEAN’ (Regional 
Report (FINAL), ASEAN Australian Development Cooperation Program Phase II (AADCP), 15 June 2011) 45. 
550  See, for example Consumers International, ‘Roadmapping Capacity Building Needs in Consumer Protection in 
ASEAN’ (Regional Report (FINAL), ASEAN Australian Development Cooperation Program Phase II (AADCP), 15 June 
2011) XVII. 
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4.3.6.2 Specific protections — surge pricing 
Singapore enacted the Third-Party Taxi Booking Service Providers Act (Singapore, S 528, 2015 
electronic ed) in 2015 as a ‘light touch’ regulatory measure to protect consumers from, amongst 
other things, surge and dynamic pricing in taxi services. The legislation applies in addition to the 
Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act which provides consumers with remedies for unfair 
practices including misleading conduct. Operators of taxis are required to comply with the 
legislation and are subject to the restrictions imposed on pricing.  
Under the Third-Party Taxi Booking Service Providers Act:   
• taxi-booking fees charged by service providers cannot exceed those charged by taxi 
companies; and  
• all information on the fare rates, surcharges and fees payable for the journey must be 
specified to consumers upfront, before they accept the dispatched taxi. These include the 
flag-down fare, distance and time rates, the booking fee charged by the service provider, and 
where applicable, peak period and location surcharges.551 
Third-party taxi service providers who do not comply with the regulatory framework are liable to 
penalties of up to $100,000 per contravention. 
The Third-Party Taxi Booking Service Providers Act only regulates taxi services that use third party 
apps. That means that ridesharing platforms, such as Uber, are free to operate ‘chauffeur’ services 
(that are very similar to Uber’s standard services in the UK, US and Canada) free of this regulation.  
4.3.6.3 Codes and guidelines 
The Singapore Code of Advertising Practice (the Code) seeks to promote a high standard of ethics in 
advertising through industry self-regulation. The Code was formulated to provide guidance 
regarding compliance with the Lemon Law. The Code applies to all advertisements for goods, 
services and facilities and, although voluntary, is strictly policed by Singapore’s Advertising 
Standards Authority. The Code provides a set of rules that promote legal, decent, honest and 
truthful advertising consistent with the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (Singapore).  
In relation to drip-pricing the Code provides that advertisements must not mislead consumers 
about the price of goods or services or underestimate the actual total cost to be paid (see, for 
example, rule 5.1 — Truthful presentation). This is consistent with the unfair practices provisions of 
the Lemon law. 
This method of self-regulation has been effective largely because it has the majority of Singapore’s 
media owners, advertising agencies, government agencies and some industry-specific agencies as 
members and it grants its policing body, the Advertising Standards Authority of Singapore (ASAS) 
the power to: 
• ask that advertisements contravening the Code be taken down or withheld from publication 
until they are modified (with the support of media owners); 
• publish the names of those parties who have breached the Code; and 
                                                          
551  Land Transport Authority, ‘New Regulatory Framework for Third-Party Booking Services to Protect the Safety and 
Interests of Commuters’ (News Release, 21 November 2014), [2]. 
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• request its members sanction parties who violate the Code including withdrawal of facilities, 
rights or services from parties concerned subject to legal constraints.552 
However, notwithstanding the fact that the Code has served the industry well, it does not expressly 
deal with online and digital advertising. As a result the Code is currently under review and new 
guidelines for digital and social media advertising have been circulated for consolation. The 
Guidelines draw upon similar codes of conduct for advertising in Australia and the UK, as well as 
some of those used by social media channels.553 
4.3.7 Comparison — Drip pricing and surge pricing in e-commerce 
4.3.7.1 Common aspects 
Drip pricing 
(1) In all of the reviewed jurisdictions including Australia the regulatory approach to drip pricing is 
similar. The problem of drip pricing is regulated through existing provisions applying to 
misleading conduct or in the case of the UK and US, the unfair commercial practices 
provisions, which include misleading conduct.  
(2) All jurisdictions also provide non-regulatory pricing practice guides to assist business to comply 
with their obligations under relevant statutory provisions.  
Surge pricing 
(1) In Australia, UK, US and Canada the issue of surge pricing is not specifically regulated. Most 
regulators and economists view surge pricing as part of a normal functioning market and the 
intervention of regulation may have a detrimental effect on the market. 
(2) Any regulation or consideration of surge pricing has generally been in the context of ride 
sharing and whether new regulation is required similar to the taxi industry.  
4.3.7.2 Differences 
Drip pricing 
(1) In the US there are no industry or platform specific regulations to provide clear guidance to 
specific industries where the problem is prevalent. Before implementing new regulations the 
FTC has determined that it needs to obtain further empirical data because much depends on 
the context in which drip pricing is used, whether there is competition for the particular  
(2) Product at issue and whether the purchasers are sophisticated consumers or not. For example, 
a firm that engages in drip pricing might prompt a competitor to offer services without such 
add-on charges, thereby giving consumers a choice.554  
                                                          
552  See section 4 of the Singapore Code of Advertising Practice and, in relation to recent enforcement action: Baker & 
McKenzie, Wong & Leow, Developments in Consumer Protection: Recent enforcement actions taken against errant 
advertisers. (July 2015) Baker & McKenzie 
www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Singapore/AL_Singapore_DevelopmentsConsumerProtection_
Jul15.pdf; Tan Chak Lim, ‘Letter to The Straits Times, 4 August 2015’ (Letter, 4 August 2015) 1. 
553  Advertising Standards Authority of Singapore, Consultation on Draft Digital and Social Media Advertising Guidelines 
(7 December 2015) Advertising Standards Authority of Singapore <https://asas.org.sg/news/post=429> 3.2(a)-(d) 
inclusive). Final guidelines were not issued as at the date of this report. 
554  Federal Trade Commission, Drip, drip, drip ...Those charges really add up… (30 May 2012) FTC: Watch 
www.law.csuohio.edu/sites/default/files/facultystaff/sagers_ftc_article.pdf. 
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(3) In contrast to Australia, Canada has a statutory requirement for disclosure of price including 
an itemised list of the prices at which goods and services are proposed to be supplied to the 
consumer including taxes, shipping charges, customs duties, brokerage fees together with the 
total amount the supplier knows to be payable by the consumer is enacted in Ontario and 
British Columbia. Similar guidelines exist in the Internet Sales Harmonization Template and the 
Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce. These provisions 
apply specifically to internet sales and create a positive duty to disclose the full details of price 
at the appropriate decision making point.  
(4) The UK has a number of industry-specific regulations addressing specific issues, including drip 
pricing in those industries. This has precipitated investigation by the regulator into drip pricing 
practices in those industries and allowed the regulator to work with the main industry bodies 
to implement best practice guidelines. It appears that initial collaboration has resulted in 
fewer formal court proceedings being instituted in those industries.  
(5) Under the UK CPRs pricing practices that may constitute drip pricing can be challenged on the 
basis of misleading conduct (acts or omissions) or under the broader prohibition of unfair 
commercial practices provision (reg 3 CPRs). The concept of an unfair commercial practice 
potentially extends the circumstances in which redress may be sort by a consumer or 
regulator. It is not necessary for the commercial practice to be misleading in order to prove 
that it ‘materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the 
average consumer with regard to the product’. Evidence of consumer biases will be relevant in 
demonstrating the behavioural response of the average consumer. 
Canada is the only jurisdiction to attempt to regulate the terms of internet contracts through the 
Internet Sales Harmonization Template.  
4.4 Online reviews and endorsements 
4.4.1 Issues 
Online reviews and endorsements ‘provide consumers with information about products, services 
and businesses based on the experiences of other consumers’555 and are an important tool for 
consumers in an online market. There is a range of review mechanisms available ranging from 
customer reviews and endorsements on product websites to independent websites that conduct 
reviews of products556 or allow consumers to post reviews.557 More recently, as the benefit of 
positive endorsements to suppliers has been realised it has become more common for feedback 
left on websites and other peer-to-peer platforms to be untrue or not wholly reflective of the 
suppliers conduct or reputation.558 According to research conducted by the University of Illinois at 
Chicago,559 almost 30% of reviews and endorsements are posted by individuals employed to write 
them. For example, sites such as freelancer.com welcome businesses to offer jobs for writing fake 
                                                          
555  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Managing online reviews, Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-your-business/managing-online-reviews. 
556  For example, Choice (www.choice.com.au); Product Review (www.productreview.com.au.. 
557  This is common in the travel industry with websites such as Tripadvisor, Expedia and Trivago.  
558  Kat Kane ‘The Big Hidden Problem with Uber? Insincere 5-Star Ratings’, Wired (online), 19 March 2015 < 
www.wired.com/2015/03/bogus-uber-reviews/; Cohen, Schneider & O’Neill LLP, Product Reviews, Endorsements 
and Astroturfing (30 October 2015) Cohen Schneider & O/Neill LLP 
www.cohenschneider.com/product-reviews-endorsements-and-astroturfing/. 
559  Karen Weise, ‘A Lie Detector Test for Online Reviewers’, BusinessWeek Magazine (online), 29 September 2011 
www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/a-lie-detector-test-for-online-reviewers-09292011.html. 
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reviews and there are a number of fake review writers who offer their services on websites such as 
Fiverr.com in exchange for free products or services.560  
Fake reviews and endorsements are most commonly used in travel, electronics and home repairs561 
but can be found across almost all platforms selling goods or services over the Internet. 
Four main practices have been identified as leading to fake reviews:  
• Businesses commission or write fake negative reviews about other businesses. These reviews 
make false, negative claims about an experience with a product, service or business;  
• Businesses commission or write fake positive reviews about themselves  which make false, 
positive claims about an experience with a product, service or business;562  
• Review sites or businesses cherry pick positive reviews and suppress negative reviews without 
making it clear negative reviews are not included; 
• Endorsements are commissioned where the reviewer is offered an incentive, or has a 
commercial relationship with the business whose goods or services are being reviewed.563  
Most regulators recognise the importance of customer reviews, endorsements and comparator 
websites in online markets. In the UK research reveals that more than 80% of consumers read 
online reviews before deciding to buy564 and US literature asserts that only 50% of consumers can 
identify a false or fake review. The increase in online transactions and the significance of reviews to 
online business success contributes to the potentially detrimental effect of false or fake reviews. 
Fake reviews are estimated to represent between 1% — 16% of all consumer reviews,565 which has 
the potential to detrimentally affect decision making by consumers and distort markets.  
The regulatory approach in each jurisdiction is similar. In most jurisdictions false or misleading 
reviews or claims to endorsement in e-commerce are treated as forms of misleading conduct and 
offenders are prosecuted under existing regulations prohibiting misleading conduct, 
representations or advertising. No specific modifications have been introduced for the application 
of these laws to e-commerce due to the broad drafting of the prohibitions in the UK, US, Canada 
and Australia. No specific extension of jurisdictional limits for enforcement against operators 
outside of the jurisdiction has been enacted. Most jurisdictions also have codes or guidelines, 
generally for advertising standards which deal specifically with online reviews and endorsements as 
part of ensuring compliance with general prohibitions. 
                                                          
560  David Streitfield, ‘For $2 a Star, an Online Retailer Gets 5-Star Product Reviews’, New York Times (online), 26 
January 2012 www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/technology/for-2-a-star-a-retailer-gets-5-star-reviews.html?_r=2&hp;  
Mary Pilon, ‘A Fake Amazon Reviewer Confesses’. The Wall Street Journal (online), 9 July 2009 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wallet/2009/07/09/delonghis-strange-brew-tracking-down-fake-amazon-raves/. 
561  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 29. 
562  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 21. 
563  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Managing online reviews, Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-your-business/managing-online-reviews. 
564  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015 2. 
565  European Parliament Think Tank, Online consumer reviews: The case of misleading or fake reviews (6 January 2016) 
European Parliament www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2015)571301. 
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4.4.2 Australia 
In Australia fake online reviews and endorsements are subject to the misleading conduct 
provisions of the Australian Consumer Law.  
4.4.2.1 General Protections — misleading conduct 
The prohibition on misleading conduct in trade or commerce in s 18 of the ACL is sufficiently broad 
to apply to direct conduct engaged in by a supplier or their agents to produce a fake or misleading 
review as well as where a supplier is aware of a fake review or endorsement and allows it to remain 
publicly available. The ACCC considers that a fake review is misleading conduct on the basis that 
such conduct ‘may ‘mislead consumers if they are presented as impartial, but were, in fact, written 
by the reviewed business, a competitor, someone paid to write a review who has not used the 
product or someone who has used the product but written an inflated review to receive financial 
or non-financial benefit’.566  This will apply to each of the identified types of fake review. 
A range of enforcement action can be taken by the ACCC for a contravention of s 18 or any of the 
specific protections in Part 3 of the ACL. A consumer or the regulator may also take action relying 
upon the specific unfair practices provisions in Part 3.567Action of this nature may however be 
difficult where the supplier is based outside Australia or there is no clear evidence of the supplier’s 
involvement in the misleading review. In the case of fake reviews or endorsements specific 
provision is made in s 29 ACL which relevantly provides: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible 
supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the 
supply or use of goods or services: 
…. 
(e)  make a false or misleading representation that purports to be a testimonial by any 
person relating to goods or services; or 
(f) make a false or misleading representation concerning: 
(i) a testimonial by any person; or 
(ii) a representation that purports to be such a testimonial; 
(iii) relating to goods or services; … 
Section 29 of the ACL specifically prohibits making of a false or misleading representation that 
purports to be a testimonial or relates to a testimonial by another person. The same conduct will 
be an offence under s 151(1)(e) and (f) of the ACL. 
Application of the section is limited to: 
(i) supply of goods or services in trade or commerce; and 
(ii) false or misleading representations. 
A broad range of enforcement mechanisms are available to the regulator under the ACL, including 
corrective advertising, disclosure orders, agreement to a compliance/education  program for 
employees, undertakings to remove the reviews, the imposition of civil penalties or a criminal 
                                                          
566  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Managing online reviews, Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-your-business/managing-online-reviews. 
567  In the context of fake online reviews this will most likely be s 29(1)(e) or (f) ACL. 
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prosecution. While enforcement action may be based on a contravention of the general misleading 
conduct provision in s 18 ACL or the specific protections in s 29 ACL, a civil penalty is not available 
for a contravention of s 18 ACL. This means that a civil penalty can only be sought for a positive 
false or misleading representation and not silence or inaction in relation to a testimonial or review. 
The ACCC has taken enforcement action against several companies for misleading reviews and 
testimonials. The Advertising Medical Institute, Citymove Pty Ltd,568 Electrodry569 and Euro 
Solar/Australian Solar Panels570 provide useful examples of fake online reviews and endorsements 
in the Australian context the range of enforcement remedies obtained. 
4.4.2.2 Consumer guidance and education 
In 2013, the ACCC in their Annual Report prioritised online consumer issues and in 2014 
comparator websites. In 2013 the ACCC issued a compliance guideline, Online reviews—a guide for 
business and review platforms to assist business with compliance and followed up with a report in 
2014 examining the comparator website industry in Australia.  
Consumer tips for online product reviews were added to the ACCC’ s website, which encourage 
consumers to seek information from multiple sources and to look at multiple reviews, as well as to 
check whether review platforms have commercial arrangements with reviewed businesses. The 
ACCC identified concerns about specific online review practices related to country of origin claims 
that were escalated for further investigation resulting in civil penalties. 
4.4.3 United Kingdom 
The regulatory approach of the UK government has been to ensure that existing legislative 
provisions within the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK) SI 2008/1277 
(‘CPR’) prohibiting unfair commercial practices apply to fake reviews published in any medium. To 
assist with compliance the Competition and Market’s authority has issued guidance notes 
confirming that ‘review sites should be clear about how reviews are obtained and checked, publish 
all reviews (even negative ones) provided they are genuine and lawful and explain the 
circumstances in which reviews might not be published or might be edited, make sure there is not 
an unreasonable delay in publishing reviews, disclose commercial relationships, clearly identify all 
advertising and paid promotions and have appropriate procedures in place to detect and remove 
fake reviews and endorsements’.571 The UK regulator has made it clear that ‘businesses (and 
anyone acting on their behalf) should not pretend to be a customer and write fake reviews about 
their own or other businesses’ goods and services’.572 
A separate voluntary code, Code of Non-broadcast Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct 
Marketing, is also available for guidance. 
                                                          
568  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC: Removalist admits publishing false testimonials (9 
November 2011) Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-removalist-admits-publishing-false-testimonials. 
569  ACCC v A Whistle & Co (1979) Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1447, 1449 and 1450 [6], [7] and [10]. 
570  ACCC v P & N Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] FCA 6, 11. 
571  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 29 -30. 
572  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 29. 
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4.4.3.1 General Protections — unfair commercial practices  
Regulation 3 of the CPR is a general provision prohibiting unfair commercial practices that cause, or 
are likely to cause, the average consumer to make a different decision. Where the supplier gives 
false or misleading information or omits or hides information material to a consumer’s decision to 
purchase a product this conduct will be an unfair practice under regulations 5 and 6. These 
provisions potentially apply to a range of business practices involving fake reviews. In addition 
unfair practices listed in Schedule 1 of the CPRs are deemed by regulation 3(4)(d) to be an unfair 
practice. Included in this blacklist are: 
• 4. Claiming that a trader (including his commercial practices) or a product has been approved, 
endorsed or authorised by a public or private body when the trader, the commercial practices 
or the product have not or making such a claim without complying with the terms of the 
approval, endorsement or authorisation 
• 11. Using editorial content in the media to promote a product where a trader has paid for the 
promotion without making that clear in the content or by images or sounds clearly identifiable 
by the consumer (advertorial). 
• 22. Falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for purposes 
relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a 
consumer. 
The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) has been active in taking action against 
businesses and organisations that have published fake online reviews and endorsements and those 
that have been involved in their publication. 
• Online reviews: Evidence of fake reviews being posted to Trip Advisor led the UK regulator 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) to order TripAdvisor to stop claiming that its reviews 
were ‘honest’. TripAdvisor has since removed its slogan, ‘world’s most trusted travel advice’, 
from its banner.573  
• Online endorsements — social media: In December 2010, the UK’s Office of Fair Trading (the 
predecessor to the Competition and Consumer Commission) obtained undertakings from an 
operator of a commercial blogging network, Handpicked Media, ‘requiring them to clearly 
identify when promotional comments have been paid for’;574 and 
• Online endorsements — affiliates paid for positive reviews: The Advertising Standards 
Authority found that Mondelez UK Ltd had breached the UK Code by allowing a number of its 
paid vloggers to create and publish vlogs that featured, and were intended to advertise, Oreo 
biscuits. The Advertising Standards Authority made it clear that a link in a ‘show more’ button 
that stated ‘Thanks to Oreo for making this video possible’ and ‘Check out the Oreo site for 
more licking action’ were not sufficient disclosure of the vlogger’s commercial relationship 
with the makers of Oreo biscuits;575 and 
                                                          
573  Kate Springer, Fake travel reviews (2016) SmartTravelAsia <http://www.smarttravelasia.com/FakeReviews.htm>. 
574  Office of Fair Trading, OFT secures promotional blogging disclosures (13 December 2010) Office of Fair Trading 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010
/134-10. 
575  Advertising Standards Authority, ASA Ruling on Modelez UK Ltd (26 November 2014) ASA 
www.asa.org.uk/Rulings/Adjudications/2014/11/Mondelez-UK-Ltd/SHP_ADJ_275018.aspx#.VspphRyb_qI.  
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4.4.3.2 Voluntary Code  
Section 3 of the UK Code of Non-broadcast Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct Marketing 
specifically deals with fake reviews and endorsements. Although compliance is voluntary, it 
prohibits misleading claims (section 3.47) and requires all signatories to retain evidence that a 
testimonial is genuine and hold contact details for the person or organisation who provided it 
(section 3.45).  
4.4.3.3 Regulatory Guides 
The UK government has also implemented a number of regulatory guides including: 
• Codes and trustmarks to improve consumer confidence: The Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills has recently asked British Standards to consider common issues 
experienced by consumers when making online purchasing decisions and explore whether 
these could be addressed by a new BSI standard or mark that could be displayed on approved 
websites.576  
• Guidance for bloggers and industry guidelines on paid promotions: In March 2014, the UK 
Committee of Advertising Practice released guidance for bloggers in response to a significant 
number of queries they had received regarding blogger’s obligations under the UK Code.577 
The International Advertising Bureau UK has also issued best practice guides in relation to 
Affiliate Audits578 and paid promotions in social media.579  
• Self-regulation: A number of the most reputable sites have started to self-regulate reviews on 
their websites. A number of different approaches have been adopted including allowing users 
to self-police reviews by placing a mark next to suspicious reviews, conducting investigations 
in response to complaints from businesses or notifications or suspicious reviews, using manual 
checks or software designed to spot anomalies, stop suspicious reviews from being posted or 
remove them and terminate the submitter’s membership.580  
4.4.4 United States 
Similar to the UK and Australia, the US has approached the increase in fake online reviews and 
endorsements through a combination of existing consumer protection laws, amended regulations 
and educational materials. Fake reviews and endorsement are referred to in the US as 
‘astroturfing’. The significant reliance on fake reviews and endorsements has been identified as a 
major problem for US consumers, as research suggests that the average person can only identify 
fake reviews at a rate of 50 per cent.581 US regulators recognise that the imbalance of information 
for consumers about the origin of a review and the inability of a consumer to ascertain this 
information to determine authenticity in an online environment have significant potential 
detrimental effects for the particular market. 
                                                          
576  BSIGroup, Delivering approval schemes that promote consumer trust (15 June 2015) BSI. 
www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/our-services/events/2015/2015-06-15-Delivering-approval-schemes-that-promote-cons
umer-trust/. 
577  Advertising Standards Authority, New words on the blog … (19 March 2014) Committee of Advertising Practice  
www.cap.org.uk/News-reports/Media-Centre/2014/New-words-on-the-blog.aspx#.Vsppdhyb_qI. 
578  Individuals or corporations who promote programs/campaigns on behalf of others such as bloggers and vloggers: 
Internet Advertising Bureau UK, ‘Best Practice Guides: Affiliate Audits’ (Guidelines, Internet Advertising Bureau UK, 
May 2015. 
579  Internet Advertising Bureau UK, ‘Paid Promotions in Social Media’ (Bitesize Guide, Internet Advertising Bureau UK, 
12 July 201)2. 
580  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 23-24. 
581  Ibid 3. 
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4.4.4.1 General protections — unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
The US has responded to the issue of fake online reviews by using existing prohibitions on ‘unfair or 
deceptive practices’ in the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) but supplementing them with 
guidelines aimed specifically at educating suppliers about appropriate use of online reviews and 
potential liability if the guidelines are not followed.  
The FTCA provides that ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce’ are unlawful and 
empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent persons from using such acts or 
practices.582  The dissemination of any false advertisement by any means for the purpose of 
inducing the purchase of goods or services is an unfair or deceptive act or practice for the purposes 
of § 45.583  
Reviews or endorsements are potentially unfair or deceptive practices if they mislead consumers 
and the practice is material to the consumer’s choice (acting reasonably) of or conduct regarding a 
product or service.584   US government agencies have taken action in reliance upon s 52 FTCA 
against businesses engaged in the use of fake reviews in the online environment to promote their 
business: 
• Public Relations Firm: This was the FTC’s case focusing solely on fake product reviews. In this 
case, Reverb (a public relations firm) was hired to promote certain iPhone apps on the Apple 
iTunes store. The FTC alleged that Reverb engaged in deceptive advertising by having its 
employees pose as consumers without disclosing the commercial relationship Reverb had with 
the app developer. As part of that settlement Reverb agreed to remove all reviews that 
violated the disclosure requirements and agreed not to post similar items without proper 
disclosures in the future.585  
• Online Music Lessons: In 2011 the FTC took action against Legacy Learning Systems Inc, a 
business that recruited affiliates to promote its online learning courses in articles, blogs and 
other online material under the pretence they were ordinary consumers or independent 
reviewers. The promotions also failed to disclose that the reviewers had been paid for every 
sale they generated.586 The matter was settled in March 2011 with Legacy Learning required to 
pay $250,000 in penalties;587  
• New York (Operation Clean Turf): In October 2013 the New York Attorney-General entered 
into Assurances of Discontinuance with 19 companies to cease writing fake reviews for 
businesses on consumer-review websites and to pay more than $350,000 in penalties. The 
year-long investigation by the Attorney-General’s office identified that reviews were often 
written by the companies’ employees and freelance writers in Bangladesh, Eastern Europe and 
the Philippines for between $1 and $10 per review and were published on websites like Yelp, 
Google Local and CitySearch.588  
                                                          
582  15 USC § 45(1), (2). 
583  15 USC §52(2)(b). 
584  Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Policy Statement on Deception’ (14 October 1983) 
www.ftc.gov/putlci-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception. Further discussion of the unfairness test 
appears at [8.2] under Punitive Fees. 
585  Federal Trade Commission v Reverb Communications Inc and Tracie Snitker FTC Docket No. C-4310 (Nov. 22, 2010) 
(consent order). 
586  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 57.  
587  Federal Trade Commission, ‘Firm to Pay FTC $250,000 to Settle Charges That it Used Misleading Online ‘Consumer’ 
and ‘Independent’ Reviews’ (Press Release, 15 March 2011). 
588  Eric T Schneiderman, ‘A G Schneiderman Announces Agreement with 19 Companies To Stop Writing Fake Online 
Reviews And Pay More Than $350,000 In Fines’ (Press Release, 23 September 2013) 1. 
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4.4.4.2 Endorsement Guide  
The Electronic Code of Federal Regulations Guides concerning use of endorsements and 
testimonials in advertising 16 CFR 255 (2015) (‘Endorsement Guide’), revised in 2009, offers 
practical advice to businesses on endorsements by consumers, celebrities, and explains in general 
terms when the FTC may find endorsements or testimonials unfair or deceptive for the purposes of 
section 52 of the FTCA. Relevantly, the Endorsement Guide responds directly to some of the 
regulatory issues identified above by requiring: 
• Endorsements to reflect the honest opinions, beliefs or experience of the endorser 
(s 255.1(a)); 
• Requires the endorser to be a bona fide user of the good or service at the time the 
endorsement was given (s 255.1(c)); 
• Requires advertisers, endorsers and sellers to disclose material connections between 
themselves (s 255.1(d) and s 255.5). A ‘material connection’ is defined as a relationship that 
might affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement. For example, if an endorser is an 
employee or relative of the advertiser, that fact must be disclosed because it is relevant to 
how much weight a consumer would give to the endorsement. Similarly, an advertiser must 
disclose if a consumer has been paid for giving an endorsement; 
• Requires consumer endorsements to be substantiated by, when relevant, relevant scientific 
evidence (s 255.2 (a) and (b)); and 
• Requires consumers and experts to be ‘actual consumers’ and experts in the field respectively 
(s 255.2(c)) and s255.3). 
The Endorsement Guide also provides a number of examples to demonstrate what the FTC 
considers to be a misleading review or endorsement (s 255.0).  
4.4.4.3  Dot.com disclosure information 
The Dot.com Guide is a Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’) staff guidance document that explains the 
information businesses should consider as they develop advertisements for online media to ensure 
compliance with the FTCA. In the context of online reviews the Dot.com guide provides guidance 
about how to make effective disclosures in digital advertising. Relevantly, it provides general 
guidance regarding endorsements and online reviews and, in relation to specific detail, refers to 
the Endorsement Guide. Examples are provided in the guide of appropriate disclosure of 
commercial benefits. 
4.4.4.4 Other Regulator Action 
In addition to regulatory enforcement the US government, as part of its membership of ICPEN, 
participates in annual sweeps of its domestic websites to identify misleading conduct.589 Each 
annual sweep focuses on a different theme, including endorsements and trustmarks.590  In addition 
to the annual sweeps, Cornell University has also developed software to specifically identify and 
flag false reviews.591  
                                                          
589  See www.icpen.org/for-consumers/what-icpen-does-for-you/international-internet-sweeps.  
590  International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network ‘I Bought what!?: Targeting misleading and 
inadequate information disclosure in the online mobile worlds’ (International Sweep Kit #14, International 
Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, 2012) 13. 
591  See Myle Ott et al, ‘Finding Deceptive Opinion Spam by Any Stretch of the Imagination’ (Research Report, Cornell 
University, 19 June 2011). 
Part 4: Approaches to Regulation of e-commerce and peer-to-peer transactions 
Comparative analysis of overseas consumer policy frameworks Page 125 
4.4.5 Canada 
The Canadian government’s regulatory approach to fake online reviews and endorsements is 
consistent with their overall policy approach to e-commerce. The laws are drafted to ensure 
consistent protections for consumers irrespective of the medium in which the transaction is 
conducted. Consistent with the approach in the UK, Australia and the US, Canada has, to date 
regulated fake reviews and endorsements using existing regulation (the Competition Act) together 
with the voluntary Code of Advertising Standards, which deals specifically with endorsements.  
4.4.5.1 General protections — Competition Act  
Fake reviews and endorsements can be challenged under the general misleading conduct 
provisions of the Competition Act RSC 1985. Section s 74.01 of the Competition Act RSC 1985 is 
widely drafted. A person engages in reviewable conduct if ‘for the purpose of promoting, directly 
or indirectly, the supply or use of a product or for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, 
any business interest, by any means whatever (a) makes a representation to the public that is false 
or misleading in a material matter’. Misleading advertising or fake reviews may be subject to both 
civil and criminal proceedings under (sections 52(1) (criminal) and s 74.01(1)(a) (civil)). 
The Competition Act also includes specific provisions dealing with testimonials (section 74.02). 
Those provisions prohibit using testimonials unless the publisher can show that the testimonial was 
previously made or published (or approved and written permission obtained) and generally accords 
with what is actually published or approved. 
The Canadian Competition Bureau has provided additional information and explanation of the 
operation of these provisions in the context of website reviews. Compliance with the provisions of 
the Act requires all representations made in endorsements or testimonials to ‘be free from 
ambiguity’ and ‘contain all of the information necessary to enable a reasonable purchaser to make 
a sound purchasing decision’.592  
4.4.5.2 Canadian Code of Advertising Standards  
The Canadian Code of Advertising Standards sets out criteria for acceptable advertising in Canada. 
The Code was created by the advertising industry in 1963 to promote the professional practice of 
advertising and is a voluntary code that can be adopted by advertising businesses. Administered by 
Advertising Standards Canada, the Code is regularly updated to ensure it is current and 
contemporary.  
Section 2 of the Code prohibits the presentation of concealed or disguised advertisements. 
Although the Interpretation Guidelines don’t clarify the scope of ‘disguised advertisements’ some 
of Advertising Standards Canada’s enforcement action makes it clear that it extends to ‘native 
advertising’ and endorsements. 
Advertising Standards Canada (‘ASC’) has investigated a number of consumer complaints regarding 
‘disguised advertising’.593 
                                                          
592  Canadian Competition Bureau, False or Misleading Representations (5 November 2015) Competition Bureau 
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/00513.html [2] and [3]. 
593  Disguised advertising is where the commercial intent of the advertising is concealed by way of its format or 
content: Canadian Code of Advertising Standards, clause 2. 
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4.4.5.3 Consumer education 
In addition to enforcement action, the Canadian Competition Bureau has focused its attention on 
preventing consumers from being influenced by fake online reviews and endorsements. In the 
Bureau’s False or Misleading Representations and Deceptive Marketing Practices guide, the Bureau 
describes how fake reviews and endorsements can be caught under Canadian competition law and 
provides guidance as to how to ensure testimonials comply with the Competition Act.594 Further, in 
2014, the Competition Bureau issued a press notice regarding fake online reviews.595 
4.4.6 Singapore 
The Singapore government considers existing laws and codes already satisfactorily regulate fake 
online reviews and endorsements.596 The regulatory issues are generally consistent with those 
identified in other areas of this report. The Singapore government’s policy objectives again mirror 
those identified in relation to general misleading, unfair and deceptive practices, namely that 
consumers: 
• must be protected against such practices; 
• must be provided with sufficient information to make an informed decision;597 and  
• should be able to operate in a fair and equitable trading environment.598 
4.4.6.1 General Protections — Online reviews and endorsements  
The Singapore government and its associated agencies have treated fake reviews and 
endorsements in the same manner as general misleading, unfair and deceptive practices.  
The Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (Singapore), s 4(a) provides a general prohibition 
against unfair practices including, relevantly, doing or saying anything, or omitting to do or say 
anything, if such statements or omissions might reasonably mislead a consumer. This general 
provision is supplemented by examples contained in Schedule 2 to the Act. The relevant examples 
here include: 
• making a representation that appears to be objective, but which is primarily made to sell 
goods or services (example 14); 
• representing that a particular person has offered or agreed to acquire goods or services if they 
have not (example 15); and 
• using small print to conceal a material fact from a consumer (example 20). 
                                                          
594  Canadian Competition Bureau, False or Misleading Representations and Deceptive Marketing Practices (5 
November 2015) Canadian Competition Bureau www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03133.html. 
595  Canadian Competition Bureau, Don’t buy into fake online endorsements: Not all reviews are from legitimate 
consumers (28 July 2014) Canadian Competition Bureau 
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03782.html. 
596  Advertising Standards Authority of Singapore, ‘Singapore Code of Advertising Practice’ (Code (3rd ed), Advertising 
Standards Authority of Singapore, February 2008) 15. 
597  Allan Asher, ‘Consumer Protection in E-Commerce: Report on OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
Context of Electronic Commerce’ (Paper presented at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Electronic Commerce 
Steering Group Workshop on Consumer Protection, Singapore, 20 July 2000) 2. 
598  Consumers Association of Singapore, CPFTA & Lemon Law, (2013) Consumers Association of Singapore 
www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_cpfta.aspx. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the above examples (particularly examples 14 and 15) quite clearly 
deal with fake online reviews and endorsements, the Singapore Advertising Standards Authority 
has recently called for public consultation on new guidelines focused on social media and digital 
advertisements. The guidelines were drafted in response to a perceived gap in Singapore’s 
regulatory regime. 
4.4.6.2 Voluntary code  
Singapore’s voluntary Code of Advertising Practice sets out guidelines regarding, amongst other 
issues, the use of testimonials and expressions of opinion. The Code requires testimonials to be 
genuine, reflect general consumer experience and relate to the current personal experience of the 
party who provided the testimonial or endorsements (guideline 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4). 
Singapore’s government agencies are yet to enforce their regulations relating to unfair use of 
testimonials. However, the Advertising Standards Authority has finalised its draft ‘Digital and Social 
Media Guidelines’ (that expressly cover online reviews and endorsements) on which it sought 
public consultation. The consultation process ran from 7 December 2015 and closed on 8 January 
2015. The Advertising Authority is yet to release its report.  
In summary, the draft guidelines require all commercial relationships between blog writers, social 
media platforms and advertisers to be disclosed and that all paid advertisements are identified as 
such (see, for example, clause 3.1). 
4.4.7 Comparison  
4.4.7.1 Common aspects 
There is a high level of consistency in the regulatory approach of each reviewed jurisdiction.  
(1) All jurisdictions have general protections cast in broad terms and which are applicable to 
misleading or deceptive conduct in any medium. In each jurisdiction the following type of 
conduct is prohibited: 
(i) Supplier writes or engages another person to write a positive review and claims it is a 
consumer review 
(ii) Supplier writes a detrimental review of a competitor  
(iii) Supplier approves or endorses a review of their business they know to be false 
(iv) Supplier approves or endorses a review of their business they suspect to be false 
(misleading impression) 
(v) Supplier fails to take action to remove or dis-endorse a fake review 
(vi) Advertorials 
(2) No specific modifications have been introduced for the application of these laws to 
e-commerce due to the broad drafting of the prohibitions. This has allowed the UK and 
Canada to maintain its policy of a consistent consumer protection approach to traditional 
transactions and online transactions.  
(3) No jurisdiction has altered existing jurisdictional limits of the general protections. No 
significant issue has arisen where a regulator has been unable to take action on the basis of a 
lack of jurisdiction. This may be to a large extent attributable to the willingness of regulators to 
cooperate and the similarities in scope of the prohibitions and regulatory powers. 
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(4) All jurisdictions provide some level of online consumer education and guides to assist 
consumers to recognise fake reviews. 
4.4.7.2 Differences 
Differences in approach appear in the use of codes or guidelines by jurisdictions: 
(1) Voluntary codes for advertising in all mediums have been used effectively in the UK and 
Singapore. The codes are consistent with the general statutory prohibitions and aim to 
improve compliance. The UK Code has been reviewed for application to online and other 
electronic mediums. However, Singapore’s Advertising Standards Authority has identified gaps 
in its regime dealing with, amongst other things, advertising on blogs and social media 
platforms.  
 
The ‘gaps’ largely relate to the broad language currently used in Singapore’s regulatory 
regime. For example, unlike the ACL that refers specifically to ‘testimonials’, the CPFTA simply 
refers to ‘representations’. The CPFTA’s extension to social media and digital marketing has 
also not been considered by the Singapore judiciary.  
(2) In addition to general prohibitions of misleading conduct, specific prohibitions of false or 
misleading testimonials exists in Australia, the UK and Canada. The specific application of 
general prohibitions to testimonials improves the effectiveness of the statutory provisions in 
an e-commerce context. 
(3) The Endorsement Guide in the United States has been particularly effective in conveying the 
requirements for appropriate endorsements. It assists in making clear that endorsements 
must be honest and represent the beliefs of the endorser, requires the endorser to be a bona 
fide user or actual consumer of the goods or services and requires material connections to be 
disclosed. The guide makes explicit what is implicit within the legal test of ‘unfair commercial 
practice’.  
4.5 Consumer fraud 
4.5.1 Issues 
Internet fraud has been defined as an intentional deception, done for personal gain for the 
purposes of damaging another individual committed on the Internet.599 There are numerous 
examples of fraudulent or deceptive practices, which utilise the internet to defraud or scam other 
people.600 A common theme in most scams is that the scammer uses a hoax, ruse or other form of 
subterfuge to extract money from the unsuspecting person. There is considerable overlap between 
consumer protection regulations and criminal offences that relate to obtaining advantage in the 
marketplace by deception.601 For the most part, online fraud is covered by the relevant criminal 
laws of the jurisdictions discussed in this report.  
                                                          
599  European Consumer Centres Network, ‘Fraud in Cross-Border E-Commerce’ (Report, European Consumer Centres 
Network, 12 December 2014) 3; Adam Graycar and Marianne James, ‘Older People and Consumer Fraud’ (Paper 
presented at the 4th National Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia, New Crimes or New Responses, Canberra, 
21-22 June 2001), 2.  
600  Refer to a list of examples on the ACCC website at www.scamwatch.gov.au/types-of-scams.  
601  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Submission No 46 to House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Communications, Inquiry into cyber crime, July 2009, 3. 
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Most jurisdictions have developed coordinated policies for enforcement, prosecution and 
consumer education and remedies for fraud. In most cases the policy approach to fraud in 
e-commerce is consistent with other mediums. Specific issues identified within an online 
environment and which regulators have considered are:  
• Do online transactions increase the risk of fraud? The remote nature of an online transaction, 
where the parties never meet and goods are sold sight unseen, has the potential to allow 
fraudsters to more easily and successfully engage in deceptive conduct. The risk of fraudulent 
activity potentially increases for both a buyer and seller online i.e. a fake listings and from the 
supplier’s perspective i.e. non-payment; 
• Changes in technology present new opportunities for fraud: The Internet’s promise of 
substantial consumer benefits is, however, coupled with the potential for fraud and deception. 
Fraud operators are always opportunists and are among the first to appreciate the potential of 
a new technology;602  
• Online auction websites present the most likely breeding ground for fraud: Fraudulent 
schemes appearing on online auction websites are among the most frequently reported form 
of mass-marketing fraud;603 and 
• Potential impact of internet fraud is compounded by access to a global market: There is 
nothing new about most types of Internet fraud the Commission has seen to date. What is 
new -- and striking -- is the size of the potential market and the relative ease, low cost, and 
speed with which a scam can be perpetrated.604  
The clear difference between previous forms of scams and those perpetrated online is the speed 
with which new forms of fraud are executed and the increased size of the potential financial loss 
that may be incurred. Accordingly, the predominant policy consideration of regulators is the need 
to maintain consumer confidence in online markets and ensure that fraudulent activities do not 
inhibit growth and innovation within online markets.605  
A common regulatory approach is evident within the jurisdictions reviewed. A purely legislative 
approach has been considered inadequate due to the speed at which new forms of fraud emerge 
and also because statutory provisions prohibiting fraud will do little to discourage new scams. A 
coordinated approach between business, government and consumer groups is common and 
usually includes: 
(a) coordinated law enforcement against fraud and deception comprising both criminal sanctions 
and civil remedies;  
(b) private initiatives and public/private partnerships; and  
                                                          
602  Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement  before the Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on commerce United States House of Representatives, Consumer 
Protection in Cyberspace: Combating Fraud on the Internet, 25 June 1998. 
603  The United States Department of Justice, Mass Marketing Fraud (2 November 2015) The United States Department 
of Justice www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/mass-marketing-fraud. 
604  Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement before the Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on commerce United States House of Representatives, Consumer 
Protection in Cyberspace: Combating Fraud on the Internet, 25 June 1998. 
605  Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement before the Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on commerce United States House of Representatives, Consumer 
Protection in Cyberspace: Combating Fraud on the Internet, 25 June 1998. UK: Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 
11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer practices in the internal market and amending Council 
Directive 84/450/EEC, Directive 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[2005] OJ L 149/22 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/unfair-trade/unfair-practices/index_en.htm.  
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(c) consumer education through the combined efforts of government, business and consumer 
groups606 and by granting government agencies the authority and resources to take vigorous 
action to against consumer fraud and requiring that businesses are held responsible for any 
abuse of their services.607  
Existing legislative provisions prohibiting deceptive conduct or unfair business practices are used by 
regulators in each jurisdiction to prosecute fraudsters and seek remedies for consumers where 
possible. Generally the existing legislative provisions have been cast broadly enough to apply to 
scams and fraud perpetrated via the internet either within the jurisdiction or as against persons 
residing in the jurisdiction.  
Regulators are also generally very active in providing consumer education, either as support to 
consumer groups or directly through websites, explaining how to recognise common scams and 
steps for consumers to take to avoid loss. 
4.5.2 Australia 
Australia’s approach to the issue of consumer fraud parallels the approach in the other reviewed 
jurisdictions. The ACCC uses a multipronged approach to attack the issue of consumer fraud 
including regulatory prohibitions, civil and criminal penalties and consumer education. 608 
General misleading and deceptive conduct provisions (s 18 and s 29) or unconscionable conduct 
provisions (ss21 and 22) provide a basis for civil and criminal action (s 151) against parties involved 
in fraudulent activity. Many of the consumer fraud examples outlined above are prohibited by 
either the general provisions of the Australian Consumer Law or specific provisions aimed at unfair 
or deceptive practices. In most cases these provisions apply to consumer fraud engaged in through 
any medium. The only exception is the unsolicited consumer agreement provisions which only 
apply where a consumer is pressured into signing an agreement by a salesperson either over the 
phone or face to face, where the salesperson was not invited to call or attend their residence.609 
Unsolicited emails are however regulated under the Spam Act 2003 (Cth). 
4.5.3 United Kingdom 
The regulatory approach in the UK is largely focused on boosting consumer confidence and curbing 
unfair business practices generally rather than being specifically focussed on consumer fraud.610  
Prosecution for fraudulent activity is usually undertaken as a criminal offence by police or other 
security agencies and is outside the authority of the regulator.  
                                                          
606  Federal Trade Commission Staff, ‘Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global 
Marketplace’ (Report volume 1, Federal Trade Commission, May 1996), exhibit 1. Australia — See ACCC Scamwatch 
website www.scamwatch.gov.au/.  
607  Consumer Federation of America, Fraud (2015) Consumer Federation of America 
http://consumerfed.org/issues/consumer-protection/fraud/. 
608  See, for example the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce, 
www.scamwatch.gov.au/about-scamwatch/australasian-consumer-fraud-taskforce. 
609  Refer to the examination of these provisions at [17]. 
610  Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer practices in the internal 
market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directive 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council [2005] OJ L 149/22 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/unfair-trade/unfair-practices/index_en.htm. 
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4.5.3.1 General Protection — unfair commercial behaviour 
Consistent with the approach in the reviewed jurisdictions the CPR applies to unfair commercial 
behaviour that occurs before, during and after a contract is made.611 In the context of consumer 
fraud unfair commercial practices will include misleading actions and omissions such as establishing 
fake websites to sell goods or services that are never provided (refer to regulations 5 and 6), 
aggressive commercial practices (see regulation 7) and shill bidding (commercial practice 22 of 
schedule 1). 
4.5.3.2 Industry regulation 
A number of self-regulatory bodies in the UK require compliance with laws such as the 
Electronic-Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 in their codes of practice.612  The Internet 
Service Providers and other platform operators have responded to such requirements by imposing 
their own ‘User Agreements’ that set the ground rules for the sale of products.613 However, the 
difficulty for the Internet Service Providers and platform operators is that those involved in 
fraudulent activity rarely have regard for the law,614 which is why the majority of these agreements 
generally purport to exclude or exempt the platform operator’s liability for fraudulent activity.615  
4.5.3.3 Consumer Education 
Consumer education is provided by the European Consumer Centres Network which focusing on 
‘minimising the risk to consumers by increasing their awareness and their knowledge on how to 
shop safely online’.616  
4.5.4 United States 
Similar to the UK, the US approaches consumer fraud predominantly from a criminal perspective. 
The primary consumer policy objective is the need to address Internet fraud promptly before it 
discourages new consumers from using the Internet and inhibits the impressive commercial growth 
and innovation currently being experienced in that area.617  
Consistent with the other reviewed jurisdictions the US employs a coordinated multipronged 
approach across statutory regulation, public private partnerships and consumer education. This 
policy has been given effect by expansion of the remedies contained in the Uniform Commercial 
Code s 2-271 to apply in the case of fraud and interpreting s45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
15 USC (FTC Act) to include e-commerce transactions. 
                                                          
611  See detailed explanation at [26.5]. 
612  See, for example, the Internet Service Providers’ Association Code of Practice, paragraph 2.1 (found at 
www.ispa.org.uk/about-us/ispa-code-of-practice/. 
613  Kanchana Kariyawasam and Scott Guy, ‘The Contractual Legalities of Buying and Selling on eBay Online Auctions 
and the Protection of Consumers’ (2008) 19 Journal of Law, Information and Science 42 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/JlLawInfoSci/2008/4.html. 
614  European Consumer Centres Network, ‘Fraud in Cross-Border E-Commerce’ (Report, European Consumer Centres 
Network, 12 December 2014), 20. 
615  See, for example, eBay UK, User Agreement (20 October 2015) eBay UK 
http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/user-agreement.html#listing, liability. However, see, Andres Guadamuz 
Gonzalez, eBay Law: The Legal Implications of the C2C Electronic Commerce Model, University of Edinburgh 
www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/2259/eBaylaw.pdf?sequence=1, 9, as to whether such an exclusion 
or exemption is effective under UK law. 
616  European Consumer Centres Network, ‘Fraud in Cross-Border E-Commerce’ and referring fraud cases, originating 
from dishonest traders to the police or criminal enforcement authorities (Report, European Consumer Centres 
Network, 12 December 2014) 23. 
617  Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement before the Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on commerce United States House of Representatives, Consumer 
Protection in Cyberspace: Combating Fraud on the Internet, 25 June 1998. 
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4.5.4.1 General Protection 
Section 2-721 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that the remedies for material 
misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under article 2 of the UCC for 
non-fraudulent breach. That section covers situations where one party to a transaction is 
fraudulently induced to enter a contract of sale by the other party618 and allows the defrauded 
party to rely on other remedies, such as rescission of the contract or rejection or return of the 
goods, in addition to any claim for damages or other remedy.  
Section 45(1) of the FTC Act provides generally that unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce are unlawful. Consumer fraud is clearly within the section. The section can be 
used in the case of online transactions irrespective of the location of the fraudulent party if the 
deceptive practice is likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury with the US or involve material 
conduct occurring in the US.  
Examples of actions taken by the FTC in reliance upon these provisions include: 
Deceptive emails:  
In January 2000, the FTC settled a deceptive SPAM charge with ReverseAuction.com. FTC alleged 
that ReverseAuctions has violated consumer’s privacy by harvesting consumers’ personal 
information from a competitor’s site and then sending deceptive spam to those consumers 
soliciting their business. The settlement bars ReverseAuction from engaging in such unlawful 
practices in the future, to delete the personal consumer information of consumers who received 
the spam but declined to register with ReversAuction, and to give those who did register, notice 
of the FTC charges and an opportunity to cancel their registration.619  
 
Fake News Websites used to advertise Weight-Loss products:  
In February 2013 the FTC settled a clam against Beony International (and owner Mario Milanovis 
and employee Cody Adams) relating to that company’s use of fake news websites to market an 
acai berry supplement and other weight-loss products. Beony International, Mr Milanovis and Mr 
Adams have agreed to pay the FTC $1.6 million and sell a 2008 Porsche in settlement of the 
matter.620  
 
                                                          
618  Larry Schiffer, ‘The Availability of Benefit of the Bargain damages in a fraud action under section 2-721 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code’ (1978-79) 43 Albany Law Review 930, 931. 
619  Federal Trade Commission, Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges (6 January 2000) Federal Trade 
Commission www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/01/online-auction-site-settles-ftc-privacy-charges. 
620  Federal Trade Commission, FTC Permanently Stops Fake News Website Operator that Allegedly Deceived Consumers 
about Acai Berry Weight-Loss Products (7 February 2013) Federal Trade Commission 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/ftc-permanently-stops-fake-news-website-operator-allegedly. 
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Fake eBay listings 
In February 2010, a Brazilian businessman living in Florida, was sentenced to 68 months in prison 
by a federal court in Miami, for operating an eBay auction fraud scheme.  
From October 2003 through to June 2008, the defendant sold more than 5,500 items on eBay 
using over 200 different eBay accounts, earning approximately $717,000.  
None of those goods were ever shipped or delivered. The defendant kept the money for personal 
use.621  
4.5.5 Canada 
Canada relies on existing misrepresentation laws to police consumer fraud and has implemented 
specific laws at the provincial level to protect consumers against financial fraud arising in the 
crowdfunding context. Consistent with the other reviewed jurisdictions consumer regulators are 
focused on creating a climate of trust among consumers and businesses that foster economic 
growth622 whilst recognising that e-commerce provides a perfect vehicle for fraudsters looking to 
target less-knowledgeable or naïve consumers.623 The Canadian government is also conscious that 
any consumer protection framework that it implements should be consistent at an international 
level.624 
In giving effect to its policy objectives the Canadian government has adapted existing consumer 
protection laws to apply to electronic commerce and harmonised those provisions across provinces 
rather than implementing a new regulatory regime to deal with consumer fraud.625  
This policy has been given effect by interpreting the existing misrepresentation regime at both a 
Federal and Provincial level as applying to e-commerce and, specifically, consumer fraud. 
4.5.5.1 General Protection 
The Competition Act RSC 1985 c C-34 is a federal law governing business conduct in Canada with 
the purpose of providing consumers with protection against misleading advertisements and 
deceptive practices (section 74.01). It also extends this protection to misleading or deceptive 
conduct arising in the sender or subject matter of an email (section 74.011). 
In relation to consumer fraud, the Competition Act provides two regimes to address consumer 
fraud: the first is a criminal regime and the second, a civil regime:  
(1) Criminal regime: The provisions prohibit all materially false or misleading representations 
made knowingly or recklessly (section 52), forbids deceptive telemarketing (section 52.1), 
deceptive notices of prize winnings (section 53), double ticketing (section 54) and pyramid 
                                                          
621  Gordon Gibb, Largest Internet Scam in eBay History Finally Cracked (25 February 2010) Laweyrsandsettlements.com 
www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/internet-technology/internet-lawyers-technology-lawyer-information-13
664.html. 
622  Industry Canada. ‘The Challenge of Change: Building the Century Economy’, (Conference Background Paper 
presented at e-Commerce to e-Economy Strategies for the 21st Century, Ottawa Canada, 27–28 September, 2004), 
page i. www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-ceac.n2013. 
623  In the crowdfunding context see Arshy Mann: Untangling Canada’s proposed new crowdfunding laws (21 March 
2014) Canadian Business 
www.canadianbusiness.com/companies-and-industries/crowdfunding-securities-regulator-rules-faq/. 
624  (Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers, ‘Principles of Consumer Protection for Electronic 
Commerce: A Canadian Framework’ (Principles of Consumer Protection, Office of Consumer Affairs of Industry 
Canada, 2009) 2. 
625  Ibid. 
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schemes (section 55626). Under this regime, misleading practices are brought before the 
criminal courts, requiring proof of each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt 
and can result in penalties ranging from CAD$200,000 to imprisonment of up to 14 years 
(section 52(5)). 
(2) Civil regime: The civil regime provides that a person who makes certain misleading 
representations to the public engages in ‘reviewable conduct’ (sections 74.01) relevantly 
including bait and switch selling (section 74.04(2)), which can result in administrative remedies 
including orders to cease such conduct and the payment of monetary penalties (section 
74.1(1)). Such representations are deemed to be made by the person who causes the 
representations to be expressed, unless that person is outside Canada, in which case the 
person who imports (or fails to import) the goods will be held responsible (section 74.03(2)). 
(3) Proceedings under this regime may be brought before the Competition Tribunal, the Federal 
Court or the superior court of a province and requires that each element of conduct be proven 
on a balance of probabilities.627 The penalties range from an order to cease the activity up to a 
monetary penalty of CAN1,000,000 for individuals and CAN15,000,000 for corporations 
(section 74.1(1)(c)). 
Examples of action taken by the Competition Bureau under the Competition Act include: 
• Fake website: In June 2013, the Competition Bureau convicted the owner of a website 
(www.oilcareer.com) who was running an employment scam of making false or misleading 
representations with respect to finding employment in the oil and gas industry.628 The Bureau 
was subsequently able to obtain restitution for the 1500 victims located in over 60 countries 
of over $185,000. The defendant was also sentenced to 30 months imprisonment and fined an 
additional $164,000.629 
•  Cross-border fraud: During 2013 the Consumer Bureau assisted the US Federal Trade 
Commission to find a Toronto man guilty of consumer fraud arising from telephone calls made 
to US residents with credit problems offering them Visa or Mastercards for an advanced fee of 
several hundred dollars. The cards were never provided. The defendant was subsequently 
sentenced by the US Federal district court in Illinois to 10 years in prison for his role in an 
advanced credit card fee scam that defrauded thousands of US consumers of more than 
US$10,000,000.630  
4.5.5.2 Fraud Prevention Forum 
The Canadian Competition Bureau established and chairs the Fraud Prevention Forum. The Forum 
has over 125 members comprised of private sector firms, consumer and volunteer groups, 
government agencies and law enforcement organisations whose aim is to ‘prevent Canadians from 
                                                          
626  Pyramid selling in Canada is examined at [15] of this Report. 
627  Competition Bureau of Canada, False or Misleading Representations and Deceptive Marketing Practices 
(5 November 2015) Competition Bureau of Canada 
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03133.html  
628  Competition Bureau of Canada, Alberta Man Found Guilty of Misleading Representations and Breach of Consent 
Agreement (25 June 2013) <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03579.html>. 
629  Competition Bureau of Canada, Bureau Investigation Leads to Restitution for Victims of Online Jobs Scam (4 June 
2014) www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03761.html. 
630  Competition Bureau of Canada, Toronto man receives 10 years in US prison following cross-border fraud 
investigation (31 January 2014) www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03654.html. 
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becoming victims of fraud by educating them on how to recognize it, report it and stop it’.631  This 
model has been adopted around the world including in the US, Australia and the UK. 
4.5.5.3 International co-operation 
The Canadian Competition Bureau has recognised that in order to fulfil its law enforcement 
mandate under the Competition Act it must collaborate closely with competition and consumer 
protection authorities around the world. To give effect to that approach, the Canadian Competition 
Bureau has entered into a number of international cooperation agreements with, amongst others, 
Australia,632 the UK633 and the US.634 These agreements encourage the sharing of information 
between the parties in relation to, amongst other things, consumer protection and fraud.  
4.5.6 Singapore 
Singapore relies on a combination of existing and new regulations to combat consumer fraud. As 
with the other jurisdictions, the majority of fraud related offences are caught by the criminal 
regime635 as fraud is considered to fall outside the ambit of consumer protection at an ASEAN 
level.636 While there is recognition of the same issues arising from consumer fraud on the internet 
the Singapore policy response it to bundle fraud into other unfair business practices and apply 
existing consumer provisions in the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act. The primary aim of this 
legislation is to allow consumers and businesses to operate in a fair and equitable trading 
environment637 and be provided with enough truthful and accurate information to make an 
informed decision.638  
4.5.6.1 General Protection 
Section 4 of the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act contains a general prohibition against 
unfair practices, including false claims, and paragraph 5 of schedule 2 expands the definition of 
unfair practice to include other fraud-related activities such as: 
• bait advertising; 
• taking advantage of a consumer by including harsh or oppressive provisions in an agreement 
or by exerting undue pressure or undue influence to enter into the transaction; 
• representing that a particular person (such as celebrity or specialist in the area) has agreed to 
acquire goods or services when they have not; 
                                                          
631  Competition Bureau of Canada, Fraud Prevention Forum (19 November 2015) Competition Bureau of Canada 
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03662.html.  
632  See Competition Bureau of Canada, www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01595.html. 
633  See Competition Bureau of Canada, www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03763.html#Kingdom. 
634  See Competition Bureau of Canada, www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03763.html#States.  
635  See for example, Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act, ss 4(1) and (2) (access to computer with intent to commit 
or facilitate commission of offence and the financial securities regime, see: Securities and Futures Act (Singapore, 
cap 289, 2006 rev ed) ss 6 (Monetary Authority of Singapore approval required for issue) and 46C (Licensing 
requirement for equity based crowdfunding and the House to House and Street Collections Act (Singapore) cap 128, 
2014 rev ed (Donations based crowdfunding only). 
636  In relation to the ASEAN approach see: ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program Phase II, ‘Consumer 
Protection Digests and Case Studies: A Policy Guide (Volume 1)’ (Policy Guide, ASEAN and Australia Aid, November 
2014) 30). 
637  Consumers Association of Singapore, CPFTA & Lemon Law, (2013) Consumers Association of Singapore. 
www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_cpfta.aspx. 
638  (Allan Asher, ‘Consumer Protection in E-Commerce: Report on OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
Context of Electronic Commerce’ (Paper presented at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Electronic Commerce 
Steering Group Workshop on Consumer Protection, Singapore, 20 July 2000) 2). 
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• offering gifts, prizes or other free items in connection with the supply of goods or services if 
the supplier knows those items will not be provided; and 
• generally using small print to conceal a material fact from a consumer or to mislead a 
consumer.  
The provisions are not limited to internet fraud. 
4.5.7 Comparison 
4.5.7.1 Common aspects 
The Federal Trade Commission, UK regulator and Canadian regulator have focussed attention on 
international consumer protection issues arising from the use of the Internet and various platforms 
contained on it. This is the same approach Australia has adopted having recognised the increasing 
importance of such inter-agency cooperation to achieve positive outcomes in this area.639  
A majority of the reviewed jurisdictions have a similar regulatory approach to the issue of 
consumer fraud. The elements of this common approach are: 
(a) coordinated law enforcement against fraud and deception comprising both criminal sanctions 
and civil remedies;  
(b) remedies available to consumers in the case of fraud mirrors the remedies available for 
misleading conduct in a civil case; 
(c) existing consumer protection provisions for deceptive conduct and unfair commercial practices 
are reviewed to ensure clear application to fraudulent conduct occurring over the internet; 
(d) consumer education through the combined efforts of government, business and consumer 
groups640 and by granting government agencies the authority and resources to take vigorous 
action to against consumer fraud and requiring that businesses are held responsible for any 
abuse of their services.641 
The effectiveness of the regulatory frameworks instituted on a national basis is further enhanced if: 
(a) the framework is consistent with international regimes for monitoring and prosecuting 
fraudsters; and  
(b) the regulator is willing to cooperate on an international level with other regulators to share 
information and coordinate enforcement and prosecution of fraudsters operating 
internationally.  
                                                          
639  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Submission No 46 to House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Communications, Inquiry into cyber crime, July 2009, 2. 
640  Federal Trade Commission Staff, ‘Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global 
Marketplace’ (Report volume 1, Federal Trade Commission, May 1996), exhibit 1. Australia — See ACCC Scamwatch 
www.scamwatch.gov.au/. 
641  Consumer Federation of America, Fraud (2015) Consumer Federation of America 
http://consumerfed.org/issues/consumer-protection/fraud/.  
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4.5.7.2 Emerging Issues 
There are a number of emerging issues: 
Consumer to Consumer transactions 
The increase in peer to peer transactions raises for consideration whether consumer to consumer 
transactions should be regulated.642 In the context of consumer fraud, the criminal regimes 
applicable to cyber/internet crime (outside of consumer protection legislation) do not distinguish 
between conduct in the course of a business and conduct between private individuals. Offence 
provisions within consumer protection legislation are generally restricted to conduct occurring in 
trade or commerce (or some similar phrase). Not all consumer fraud scenarios will naturally fall 
within a trade or commerce paradigm and consideration needs to be given to whether, at least for 
criminal prosecutions, application to C2C transactions should be included. This may be warranted 
in circumstances where there is no other applicable criminal provision upon which to prosecute the 
fraudster. 
Liability of platform providers for deceptive conduct 
The question of whether a platform provider, such as Facebook, EBay or Airbnb, should bear any 
liability for the conduct of its users arises in a number of contexts. Whether this potential liability 
should extend to fraudulent activity engaged in using the platform arose in a recent Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) decision (upon referral from the High Court of England and Wales) 
dealing with intellectual property breaches.643  In L’Oreal SA, Lancome parfums et beaute & Cie, 
Laborartoire Garnier & Cie, L’Oreal (UK) Limited v eBay International AG, eBay Europe SARL and 
eBay (UK) Limited644 the European Court considered whether eBay was liable for alleged 
infringement of L’Oreal’s intellectual property rights by its users under article 14 of the EU’s 
E-Commerce Directive.645  Article 14 relevantly provides that intermediaries may avoid liability for 
the information they host or store if ‘upon obtaining [actual] knowledge or awareness of [illegal 
activities they act] expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information’. This provides a 
defence to any civil or criminal liability imposed by other statutory provisions or the law for hosting 
the information. No liability is imposed by the E-Commerce Directive directly.  
The decision confirmed that online market platforms are not required to police the sale of items on 
their website for trademark infringements or other activity. However, the defence in Article 14 was 
not considered to be available if the online market operator: 
• has taken an active role in the relationship between buyers and sellers. This may occur where 
the online market operation provides assistance to optimize the presentation of offers for sale 
beyond purely administrative or technical assistance; or  
                                                          
642  Refer to [29.3] which examines the consumer to consumer issue in the context of peer to peer transactions. 
643  See, European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/95/EC 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the 
Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJ L 299/25, art 5(a) (Rights conferred by a Trade Mark) and Council 
Regulation (EC) No40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark [1993] OJ L 011/1, art 9(1)(a) (Rights 
conferred by a Community Trade Mark) (implemented as UK law in the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK) c 26, s 9 and 
Part II). 
644  (C-324/09) [2011] EUECJ 474. 
645  Council Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1, art14(1) incorporated in UK law by the Electronic Commerce 
(EC Directive) Regulations 2002 SI 2002/2013, regulation 19. 
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• is aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which ‘a diligent economic operator should 
have identified’ an unlawful activity and did not act to remove or disable the infringing 
information.646 This may occur where an operator finds infringements through a monitoring 
process or infringements are notified by other users or consumers. 
4.6 Peer-to-peer transactions and the sharing economy 
4.6.1 Overview 
The sharing economy has been defined as ‘online platforms that help people share access to assets, 
resources, time and skills’.647 These platforms have been established due to advances in technology 
which allow buyers and sellers (both individual and businesses) to provide goods and services at 
lower costs. Many ‘suppliers’ of goods or services via peer to peer platforms are individuals who 
are no engaged in traditional business activities but are ‘sharing’ their existing assets for monetary 
gain. High profile examples like Uber and Airbnb allow individuals to share their cars or property 
with other individuals for consideration.648  Other examples are peer to peer lending, task services 
and the sharing of household goods. Most commentators agree that the sharing economy will 
continue to grow649 which in turn will drive changes to business models employed by suppliers 
using these platforms.  
Concerns have been raised in a number of forums about the application of existing laws to the 
sharing economy business model. Laws developed for traditional business models have in some 
cases been circumvented by platform operators, particularly in relation to licensing regimes. This 
has caused significant concern globally in relation to the applicability of laws related to public 
safety, insurance, tax avoidance and employment. A number of countries have undertaken reviews 
of sharing economy platforms to understand the issues within the different markets.650 Reference 
is made to these reviews where relevant to consumer issues in this report. While the issues 
canvassed in these reports are important for consumer welfare they are the subject of regulatory 
regimes outside of the Australian Consumer Law. The focus of this report is on the consumer 
protection issues that are of most relevant to the Australian Consumer Law.  
Many countries have been grappling with the balance between encouraging and fostering 
innovation within a digital economy and the need to build consumer trust651 in online transactions 
and maintain consumer protections where appropriate. In this section we explain the consumer 
protection issues in peer to peer transactions, compare the policy and regulatory approaches of the 
reviewed jurisdictions to these issues and conclude with a summary.  
                                                          
646  Osborne Clarke, But was it worth it? The significance of the L’Oreal v eBay trade mark ruling for brand owners and 
online marketplaces (19 July 2011) Osborne Clarke 
www.osborneclarke.com/connected-insights/publications/but-was-it-worth-it-the-significance-of-the-loreal-v-ebay
-trade-mark-ruling-for-brand-owners-and-online-marketplaces/#sthash.j6M4DAE9.dpufz. 
647  Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking the Sharing Economy: An Independent Review, (available at 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/378291/bis-14-1227-unlocking-the-shari
ng-economy-an-independent-review.pdf. Other terminology is commonly used such as ‘peer to peer economy’, 
individual to individual services’ and ‘collaborative economy’. 
648  Not all platforms operate on a commercial model some enable individuals to share assets gratuitously.  
649  Deloitte Access Economics, ‘The sharing economy and the Competition and Cconsumer Act 2015’ Deloittes (NSW). 
650  D Wosskow (2014) Unlocking the sharing economy — an independent review, Report for the Minister of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Energy; Deloitte Access Economics The sharing economy and the Competition and 
consumer Act 2015; Deloittes (NSW). 
651  Trust in a sharing platform is identified as one of the major issues for consumers by PWC in The Sharing Economy 
(2014), available at 
www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf . 
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4.6.2 Peer to peer platforms — Scope of report 
Before considering the consumer issues within the sharing economy a brief explanation of the 
types of platforms is warranted. A common characteristic of peer to peer transactions is the 
existence of a platform which is used to connect the parties to the transaction. The benefit of the 
platform to the sellers is that transactions costs such as advertising, bargaining, decision costs and 
enforcement are borne by the platform reducing the costs to the seller. Platforms usually allow 
owners of idle assets to better utilize excess capacity of those assets to a potentially global market. 
To be regarded as part of the sharing economy the platform should be owned and operated 
separate to ownership of the assets being shared. This differentiates this type of transaction from 
other online transactions which may be conducted through online networks or platforms owned by 
the seller.  
There are a broad range of peer to peer platforms.  
Type of platform Description 
Ridesharing platforms  
*Uber, Lyft, Blablacar and 
Sidecar 
Transport network companies that operate a platform which 
allows consumers with smart phones to submit a trip request 
that is then sent to drivers who use their own cars.  
• Prices may or may not be set by the platform operator; 
• Consumers may or may not choose the driver; 
• Payment is usually made via the application using the 
consumer’s payment details contained in their profile.652   
Car sharing platforms 
*GoGet, *GreenShareCar, 
*Flexicar 
Allows users to rent cars for short period of time, usually by the 
hour from commercial operators 
Peer to peer car sharing 
DriveMyCar, Car Next Door 
Individuals make their vehicles available for other to rent for 
short periods of time. Users are matched via a platform. 
Accommodation platforms  
*Airbnb, HomeAway and 
Flipkey , VacationRentalsm 
VRBO, Couchsurfing 
Online platforms that connect travellers with hosts who offer 
their home (or a part of it) as a place to stay.653  
This has also extended to platforms facilitating short term letting 
of commercial space and car parking (*ParkHound, *Divvy, 






Crowdfunding platforms allow persons seeking funding to 
showcase projects or companies on an Internet platform and 
members of the public provide funding through that platform. 
There are 2 main types of crowdfunding platforms:654  
• Donations or rewards model: individuals provide money for 
benevolent reasons;655  
• Investment model: individuals make investments in return 
for a share in the profits or revenue generated by the 
company/project.656  
                                                          
652  Lauren Goode ‘Worth It? An App to Get a Cab’, The Wall Street Journal (online), 17 June 2011 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/06/17/worth-it-an-app-to-get-a-cab/. 
653  Airbnb, About Us (2015) Airbnb www.airbnb.com.au/about/about-us.  
654  Osborne Clarke, ‘The regulation of crowdfunding in the UK’  (Report, Osborne Clarke, 4 December 2014) 2 
www.osborneclarke.com/connected-insights/publications/regulation-crowdfunding-uk/. 
655  The most popular example of a donation-based funding model is gofundme www.gofundme.com or for a 
non-monetary reward; See, for example, Kickstarter www.kickstarter.com/ and Indiegogo www.indiegogo.com. 
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Type of platform Description 
Peer to Peer lending 
*SocietyOne, *RateSetter 
Australia, *DirectMoney, 
*ThinCats, *Marketland  
Individuals lend money to a company or project in return for 
repayment of the loan and interest on their investment;657 




Peer to Peer Marketplaces 
*Gumtree, *eBay, *Etsy 
Peer to Peer sharing 
*The Clothing Exchange, 
*Garage Sale Trail, *TuShare 
Online auction and shopping websites 
 
Online exchange of goods and services for consideration or for 
free. 
*Indicates those platforms currently operating in Australia 
 
This report considers a number of regulatory issues that apply generally to peer to peer 
transactions across the different aspects of the sharing economy.  
Crowdfunding and Peer to peer lending are not considered as part of this report. Peer to peer 
lending or crowdfunding may occur in a range of situations including, donations or gifts, raising of 
investment capital for new business, and loans on commercial terms. In the cases of lending and 
investment the regulatory issues will fall outside the ACL on the basis the platform or the party 
seeking the money will be engaged in a financial service or a managed investment. Different 
legislative frameworks apply in Australia to managed investments (Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) 
and financial services (Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act)). 
Amendments proposed to the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Amendment (Crowd-sourced 
funding) Bill 2016) aim to regulate crowdfunding for investment as a managed investment scheme. 
A similar approach is adopted in other jurisdictions658 were specific legislation applying to financial 
services or investment are considered more applicable to the issues arising in peer to peer lending. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
656  See for example, Seedrs www.seedrs.com/ and FundedByMe www.fundedbyme.com/. This is the type of 
crowdfunding most commonly referred to as peer-to-peer lending Leigh Schulz and Domenic Mollica, ‘Ask the 
Expert: The regulation of crowdfunding in Australia: where are we and what’s to come?’ (2015) 31(7) Australian 
Banking & Finance Law Bulletin 130, 137. 
657  Commonly known as peer-to-peer lending. Some popular examples include Zopa 
www.zopa.com/lending/grow-your-savings?utm_campaign=AFFThisIsMoney&utm_medium=partner&utm_source=
AFFThisIsMoney, RateSetter www.ratesetter.com/lend?tsr=MailOnline&tcm=Lend and Funding Circle 
www.fundingcircle.com/uk/investors/?utm_source=ThisIsMoney&utm_medium=Affiliate&utm_content=p2pWebI
nvestor%C2%A0&utm_campaign=FebTest. 
658  UK: Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8 (amended on 1 April 2014 to include peer-to-peer lending 
models); UK Crowdfunding, Code of Practice (2015) UKCFA www.ukcfa.org.uk/code-of-practice-2; and 
self-regulation (in relation to donations and reward crowdfunding models that fall outside the scope of the financial 
services regime because they do not involve any form of financial investment return: Osborne Clarke, ‘The 
regulation of crowdfunding in the UK’  (Report, Osborne Clarke, 4 December 2014) 2 
www.osborneclarke.com/connected-insights/publications/regulation-crowdfunding-uk/. US: Jumpstart our 
Business Startups Act 15 USC ss 78a (2012). Canada: only provincial level legislation Ontario: Multilateral 
Instrument 45-108 Crowdfunding; This law is substantially harmonised across Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia (with Saskatchewan pending) but not British Columbia. British Columbia: Securities Act RSB 1996, 
c418 and Start-up Crowdfunding Registration and Prospectus Exemptions (Multilateral CSA Notice 45-316). 
Singapore: Securities and Futures Act (Singapore, cap 289, 2006 rev ed); Monetary Services Authority’s Guidelines 
on Criteria for the Grant of a Capital Markets Services Licence; and House to House and Street Collections Act 
(Singapore) cap 128, 2014 rev ed). (Donations-based crowdfunding only). 
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Platforms that facilitate donations or gifts will not fall within the definition of financial services or 
managed investments. As these interactions are unlikely to be in trade or commerce they will also 
fall outside of the ACL.  
4.6.3 Consumer issues in peer to peer transactions 
The sectors in which sharing platforms operate are diverse and can give rise to issues unique to the 
type of asset or service being shared.659  There are a number of common consumer issues across 
the different types of platforms as well as some issues unique to the particular type of platform 
transaction. A number of these issues are similar to those already examined under product quality, 
misleading pricing practices, fake reviews and fraud. Consumer issues and the relevant sharing 
platforms to which the issue relates are summarised in the table below. Unless otherwise specified 
the consumer issues identified are similar to those examined in relation to e-commerce 
transactions earlier in the report.  
Consumer issue Platform type 
Product quality and safety Ride sharing, 660 accommodation sharing661, peer to 
peer marketplaces  
Drip pricing Ride sharing, accommodation sharing 
Surge (dynamic) pricing Ride sharing 
Fake reviews and fraudulent listings Accommodation sharing662 
Misleading information and deceptive 
practices 
Crowdfunding, peer to peer lending, accommodation 
sharing, ride sharing 
Standard form contracts Crowdfunding, peer to peer lending, accommodation 
sharing, ride sharing 
 
As demonstrated in the table, the consumer issues arising in the case of sharing platforms are also 
issues in e-commerce transactions generally. The report has previously examined regulatory 
practices in each jurisdiction related to: 
                                                          
659  For a more detailed list of the types of platforms emerging refer to (NSW) report. 
660  The main consumer protection issue, in addition to recent issues about pricing on days of high demand, has been 
public safety for consumers, which is an issue that falls outside the scope of this report. Refer to the relevant 
regulation in each of the jurisdictions: UK: Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 (more particularly Transport for 
London’s review of that legislation in regard to the sharing economy), US: California’s Decision adopting rules and 
regulations to protect public safety while allowing new entrants to the transportation industry and Singapore: Third 
Party Taxi Booking Service Provider Act 2015 (Singapore). For a more general discussion of the regulatory issues at a 
State or local level see: Mark MacMurdo, ‘Hold the Phone! ‘Peer-to-Peer’ Ridesharing Services, Regulation, and 
Liability’ (2015) 76 Louisiana Law Review 307, 323; Erin Mitchell, ‘Comment: Uber’s Loophole in the Regulatory 
System’ (2015) 6 Houston Law Review: Off The Record 75, 94; Catherine Lee Rassman, ‘Regulating Rideshare 
Without Stifling Innovation: Examining the Drivers, the Insurance ‘Gap’ and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board’ 
(2014-2015) 15 Pittsburgh Journal of Technology & Policy 81, 88).  
661  Significant issues for accommodation sharing are also compliance with planning laws, noise impact of short term 
letting, fire and insurance compliance. 
662  Fraud and fake reviews and endorsements (including whether the property meets the description on the website, 
whether the listing is genuine and loss of payments) and public safety have been significant issues in 
accommodation sharing platforms. See Joseph Shuford, ‘Hotel, Motel, Holiday Inn and Peer-to-Peer Rentals: The 
Sharing Economy, North Carolina and the Constitution’ (April 2015) 16 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 
(Online Edition) 1, 8; Brittany McNamara, ‘Airbnb: A Not-so-safe Resting Place’ (2015) 13 Colorado Journal on 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law 149, 152. 
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(a) Application of product quality regulation to goods and services [25]; 
(b) Reliance on user reviews and the regulatory protections for fake reviews [27]; 
(c) Drip pricing and surge (dynamic) pricing practices [26]; 
(d)  Use of standard form contracts with unfair terms [4.5]; 
(e) Fraud [28]. 
There are a number of particular consumer issues arising from the nature of peer to peer 
transactions:  
(a) Platform liability: Should the regulatory provisions of the ACL (or similar legislation in other 
jurisdictions) apply to both the supplier and the platform provider?  What should the 
responsibilities of the platform provider be for the conduct of the supplier? 
(b) Consumer to consumer: Should the regulatory regimes traditionally focused on business to 
consumer transactions be broadened to clearly apply to peer to peer transactions, where the 
supplier may not be in the business of providing the goods or services?  
(c) Balance of Regulation and self-regulation: Is there a need to adopt a different regulatory 
model for e-commerce? Is a different balance required between government regulation and 
industry self-regulation to encourage innovation? 
(d) Multi- jurisdiction compliance: the ability or willingness of platform operators to comply with 
laws of the various jurisdictions in which they operator are low. This encourages platform 
operators to disclaim or contract out of regulatory requirements. 
Most jurisdictions have adopted a cautious approach to intervention in the sharing economy and 
peer to peer transactions. Regulators globally have commissioned reports investigating the nature 
of the sharing economy and identifying potential market issues with a view to determining the 
nature and extent of consumer related issues within the sharing economy. 663  
Most commentators recommend a flexible regulatory regime which is capable of dealing with 
unique issues that arise from each platform type,664 provides adequate protection for consumers 
but does not create barriers to innovation and further development of the sharing economy. 
Traders within existing markets disrupted by new platform entrants have a different view and have 
called for equality in application of regulation, particularly in the context of licensing regimes. Most 
jurisdictions have responded to consumer protection concerns arising from peer-to-peer platforms 
by attempting to apply existing laws and regulations.665 In Australia the existing general protections 
and specific protections have been successfully used to ensure compliance by e-commerce 
businesses and peer to peer platforms. Educational campaigns are also used to ensure consumers 
and small businesses are fully aware of both their rights and responsibilities under the ACL, and to 
encourage compliance by businesses. 
                                                          
663  D Wosskow (2014) Unlocking the sharing economy — an independent review, Report for the Minister of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Energy; Deloitte Access Economics The sharing economy and the Competition and 
consumer Act 2015;   Deloitte Access Economics, Review of the Collaborative Economy in NSW, 2015; Christopher 
Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The case 
for Policy Change, Mercatus Research 2014. 
664  Anna Fellander, Claire Ingram and Robin Teigland, ‘Sharing Economy: Embracing Change with Caution’ 
(Naringspolitiskt Forum Rapport 11, Entreprenorskaps Forum, 2015), 59; Vanessa Katz, ‘Regulating the Sharing 
Economy’ (2015) 30 Berkley Technology Law Journal Annual Review 2015 1067, 1087. 
665  (Will Coldwell, ‘Airbnb’s legal troubles: what are the issues?’ The guardian (online), 8 July 2014 < 
www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legal-troubles-what-are-the-issues; Raphael Minder and Mark 
Scott, ‘Sharing Economy Faces Patchwork of Guidelines in European Countries’ New York Times (online) 21 
September 2014 www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/technology/sharing-economy-faces-patchwork-of-guidelines-in 
-european-countries.html?_r=0). 
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As most consumer problems are not unique and are common to other e-commerce transactions 
this approach has so far not created significant issues. In relation to ridesharing and 
accommodation platforms, the UK, Singapore and some states of the US have adopted a ‘light 
touch’ approach to regulation by acknowledging the legality of the platforms, but not imposing 
regulation similar to existing market participants. 
The primary difficulty in the context of a peer to peer transaction is whether existing laws apply to 
the platform operator as well as the seller of the goods or services who may be an individual not 
engaged in trade or commerce.  
4.6.3.1 Regulation of Platform Operator  
Application of existing regulation to platform operators depends on the business model adopted 
for the platform. A difference arises between platforms that are active in the transaction and those 
that coordinate or facilitate. The issue largely depends on whether the platform operator is 
considered to be engaged or active in the relevant industry (engaged in trade or commerce), for 
example, ridesharing, accommodation or crowdfunding666 or whether the platform operators are 
simply passive intermediaries (which is the argument raised by the ridesharing and accommodation 
platform operators to date). 
There are no specific regulatory provisions in any of the reviewed jurisdictions that impose liability 
on a platform operator for the conduct of their users. Under the existing general protections of the 
Australian Consumer Law for misleading conduct, a platform operator will only incur liability if the 
operator: 
(i) makes misleading representations on their own behalf to the market; 
(ii) adopts a misleading representation of another person as their own 
(iii) Is knowingly involved in a misleading representation by another person.  
A platform operator is unlikely to be liable for misleading statements made by a user of the 
platform about the product being offered for supply.667 For example, Airbnb is unlikely to engage in 
misleading conduct if a person offers for rent a house claiming it to be 4 bedrooms and a pool 
when in fact it is 3 bedrooms and no pool. To date Australian courts have excluded intermediaries 
who broadcast advertisements from liability where the advertisement is misleading or false, and 
the intermediary is not adopting the advertising as their own.  
The position may be different if the format of the platform website leads to a consumer being 
misled. A potential example is where the headline price for accommodation on Airbnb does not 
include all of the costs in the headline. If the website is structured by Airbnb to only allow the price 
to be dripped to the consumer, there is potential for Airbnb to be involved in a contravention with 
a user. 
To date there have been very few decisions against platform operators that could inform the 
possible direction the courts may take on these issues.  
                                                          
666  Crowdfunding operators are already largely caught within the scope of existing financial services legislation and so 
won’t be discussed further in this section of the report (See Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, ‘Crowd 
sourced equity funding’ (Report, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, May 2014) 109-110. 
667  See Google Inc v ACCC (2013) CLR 435. High Court held that Google was not responsible for misleading 
representations made in advertisements displayed on its search engine pages.  
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Three potential types of platform types are considered and the relevant regulatory provisions in 
the reviewed jurisdictions which may apply. 
Approach 1 — Platform as an intermediary 
If a platform operator is not engaged in the transaction, but instead simply acts as an intermediary 
or conduit for the supplier and consumer, then those operators may fall outside the scope of 
existing regulation (particularly in the ridesharing and short-term accommodation space). In other 
contexts Uber drivers and Airbnb hosts in the United Kingdom have been held personally liable for 
breaches of the relevant local taxi, taxation and accommodation laws.668 Whether a person 
providing ride sharing or accommodation services is subject to existing consumer protection laws 
will in most jurisdictions depend on whether the consumer is acting in trade or commerce.  
If this approach is adopted a platform operator would bear no responsibility or liability for product 
quality as liability attaches to the person supplying the goods or services to the consumer. A 
platform provider may however have liability for unfair pricing practices instituted by the operator, 
misleading statements appearing on the platform and potentially for fake reviews of which the 
platform operator is aware. 
Approach 2 — Platform as active participant 
Where a platform operator is an active participant in the business there is greater scope for 
liability. An example of this type of platform arises in the context of ride sharing where Uber (or 
similar operator) collects the fares for the drivers and provides the digital platform used by the 
customer and through which information is provided. In The US and Canada various state 
jurisdictions are considering the issue of liability in the context of customer safety as well as 
misleading statements. The California Public Utilities Commission considers it has jurisdiction to 
regulate passenger transportation over public roadways even when that service is facilitated 
through a software platform.669 This opens the platform operator to potential liability for deceptive 
advertising or unlawful or fraudulent business acts or practices of the participants.670  
In Ottawa Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) are regulated to ensure the platform and 
drivers are subject to safety and consumer protection rules similar to those that apply to taxis 
including in relation to minimum insurance requirements, criminal and driving background checks 
on drivers, and vehicle inspections.’671  
Approach 3: Platform has positive obligation for participants 
Another regulatory response is analogous to liability imposed on Internet Service Providers where 
subscribers infringe laws (in particular copyright laws) when they have either induced the use of 
the platform for the infringing activity (intentional inducement liability) or have actual knowledge 
                                                          
668  Mark Duell, ‘Uber drivers are ‘breaking the law’, says Boris: London Mayor claims taxis being hailed via the app is 
illegal because rules state only black cabs can be flagged down Daily Mail (online), 5 October 2015 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3260239/Uber-drivers-breaking-law-says-Boris-London-Mayor-claims-taxis- 
hailed-app-ILLEGAL-rules-state-black-cabs-flagged-down.html; Hugo Gye, ‘Airbnb ‘landlords’ face a huge tax bill: 
Families who let out their spare room could be hit after website hands over details to Irish taxman’, Daily Mail 
(online), 11 August 2015 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3193503/Airbnb-landlords-face-huge-tax-bill-crackdown-Ireland.html. 
669  Decision adopting rules and regulations to protect public safety while allowing new entrants to the transportation 
industry (California) COM/MP1/avs Proposed Decision Agenda ID #12291 (Rev 4) Quasi-Legislative 9/19/2013 Item 
39 at 13. 
670  (Unfair Competition Law, Cal Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq  (1872)) 
671  City of Ottawa, ‘Taxi and Limousine Regulations and Service Review: Case Studies’ (Case Studies, City of Ottawa, 1 
October 2015) 7-8. 
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of an infringement and have the ability to remove the infringement but fail to do so within a 
reasonable time.672 
In the US, the Clinton Administration’s Working Group on Intellectual Property released a White 
Paper concluding that because the platform operators were in a better position to police infringing 
users than copyright owners, the best policy would be to hold the platform provider liable.673  This 
approach has been embraced by academics who have indicated that platform operators, such as 
Pinterest, Facebook and eBay, may be liable for users’ infringement through secondary liability, 
that is, vicarious liability (particularly in the case of ridesharing), contributory liability and 
intentional inducement liability.674 
The UK has adopted a similar approach, drawing a distinction between those operators that 
actively participate versus those that passively participate in the industry.675   
In the context of ridesharing and accommodation platforms, this could mean that platform 
operators such as Uber could be found to be actively engaged in the ridesharing industry because 
they provide the platform, the payment mechanism and conducts various background checks on its 
drivers before accepting them into the driving pool. In contrast an operator like Airbnb may not be 
liable for fraudulent listings on its site unless it has been made aware of them and has failed to 
remove the offending listing and/or supplier from its platform. Irrespective of which analysis is 
accepted, platform operators may accept some level of liability for their suppliers’ conduct, 
particularly in the case of personal injury or property damage. For example, Airbnb provides Host 
Protection Insurance against liability claims up to $USD1 million676 and Uber has public liability 
insurance that covers all Uber drivers for damage to third parties.677  Risk of injury and property 
damage are issues being considered by local and state government in the decision whether to 
enact laws to regulate.678 
4.6.3.2 Consumer-to-consumer transactions  
The second major result of an increase in peer-to-peer transactions is the increase in consumer to 
consumer transactions. This raises the question of the concept of a ‘consumer’ should be revisited.  
                                                          
672  Contributory liability; See Inwood Laboratories Inc v Ives Laboratories Inc 456 US 842, 2182; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc v V Grosker Ltd 545 US 913. 
673  Bruce A Lehman, ‘Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working 
Group on Intellectual Property Rights (Report, Information Infrastructure Task Force, September 1995) 117 referred 
to in Comment, ‘Internet Copyright Infringement Liability: Is an Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a 
Dance Hall Operator?’ (197) 27 Golden Gate University Law Review 555, 599. 
674  Susanna Monseau, ‘Fostering Web 2.0 Innovation: The Role of the Judicial Interpretation of the DMCA Safe Harbor, 
Secondary Liability and Fair Use’ (2012) 12 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 70, 92 
675  See, for example, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (active); Metropolitan 
International Schools v Designtechnica Corp (passive). 
676  Airbnb, Host Protection Insurance (2016) Airbnb.com <https://www.airbnb.com.au/host-protection-insurance>.  
677  Uber, Ridesharing with Uber: a safe, reliable and affordable transport option (1 November 2015) Uber Newsroom 
https://newsroom.uber.com/australia/ridesharing-with-uber-a-safe-reliable-and-affordable-transport-option. 
678  See foreign examples: UK: Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998; US: Decision adopting rules and regulations to 
protect public safety while allowing new entrants to the transportation industry (California) COM/MP1/avs 
Proposed Decision Agenda ID #12291 (Rev 4) Quasi-Legislative 9/19/2013 Item 39; Residential Unit Conversion 
Ordinance, 41A San Fran Admin C ss 41A.1-41A.8 (American Legal Publishing Corporation, 2016); Canada: 
Passenger Transportation Act SBC 2004 ch 39; Sharing Economy Bill 2015 RSO; City of Vancouver Zoning & 
Development By Laws — By Law 10.21.6. 
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(1) Often a person who supplies goods or services or shares goods or services via a peer to peer 
platform is a person not engaged in a business or other commercial activity. Is the supply or 
sharing of their existing asset (car or house) conduct in trade or commerce? This is particularly 
important to the application of statutory guarantees and the unfair practice provisions of the 
ACL. 
(2) If a consumer (under the current definition) purchases goods which are then ‘shared’, ‘used’, 
‘sold’ to another person, does that person fall within the exception to the definition of 
‘re-supply’ in the ACL? If a consumer makes their car available for rent via a peer to peer car 
sharing platform, is that a ‘lease or hire’ of the vehicle within the definition of ‘re-supply’? This 
would exclude the statutory guarantee of acceptable quality from applying to the owners 
contract of purchase for the vehicle. 
The issue is raised by commentators due to the increase in these types of transactions and the 
inability of consumers transacting on the internet to distinguish between sales by traders and other 
consumers. No jurisdiction has embraced any regulatory extension of existing consumer protection 
regimes to C2C transactions in the context of the sharing economy. Although the ACL does not 
extend to activities that are not ‘in trade or commerce’, consumer-to-consumer transactions 
remain caught by the Sale of Goods Act both in Australia and in the UK, Canada and Singapore. The 
rationale for excluding consumer-to-consumer transactions in these jurisdictions is that peers have 
equal bargaining power and do not require the level of protection afforded by the ACL (and 
equivalent primary consumer protection regulations in foreign jurisdictions).679  
4.6.4 Australia  
The majority of ACL consumer protections apply only to those transactions that occur ‘in trade or 
commerce’. This includes: 
• misleading and deceptive conduct; 
• statutory guarantees680; 
• unfair practices (single pricing, referral selling, bait advertising,); 
• unconscionable conduct; 
• unfair terms. 
This means that sellers conducting private sales via online auction platforms such as eBay, are not 
subject to the ACL regime as sales by private persons to others are not ‘in trade or commerce.’681 
In each case this will depend upon the characteristics of the seller’s activities. In the context of ride 
sharing and accommodation sharing platforms, if a person is regularly engaged in sharing assets for 
consideration it is likely that the activities will gain some commercial or business flavour. For 
example, a seller who earns an income from regular driving for Uber is likely to be acting in ‘trade 
or commerce’ whereas a ‘one off’ sale on Ebay may not be commercial in nature.  
The primary difficulty for consumers is that it is difficult to distinguish between those sellers who 
are operating in ‘trade or commerce’ and those that are acting in their own capacity or as a hobby: 
the former being liable under the ACL and the latter escaping liability.  
                                                          
679  Christine Riefa, The Legal Classification of Online Auctions: Towards a Safer Legal Framework (Ashgate Publishing, 
2015) 23. 
680  Statutory guarantees as to title (s 51), undisturbed possession (s 52) apply to all consumer sales. 
681  Matthew Webster, Internet auctions, consumer protection and the Trade Practices Act, FindLaw Australia 
www.findlaw.com.au/articles/1833/internet-auctions-consumer-protection-and-the-trad.aspx. 
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Consumer  
The definition of ‘consumer’ in s 3 of the Australian Consumer Law means that a person will acquire 
goods as a consumer where: 
(1) the amount paid for the goods is not more than $40,000; or 
(2) if greater than $40,000, the goods are of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption, 
provided that the goods are not acquired for the purpose of re-supplying them; or using them up or 
transforming them in trade or commerce in the course of a process of production; or in the course 
of repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land. 
The effect of this definition is that if the goods are valued at less than $40,000, the buyer will be a 
consumer, even if the equipment is for business or commercial purposes, provided the goods are 
not for re-supply or use in a process of production or repair. 
Trade or commerce  
Generally the statutory guarantees apply to the supply of goods or services in trade or commerce. 
Trade or commerce is defined in s 2 of the Australian Consumer Law to mean trade or commerce 
within Australia or between Australia and places outside Australia and includes any business or 
professional activity. The phrase is generally given a wide meaning and applies to activity that is of 
a business or commercial nature.682 According to the existing authorities, a person will supply 
goods in trade or commerce where a person supplies goods in the course of any business or 
commercial transaction, even though the person is not in the business of supplying those or any 
other goods.683 This represents a significant change from the position under the implied warranties 
imposed by the Trade Practices Act 1974, which applied if goods were supplied to a consumer in 
the ‘course of a business’ carried on by the supplier. The use of ‘trade or commerce’ demonstrates 
an intention to broaden the scope of the guarantees.  
The supply of goods or services by a business will fall within the concept of trade or commerce 
irrespective of whether it is online or through other means. The difficulty with the restriction to 
supplies in trade or commerce is that despite the relatively wide interpretation given by the courts 
a supply of goods or service by an individual, who is not carrying on any business, will not be 
subject to statutory guarantees. It is clear in Australia684 that private sales of goods, services or real 
property are not considered to be ‘in trade or commerce’ unless they form ‘part of a scheme or 
transaction engaged in for profit and the characteristics of the parties indicate the activities are 
commercial rather than personal in nature.  
The increased use of peer to peer platforms mean that more consumer to consumer transactions 
are taking place that may fall outside of the statutory guarantee regime. It appears that Uber 
drivers generally and Airbnb hosts that rent rooms or dwellings for a number of occasions each 
year, are likely to be engaged in activities for profit that are commercial rather than personal in 
nature. If that is the case, then both the Uber drivers and the Airbnb hosts may be considered to be 
‘engaged in trade or commerce’ and be caught by the relevant consumer protection provisions 
contained in the ACL. At what point a person’s activities move from personal to commercial in 
                                                          
682  Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594; Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Theiss Contractors 
Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 215. 
683  This should be contrasted with the statement in Consumer Guarantees — A guide for business and legal 
practitioners www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/the_ACL/downloads/consumer_guarantees_guide.pdf, 8 that 
‘Trade or commerce means in the course of a supplier’s or manufacturer’s business or professional activity, 
including a non-profit business or activity’. 
684  See most recently Williams v Pisano [2015] NSWCA 177. 
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nature is not a straightforward question and potentially creates uncertainty in the application of 
existing consumer protection provisions within peer to peer transaction. For example, if an Uber 
driver who drives as part of his/her main occupation picks up passengers in-transit between 
meetings, is this an activity which is commercial or merely sharing their empty vehicle with another 
person? 
4.6.5 Other jurisdictions 
There is little guidance to be obtained from the reviewed jurisdictions as the majority exclude 
consumer-to-consumer transactions from their primary consumer protection legislation and 
instead regulate those transactions under their Sale of Goods legislation.685 This provides some 
protection to consumers in relation to product quality, but these provisions can be excluded by the 
terms of the contract. The rationale for excluding consumer-to-consumer transactions from the 
scope of primary consumer protection legislation is that ‘businesses or consumers buying from 
peers are assumed to contract with equality of bargaining power’.686 
Some State-based consumer protection laws in the US have been interpreted as applying to 
individual eBay sellers. One such case is that of Lyle Real v Radir Wheels, Inc and Richard Conklin687 
in which the defendant was found liable for misrepresentation under section 56:8-2 of the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act688 (CFA) when he sold a vintage car described as being in ‘good 
condition’ on eBay, but that was later discovered to have a number of significant defects that were 
not detailed in the relevant listing. In reaching that decision the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
noted the broad protective purpose of the CFA to ‘address sharp practices and dealings in the 
marketing of merchandise and real estate whereby the consumer could be victimized by being 
lured into a purchase through fraudulent, deceptive or other similar kind or selling or advertising 
practices.’ This approach has not yet been consistently followed in similar cases in other 
US States.689  
One commentator has suggested the solution is to require platform operators to establish different 
websites for business and consumer sellers. The ‘business only’ website could then provide 
consumers with confidence that their transactions will be governed by the relevant consumer 
protection laws and the ‘consumer/individual only’ website would make it clear that only the 
relevant Sale of Goods Act provisions apply.690  
                                                          
685  See, the broad definitions of ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ adopted in Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) c 54; Sale of Goods Act RSO 
1990 c S-I; Sale of Goods Act 1996 RSBC c 410; Sale of Goods Act (Singapore cap 393, 1999 rev ed). 
686  Christine Riefa, The Legal Classification of Online Auctions: Towards a Safer Legal Framework (Ashgate Publishing, 
2015) 23. 
687  198 NJ 511, 969 A 2d 1069. 
688  Consumer Fraud Act 56 NJ Stat Ann (Thomson West 2015. 
689  Smith v Marquross 276 SW 3d 926, 927-28 (Tenn. Ct App 2008) (affirming the liability of the defendant, an 
individual seller, for breach of contract and failing to articulate the reason for which the plaintiff’s claim under the 
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act failed); Evans v Matlock No M2001-02631-COA-R9-CV, 2002 Tenn App LEXIS 
906 at 1-2 (Tenn Ct App, 23 December 2002) (addressing only that eBay arbitration clause was inapplicable to 
consumers but failing to address plaintiff’s substantive claim that individual sellers were liable under the Tennessee 
Consumer Protection Act. 
690  Fidelma White, ‘Selling on-line: Business compliance and consumer protection’ (2004-2005) 5 Hibernian Law 
Journal 223, 226. 
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4.6.6 Increased self-regulation 
Online auction platforms, such as eBay have already attempted to implement a self-regulatory 
regime by encouraging business sellers to set up stores 
(http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/how-to-register-business.html). EBay provides guidance to 
sellers regarding whether they should register as a business or an individual and, in doing so, 
indicates that if a seller intends to sell items that they have bought to resell, sell items they have 
produced themselves, or sell a large amount of items on a regular basis then they should register as 
a business.691 EBay also provides an easy process for upgrading an individual account to a business 
account (although it does not appear to enforce these guidelines against individuals who should be 
registered as businesses).692  
4.6.7 Comparison 
There is general acknowledgment by regulators in all jurisdictions that the rapid growth of the 
sharing economy through peer to peer platforms presents different challenges for existing 
regulatory models including:  
(1) Should regulation treat all suppliers of goods or services, whether a large corporation or an 
inexperience individual, in the same way? Does the variation in the market between sharing of 
assets by individuals via peer to peer platforms and business to business transactions693 mean 
there is too much complexity for a one size fits all regulatory model? 
(2) Does the increase in ‘sharing’ of goods and services require a reconsideration of the 
application of guarantees/warranties of quality and fitness for purpose to all transactions 
similar to the Sale of Goods Acts?  
(3) What liability or responsibilities should be imposed on platform operators across a spectrum 
of business models. Regulators are considering the (i) suitability of existing liability models and 
(ii) any benefits to the sharing economy (trust and confidence of consumers) of imposing 
responsibility for the conduct of users; (iii) the appropriate extent of the responsibility. On 
particular concerns is whether requirements to remove infringing material or take action in 
the case of fake listing or fraud should be placed on platform operators. 
(4) Whether existing regulatory models are adaptable and agile so as to apply following advances 
in technology which may allow businesses to operate outside of traditional business models 
and in many cases disrupt those models. Significant advances have been made in particular in 
the areas of distributed ledger technology (Blockchain), Smart Contracts and cognitive digital 
technology (Artificial Intelligence). Questions are already being raised about whether 
regulatory models that rely on legal rules to govern behaviour and impose obligations on 
business entities will need to be supplemented by rules that govern technical code. 694   A 
further issue is whether a combination of statutory laws and industry based codes or platform 
rules will be required. The speed of technical changes means that statutory regulation may not 
be sufficiently responsive and may need to be cast broadly and supplemented with codes, 
guidelines or rules promulgated by regulators, industry or individual operators.
                                                          
691  eBay, How to register as a business eBay.com http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/how-to-register-business.htm. 
692  eBay, Changing your Account Type eBay.com http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/how-to-register-business.html. 
693  Some examples are BrandGathering (online platform that connects businesses to undertake joint marking and 
branding activities helping to save money) and Nimber (sharing of logistics). 
694  Refer to UK Government Office for Science report: Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain (available at 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-techn
ology.pdf). 
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Part 5: Institutional structures relating to the 
administration and enforcement of 
consumer laws 
Issue 3: Professor Justin Malbon Faculty of law, Monash University and Mr 
Allan Asher Foundation for Effective Markets and Governance 
5.1 Introduction  
The following Part describes international institutional structures for the administration of 
consumer laws in: 
• the US and Canada; 
• the UK, a country in the EU; 
• New Zealand; 
• Singapore a comparable ASEAN nation. 
This Part identifies compares and analyses approaches to consumer protection in those 
jurisdictions, and examines their approaches to access to justice, digital purchasing and other 
developments in e-commerce. 
All jurisdictions studied are facing the challenge of protecting consumers when they purchase 
goods or services from an overseas seller via the Internet. The resolution of cross-jurisdictional 
disputes can be particularly complex, time-consuming and expensive. Many governments do not 
devote a great deal of attention or resources to the issue, but rather are exploring ways of 
encouraging informal (often industry initiated) ways of resolving consumer disputes. In some cases, 
it is in a business’s self-interest to resolve consumer complaints so as to maintain and build a 
trustworthy reputation. 
This Part identifies a number of themes about the ways governments establish institutional 
structures for consumer protection. In some jurisdictions the ministry responsible for consumer 
affairs is a relatively distinct and separate entity, whilst in other jurisdictions responsibility for 
consumer affairs sits within the ministry responsible for trade and industry development. In the 
latter case it may raise questions about how potential conflicts in advancing consumer and 
business interests are to be resolved. In New Zealand, for instance, responsibility for consumer 
protection is subsumed under the larger policy objective of promoting business. Consumer policy is 
delegated to a division within the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment.695 In some 
jurisdictions the agency responsible for consumer affairs holds considerable investigatory, and 
sometimes judicial, powers. These agencies will often be proactive in dealing with alleged illegal 
and exploitative market behaviour. Agencies in other jurisdictions, however, may play little more 
than a monitoring and reporting role, with greater reliance being placed on industries to 
self-regulate. 
                                                          
695  Note that the name of the Department has changed several times in the last few years www.mbie.govt.nz/. 
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In some jurisdictions a considerable degree of reorganisation and reforming of institutional 
structures is taking place. In the UK for instance there has been substantial reorganisation and 
reorientation of the institutional structures for consumer affairs. This is explored further in the 
discussions below. 
5.2 Functions of consumer law enforcement and policy agencies 
Institutions for protecting and advancing consumer interests typically involve the administration of 
consumer laws and regulations, the enforcement of those laws and regulations and the resolution 
of consumer disputes with sellers. In some countries, including EU countries such as France, 
consumer protection agencies are required to take a more interventionist role than is the case in 
other jurisdictions. In France, for instance, the agency responsible for consumer affairs has both 
rulemaking and administrative powers, and takes a proactive approach to market intervention. 
In other countries, such as the EU country Germany, and to an increasing extent the UK, agencies 
take a less market interventionist role. These agencies perform a more advisory role and undertake 
consumer awareness and education programs. Under this approach, it is seen that the market itself 
is the better mechanism for protecting consumer interests than government intervention in the 
market. Similarly, the US and Canada, and increasingly the UK and New Zealand, tend to adopt a 
caveat emptor approach in which the burden is placed on consumers to protect their own 
interests. 
Amongst the studied jurisdictions the powers and functions of agencies responsible for consumer 
affairs include: 
(1) advising the government on appropriate policies and measures for consumer protection; 
(2) representing the consumer interest on inter-governmental committees; 
(3) enforcing consumer protection and (in some instances) competition laws; 
(4) advising consumers and businesses of their rights and obligations under the relevant 
consumer protection laws; 
(5) conducting or commissioning market surveys and research into consumer protection issues; 
(6) conducting or commissioning product testing for safety and quality and disseminating 
information to consumers; 
(7) managing and monitoring the performance of consumer tribunals or other bodies for the 
mediation of consumer claims; 
(8) consulting with relevant stakeholders to understand consumer issues and developing policy to 
address problem areas; 
(9) organising public education and information programmes independently or in collaboration 
with consumer organisations and business entities;  
(10) registering and issuing licences for designated types of business activities;  
(11) issuing administrative rules to regulate the conduct of business entities and ensuring 
protection of consumer interests; and 
(12)  publishing an annual report of its activities. 
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The agencies in most jurisdictions have some rule making powers, and in some instances, such as 
the US FTC can exercise a measure of judicial power. 
In some jurisdictions responsibility for protecting and advancing consumer interests extend beyond 
the usual well-established agency for consumer protection; for example, the US FTC. Other 
agencies may have responsibility for aspects of consumer protection, such as responsibility for the 
regulation of particular market segments, including the regulation of utility services that provide 
water, energy and telecommunications. These agencies are typically required assist in resolving 
consumer complaints. This is a matter of key concern in Europe where new policies and approaches 
are being developed to deal with the large growth in utility related complaints. 
Particular areas demanding policy attention include telecommunications and responses to the 2008 
financial crisis. The telecommunications market has substantially transformed over the past few 
decades as a result (in some jurisdictions) of: the privatisation of the government monopoly 
telecommunications provider, leading to the emergence of competing providers; and rapid and 
highly dynamic technological change. These developments are placing considerable pressures on 
governments to develop appropriate policy responses. In the UK telecommunications and 
broadband regulation is under a single regulator. However, these relatively clear demarcation lines 
of regulation are being challenged by smart phone technology that enables consumers to use their 
phones for banking and other financial transactions. This raises difficult questions as to whether 
mobile technology ought to be regulated by the communication regulator or the financial 
institutions regulators. In Singapore Mobile money is regulated by the Central bank, whereas in 
Canada and the US it is largely self-regulated by industry. This concern is more pronounced in the 
five less developed of the ten ASEAN Member States where mobile telephony is one of the few 
sectors of communication that functions well.  
The 2008 financial crisis, triggered by the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, has prompted significant 
financial services marketplace reforms. Financial services regulators have been granted increased 
powers to deal with market abuses and are required to place greater emphasis on consumer 
protection. In some cases regulatory functions are divided amongst different regulators. For 
instance, in the UK and the US prudential regulation is separated from marketplace conduct 
regulation. 
Root and branch reviews of the regulatory institution structures for the consumer marketplace 
have been undertaken in a number of countries, most recently in New Zealand, along with the UK 
and European countries. The general trend of the reviews is to shift from heavy reliance on 
government regulatory control and oversight to shared regulatory models with business and 
consumer co-responsibility. Governments in some countries are placing greater obligations on 
corporations to comply with international guidelines such as the OECD Guidelines for 
Multi-National Enterprises, and ISO standards such as ISO26000 on social responsibility. The recent 
Re-publication of the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection (UNGCP)696 goes to some lengths to 
reinforce the obligations upon stakeholders to meet certain standards and marketplace standards 
of conduct. 
5.3 Country institutional structures for consumer law 
This section compares international institutional structures for the administration and enforcement 
of consumer laws in each of the five reference countries. It may be noted that obtaining a 
reasonable depth of information about these structures for this study has proven difficult in some 
instances. This section outlines: 
                                                          
696  Agreed by the UN General Assembly on December 15 2015 although not yet published in a final form. 
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• the main institutions for the administration and enforcement of consumer laws, including 
semi-government and non-government agencies; 
• the jurisdictional reach and key roles of the main institutions; 
• regulatory agency responsibilities and linkages with other governmental and 
non-governmental agencies; 
• the institutional settings for consumer agencies, including whether they sit within a larger 
governmental agency such as a Ministry for business and industry; and 
• any recent changes to the jurisdictional reach or structure of the consumer protection 
agencies. 
5.4 Comparison of main institutions for consumer protection 
5.4.1 United States 
US consumer protection policy is in essence based on the notion that consumers should be 
empowered to protect their own self interests. This leads to an emphasis being placed on requiring 
sellers to provide full disclosure about their products to enable consumers to make informed 
choices, and allowing access to justice, including by enabling class actions and collective action. 
Despite that, some federal and state agencies actively engage in enforcement actions in the public 
interest. 
The best-known, biggest and most active consumer agency is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
which administers a wide variety of consumer protection and competition laws. In keeping with the 
US philosophy of equipping consumers to take care of their own interests, the FTC’s overall goal is 
to take measures to promote a deception free marketplace and unable vigorous competition. 
The FTC’s key source of authority derives from Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which prohibits ‘unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’.697 A recent publication notes that: 
… deception occurs when there is a material representation, omission, or practice that 
is likely to mislead a consumer who is acting reasonably under the circumstances. Unfair 
practices are those which cause, or are likely to cause, reasonably unavoidable and 
substantial injury to consumers without any offsetting countervailing benefits to 
consumers or competition.698 
In addition to its Section 5(a) jurisdiction, the FTC has enforcement and administrative powers 
under 46 other statutes, 37 of which relate to the FTC’s consumer protection responsibilities. 
Among these laws are credit-related acts, such as the Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit Billing Act, 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, as well as continuing enforcement 
of industry specific acts, such as the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, and the Comprehensive 
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, and additional laws relating to consumer privacy 
such as the Do-Not-Call Registry Act of 2003, and the Controlling the Assault of Non Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act 2003 (CAN-SPAM).  
The FTC uses its investigative authority to uncover deception, unfair activities, or violation of any 
statute under which it has authority. The Bureau of Consumer Protection may issue civil 
investigative demands (‘CIDs’) to explore possible violations. Like a subpoena, a CID can compel the 
                                                          
697  See www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf. 
698  See www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-office. 
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production of existing documents or oral testimony, while also requiring a recipient file written 
reports or responses to questions. Investigations can be triggered by Presidential or Congressional 
requests, court referrals, consumer complaints, or internal research.699  
Upon completion of an investigation, the FTC may issue a complaint to a person, partnership, or 
corporation if it believes the person has violated the law, and enforcement is in the public interest. 
Hearings are held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). If the actions at issue are deemed a 
violation, the ALJ may recommend entry of a cease and desist order. These orders are the FTC’s 
primary tools for stopping anti-consumer practices. If a party violates the order, the FTC is 
authorised to use the courts to seek civil penalties and restitution for harmed consumers.  
A party may appeal an order to the full FTC, then to a federal appellate court, and eventually the 
US Supreme Court. If neither party appeals the order, it becomes final within 60 days of being 
issued. Once final, a respondent’s violation of the order can result in a civil penalty of up to 
US$10,000 per violation. Third parties with has actual knowledge of a breach who violate the 
Commission’s orders may also be subject to fines.700 
The FTC also has authority to make trade regulation rules that specifically define unfair or 
deceptive trade practices. For example, according to the FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, it is 
deceptive if a telemarketer fails to truthfully disclose the cost of products or services, or the nature 
of certain return policies. Knowingly violating FTC trade regulation rules may result in a civil penalty 
of up to US$10,000 per violation.  
The FTC occasionally acts on behalf classes of consumers who suffer loss or damage. The 
Commission can require wrongdoers to surrender the proceeds of their wrongdoing. The FTC seeks 
these remedies when it can objectively determine a clear violation of a law and reasonably 
calculate the damages payment. However, if the FTC determines that private actions or criminal 
proceedings will result in complete relief for the consumer, it may choose not to use the restitution 
or disgorgement remedies. Finally, if the FTC believes a party is violating, or will violate, a law it 
may seek a preliminary or permanent injunction from the federal district court to prevent the 
violation. 
As with its jurisdiction in competition law, the FTC does not have the power to bring criminal 
charges. The Department of Justice can prosecute federal consumer protection cases involving 
criminality before a federal court. It must establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. 
The FTC consumer remit is implemented via seven divisions of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. 
Collectively they protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices. These 
divisions include: Advertising Practices, Financial Practices, Marketing Practices, Privacy and 
Identity Protection, Planning and Information, Consumer and Business Education, and 
Enforcement.  
The Division of Advertising Practices works to prevent false advertising claims, particularly if the 
claims affect health and safety or cause economic injury. In addition to advertising claims regarding 
dietary supplements, weight loss products, alcohol, and tobacco, the Division also monitors the 
marketing of food, violent movies, and music and electronic games to children.  
                                                          
699  See www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices. 
700  See www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-office. 
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The FTC’s Division of Financial Practices was the only agency specifically charged with protecting 
consumers from fraud or deceptive practices in financial services until 2010. Credit card offers, 
mortgage practices, and debt collection practices were all covered by the Division. These functions 
are now carried out jointly with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009.701  
The Division of Marketing Practices addresses the marketing of products and services over the 
Internet, the telephone, or through the mail. The Division has issued a number of trade regulation 
rules to address marketing practice concerns. For instance, the Telemarketing Sales Rule governs 
when and how marketers may use the telephone for sales pitches. Other rules, such as CAN-SPAM 
Rules, the Franchise and Business Opportunity Rule, the 900 Number Rule, and the Funeral Rule 
outline proper methods for how, when, and to whom products or services may be marketed. 
The Division of Privacy and Identity Protection is the newest division and protects consumers’ 
personal information from being used improperly, and works to ensure that companies with access 
to that information, such as credit card companies, keep it secure. The FTC also maintains a 
website wholly dedicated to preventing identity theft. 
The Division of Planning and Information manages the Consumer Response Centre and the 
Consumer Sentinel database702. The Centre receives and addresses consumer complaints via phone 
or mail, while the Consumer Sentinel is a central database which contains over 3.5 million fraud 
and identity theft complaints. The Sentinel website analyses complaint data to better understand 
and prevent fraud and identity theft.  
The Division of Consumer and Business Education seeks to equip consumers with the skills to 
protect themselves by disseminating information to consumers through a myriad of media, 
including print, broadcast, and electronic outlets. Recent education efforts include the creation of 
industry-specific websites to educate consumers about how competition in the healthcare, real 
estate, oil and gas, and technology marketplaces can result in better products at lower prices.  
When a survey showed that Hispanics were more than twice as likely than non-Hispanic whites to 
be victims of consumer fraud, the Division extended its outreach by releasing its educational 
materials in both Spanish and English. The Division also educates young consumers to be smarter 
shoppers through publications such as ‘The Real Deal,’ a booklet that teaches through the use of 
games, puzzles, and cartoons.  
                                                          
701  The preamble to the Act (www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf) states that the purpose of the act is 
‘To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end “too big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes’. 
702  See www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network Consumer Sentinel is the unique investigative cyber 
tool that provides members of the Consumer Sentinel Network with access to millions of consumer complaints.  
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A list of the most frequent consumer complaints gives a quick sense of the agency priorities in 
recent times. In 2012, the top 15 categories of consumer complaints were: 703 
 
These categories of complaints have been quite stable over the past few years.  
5.4.1.1 Other US consumer law institutions  
Other federal agencies also play an important consumer protection role. The US Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC) has a mandate for reducing injury or death caused by consumer 
products. The CPSC develops product standards for manufacturers while also conducting recalls of 
any products that could, or do, cause harm.  
The CPSC704 does not however have jurisdiction over all consumer products. For example, food, 
drug, cosmetic and medical device safety is the focus of the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). A recent initiative of the FDA has been to more deeply regulate the tobacco industry. The 
FDA has authority under the 2009 Tobacco Control Act to regulate the manufacture, marketing, 
and distribution of tobacco products to protect the public health generally and to reduce tobacco 
use by minors. The 2009 law restricts the use of ‘Light,’ ‘Mild,’ ‘Low,’ or similar descriptors in the 
labelling or advertising of tobacco products. The law also grants the FDA powers to impose civil 
penalties and even forbid tobacco sales by retailers who fail to comply with age limits and age 
identification rules regarding tobacco sales to minors.  
                                                          
703  A complete list of complaints can be found at: 
www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy2012.pdf. 
704  CPSC is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of injury or death associated with the use of the 
thousands of types of consumer products under the agency’s jurisdiction. Deaths, injuries, and property damage 
from consumer product incidents cost the nation more than $1 trillion annually. CPSC is committed to protecting 
consumers and families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard. CPSC’s work to 
ensure the safety of consumer products — such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household 
chemicals — contributed to a decline in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products over the 
past 40 years. 
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The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)705 covers automobile, truck, and 
motorcycle safety.706 Its consumer protection powers arose from a public scandal in the mid-1960s. 
In the 1950s and 1960s automobiles were designed for style, not safety. Even with accident 
prevention and driving improvement efforts, automobiles remained the leading cause of death for 
the population below age 44 in the 1960s, with about 50,000 vehicular deaths in 1965.  
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)707 has broad jurisdiction over broadcast 
communications and communication common carriers. The FCC has a Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau that ensures that consumer interests are considered in FCC decisions. The Bureau 
also monitors and resolves consumer complaints about communications services. Similarly, 
virtually every federal executive branch and independent agency has some similar office or bureau 
designed to advance consumer interest in its particular field.  
5.4.1.2 The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection708 
Following the excesses of credit and mortgage provision throughout the US, which was a major 
contributor to the global financial crisis, the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act was passed by Congress. This law can be regarded as the most significant change in 
federal consumer protection in a generation and is a distinct break from the generally hands off 
approach to markets adopted by US regulators. 
The main operative provision in the Act is the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 which 
established an independent entity within the Federal Reserve System, the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (the Bureau). The new Bureau has a substantial budget, ramping up to $500 
million per annum. The Bureau is consolidating various consumer protection functions now being 
performed by the FTC and other federal agencies such as the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
Key elements of the Bureau’s mandate include:  
• Conducting financial education programs; collecting, investigating, and responding to 
consumer complaints; collecting, researching monitoring, and publishing information about 
the functioning of markets for consumer financial products and services to identify risks to 
consumers and the proper functioning of such markets; supervising covered persons for 
compliance with Federal consumer financial law; and issuing rules, orders, and guidance 
implementing Federal consumer financial law.  
• Having broad supervisory powers over ‘non-depository covered persons’ and over large banks, 
credit unions, and savings associations. A non-depository covered person is a person to who 
provides ‘brokerage or servicing of loans secured by real estate for use by consumers’, who 
‘offers or provides to any consumer any private education loan,’ ‘offers or provides to a 
consumer a payday loan,’ and that the bureau has cause to believe ‘has engaged in conduct 
that poses risks to consumers.’ The Bureau is authorised to collaborate with the Federal Trade 
Commission or any other Federal or State agency that may assist it in carrying out its 
supervisory tasks.  
                                                          
705  See www.nhtsa.gov/About. 
706  NHTSA was established by the Highway Safety Act of 1970 and is dedicated to achieving the highest standards of 
excellence in motor vehicle and highway safety. It works daily to help prevent crashes and their attendant costs, 
both human and financial. 
707  The Federal Communications Commission regulates interstate and international communications by radio, 
television, wire, satellite, and cable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and U.S. territories. An independent 
US government agency overseen by Congress, the commission is the United States’ primary authority for 
communications laws, regulation and technological innovation. 
708  See www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/. 
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• With regard to large banks, saving associations, and credit unions, the exclusive authority to 
examine any insured institution with total assets of more than $10 billion and any affiliate 
thereof. Institutions with less than $10 billion in assets are subject to oversight by the Bureau, 
but only so far as necessary to support the implementation of Federal consumer financial laws 
and to determine risks to consumers and consumer financial markets. 
• The regulation of ‘the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under 
the Federal consumer financial laws.’ The statute explicitly defines the ‘consumer financial 
products’ that are regulated by the Bureau. Financial products include extending credit and 
servicing loans, extending or brokering leases of personal or real property, providing real 
estate settlement services or performing appraisals of real estate or personal property, 
engaging in deposit taking activities, selling, providing, or issuing stored value or payment 
instruments, providing check cashing, check collection, or check guaranty services, providing 
financial advisory services to consumers on individual financial matters, and other similar 
financial instruments and activities.  
• The power to include other financial products or services under its scope as it sees fit. 
Similarly, the Act goes to great length to identify those previously enacted consumer laws, that 
will be enforced by the Bureau. These enumerated consumer laws include the Alternative 
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, the Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Truth in Savings 
Act, among others.  
• If the Bureau finds an organization to be in violation of a federal consumer financial protection 
law, it has enforcement authority to pursue actions against that entity. Additionally, the 
Bureau is required to coordinate its enforcement activities with the FTC. The agencies may 
take joint or individual actions against an entity in violation of any of the consumer financial 
protection laws. The Bureau’s main enforcement power is the power to bring a civil lawsuit 
against the entity for any violation of any provision of federal law under its jurisdiction. Such a 
suit may be brought independently of or in conjunction with charges brought by the FTC.  
• The power to take any action allowable under the statute to prevent a covered person or 
service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or 
practice under Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer. The Bureau 
may prescribe and apply any rules or require any public disclosures it deems necessary to carry 
out this obligation. Additionally, the Bureau may require that a covered person make available 
to consumers any information concerning a financial product or service that the consumer 
obtained from the covered person, excepting any confidential information and information 
that cannot be retrieved in the ordinary course of business. 
• Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of the Bureau is 
required to appoint a Private Education Loan Ombudsman to provide assistance to borrowers 
of private education loans. The Ombudsman is charged with collaborating with the 
Department of Education to oversee the distribution of loans and provide assistance to 
borrowers of private or Federal education loans. Additionally, the Ombudsman is required to 
respond to borrower complaints and to make recommendations to the Director, Secretary of 
the Treasury, Secretary of Education, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban affairs and 
the Committee on Health, Education, Labour and Pensions of the Senate and the Committee 
on Financial Services and the Committee on Education and Labour of the House of 
Representatives.  
Part 5 — Institutional Structures Relating to the Administration and Enforcement of Consumer Laws 
Comparative analysis of overseas consumer policy frameworks Page 159 
The Bureau’s enforcement powers include using mechanisms for enforcing the federal consumer 
financial laws. It has general investigatory powers, and can appoint an investigator to conduct an 
inquiry into whether any person has violated the law. A Bureau investigator holds subpoena 
powers over witnesses and documents in connection with any investigation or hearing over a 
suspected offender.  
After investigation, the Bureau may determine that further adjudication is required, at which point 
it can subpoena evidence in formal hearings. The hearing serves as a trial to determine whether the 
covered person is guilty of a violation. The Board’s decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals 
for the circuit where the principal office of the covered person is located. If the offending party is 
found guilty, the penalty is a monetary civil penalty and possibly a referral for criminal proceedings 
as well.  
Since its creation in 2010, the Bureau has pursued several major settlements against companies 
engaging in deceptive and unfair credit and lending practices. In 2012, Discover Bank agreed to pay 
a $14 million penalty in addition to $200 million in restitution to 3.5 million customers for engaging 
for using deceptive sales practices to mislead consumers into paying for credit card add-on 
products.  
The Bureau has also prohibited a Florida company from engaging in debt-relief sales or advertising 
for illegal debt-relief practices. Most recently, the Bureau obtained a $6.5 million refund from a US 
bank that serviced members who participated in the Military Instalment Loans and Education 
Services auto loan program. 
5.4.1.3 Structure of the Bureau709  
The Bureau is led by a Director who is appointed for a five-year term by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The Director is charged with establishing the departments within 
the Bureau, which will assist with carrying out the Bureau’s mandate. 
There are three Specific Functional Units: Research, Community Affairs, and Complaint Collection 
and Tracking. In addition, there are four separate offices within the Bureau: The Office of Fair 
Lending and Equal Opportunity, the Office of Financial Education, the Office of Service Member 
Affairs, and the Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans.  
The Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity is responsible for overseeing and enforcing any 
Federal laws intended to ensure the fair, equitable, and non-discriminatory to access to credit for 
both individuals and communities. Additionally, the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity is 
charged with coordinating fair lending efforts between the Bureau and other Federal and State 
agencies, and working with private industry and consumer advocates on the promotion of fair 
lending compliance and education. 
The Office of Financial Education develops and implements initiatives intended to educate and 
empower consumers to make better informed financial decisions. Additionally, it is charged with 
developing programs to improve the financial literacy of consumers through financial counselling, 
providing information to aid in understanding credit histories and credit scores, and advising 
consumers with regards to educational expenses, debt reduction, and improving long-term savings 
strategies.  
                                                          
709  See www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/. 
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The Office of Service Member Affairs is responsible for developing and implementing initiatives for 
military service members and their families to help them make informed decisions about financial 
products. The Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans which provides individuals over 
the age of 62 with protection from unfair and abusive practices and activities to assist in the 
financial literacy of senior citizens.  
A Consumer Advisory Board and a Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund is established within the 
Bureau. The Board provides information about emerging practices in the consumer financial 
products or services industry. The Board is composed of six members appointed after 
recommendation by the Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, and meets at a minimum of twice a year. 
The Civil Penalty Fund provides relief for victims of activities for which charges have been brought 
against a financial service provider. With the critical jurisdiction of financial transactions, Internet 
and cross-border commerce, it is clear that the bureau’s will eventually become the largest 
consumer protection agency in the United States. 
5.4.1.4 State institutional structures for consumer protection  
State governments act as both consumer law enforcement agencies and consumer advocates, 
much like the federal government. Responsibility for consumer protection within state 
governments tends to be highly decentralized, without the presence of any single overarching 
consumer protection department or agency.  
The State Attorney Generals are charged with enforcing state consumer protection laws In most of 
the 50 states. An Attorney General may, in most states, file lawsuits on behalf of consumers, 
investigate possible violations, issue injunctions to terminate ongoing illegal activity, obtain 
restitution on behalf of consumers, bring criminal cases when authorised by law, and make rules to 
govern trade practices. 
The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) facilitates cooperation among Attorney 
Generals to enhance their consumer protection effectiveness and support multi-state consumer 
protection activity and litigation. In larger cities and counties, there may also be a consumer 
protection division or bureau handling criminal and civil investigations and cases under state or 
local law.  
One of the most successful recent consumer protection initiatives was the joint state-federal 
National Mortgage Settlement. In 2012, 49 state attorneys general and the federal government 
announced a historic settlement agreement with the five largest mortgage servicing entities in the 
United States. The settlement has provided over $50 billion in relief to mortgage borrowers and 
state and federal agencies in connection with allegation over improper mortgage foreclosure 
practices by the respondents. In the settlement, borrowers received loan modifications, refinancing 
relief, and payments to those borrowers who lost their homes. In addition, the mortgage servicing 
firms agreed to nationwide standards for the servicing of both past and future mortgages and the 
appointment of an independent third-party monitor to oversee and report on compliance with the 
terms of the settlement.  
5.4.1.5 State Investigative Powers  
State agencies generally have the authority to issue Civil Investigative Demands, or CIDs. Under a 
CID, and agency may request documents or oral testimony from specific individuals or companies. 
Attorney Generals may issue CIDs if they believe a violation has or will occur, and need not 
establish probable cause. Criminal investigations are conducted through the grand jury process and 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the appropriate state court.  
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5.4.2 Canada 
In Canada, responsibility for consumer protection legislation is divided between federal and 
provincial governments. The federal government is responsible for certain specific sectors as well 
as for national marketplace standards, whereas provincial governments are responsible for 
contractual and local matters. Each of the provinces and territories has consumer protection laws 
and regulations. 
The Canadian Constitution does not specifically assign consumer affairs to either federal or 
provincial jurisdiction. In practice, the federal government is responsible for certain specific sectors 
as well as for national marketplace standards, whereas provincial governments are responsible for 
contractual matters and local matters. 
5.4.2.1 Federal mechanisms 
The Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA) promotes the interests and protection of Canadian 
consumers. Well-informed and confident consumers help stimulate competition and innovation in 
the Canadian marketplace. 
The OCA aims to ensure consumers have a voice in developing government policies and are 
effective marketplace participants. It provides research and analysis on marketplace issues in 
support of both policy development and intergovernmental harmonization of consumer protection 
rules and measures. It also identifies important consumer issues and develops and disseminates 
consumer information and awareness tools. Finally, the OCA provides financial support 
to not-for-profit consumer and voluntary organizations, in the form of a Contributions Program, to 
encourage them to reach financial self-sufficiency and assist them in providing 
meaningful, evidence-based input to public policy in the consumer interest. 
Under the Department of Industry Act, the Minister of Industry is mandated to promote and 
protect consumer interests throughout Canada. The Minister’s powers also extend to measures to 
strengthen the national economy, promote sustainable development, ensure an efficient internal 
market governed by effective marketplace rules, and foster science and innovation. 
The OCA contributes to this broad mandate by helping to build trust in the marketplace, so 
consumers can protect themselves and confidently and knowledgeably drive demand for 
innovative products and services at competitive prices. 
The OCA bases its strategic directions and agenda on the following three themes: 
• vulnerable consumers in the marketplace; 
• OCA assesses the nature of consumer vulnerability in Canada and helps ensure that policy 
developments do not impact disproportionately on the most vulnerable or disadvantaged 
Canadian consumers; 
• consumers in the electronic marketplace; 
• OCA helps to increase consumer confidence in the electronic marketplace as new 
technologies emerge. OCA works on issues such as e-commerce and electronic payment 
mechanisms, and lays the groundwork for possible future policy initiatives in areas such as 
commercial e-services and mobile commerce; 
• consumers in the sustainable marketplace. 
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The OCA works in collaboration with key stakeholders to improve consumer understanding of their 
role in sustainable production and consumption. The OCA undertakes research and policy 
development on how best to educate and equip consumers to deal with sustainable consumption 
issues in the marketplace. 
5.4.2.2 Other Canadian federal Laws for consumer protection 
Key federal consumer protection laws include the following: 
• Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34 (ensures fair and competitive markets provide consumers 
with competitive prices and product choices). 
• Weights and Measures Act, RSC 1985, c W-6 (establishes standards for weights and measures). 
• Food and Drug Act, RSC 1985, c F-27 (includes requirements for food, drugs, cosmetics and 
therapeutic devices). 
• Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c 38 (ensures accessibility of telecommunication to 
consumers, and sets a framework for regulation of the telecommunications industry by the 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission). 
• Canadian Consumer Product Safety Act, SC 2010, c 21(protects consumers from potentially 
dangers products). 
• The Bank Act, SC 1991, c46 (includes consumer protection measures applying to the banking 
industry). 
• Finally, the Department of Industry Act, SC 1995, c 1, gives the Minister of Industry jurisdiction 
over consumer affairs and standards relating to consumer goods, and the task of promoting 
consumer interests in Canada. 
Each of Canada’s thirteen provinces and territories has consumer protection laws and regulations, 
often found in consumer protection acts, businesses practices act or fair trading acts. 
Consumer protection institutions approximate the role and structure of those in Australian States 
and Territories prior to the implementation of the Australian Consumer Law in 2010 
• Alberta: Fair Trading Act, RSA 2000, c F-2. 
• British Columbia: Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, SBC 2004, c2. 
• Manitoba: Consumer Protection Act, CCSM, c C200. 
• New Brunswick: Financial and Consumer Services Act, SNB 2013, c 30.  
• Newfoundland: Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, SNL 2009, c C-31.1. 
• North West Territories: Consumer Protection Act, RSNWT 1988, c C-17. 
• Nova Scotia: Consumer Protection Act, RSNS 1989, c92. 
• Nunavut: Consumer Protection Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c C-17. 
• Ontario: Consumer Protection Act, SO 2002, c30. 
• Prince Edward Island: Consumer Protection Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-19. 
• Quebec: Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c P-40.1. 
• Saskatchewan: The Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, SS 2014, c C-30.2. 
• Yukon: Consumer Protection Act, RSY 2002, c40. 
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Several provinces also have industry specific laws and regulations. These cover specific industries 
such as travel agents, funeral services, debt collection, insurance, real estate and real property.  
5.4.3 New Zealand 
Institutional structures for the administration and enforcement of New Zealand consumer laws 
have remained largely unchanged for the past decade. However, commencing in 2010, successive 
governments have undertaken a root and branch review of all areas of consumer law and policy 
and gradually implemented major reforms to the law, policy and enforcement systems.710 
5.4.3.1 Commerce commission 
The main agency responsible for enforcement of competition and consumer laws is the Commerce 
Commission (CC). The Commission is accountable to the Minister of Commerce 
and Consumer Affairs for its performance. Established as an independent agency, the CC operates 
as an impartial promoter and enforcer of the law. 
A Statement of Intent is produced at least every three years setting out a work programme for the 
following four financial years. CC also produces a Statement of Performance Expectations annually 
outlining priorities, forecast financial statements, and output measures for the next financial year. 
5.4.4 Singapore 
5.4.4.1 Consumer Protection Legal and Institutional Arrangements 
In Singapore, the Ministry for Trade and Industry is the responsible department for consumer law 
and institutions. It states as its vision: 
… for Singapore to be a leading global city with a dynamic economy, world-class 
enterprises and innovative and productive SMEs. Singapore will offer a conducive 
environment for entrepreneurs and enterprises to tap its diverse opportunities, and 
provide good jobs which are attractive to talent at all levels. 
Consumer law administration and enforcement in Singapore is largely contracted out to 
implementation through schemes of self-regulation and co-regulation and in particular through the 
operations of the Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE)711 which is contacted by the 
government to take a wide range of mediation negotiation and even enforcement action on the 
half of consumers. CASE is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation that is committed towards 
protecting consumer’s interest through information and education, and promoting an environment 
of fair and ethical trade practices. 
There are a number of laws in Singapore dealing with consumer protection, including the 
Multi-Level Marketing and Pyramid Selling (Prohibition) Act, Sale of Goods Act and the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act. These laws are generally applicable to transactions over the Internet. However, 
the Government recognises that some laws may not adequately address electronic transactions, 
and is thus actively looking into how existing consumer protection laws can be clarified and applied 
specifically to cyberspace consumer transactions. 
                                                          
710  At the heart of reform of New Zealand consumer laws are changes to the Fair Trading Act which commenced 
operation at the end of 2013. 
711  A concise outline of the history and functions of CASE can be found on the organisational member page of the 
Consumers International web site at: 
www.consumersinternational.org/our-members/member-directory/CASE%20-%20Consumers%20Association%20o
f%20Singapore. 
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5.4.5 United Kingdom 
Institutional structures for the administration and enforcement of consumer laws in the United 
Kingdom have undergone radical change over the past five years. Policy responsibility for consumer 
issues rests with the Employment Relations, and Postal Issues, Consumer, Competition, Corporate 
Governance and Intellectual Property Division of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(DBIS), which was formed after the abolition and re-formation of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI). 
The UK has transitioned away from a model in which a number of national quasi-autonomous 
enforcement, educational and advocacy bodies worked alongside the Trading Standards Offices 
and the Citizens Advice Network. Major nationally operating enforcement agencies such as the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC) were abolished as were 
consumer complaints, policy and advocacy bodies such as Consumer Voice and Energywatch.  
5.4.5.1 Abolition of national bodies 
The work of the national bodies is now undertaken by a network of about 200 local authority 
Trading Standards Offices (TSO). The UK government has effectively contracted out its regulatory 
functions to the TSO and the charitable Citizens Advice (CA) offices. Much of the UK’s previously 
existing consumer protection laws have been repealed and replaced. The Government was 
motivated by a desire to shift the burden of enforcement from government, and to place greater 
reliance on ‘light touch’ industry-based schemes.  
The Government implemented new regulations in October 2015 to give effect to its obligations 
under the European directives on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Online Dispute 
Resolution (ODR). The regulations require traders who fail to resolve a dispute through their own 
customer service processes to advise the consumer complainant of their right to have their dispute 
resolved by an alternative dispute resolution body. Traders are not compelled to use the ADR body, 
however, it is hoped that the new regulations will encourage traders to do so.  
5.5 Legislation and jurisdictional comparisons 
5.5.1 United States 
Most US states have statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive conduct, modelled to varying 
degrees on the Federal Trade Commission Act. Under these ‘Little FTC Acts,’ each state 
Attorney-General has statutory authority to seek injunctions to remedy unfair or deceptive trade 
practices. A company may face contempt charges if it continues a practice after an injunction has 
been issued. Attorney Generals may also obtain voluntary assurances of compliance from violating 
companies. A breach of the voluntary assurance is akin to an injunction violation. States also may 
use civil and criminal penalties to penalise unfair or deceptive trade practices.  
An Attorney-General may seek restitution for consumers who are victims of fraud or deception. 
Some states expressly grant Attorney-Generals the statutory power to obtain restitution. Other 
states do so implicitly because of state court decisions authorizing such actions. This remedy is 
especially effective if consumers have been harmed but monetary damages are not large enough to 
warrant litigation by private individuals. Restitution is paid directly to affected consumer if they can 
be readily identified. Otherwise the funds are distributed in lump sums to consumer groups and 
related non-profit organisations under the cy pres doctrine. 
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Most state consumer protection statutes allow the Attorney General, or other state regulatory or 
enforcement agency, to create rules that advise businesses of prohibited and acceptable business 
practices. Approximately 20 states have chosen to create such rules. 
5.5.1.1 State Regulatory Authorities  
Each state has a different system for addressing the special needs of regulated industries such as 
energy, transportation, health, and financial institutions. They each has a variety of mechanisms for 
addressing consumer concerns, resulting in little uniformity between the states or within the same 
state among the different regulatory structures for each industry.  
States also regulate trades and professions through licensing boards and enforcement divisions. 
These state departments attempt to protect consumers by licensing only qualified individuals to 
work in specific professions, from health care providers, real estate agents, lawyers, and 
accountants. Consumers may search state license databases to find potential service providers or 
lodge a complaint against a licensed professional. Professional licenses can be suspended 
temporarily or permanently, or be revoked after a hearing; with the losing party having a right to 
appeal within the state court system. 
5.5.1.2 Private Rights of Actions for Consumers 
Private citizens can use the state and federal court systems to protect themselves from 
marketplace fraud and deceit. At the state level, consumers may use both common law and 
statutory causes of action such as the Little FTC Acts. Although the federal courts and each state 
court system operate independently, there are numerous commonalities to the private rights of 
action protecting consumers.  
Common law legal action is one of the oldest means for obtaining consumer protection. Current 
common law actions provide consumers protection through torts for deceit, fraud, 
misrepresentation, and breach of warranty.  
A consumer may file a lawsuit for deceit or fraud if a seller intentionally conceals a material fact or 
makes a false representation of a material fact, knowing the representation is false and seeks to 
induce the consumer to act on the representation. The plaintiff must also reasonably rely on the 
misrepresentation and suffer damage as a result of reliance. Deceit can arise if a seller makes a 
direct false statement, or when a misrepresentation arises from silence, concealment, half-truths, 
or ambiguity about a good or service. While misrepresentation of product facts may bring legal 
action, mere puffery or opinions are generally not subject to lawsuits for deceit.  
If successful in court, a consumer may receive damages for out of pocket losses, rescission of the 
transaction at issue, damages to ensure the consumer receives the benefit of the bargain, or 
possibly punitive damages. Most common law consumer protection actions are brought in state 
court, although actions between citizens of different states can be brought in federal court under 
certain situations. 
5.5.1.3 Statutory Causes of Action  
Although common law actions have long protected consumers from fraud, it is often burdensome 
to successfully plead and prove such a case, particularly because a consumer must prove that the 
seller intended harm. If a common law claim is not possible, consumers may rely on federal or state 
unfair trade practice statutes to remedy misrepresentations or material omissions. 
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There is no private right of action under the Federal Trade Act, although there may be private rights 
under the more specific statutes enforced by the FTC and the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau. Each state also has some form of consumer protection law, and many are modelled after 
the Federal Trade Commission Act and prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. These state 
laws normally allow consumers to sue for damages and injunctive relief. Consumers have a better 
chance of success in combating misrepresentations under these statutes because they do not 
typically require proof that the seller intended harm and often relax other requirements of 
common law fraud. In addition to protection from unfair and deception trade practices, many 
states also specifically prohibit certain deceptive pricing, bait and switch tactics, and pyramid sales 
scheme practices. In addition to preventing the broader harms of ‘unfair and deceptive’ trade 
practices, state ‘lemon’ laws streamline the remedy process for consumers who purchase a 
defective new or used car. 
5.5.2 Canada 
In common with the United States, Canadian consumer protection laws do not for provide for 
Federal action on behalf of individual consumers. Consequently, the level of Federal intervention is 
relatively low. Canada, like the US, places heavy reliance on litigation as a basis for consumer 
redress. Despite that, there are a number of sector-specific areas where Canadian consumers have 
access to dispute resolution services. For example, the Commissioner for Complaints for 
Telecommunications Services provides a dispute resolution service for telephone and 
internet-related complaints. The Ombudsman for Banking and Investment Services provide services 
for consumers with banking and investment complaints. 
5.5.3 New Zealand 
The Fair Trading Amendment Act 2013 modernises New Zealand consumer law, and responds to 
the rapid uptake of electronic and cross-border trade, and provides greater alignment of New 
Zealand and Australian Consumer laws than previously existed. The stated objectives of the 
updated legislation are to help ensure businesses can compete more effectively and that 
consumers are better protected. 
Changes to legal and institutional arrangements for consumer law in New Zealand commenced 
with the publication of discussion papers in 2009 and 2010. In making the changes the government 
stated it reviewed the purpose and ongoing relevance of the then existing statutes, and sought to 
fill any gaps in the law. It also reviewed the overall effectiveness of enforcing those laws. The bulk 
of legislative change occurred at the end of 2013 when the consumer law reform bill received Royal 
assent. 
5.5.3.1 Objectives of the reform 
The stated objectives for the reform were to revise and update consumer law so that it: 
• is principles-based; 
• enables consumers to transact in confidence; 
• protects suppliers and consumers from inappropriate market conduct; 
• is easily accessible to those who are affected by consumer law; 
• better aligns New Zealand law with the Australian Consumer Law, where appropriate, in 
accordance with the government’s agenda for a single economic market with Australia. 
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The New Zealand Commerce Commission has been empowered to act in a timelier and more 
effective manner in dealing with breaches. Changes under the Act include providing additional 
rights for consumers and obligations for businesses as well as investigation and enforcement tools 
for the Commerce Commission. The list below provides a summary of the changes.  
5.5.3.2 Rights and obligations  
• Auctions — new rules apply to certain types of auctions (excluding online auctions like Trade 
Me) Buying and selling online — traders who sell online must make it clear they are traders, 
meaning purchases have rights under the Consumer Guarantees Act Contracting out of the 
Fair Trading Act — businesses cannot contract out of their obligations to consumers. 
• Door-to-door and telemarketing sales — consumers have extra protection when approached 
by uninvited sales people at their home or workplace, or by telephone. 
• Extended warranties — traders must now disclose consumer’s rights under the Consumer 
Guarantees Act and a comparison of those rights with the benefits of the extended warranty 
being offered. 
• Substantiation — it is an offence for traders to make a claim they can’t back up. 
• Unsolicited goods and services — it is illegal for a business to demand payment for goods or 
services that haven’t been requested by the recipient Investigation and enforcement. 
• Increased fines — penalties for misleading and deceptive conduct, false representations, 
unfair practices and issues around product safety have increased from $60,000 to $200,000 for 
individuals and from $200,000 to $600,000 for businesses. 
• Management banning orders — in certain circumstances the Commerce Commission can ban 
an individual from being a director or involved in the management of a company. 
• Product Safety Monitoring and Enforcement Powers — new powers when conducting 
inspections Laws prohibiting unfair contract terms. 
• Compulsory interview powers — The Commerce Commission now has the ability to require 
oral evidence from people during some Fair Trading Act investigations. Previously the 
Commission could only request interviews and individuals could refuse to be interviewed or to 
answer certain questions. The interviewee must answer questions put by the Commerce 
Commission, but any responses cannot be used against the interviewee in criminal 
proceedings, other than in some limited, specified circumstances. The compulsory interview 
power can be used for investigations that started before the provision came into effect. 
• Enforceable undertakings — are a form of out-of-court negotiated settlement. Where the 
Commerce Commission believes there has been a breach of the Act the Commission may 
accept enforceable undertakings. They may include agreements by a person or business to 
stop doing something, make compensation payments, publish corrective advertising or pay 
costs to the Commission. If the party does not keep to their agreement the Commission may 
apply to the Court to enforce the agreement. 
Recent changes to the Act include significantly increased penalties, the introduction of 
infringement offences and the ability for courts to impose banning orders. The new penalties came 
into effect in 2015. Important changes include: Fines for misleading and deceptive conduct have 
been increased by at least 300%. 
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• Individuals now face fines of up to $200,000 per offence. Companies face fines of up to 
$600,000 per offence. 
• Participants in pyramid schemes now face fines of up to $60,000. In addition, a Court can also 
strip offenders of the equivalent revenue or ‘commercial gain’ earned from the offending. 
Breaches of Part 2 of the Act (relating to Consumer Information) or Part 4A (relating to 
consumer transactions and auctions) can result in a fine for an individual of $10,000 and 
$30,000 for a body corporate. 
• The Commerce Commission can issue infringement notices with fines of up to $2,000 for 
offences for: failing to comply with a suspension of supply notice issued under section 33D; 
involving the contravention of section 28 (consumer information standards); failing to comply 
with section 28B(1) or (2) (disclosure of trader status on Internet); involving the contravention 
of any of the following provisions of Part 4A:  
(i) s 36C (layby disclosure requirements); 
(ii) s 36D (further layby disclosure requirements);  
(iii) s 36L (uninvited direct sale disclosure requirements); and  
(iv) s 36T (extended warranty disclosure requirements.  
5.5.3.3 Other remedies  
Other remedies under the Act remain unchanged. These include:  
• Corrective advertising orders. A court may require a trader to publish corrective advertising; to 
disclose information to the public generally, or to an affected section of the public; and to 
publish corrective statements. 
• Compensation or refund orders may be granted by a court. A court may also order a trader to 
refund or compensate a person who suffers loss from the trader’s unlawful conduct.  
• Altering or voiding a contract is an available remedy. A court may order that a contract be 
altered or voided as a result of unlawful conduct. 
A Court can impose a management banning order which prohibits an individual from being 
involved in the management of a company. A management banning order can be taken against an 
individual who:  
• has, on at least two separate occasions within a 10 year period, committed a criminal offence 
under the Act, or  
• is, or was at the time of committing the offence, a director of, or concerned in the 
management of, an incorporated or unincorporated body that has, on at least two separate 
occasions within a 10-year period, committed a criminal offence under the Act, or  
• has been prohibited by an overseas jurisdiction, in connection with the contravention of any 
law relating to unfair trading, from carrying on certain activities.  
A person who breaches a management banning order commits an offence punishable by a fine of 
up to $60,000.  
5.5.3.4 Enforcement mechanisms in New Zealand 
Key measures for consumer protection enforcement in New Zealand: 
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• Product Safety Standards — Mandatory safety standards for certain products are enforced by 
the Commerce Commission under the Act. The purpose of these regulations is to prevent or 
reduce the risk of injury.  
• Service Safety Standards — These are regulations made under section 35 of the Fair Trading 
Act 1986. Their purpose is to prevent or reduce the risk of injury to any person. Currently 
there are no Service Safety Standards under the Act. 
• Suspension of Supply Notices — These notices prohibit the person or persons identified in 
them from supplying the particular goods for a short period. It may be issued by a Product 
Safety Officer of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment and are enforced by the 
Commerce Commission.  
• Unsafe Goods Notice — The relevant Minister may declare any goods unsafe where it appears 
they may cause injury. It is then the Commerce Commission’s role to enforce compliance with 
the Notice. 
• Unfair contract terms — Unfair contract terms are prohibited in all standard form consumer 
contracts entered into after 17 March 2015, and also in those contracts (except insurance 
contracts) that are renewed or varied after that date. The provision allows the Commission to 
seek a declaration from a court that a term in a standard form consumer contract is unfair. 
While only the Commerce Commission can apply for this, any person may ask the Commission 
to apply to the court in relation to a contract to which they are a party.  
In relation to the foregoing provisions on unfair contract terms, the court may declare a term unfair 
if it is satisfied that the term would cause: 
• a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations, and  
• is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be 
advantaged by the term, and  
• would cause some detriment (whether financial or otherwise) to the other party if applied, 
enforced or relied on.  
Certain terms cannot be declared unfair. These are terms that: define the main subject matter of 
the contract or set the upfront price payable under the contract. 
5.5.4 Singapore 
5.5.4.1 Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 
As with other jurisdictions reviewed in this comparative study, Singapore has a range of statutes 
providing consumer protection. The core law for consumer protection is the Consumer Protection 
(Fair Trading) Act. This Act provides the legislative framework to allow consumers aggrieved by 
unfair practices to have recourse to civil remedies before the courts. It also provides for a 
cooling-off period for direct sales and time share contracts, and allows specified bodies to enter 
voluntary compliance agreements with, or apply for injunction orders against errant traders. 
5.5.4.2 Personal Data Protection 
Singapore has both a strong common law tradition as well as appropriately structured statutory 
provisions to regulate use of personal data. Under the general law, confidential information may be 
protected under a duty of confidence. Personal information is also protected under sector-specific 
laws such as the Banking Act, Statistics Act, the Official Secrets Act and the Statutory Bodies and 
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Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act. There is however no overarching legislation for 
the protection of personal data in Singapore. In February 2002, the National Internet Advisory 
Committee (NIAC) released a draft ‘Model Data Protection Code for the Private Sector’ which is 
modelled on internationally recognised standards. 
In relation to e-commerce, cross border trade and consumer protection, Singapore has a highly 
developed policy and regulatory scheme. At the centred of the scheme is a statutory body, 
Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore (IDA). In the relatively laissez faire style 
of Singapore the IDA is something of an exception. To achieve the national goal of leadership in the 
region san e-commerce hub a range of policies and regulations have been promulgated and these 
constitute a large part of IDA’s efforts to create a conducive infocomm environment that is both 
pro-consumer and pro-business. To ensure sustainable growth and competition in a 
multi-operator, multi-network environment, IDA formulates and develops short- and medium-term 
infocomm-related policies, as well as standards, codes of practices and advisory guidelines — all of 
which are enforceable by IDA — pertaining to issues such as licensing, interconnection, resource 
and competition management. 
IDA also monitors local and global infocomm market trends, developments and regulatory 
measures, while remaining technology-neutral, to ensure that the current infocomm policies and 
regulatory frameworks are effective and relevant. 
Throughout its Policy and Regulations work, IDA claims to be committed to the principles of: 
• Promoting effective and sustainable competition; 
• Promoting facilities-based competition to the greatest extent possible; 
• Relying on market forces; 
• Adopting proportionate regulation; 
• Remaining technology-neutral; and 
• Providing a transparent and reasoned decision-making process. 
These principles are aimed at creating an infocomm environment that allows free and fair 
competition, so that consumers’ interests are protected and they benefit from greater choices and 
the proliferation of innovative infocomm products and services. 
In recognition of the dynamic nature of the infocomm industry, IDA also progressively fine-tunes 
and reviews its policies and regulations. We value the opinions, concerns and expertise of 
stakeholders and will continue to engage and consult the industry and consumers when 
formulating new policies or reviewing existing ones. 
The IDA and the National Trust Council (NTC) conducted a public consultation on the code. Based 
on comments from the industry and members of the public, the Model Code has now been in 
operation for a number of years and has been taken up by the private sector. 
The Model Code is a generic code that is available for adoption by the entire private sector. It 
applies to any private sector organisation that collects and installs personal data in electronic form, 
online or offline, using the Internet or any other electronic media. In the e-commerce area, the NTC 
has aligned its trust mark programme with the principles of the Model Code. 
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5.5.5 United Kingdom   
5.5.5.1 Key UK legislation 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 was introduced to update and transform institutional arrangements 
and legal provisions in the UK. 
The Consumer Rights Act aims to rectify the complexities of UK consumer law by consolidating 
eight pieces of separate legislation in this area into a single piece of legislation. The Act is split into 
three parts. Part 1 deals with consumer contracts for goods, digital content and services; Part 2 
covers unfair terms; and Part 3 contains miscellaneous and general provisions. 
For the most part, the law set out in the Act is similar to existing UK laws, although there have been 
some changes, particularly regarding services and unfair terms. The Act introduces significant 
changes to private actions in competition law; including by expanding the jurisdiction of the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal, the introduction of opt-out collective actions and the establishment 
of voluntary redress schemes.  
The majority of the Act’s provisions came into force on 1 October 2015 and, in theory, should make 
compliance with consumer protection laws much easier in the long run. However, as the Act makes 
changes to contractual relationships and affects how products should be offered to consumers, 
some preparation will be required at the outset.  
5.5.5.2 Application of the law in the United Kingdom 
The Consumer Rights Act applies to contracts and notices between a ‘trader’ and a ‘consumer’. A 
‘consumer’ is defined as ‘an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that 
individual’s trade, business, craft or profession’. This definition is wider than definitions previously 
found in UK and EU law as it includes individuals who enter into contracts for a mixture of business 
and personal reasons.  
A ‘trader’ is defined as ‘a person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft 
or profession, whether acting personally or through another person acting in the trader’s name or 
on the trader’s behalf’. This definition includes government departments and public sector 
authorities. 
Territorially, the Act extends to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, some 
parts of the Act include separate rules for Scotland: for example, it makes reference to the Scots 
law remedy of ‘specific implement’, which is used to compel performance. 
Certain parts of the Act do not apply to financial services firms as they implement parts of the EU’s 
Consumer Rights Directive which do not apply to these firms. The Act does not make it clear which 
terms do not apply to financial services firms. However, some provisions relating to the contractual 
status of information and the delivery and risk in goods that originated in the EU Directive clearly 
do not apply to financial services firms. 
5.5.5.3 Supply of services 
The provisions regarding the supply of services consolidate various pieces of existing legislation and 
regulations. The new provisions apply to financial services firms. So to do the various 
industry-specific regulations that are imposed on businesses, mainly by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA); which apply as a result of industry-specific EU legislation. It is intended that if 
stricter duties or requirements are already in place, these will take precedence over applicable 
provisions outlined in the Act. 
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5.6 Comparative issues in policy and practice 
5.6.1 United States 
A long running consumer protection issue in the United States is the extent to which the law and 
the courts permit restrictions on consumers’ rights to take collective action. The debate concerns 
class actions and fee shifting by lawyers.712 Although filing a lawsuit is an option for combating 
fraud, when the economic harm is small, expensive litigation is not always a viable option. Class 
action lawsuits allow victimised consumers who are likely to receive relatively low amounts of 
damages to file a lawsuit collectively.  
There is a growing trend for standard form consumer contracts to include an arbitration clause in 
which the consumer waives their right to bring a class action. Bringing a class action lawsuit for 
common law fraud is difficult because US courts require a high degree of commonality among all 
the plaintiffs’ claims. If, however, there is such commonality, class actions can be a useful tool for 
consumers to assert their rights. 
Attorney fee shifting renders legal action a possibility for consumers who have suffered low 
amounts of damages. In the American legal system, each party customarily pays its own legal 
expenses. However, in many federal and state consumer protection causes of action, and in most 
class actions, a prevailing party may be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs to 
be paid by the defendant, in addition to any applicable damages. In most circumstances, 
unsuccessful plaintiffs are not responsible for the attorney fees and costs of the prevailing 
defendant. Such provisions have the effect of both increasing the incentives to bring such claims 
and minimising the cost of a successful lawsuit.  
5.6.1.1 Consumer associations and related groups  
Consumer associations and other non-profit entities play an important role in consumer protection. 
They play a critical role in investigating, publicising, lobbying, litigating, and researching consumer 
issues. US consumer groups or associations lack the statutory right to bring super-complaints or 
collective action suits as is the case in several European countries. They do, however, have the 
power to bring complaints to government agencies, and bring actions in their own name. Unlike in 
the EU and most European countries, an agency complaint in the US is normally informal and does 
not require formal agency action (or judicial review) if the government agency chooses not to 
pursue the matter.  
Nevertheless, many of the developments described above are the result of one or more private 
actors bringing to the governments, or the publics, attention conduct that harms consumers either 
physically or economically. Much like governmental action in this area, there are numerous 
different private groups focused on different aspects of the consumer protection field as outlined 
above. A small sample of such private sector entities follows.  
5.6.1.2 Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union  
The Consumer Federation of America has four main functions. Specifically, the Federation: 
(1) advocates for consumers to state and federal legislative and regulatory bodies; 
(2) researches consumer behaviour and concerns through polling and surveys; 
                                                          
712  See www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf. 
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(3) attempts to provide education about consumer concerns by disseminating press releases, 
reports, and other material to the media, government representatives, and consumers; and 
(4) Supports a variety of local consumer-related organisations.  
The Consumers Union was founded in 1936 and is a non-profit, nonpartisan organisation that 
educates consumers about a wide variety of products. The Union’s mission is to work for a fair, just 
and safe marketplace for all consumers. It the Consumers Union publishes the magazine, Consumer 
Reports, as well as two newsletters, Consumer Reports on Health and Consumer Reports Money 
Adviser. Consumer Reports provides product reviews of cars, computers, appliances, extended 
warranties, and even sporting equipment so that consumers may have reliable third-party 
information before making a purchase. The Consumers Union also supports initiatives for health 
care access, food safety and consumer choice in media.  
5.6.1.3 Summary of US administration and enforcement  
Focusing on the formal rights and remedies of consumers provides only a partial picture of the 
state of consumer protection in the United States. Because of the emphasis on the formal nature of 
legal consumer rights, much depends on access to the legal system.  
There is no constitutional or statutory right to legal representation in consumer protection matters, 
or civil litigation in general. Consumers without practical access to the courts may still benefit if one 
of the many government agencies discussed above take action on their behalf. Consumer 
associations also help fill the gap, as do legal aid bureaus and other forms of legal clinics. The 
availability of private rights of action which provide for different types of damages, attorney’s fees, 
and costs to prevailing plaintiffs further help, but are still an incomplete solution.  
Only certain causes of actions are covered, and only those cases with the best chances of prevailing 
and the best chance of recovering substantial damages will be brought, because of the needs of the 
private bar to obtain its fees at the end of the litigation. The US has moved from policy setting 
which could be described as caveat emptor, but still relies heavily on consumer self-protection 
5.6.2 Canada 
Provincial consumer protection legislation addresses digital purchasing and digital products in a 
variety of ways. Some provinces have incorporated e-commerce laws and regulations into existing 
legislation on distance sales, other provinces have created separate sections within legislation to 
deal specifically with e-commerce. 
In 2001 the Consumer Measures Committee (CMC) working group on e-commerce created 
the Internet Sales Contract Harmonization Template (ISCHT) in an effort to encourage consistent 
legislation across the country. All or part of the template has been incorporated in the legislation 
of most provinces. The template includes guidelines for information disclosure requirements, 
contract formation, cancelation and recovery. 
Under the Canada Consumer Product Safety Act Health Canada federal inspectors have the 
authority to conduct investigations into product safety. Where products do not comply with the 
Act, Health Canada may issue a recall and order the manufacturer, advertiser, importer or seller of 
the product to take corrective measures. If a business fails to comply with an order Health Canada 
may issue an Administrative Monetary Penalty and seek to have criminal charges laid against the 
business. 
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5.6.2.1 Enforcement mechanisms 
Enforcement of more general consumer complaints is often undertaken by provincial consumer 
protection branches. For example, provincial inspectors in British Columbia have the authority to 
investigate complaints as well as to issue compliance orders, freeze bank accounts and initiate civil 
actions where the circumstances warrant. The Director may also initiate civil actions, issue 
monetary administrative penalties, and has prosecutorial powers. 
Some specific laws affecting consumer interests, such as building codes, are administered and 
enforced by municipalities through power delegated to them by the provinces. In most cases 
enforcement of bylaws relating to consumer interests takes place through municipal business 
licensing.  
5.6.2.2 Chargebacks 
Section 11 of the ISCHT outlines procedures relating to credit card chargebacks. The section 
requires a credit card issuer to cancel or reverse the credit card charge and any associated interest 
or other charges where a consumer has cancelled a contract under and the supplier has not 
refunded all of the consideration within 15 days. This section has been adopted in part or full by six 
provinces. 
5.6.2.3 Innovative measures 
• Canada’s Anti-Spam Legislation (CASL) came into force in 2014. This legislation requires 
business to have consent, include prescribed information, and have an unsubscribe 
mechanism when sending commercial electronic messages. 
• Under the 2010 Canada Consumer Product Safety Act the federal government created 
expanded powers of inspection, information monitoring and enforcement of consumer 
product safety standards. 
• The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission recently developed 
a Wireless Code. The Wireless Code is a mandatory code of conduct for providers of retail 
mobile wireless voice and data services. 
• The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission has also developed 
a Television Service Provider Code (announced today) requiring television providers to provide 
consumers with accessible information on billing and services. The code will come into force in 
September of 2017 and be enforced through licensing. 
5.6.3 New Zealand 
5.6.3.1 Changes to rights and obligations  
• Auctions — new rules apply to certain types of auctions (excluding online auctions like Trade 
Me) Buying and selling online — traders who sell online must make it clear they are traders, 
meaning purchases have rights under the Consumer Guarantees Act Contracting out of the 
Fair Trading Act — businesses cannot contract out of their obligations to consumers 
• Door-to-door and telemarketing sales — consumers have extra protection when approached 
by uninvited sales people at their home or workplace, or by telephone 
• Extended warranties — traders must now disclose consumer’s rights under the Consumer 
Guarantees Act and a comparison of those rights with the benefits of the extended warranty 
being offered 
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• Substantiation — it is an offence for traders to make a claim they can’t back up 
• Unsolicited goods and services — it is illegal for a business to demand payment for goods or 
services that haven’t been requested by the recipient Investigation and enforcement 
• Increased fines — penalties for misleading and deceptive conduct, false representations, 
unfair practices and issues around product safety have increased from $60,000 to $200,000 for 
individuals and from $200,000 to $600,000 for businesses  
• Management banning orders — in certain circumstances the Commerce Commission can ban 
an individual from being a director or involved in the management of a company  
• Product Safety Monitoring and Enforcement Powers — new powers when conducting 
inspections Laws prohibiting unfair contract terms 
• Compulsory interview powers — The Commerce Commission now has the ability to require 
oral evidence from people during some Fair Trading Act investigations. Previously the 
Commission could only request interviews and individuals could refuse to be interviewed or to 
answer certain questions. The interviewee must answer questions put by the Commerce 
Commission, but any responses cannot be used against the interviewee in criminal 
proceedings, other than in some limited, specified circumstances. The compulsory interview 
power can be used for investigations that started before the provision came into effect  
• Enforceable undertakings — are a form of out-of-court negotiated settlement. Where the 
Commerce Commission believes there has been a breach of the Act the Commission may 
accept enforceable undertakings. They may include agreements by a person or business to 
stop doing something, make compensation payments, publish corrective advertising or pay 
costs to the Commission. If the party does not keep to their agreement the Commission may 
apply to the Court to enforce the agreement. 
Changes to the Fair Trading Act in 2013 include significantly increased penalties, the introduction 
of infringement offences and the ability for courts to impose banning orders. The new penalties 
came into effect in 2015.  
Important changes include:  
• Fines for misleading and deceptive conduct have been increased by at least 300%. Individuals 
now face fines of up to $200,000 per offence. Companies face fines of up to $600,000 per 
offence 
• Participants in pyramid schemes now face fines of up to $60,000. In addition, a Court can also 
strip offenders of the equivalent revenue or ‘commercial gain’ earned from the offending. 
Breaches of Part 2 of the Act (consumer information) or Part 4A (consumer transactions and 
auctions) can result in a fine for an individual of $10,000 and $30,000 for a body corporate  
• The Commerce Commission can issue infringement notices with fines of up to $2000 for 
offences for: failing to comply with a suspension of supply notice issued under section 33D; 
being involved in the contravention of section 28 (consumer information standards); failing to 
comply with section 28B(1) or (2) (disclosure of trader status on Internet); being involved in 
the contravention of: 
– s 36C (layby disclosure requirements); 
– s 36D (further layby disclosure requirements);  
– s 36L (uninvited direct sale disclosure requirements); and  
– s 36T (extended warranty disclosure requirements.  
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5.6.3.2 Other remedies  
There are other remedies available under the Fair Trading Amendment Act 2013 that are the same 
as before the Act’s amendment include corrective advertising orders. A court may require a trader 
to publish corrective advertising to disclose information to the public generally, or to an affected 
section of the public, and to publish corrective statements. 
A Court can now also impose a management banning order that prohibits an individual from being 
involved in the management of a company. A management banning order can be taken against an 
individual who:  
• has, on at least two separate occasions within a 10 year period, committed a criminal offence 
under the Act, or  
• is, or was at the time of committing the offence, a director of, or concerned in the 
management of, an incorporated or unincorporated body that has, on at least two separate 
occasions within a 10-year period, committed a criminal offence under the Act, or  
• has been prohibited by an overseas jurisdiction, in connection with the contravention of any 
law relating to unfair trading, from carrying on certain activities.  
A person who breaches a management banning order made against him or her commits an offence 
that is punishable by fine of up to $60,000.  
5.6.4 Singapore 
5.6.4.1 Trust Marks to build confidence in the online market 
As noted in the commentary on Singapore under the heading of Institutional Structures, the 
government has been active in establishing an environment conducive to growth of e-commerce. A 
further step in that direction was taken through the government sponsored development of 
e-commerce trust marks which form a significant part of consumer policy in Singapore. Part of a 
project known as ‘e-Power’, the Trust Marks are intended to encourage the private sector to 
position Singapore as an e-commerce hub. Together with relevant government agencies, 
Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore (IDA) identified a four-pronged 
approach to build trust and confidence in e-commerce: 
• Establishing a secure environment; 
• Establishing confidence in e-business; 
• Building user confidence; 
• Raising user awareness. 
To ensure the proposed approach addresses the concerns of the industry, IDA issued a consultation 
document on 26 September 2000 to obtain feedback from the industry and the public. Much of the 
feedback indicated that trust marks would instil greater user confidence in e-commerce 
transactions. It was also recognised that a coordinated and multi-faceted approach must be taken 
to achieve widespread usage of trust marks.  
The National Trust Council (NTC) was formed with the vision to build public confidence in 
e-transactions. The NTC, formed on 28 February 2001, is an industry-led committee with 
government support to ensure that relevant concerns from industry are addressed.  
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The Council implemented the first nationwide Trustmark Programme, TrustSG, whereby 
appropriate organisations, such as trade associations, chambers of commerce and businesses will 
be accredited as Authorised Code Owners (ACO). Upon accreditation, the ACO will be granted a 
license to use the TrustSzseal, and they can thereafter award the TrustSg seal to merchants who 
adhere to their stringent codes of practice. The TrustSg seal awarded by the ACOs identifies online 
merchants as e-commerce enterprises which adhere to good e-business practices. Together with 
the TrustSg seal, the accredited merchants will also receive the consumer or industry-specific trust 
mark from the ACOs. 
5.6.4.2 Content Regulation 
Singapore has a three-pronged approach to Internet content regulation. Firstly, a light-touch class 
license scheme applies, which provides minimum standards to safeguard values and promote 
healthy growth. Secondly, it encourages industry to self-regulate. Thirdly, an active public 
education programme has been introduced to promote parental supervision over children’s access 
to the Internet. The class license scheme, administered by the Media Development Authority of 
Singapore, which oversees an automatic licensing scheme that requires Internet Service Providers 
and content providers to comply with an Internet Code of Practice. 
5.6.4.3 Lemon Law 
Consumer protection in Singapore is distinctive because of its overt approach to consumer 
warranties. Under the law, a consumer is entitled to reject goods and obtain a refund if they are 
not of satisfactory quality of a purchased good at the time of delivery. The legislation, which took 
effect in September 2012, provides more options for both consumers and retailers by providing the 
additional remedies of repair, replacement, and reduction in price for the purchase of goods. The 
law also applies to hire purchase agreements. Goods include second-hand goods, discounted goods 
and perishable goods. It does not apply to contracts of hire (such as rental goods), the supply of 
services or the sale of real property (i.e. land, buildings and fixtures).  
The key elements of the Lemon Law 
Rules for repair or replacement of goods 
The retailer may offer to repair or replace a defective good, and must do so within a reasonable 
period and with minimal inconvenience to the consumer. In some cases, repair and replacement 
are not possible or reasonable. The consumer may instead keep the defective good and ask for a 
reduction in price (estimated to be the difference between the value of the product in its 
contracted condition and the value of the product in the faulty condition). Alternatively, a 
consumer may request to return the product for a refund. The refund amount may be reduced to 
take into account the use that the consumer has had of the goods. If the item has never worked, a 
full refund should be made. 
Rules on burden of proof 
The legislation provides clearer rules on the burden of proof. If a defect is found within six months 
of delivery, it is assumed that the defect existed at the time of delivery, unless the retailer can 
prove otherwise or if such a presumption is incompatible with the nature of the goods (e.g. 
perishable goods would not be expected to last longer than their normal shelf life). If the defect is 
found after six months of delivery, it is for the consumer to prove that the defect existed at the 
time of delivery.  
Consumers can use the remedies of repair and replacement that the law provides. However, a 
consumer must give the retailer a reasonable time to comply with the requested remedy (e.g. 
replacement or repair) before seeking an alternative remedy (such as refund or reduction of price). 
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The legislation does not replace the existing protection available, such as guarantees/warranties, 
retailers’ own return policies, and existing remedies under other legislation (such as the Sale of 
Goods Act) or the common law.  
Consumers are not entitled to a remedy if they damaged the item, misused it and caused the fault, 
or tried to repair it themselves or had someone else try to repair it, which damaged the item. The 
remedies are also not available if the consumer knew about the fault before they bought the 
goods, or if they simply changed their mind and no longer want the item. 
5.6.5 United Kingdom 
5.6.5.1 Changes to remedies and unfair terms regulation  
Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015,713 consumers have statutory remedies of ‘repeat 
performance’ and price reduction if a service does not conform to the contract. The remedy 
available is dependent on the level of non-compliance, for example: 
• if a trader breaches its duty to provide services with ‘reasonable skill and care’, or does not 
comply with information that they have provided to the consumer about the service, the 
consumer is entitled to repeat performance or a price reduction for the services; 
• if the service is not performed within a reasonable time, or the trader does not comply with 
the information that it has provided to the consumer which does not relate to the service, 
then the consumer is entitled to a price reduction for the services. 
Although the consumer has a statutory right to these particular remedies in the above 
circumstances, this does not exclude them from seeking other remedies such as damages or 
specific performance provided that they do not recover twice for the same loss. The inclusion of 
specific statutory remedies where none previously existed improves the consumer’s position and 
provides clarity about their rights. 
5.6.5.2 Changes to the contractual status of voluntary statements 
Spoken or written voluntary statements, made by the trader, about the trader or the trader’s 
service can now be deemed to be binding contractual terms. This can be the case where the 
statement is taken into account by the consumer when: 
• deciding to enter into the contract; 
• making any decision about the service after entering into the contract. 
                                                          
713  A concise summary of the legislation can be found at www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes/division/2. The 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 sets out a framework that consolidates in one place key consumer rights covering 
contracts for goods, services, digital content and the law relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts. In addition, 
the Act introduces easier routes for consumers and small and medium sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) to challenge 
anti-competitive behaviour through the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’). The Act clarifies the maximum 
penalties that the regulator of premium rate services can impose on non-compliant and rogue operators. It also 
consolidates enforcers’ powers as listed in Schedule 5 to investigate potential breaches of consumer law and 
clarifies that certain enforcers (Trading Standards) can operate across local authority boundaries. It will also give 
the civil courts and public enforcers greater flexibility to take the most appropriate action for consumers when 
dealing with breaches or potential breaches of consumer law. Additionally, it changes the way in which judges are 
able to sit as chairs in the CAT; and imposes a duty on letting agents to publish their fees and other information. 
Further, the Act expands the list of higher education providers which are required to join the higher education 
complaints handling scheme, and includes certain requirements relating to resale of tickets for recreational, 
sporting and cultural events. 
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Previously, if a consumer was presented with misleading information, this information would not 
be deemed part of the contract. This meant that the only remedy available to the consumer would 
be to raise an action of misrepresentation. As any misleading statements made by the trader can 
now become contractual terms, a consumer will now be entitled to raise a breach of contract 
claim. This is significant because claims for breach of contract are generally easier to prove, and 
because damages will be awarded based on what the consumer’s position would have been had 
the contract been performed. 
5.6.5.3 Unfair terms 
The test for ‘unfair terms’ in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 is the same as under the 1977 Unfair 
Contract Terms Act. It provides that a term is ‘unfair’ if ‘contrary to the requirements of good faith, 
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer. 
The most significant change in the Act relates to ‘relevant terms’; which are terms specifying the 
main subject matter of the contract or setting the price. These terms are not subject to the 
‘fairness’ test provided that they are both: 
• transparent: in plain and intelligible language and, if in writing, legible; 
• prominent: brought to the consumer’s attention in such a way that the average customer — 
who is well informed, observant and circumspect — would be aware of the term. 
5.6.5.4 Individually negotiated terms 
The Act provides that a term can be deemed to be unfair even if it has been individually negotiated 
with the consumer. This goes further than both the pre-existing law and the EU’s Consumer Rights 
Directive. However, it is unlikely to have a major impact given that very few consumer contracts are 
actually individually negotiated, as consumers rarely have the bargaining power to negotiate their 
contract terms individually with traders. 
5.6.5.5 Additions to the ‘grey list’ 
The ‘grey list’ is an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms in consumer contracts that may be 
regarded as being unfair. The list gives an indication of the types of terms which are likely to be 
considered unfair without any justification being provided. However, a term can be fair even if it is 
included on the grey list, and can be unfair even if it is not. 
The Consumer Rights Act adds an additional three terms to the grey list. These are terms which 
have the object or effect of: 
• allowing the trader to decide the characteristics of the subject matter after the consumer is 
bound; 
• allowing disproportionate charges or requiring the consumer to pay for services which have 
not been supplied when the consumer ends the contract; 
• allowing the trader discretion over the price after the consumer is bound. 
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5.6.5.6 Inclusion of ‘notices’  
An innovate extension to the law in relation to fairness concerns the contents of notices given to 
consumers by traders. Consumer notices were not previously expressly covered in legislation but 
they are specifically covered in the Act, which brings them within the fairness regime. The Act 
treats consumer notices in much the same way as contract terms. Businesses will therefore have to 
be conscious of the content which is included in notices and ensure that this complies with the 
fairness test. 
A consumer notice is broadly defined as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between the 
trader and the consumer or restricts the trader’s liability. The definition includes announcements 
and other communications even where these are made orally. 
5.6.5.7 New duty to consider fairness 
A court is now under an obligation to consider contractual terms for fairness, even if neither party 
to the proceedings raises fairness as an issue. This is already the position of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). This change will lead to contract terms coming under increasing 
scrutiny by the courts and terms may be held to be unfair even when the consumer has not 
complained of unfairness. 
5.6.5.8 Digital content 
The Consumer Rights Act is the first piece of legislation to regulate the supply of digital content as 
such. Generally, the supply of digital content is treated in much the same way as the supply of 
goods in that it must be of satisfactory quality, fit for purpose, and conform to the description 
provided by the trader. 
The supply of digital content will be regulated when: 
• it is supplied for a price; or 
• it is supplied free with goods and services which the consumer has paid for, and would not be 
generally available to consumers otherwise. 
• The provisions do not apply merely because the trader supplies a service by which digital 
content reaches the consumer. 
5.7 Revised United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
In November 2015, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution adopting a revised set of United 
Nations Guidelines on Consumer Protection (UNGCP).714 The resolution which recognises the rapid 
growth of e-commerce, privacy and digital consumption as essential measures for consumer policy 
comes 30 years after their initial implementation and 16 years after the addition of a chapter on 
sustainable consumption. 
 It is the first comprehensive revision of the UNGCP since 1985 and specifically recognises access to 
basic goods and services, and the protection of vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers as 
legitimate needs for consumers. 
                                                          
714  2015 version not yet published this reference to previous version 
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/consumption_en.pdf. 
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The revision follows a three-year process in which UN Member Countries and civil society 
organisations have been working on the strengthening and updating of the UNCPG. 
The revision of the UN Guidelines was led by the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). In announcing the passage of the revised guidelines, Dr Mukhisa Kituyi, Director General 
of UNCTAD said: 
Today’s adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the revised Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection is a milestone in the protection and promotion of consumer rights 
worldwide. I congratulate Governments and the civil society organisations that have 
joined these efforts. More globalised consumers require strengthened international 
cooperation, and UNCTAD, with this renewed mandate, stands ready to support 
developing countries and their consumers in seeking a more sustainable and inclusive 
world. 
5.8 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 
Following the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the post — 2015 development agenda, 
the General Assembly of the United Nations agreed on a plan of action to achieve global 
sustainable development, which has relevance to moving towards sustainable consumption of 
consumer goods. 
The UN recently announced the Sustainable Development Goals and targets which sets out 17 
sustainable development goals and 169 targets. They are designed to stimulate action over the 
next fifteen years in areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet.715 
The Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development can be found 
at www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf.  
5.9 Digital purchasing and digital products 
The increased purchasing of goods and services online is presenting new enforcement and 
administrative challenges. A significant problem arises regarding cross-border enforcement. In this 
context, the paper reviews the newly introduced EU Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution. This 
section: 
(a) reviews the range of measures being undertaken by the European Commission and other 
nominated jurisdictions regarding e-commerce and digital purchasing; 
(b) reviews mechanisms for consumer disclosure and redress; 
(c) considers specifically implementation of the 2015 EU Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution; 
(d) surveys educational work undertaken by ECC-Net. 
Perhaps the greatest distinction between the institutional structures relating to the administration 
and enforcement of consumer laws between United States and Canada on one hand and European 
member states on the other is the approach to alternative dispute resolution. 
  
                                                          
715  See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 
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5.9.1 Obstacles to the Digital Single Market (2015) 
In September 2015, the European Commission published the results of extensive consumer surveys 
to identify the main cross-border obstacles to the completion of the Digital single market and map 
means of overcoming them.716 The report entitled ‘Identifying the main cross border obstacles of 
the Digital Single Market and where they matter most’.717 
The rationale for the studies was that in view of the rapid grow of E-commerce in the EU and the 
Commission’s plans to complete a connected Digital Single Market (DSM) for Europe, it was 
imperative to identify the existing barriers to the proper functioning of the DSM and to 
cross-border e-commerce in particular. 
Both surveys covered three broad market categories: tangible goods and offline services ordered 
online (e.g. clothing, travel services), online services (e.g. social networks, communications 
services) and digital content (e.g. e-books, films and TV series). The Core survey was conducted 
online in all EU28 Members States, including Norway and Iceland, using consumer panels in all 
30 countries. The Clickstream survey was conducted in Belgium and Poland with online 
respondents who reported their intention to make an online purchase during a 2-3-week period. 
Respondents allowed their online activity to be tracked by a special add-on designed to record 
online browsing activity (websites, time spent etc.). The raw clickstream data collected was 
supplemented by consumer insights obtained via weekly diary surveys which collected additional 
data on respondents’ actual online purchases.  
Combining insights from clickstream data with online survey data provided a richer preliminary 
overview of the drivers and impediments to domestic and cross-border e-commerce. A dedicated 
chapter ‘Consumers in the Digital Single Market’ of the surveys’ results is featured at the 2015 
Consumer Conditions Scoreboard. 
5.9.2 Key findings of the surveys 
• The proportion of online consumers who purchased tangible goods and offline services 
domestically ranged from 61-75% across 12 types of markets (54-73% accessed 8 different 
types of digital content), with cross border purchases within the EU accounting for 14-22% 
(12-17% for access to digital content) of online consumers. A significant proportion of 
respondents who accessed digital content (22-35%) did not know the origin of their online 
seller/provider 
• At EU28 level, 95% of all online survey respondents purchased tangible goods and offline 
services at least once in the last 12 months. The most commonly purchased goods were 
clothing, shoes and accessories (76%).  
• Online shoppers make cross-border purchases without always realising it — 40% of those 
making their latest online purchase from another EU country assumed the purchase to be 
from a domestic seller. 
• Cross border online activity is more popular in some smaller EU countries with language and 
cultural links to larger markets. Young age and higher international exposure (knowledge of 
foreign languages and travelling abroad) are positively correlated with making online 
cross-border purchases. 
                                                          
716  Recent study on obstacles to the Digital Single Market (2015): http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_ 
evidence/market_studies/obstacles_dsm/index_en.htmCivic Consulting study on cross-border ADR (2011): 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/imco/dv/adr_study_/adr_study_en.pdf. 
717  See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/obstACLes_dsm/index_en.htm. 
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5.9.3 Types of purchases and online spending718 
• The total market value of the B2C segment of the DSM Market is estimated at ~ €231 billion. 
Tangible goods and offline services are estimated to represent 92% of this total value, with 
digital content and paid online services accounting for only 6% and 2% respectively. The 
intra-EU cross-border component represents around 14% of the total value (and cross-border 
purchases from outside the EU around 6%).  
• The average online consumer who purchased tangible goods and offline services in the last 
year reported spending €760. Much lower figures for online services (€94/year) and digital 
content (€107/year) were reported amongst those who made such purchases (different base 
sizes). The difference between domestic and cross-border spending was less pronounced for 
digital content products than with tangible goods/offline services. 
• EU13 consumers spend relatively more (than EU15) on online purchases from other EU 
countries. 
• Online consumers spent on average €100 on their latest online purchase which tended to be a 
tangible good/offline service (93%). The most commonly purchased product was clothing, 
shoes and accessories (21%), followed by electronics and computer hardware (13%).  
5.9.4 Consumer attitudes and behaviour regarding online purchases 
• The average time online shoppers spent in total on their most recent online purchase was 3.1 
hours. 
• Visiting online market places, e.g. Amazon, eBay (42%), visiting seller or service provider 
websites (41%) and searching via a general search engine (38%) were the three most preferred 
means of researching an online purchase.  
• The choice for a specific seller is mostly determined by price (45%) and previous experience 
(44%). 84% of online shoppers used a website for their latest online purchase, with 13% 
purchasing via an app and 3% via an Appstore. 
• Respondents from EU13 countries (47% vs 12% for EU15) are much more likely to pay cash on 
delivery. The most commonly used devices for making online purchases were a laptop (80%), 
followed by a desktop PC (73%) and a smartphone (59%). 
• Concerning knowledge of consumer rights when buying online, only 9% of EU28 online 
consumers identified correctly the latest stage when they have the right to withdraw from a 
purchase of a digital content and get their money back. 
5.9.5 Perceived and actual barriers with online (cross-border) purchases 
• Data protection and payment security (30% of online consumers were concerned that 
personal data may be misused and 25% that payment card details may be stolen) and 
consumer rights (fear of receiving wrong or damaged products — 26%, difficulty in replacing 
or repairing a faulty product — 22% and difficulty in returning a product they did not like and 
get reimbursement — 22%) are key concerns in domestic e-commerce. 
                                                          
718  Recent study on obstacles to the Digital Single Market (2015): http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_ 
evidence/market_studies/obstacles_dsm/index_en.htm. Civic Consulting study on cross-border ADR (2011): 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/imco/dv/adr_study_/adr_study_en.pdf. 
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• Concerns about cross-border e-commerce are linked primarily to delivery (delivery costs — 
27%, high return shipping costs — 24% and long delivery times — 23%), followed by redress 
(the difficulty of solving problems if something goes wrong — 23%) and consumer rights 
(getting a faulty product replaced or repaired — 20%, returning a product consumers did not 
like and getting reimbursed — 20%) 
• 31% of all EU28 online shoppers experienced at least one problem when making or trying to 
make an online purchase in the past year; problems were more prevalent in the EU13. 
Cross-border purchases, both within the EU and from outside the EU, accounted for a 
disproportionately high amount of problems. 
• Consumers continue to face problems with cross-border online transactions linked to their 
country of residence (e.g. refusal to sell, redirection to the foreign seller’s website in the 
country of the consumer, being charged more by foreign seller, not being able to access the 
service etc.). 
• When crossing an EU border, consumers are frequently prevented from accessing streaming 
content which they accessed for free or via a payment in their home country. Out of those 
respondents who streamed films and TV series or live events (e.g. sports matches) in the last 
12 months and tried to access these streaming services of their own country while being 
abroad, 43% and 51% respectively reported not being able to access the content when abroad. 
• 16% of respondents did not take any action to resolve their most recently experienced 
problem. Approximately two thirds of respondents who took action were satisfied with the 
way their complaint was handled. The highest satisfaction was with out-of-court dispute 
resolution entities (68%), whilst the lowest with court (54%). 
5.10 Other interesting developments  
The terms of reference for this project called for identification and a description of ‘other 
interesting developments’. This section contains a number of recent consumer protection 
innovations and proposals.719 
The first provides a review of the first 10 years of operation of the EEC-Net.  
• Included in this section is a summary of the recent ECC-Net Europe wide study on Chargeback 
and maps the growing use of chargeback as a means for resolution of consumer.  
• The section also includes a brief history of the development of chargeback and limitations in 
this remedy in circumstances where traders refused to make a refund where it is warranted. 
• Also discussed is a proposal for the development of a Pan-European Trust Mark. 
• The paper includes a review the project on Best Practices of Consumer Redress being 
undertaken by Dr Ying Yu from the University of Oxford for UNCTAD. 
• Recent information on the launch of the European Union Online Disputes Resolution platform 
is provided. 
• An outline of the innovative European e-Justice Portal. 
                                                          
719  This recent study on legal and commercial guarantees may also be of 
relevance:http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/guarantees/index_en.htm. 
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• Consumer Conditions Scoreboard which tracks the situation and behaviour of consumers 
across member states of the EU and over time. Such a tool enables policymakers to plan 
interventions where necessary or discontinue interventions which are no longer necessary. 
• To understand the progress and achievements of consumer and market integration polices, 
the EU commissions from time to time impact studies. This report presents the results of a 
study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection (IMCO) and carried out by Civic Consulting between July and September 
2014. The study concerns achievements in the area of the single market and consumer 
protection. 
5.11 The European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net) 
ECC-Net was established in 2005 to respond to the multiple challenges to consumer welfare caused 
by burgeoning cross border commerce. It was created by the European Commission together with 
national governments to provide an accessible network of European Consumer Centres (ECCs) for 
consumers across the Commission Member Countries. According to an ECC-Net report published 
on the 10th anniversary of the network, between 2005 and 2014, 650,000 consumers have used 
the services of the network. In recent years the activities of ECC-Net have extended beyond the 
boundaries of the EU and now include Norway and Iceland. 720 
A key aim for the Network (which has no formal consumer law enforcement role) is to undertake 
comparative research, engage in information and education projects and help consumers 
understand and use their consumer rights. 
5.11.1 Operational information 
The ECC-Net is a network of 30 offices in the EU Member States, Norway and Iceland, providing 
free-of- charge help and advice to consumers on their cross-border purchases, whether online or 
on the spot within these 30 countries. 
The ECC-Net report states that is in direct contact with some 100,000 consumers every year and 
handles about 40,000 consumer complaints. Well over 3 million more access information on 
member websites, and many others through their apps, from ECC staff on stands at events, or from 
media reports highlighting warnings or cases published by the Centres. 
The ECC-Net is staffed by legal experts who provide personalised advice and assistance. They help 
consumers make complaints against traders who sell faulty goods and services, or otherwise fail to 
live up to the standards required by EU legislation, e.g. on travellers’ rights. 
The ECC-Net advises on handling disputes between a consumer and a trader located in two 
different countries with the aim of achieving amicable outcomes. More than two third of the cases 
are solved in this way. 
ECC-Net staff do not have legal powers to settle disputes or offer court representation, but can 
advise on how to go down these routes if it proves necessary. The ECC-Net Centres strive to deliver 
services to a common high standard, based on uniform guidance on customer service, good 
practice, data protection, quality, branding, case-handling and more. 
                                                          
720 CPEC evaluation of the ECC-Net (2011): http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/final_report_cpec_en.pdf. CPEC 
evaluation of the CPC Regulation (2012): http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/docs/cpc_regulation_ 
inception_report_revised290212_en.pdf. 
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The ECC-Net Centres work closely with each other and with enforcement bodies to resolve 
complaints, and to uphold the uniform consumer rights that EU residents enjoy wherever they are 
in the EU. 
The ECC-Net Centres pool their expertise to research consumer rights topics and consumers’ 
day-to-day experiences with EU legislation in action, and in this way to identify gaps and emerging 
issues. 
5.11.2 Role and activities 
European consumer policy and measures to implement it are an amalgam of Member State 
measures plus EU Directives which are transposed into local law and enforced and implemented by 
member state institutions. This makes ECC-Net an unusual body as an EU body operating in 
Member Sates alongside existing government and non-government agencies. In recent years, 
consumer policy has received high priority on the Commission’s agenda and this is true of the 
current Juncker Commission’s priority list. A key role adopted by ECC-Net is to assist in achieving a 
strong and coherent consumer policy to reap the full benefits of the Digital Single Market — for 
both consumers and businesses. 
With rapid growth in online shopping, the ECC-Nets’ role in resolving cross-border disputes has 
grown and is expected to continue at an accelerating rate. Their role in advising consumers, and 
ensuring that their rights are upheld are seen as important to building trust in the digital economy. 
5.11.3  Future challenges 
According to the 10th Anniversary Report of ECC-Net: 
The numerous achievements of the last 10 years and the proposals for improvements 
already in the pipeline and described in this report are not the end of the story. There 
are still obstacles to consumers making the most of the opportunities of the EU’s Single 
Market, and above all of the Digital Single Market. Consumers could save EUR 11.7 
billion per year if they could choose from the fullest possible range of goods and 
services from across the EU’s 28 countries when they shop online.721 
Nearly three-quarters of all European Internet users feel they are being asked for too much 
personal data online, and of all attempts to place a cross-border order, in just over half the seller 
does not serve the country of the consumer. 
In addition, copyright rules are preventing Europeans from watching content from their own 
country when they travel, or from watching content from other countries from their own homes. 
Yet, images, films, music and games are the most popular online activities and digital spending on 
entertainment and media has double digit growth rates. 
The Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy is about overcoming the obstacles. Future 
legislation will improve data protection and give individuals control over their personal data, and 
further harmonise online rights while tackling unfair practices and discrimination. Other obstacles 
will be addressed by improving technical standards and telecoms infrastructure, and citizens’ digital 
skills. 
                                                          
721  See www.google.co.id/search?q=ecc-net+10th+anniversary&oq=ecc-net+10th+anniversary&aqs=chrome. 
69i57.11395j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8.  
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Over the 10 years from 2005-2014, the ECCs had over 650,000 direct contacts with consumers, and 
the number has grown steadily. In 2014 alone, the figure was well over 90,000, twice as many as in 
2005. These are consumers who have made direct contact with an ECC. More often than not, all 
they need is an explanation about their rights. 
If a consumer has a specific complaint about a trader, the Centres’ legal experts provide specific 
advice. Where complaints remain unresolved, the ECC may get more directly involved, either by 
contacting the trader or asking the ECC in the country where the trader is established to do so. 
ECCs have helped out in this way nearly 300,000 times in the last 10 years. In 2014, they dealt with 
more than 37,000 complaints. 
5.11.4  Contacts and complaints 
In addition to direct contacts, ECCs often reach out to consumers at events with publications and 
information, and increasingly consumers find what they need on the ECCs’ detailed websites. In 
2014, they received more than three million visits altogether. This number is expected to grow 
considerably as a consequence of active online marketing efforts being undertaken by the ECCs. 
The move to online is also increasingly reflected in the way complaints are lodged, that is, via 
online forms (20% of all complaints in 2014). 
 
 
5.11.5  Research activity 
Recent consumer research commissioned by ECC-Net undertaken through cross-border mystery 
shopping entitled ‘State of the e-Union’ uncovered a series of obstacles to cross-border shopping, 
starting with it being surprisingly difficult to find a website willing to sell to someone in another 
country. Many websites were not providing basic information about how to contact them, on 
where they were based, but for the websites agreeing to deliver cross border, there were as few 
issues as for a purely domestic transaction. 
So while the ECCs concluded that consumers can shop on line with confidence, they stressed the 
need to check some basics before embarking on a purchase. 
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The ECC-Net has supported the development of online consumer fairness with tips for consumers 
on how to know which traders to trust and how to avoid scams. In the European Consumer Centres 
E-commerce report 2014, for example, consumers can test their knowledge of their rights using a 
checklist, and there is also a checklist where traders can make sure they are on the right side of the 
law. 
5.11.5.1 Case studies of ECC-Net activities 
Car rental to find a fair deal 
• ECCs have dealt with more than 8,000 cases involving car rental over the last 10 years. 
Moreover, the number of complaints has more than doubled between 2010 and 2014, while 
the total number of complaints received by ECCs only increased by half. 
• This has led ECCs to engage vigorously with the car rental industry, requiring it to become 
much more transparent about total rental costs and various exceptions to the damage 
coverage solutions proposed, and to be so right from the booking stage. 
• ECCs have issued leaflets and detailed advice warning consumers about most common unfair 
commercial practices, such as overcharging for damage or fuel, or high administrative costs for 
dealing with road traffic fines on behalf of consumers. 
• The evidence of malpractices accumulated by ECCs led the European Commission to propose 
to national enforcement authorities that they act jointly at EU level to require the car rental 
industry to comply with EU consumer legislation 
ECCs provide guidance 
• ECCs proactively issue guidance on passenger rights, regularly issuing information when 
airlines go out of business or passenger travel companies are on strike; they frequently take 
stands at travel fairs and have issued a number of special reports to support consumers and/or 
policy makers: 
• 2010: Classification of Hotel Establishments within the EU provided practical guidance on 
understanding Europe’s complex hotel classification systems. It described each ECC country’s 
system in detail. 
• ECC-Net Air Passenger Rights Report 2011 — in the aftermath of the ‘Volcanic Ash Crisis’: the 
problems passengers experienced in asserting their air passenger rights when many flights 
were re-routed, delayed or cancelled. These included a lack of information on their rights, a 
lack of assistance and not getting their money back when they arranged their own alternative 
transport. 
• 2012: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Air Passenger Rights Sector, highlighting how 
diverse the ADR landscape is for air travellers and underlining that it had not reached its full 
potential. 
• 2013: Ski Resorts in Europe 2012/2013: the price range and infrastructure of ski, cross- country 
and indoor resorts all over Europe. 
ADR research 
• There has been a steady increase over the last decade in the number of EU-wide rapid and 
inexpensive cross-border dispute resolution options designed for cases which often involve 
small amounts of money. Consumers hesitate to engage in court litigation in such cases. 
Surveys have shown that one third of the EU’s consumers have not gone to court after a 
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problem they encountered because the sums involved were too small or the procedure for 
going to court would be too expensive or too complicated. The same number felt similarly 
about alternative dispute resolution, or simply did not know this possibility exists.  
• Pointing consumers in the direction of the right alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
which offers a fast and cheap solution is therefore an important part of the work of ECCs, once 
their best efforts to broker an amicable solution have not been successful. 
5.11.6  Chargeback as a consumer protection tool 
Recent developments in the protection of consumers in E-commerce include the right of payment 
card holders to ‘chargeback’ for payment for unsatisfactory goods or services. This US development 
is being taken up in the EU. 
This section contains a summary of the recent ECC-Net Europe wide study on Chargeback and maps 
the growing use of chargeback as a means for resolution of consumer disputes in circumstances 
where traders refused to make a refund where it is warranted. 
The section also includes a brief history of the development of chargeback and limitations in this 
remedy. This paper summarises a 2014 ECC-Net research report entitled ‘‘Chargeback in the 
EU/EEA:  
A solution to get your money back when a trader does not respect your consumer rights’ 
The report considers that consumers in Europe have benefited greatly from recent improvements 
to national and European Union consumer legislation the reliability of e-commerce (and distance 
selling in general) has greatly improved in Europe in the last ten years. According to the last 
Consumer Scoreboard published by the European Commission1, the proportion of consumers 
engaging in e-commerce has grown significantly in recent years (from 20 % in 2004 to 45 % in 
2012). 
Despite the improvements in consumer protection, there remain a number of challenges to protect 
consumer rights when a trader refuses to provide a refund when warranted or has gone bankrupt, 
or when a card transaction was not authorised. 
The 2012 ECC-Net European Small Claims Procedure Report highlighted a lack of awareness of the 
procedure among judges. It pointed out that translation costs can undermine the principle of 
obtaining redress. Serving the judgement, and above all, getting it enforced, are other obstacles to 
this procedure working as well as it might. This work was taken into account by the Commission in 
its 2014 proposal on a revised Procedure. 
In many EU Member States, consumers having used a payment card may be entitled to be 
reimbursed by a chargeback procedure through the card issuing bank. The ECC-Net report was 
commissioned to inform European consumers about this procedure and how it is implemented in 
the various EU countries, Norway and Iceland. 
5.11.6.1 Definition of chargeback 
According to the ECC-Net originally chargeback was a system developed by payment card issuers to 
protect consumers in case of fraudulent authorisation of their card (e.g. following a theft or card 
cloning). However, chargeback may also apply to reverse authorised payments made by a 
consumer by card in duly justified cases of breaches of consumer rights or in case of the report 
bankruptcy of the recipient. 
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In a report from the year 2000 from the EU- Commission, chargeback is defined as the following: 
Chargeback is the technical term used by international card schemes to name the 
refunding process for a transaction carried out by card following the violation of a rule. 
This process takes place between 2 members of the card scheme, the issuer of the card 
and the acquirer (the merchant’s bank). The final customers of these 2 schemes 
members, the cardholder for the issuer and the merchant for the acquirer, do not have 
any direct relationship in the chargeback process. 
5.11.6.2 Objective and methodology of the report 
The objective of the report is to clarify the legal bases for chargeback procedures that can be used 
by consumers in the EU, Norway and Iceland (namely Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services in 
the internal market (PSD) and Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers (CCD), 
how they are implemented on the ground, the existence of out-of-court dispute resolution 
procedures and the additional possibilities that card issuers may give to their clients. The report has 
been completed by the European Consumer Centres Network. The ECC-Net main objective is to 
inform and assist European citizens in all their practical cross-border consumer issues. There is 
established a European Consumer Centre in the 28 EU countries. 
5.11.6.3 Legal rights to chargeback 
EC rules for payment services and credit722 form the main legal bases to request a charge back in 
the following cases: 
• the transaction is not authorised by the consumer/cardholder; 
• the trader does not respect the consumers’ rights; 
• in the case of bankruptcy. 
According to the ECCs participating in the project, these Directives have been transposed into the 
domestic legislation in all the EU member States, Norway and Iceland. 
5.11.6.4 Non-authorised use of cards 
In the EU, Norway and Iceland, when the consumer’s card has been charged without authorisation 
from the consumer, e.g. if the card has been stolen, the payment service provider (e.g. a credit 
institution) shall refund the amount to the cardholder (Article 60 of the PSD). 
However, Article 61 states that the cardholder/consumer shall bear the losses relating to any 
unauthorised payment transactions, up to a maximum of EUR 150, resulting from the use of a lost 
or stolen payment instrument, or if the cardholder has failed to keep the personalised security 
features safe, from the misappropriation of a payment instrument. In this respect, Article 56 of the 
PSD requires the cardholder to take all reasonable steps to keep personalised security features 
safe, incl. the PIN number. 
5.11.6.5 Cases relating to use of the PIN code 
If the PIN number has been used, the consumer may therefore be obliged to cover the losses 
him/herself in case of proven gross negligence or fraudulent behaviour (in the latter case, there 
could also be a criminal prosecution). 
                                                          
722  EU Payment Agreements Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal market (PSD) and Directive 
2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers (CCD). 
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The consumer has to notify the loss, theft or inappropriate use of the card to the card issuer as 
soon as he/she becomes aware. The payment service provider shall ensure that appropriate means 
are available at all times to enable the consumer to make a notification.723 
5.11.6.6 Pre-authorised payment transactions 
When it comes to pre-authorised payment transactions, sometimes the consumers complain about 
unexpected supplementary charges in the final payment, e.g. in relation to car rental. However, the 
consumers might have signed an agreement where the supplementary charges are included, for 
example that they have accepted to be charged for any damages to the car. According to PSD, 
Article 62, the cardholder may still be entitled to a refund of a payment transaction initiated by or 
through a payee and which has already been executed. The conditions are that the authorisation 
did not specify the exact amount, and this amount exceeded the amount the cardholder could 
reasonably have expected, taking into account his previous spending pattern, the conditions in his 
framework contract and relevant circumstances of the case. 
5.11.6.7 Goods or services not delivered or not in conformity with the contract 
If the consumer has purchased goods on the internet and does not receive the goods, he or she 
should first complain to the trader. If the trader does not deliver the goods or does not reimburse 
the payment made, the consumer can turn to the payment service provider. 
In terms of chargeback, EU-law only covers credit card chargeback. Purchases where debit cards 
are used are not covered by EU-law but can be covered by national law such as in Denmark and 
Portugal. Debit card holders may nevertheless under certain circumstances enjoy protection of the 
card companies operating rules.724 
The CCD leaves ample space for consideration to member states. The legal situation therefore 
varies among participating countries. Some countries allow consumers to exercise the same rights 
against the creditor (credit card issuer) as well as against the seller of goods or service provider. 
Certain conditions may have to be met in order for the consumer to be allowed to make a claim 
against credit card issuer. Such conditions may for instance include that the consumer makes an 
unsuccessful claim with the seller or service provider first. 
5.11.6.8 Bankruptcy 
When the trader goes bankrupt the trader will often not have the economic recourses to reimburse 
the consumer, and chargeback could be the only way for the consumer to obtain a refund.  
5.11.7  Other chargeback possibilities 
Many of the respondents have stated that banks do provide chargeback based on the card 
companies operating rules, however, many of them also state that the bank doesn’t inform 
consumers about this possibility and that consumers must insist to get the bank handling their 
requests. 
                                                          
723  The consumer could be liable for all losses where there has been a failure to fulfil one or more of his obligations 
under Article 56 with intent or gross negligence, cf. Article 61 number 2. 
724  Under Article 15 of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers (CCD) where the goods or services 
covered by a linked credit agreement are not supplied, or are supplied only partially, or are not in conformity with 
the contract for the supply thereof, the consumer has the right to pursue remedies against the creditor. Member 
States shall determine to what extent and under what conditions those remedies shall be exercisable. 
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5.11.7.1 Out-of-court dispute resolution procedures 
According to CCD (Article 24) and PSD (Article 83), the Member States shall ensure that 
out-of-court dispute resolution procedures/ Out-of-court redress procedures for the settlement of 
disputes are in place. If the consumer does not obtain a chargeback/refund, he should therefore be 
able to make use of out- of-court procedures. 
There are out-of-court dispute resolution entities which can handle chargeback in all of the 
countries which participated to the survey. Not all of the countries have a specific ADR body for 
these cases. Romania has authorised mediators who have the competence to deal with payment 
service problems. In most countries, however, there is a specialised ADR, a general ADR covering all 
types of consumer disputes or different ADRs depending on the dispute category. 
However, there might be certain conditions which must be fulfilled before the consumer can make 
use of the out-of-court dispute resolution procedures. In Romania mediation can only take place if 
both parties agree and conclude a contract. According to the Italian Law on Banking, it is 
mandatory for banks and financial intermediaries to participate in systems for the out-of-court 
resolution of disputes with customers. In Spain it is not mandatory to be a member of the ADR 
system. If the bank is not a member of the ADR system, the ADR is not able to handle the case. This 
is also the current situation in Norway, but very few companies do not participate in the ADR 
system, and participation will soon become mandatory. 
The Financial Services Ombudsman of Ireland has handled 26 chargeback complaints from 2011 to 
2013. Although these cases are confidential, they informed the ECC that the consumer complaint 
was upheld on 3 occasions, partially upheld on 1 occasion and not upheld in 22 instances. 
5.11.7.2 Cross-border disputes 
According to CCD (Article 24) Member States shall encourage the out-of-court entities to cooperate 
in order to also resolve cross- border disputes concerning credit agreements made between two 
parties residing in two different countries. According to PSD (Article 83), Member States shall also 
make sure that those concerned bodies cooperate actively in resolving cross-border disputes. 
5.12 Proposal for a Pan-European Trust Mark 
This study presents the results of research conducted by Civic Consulting between March and June 
2012. Its purpose is to examine the possibilities and opportunities of creating a pan-European 
Trustmark for e-commerce.  
5.12.1  Consumer trust in e-commerce  
Trust has been identified as an important factor in consumers’ purchasing decisions and lack of 
trust has been repeatedly highlighted as one of the key impediments to e-commerce.  
In a 2011 consumer market study consumers were concerned, among other things, about returning 
products, wrong or damaged products being delivered, problems with replacement or repair of a 
faulty product, products not being delivered at all, personal data being misused and payment card 
details being stolen. When considering shopping online in another EU country, only 12% of 
consumers stated that they did not have any concerns.  
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There are different possibilities for trust-building related to online shopping. Differences between 
smaller traders and those that have built their own widely known brands have to be noted. Big 
brands capitalise on their recognition and reputation and have less or no need to support their 
trustworthiness with additional cues such as Trustmarks.  
5.12.2  Trustmarks for e-commerce  
Trustmarks for e-commerce are intended to be displayed on a website as electronic labels, and the 
purpose is to signal adherence to a set of rules (a code of conduct) to increase consumers’ 
confidence in the online trader.  
One of the defining characteristics of a Trustmark is the involvement of a third party which 
provides an assurance to consumers regarding the online trader. Third-party certification is at the 
heart of a credible Trustmark. It entails a set of requirements and the assessment of an online 
trader’s compliance with these requirements.  
There is significant diversity among existing Trustmarks in the EU. Some points of distinction are: a 
formal accreditation of a Trustmark, the nature of organisations which administer Trustmarks, their 
sources of funding, involvement of stakeholders, geographical and substantive scope of coverage, 
monitoring traders’ compliance and sanctioning non-compliance.  
Research findings concerning the actual effects of Trustmarks are scarce and not consistent. 
Several studies have found that effects of Trustmarks are mostly identifiable with people who 
generally consider online shopping as risky. A previous study has indicated awareness among 
consumers and businesses as one of critical success factors, thus a particular challenge is the low 
consumer awareness of Trustmarks.  
There has been some progress in recent years with the consolidation and expansion of some of the 
existing Trustmarks, as can be inferred from the increasing numbers of certified traders using 
Trustmarks included in this study.  
5.12.3  Advantages and disadvantages of an EU Trustmark for e-commerce  
Potential advantages and disadvantages of an EU Trustmark are conditional upon its design.  
The main possible advantages identified through research for this report are: support for SMEs; 
enhanced cross-border coordination of Trustmarks and exchange of best practices; overcoming 
language barriers; increased legal certainty; increased credibility of accredited Trustmarks; broad 
recognition among consumers in different MS; increased trust in online shopping; enhanced 
cross-border trade.  
Possible disadvantages could be in the administrative burden for businesses; potential confusion 
among consumers; interference with existing Trustmarks; difficulties with ensuring consistency 
across the EU; the cost of administering the Trustmark; gaps in coverage in case of an accreditation 
scheme for existing Trustmarks; and discrediting compliant traders and other Trustmarks in case of 
lacking enforcement.  
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5.12.4 26.4 Legal framework for e-commerce Trustmarks725 
There is no particular piece of EU legislation addressing only Trustmarks, but some legislation 
touches upon several relevant aspects: The primary legislation regulating the use of Trustmarks is 
that concerning commercial communication directed at consumers, including in particular the 2005 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD). In addition, a number of other consumer protection 
directives are relevant in the context of drafting the requirements for the use of a Trustmark.  
Generally, there is a comprehensive set of rules in EU legislation protecting consumers in 
e-commerce and any code of conduct underlying a possible EU Trustmark for consumer protection 
in e-commerce must be understood in the context of already existing EU legislation.  
A Trustmark is likely to be perceived as a guarantee by a consumer. This entails that Trustmark 
must guarantee something that is not already prescribed by law. This principle is introduced into 
EU law in the UCPD Annex I, item 10, which states that it is a misleading commercial practice to 
present rights given to consumers in law as a distinctive feature of the trader’s offer. However, it 
should be considered that for example certification, monitoring, enforcement, etc. by a third party 
intrinsically entails benefits for the consumer and is beyond what is merely prescribed by law.  
The Trustmark may establish expectations, such as guarantees with consumers that the issuer may 
be liable for, to the extent consumers are disappointed with regard to their reasonable 
expectations. The Trustmark operator is not likely to be liable for all breaches by a trader — unless 
the Trustmark includes a guarantee that specifically covers this. Whether the Trustmark operator 
may be liable will depend on the interpretation of national law, including whether the Trustmark 
operator has failed to carry out controls of the trader in accordance with the reasonable 
expectations that consumers may form from the Trustmark and its marketing.  
5.12.5  An EU Trustmark for e-commerce726 
There exists a broad spectrum of policy options on how to tackle and foster a pan European 
Trustmark for e-commerce. Five main strands of policy scenarios are: no intervention; encouraging 
self-regulation; co-regulation; establishing EU accreditation of Trustmark providers; establishing a 
pan-EU Trustmark for ecommerce.  
If EU policy makers decide to introduce a Trustmark at EU level, this would basically be akin to 
establishing a privately operated Trustmark in the sense that the desired scope can be freely 
chosen. It is advisable for an EU Trustmark to provide for procedures for both initial and recurrent 
assessment as well as sanctions in case a violation of the code of conduct is identified.  
A consumer may reasonably infer that a Trustmark is something earned (i.e. voluntary) rather than 
something required, as well as that the bearer of a Trustmark performs above the requirements of 
legislation. The existence of certification requirements and procedures could be taken to exceed 
compliance with legislation and offer consumers an extra aspect of protection.  
If policy makers decided to introduce a mandatory EU Trustmark for e-commerce, it would be 
necessary to introduce EU legislation imposing the requirement on traders and to examine 
potential conflicts with existing EU legal framework. From a political and economic perspective, a 
mandatory EU Trustmark might come with a number of additional challenges.  
                                                          
725  See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/e_commerce/index_en.htm. Civic 
Consulting study on a Pan-European trust market for e-commerce (2012): 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/a-pan-european-Trustmark-for-e-commerce-pbBA3212266/. 
726  See www.ecommerce-europe.eu/about. 
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In general terms, the choice of legal instrument follows the scale of the extent to which Member 
States are to carry out the intentions of the Trustmark scheme. If an EU institution should award 
the Trustmark, a regulation would be appropriate. If the approach was for Members States to set 
up national institutions and ensure accreditation at national level, a directive would be 
appropriate.  
When laying out the principles for certification of the EU Trustmark, it would be important to note 
that compliance with some requirements is much easier to control than with others. In contrast to 
compliance with information requirements that are generally easy to assess, the adherence to 
requirements concerning commercial practices and the processing of personal data seems rather 
difficult.  
Challenges inherent in the setting-up of an EU accreditation scheme or an EU Trustmark would 
include legal implications, proper enforcement and sustainable funding, among others. Awareness 
among consumers is considered a key factor for success. Analysis for this study has revealed that it 
typically takes a minimum of five years from the inception of a Trustmark until considerable 
dissemination.  
Differences in substantive law that continue to exist must be considered. They can be overcome by 
adopting a code of conduct that satisfies requirements in all Member States (highest common 
denominator). Another approach to deal with differences in national consumer protection law is to 
fully harmonise the areas in question.  
5.13 Best practices for all consumer redress 
Review the project on Best Practices of Consumer Redress being undertaken by Dr Ying Yu from the 
University of Oxford for UNCTAD. 
During 2015, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) commissioned 
Dr Ying Yu, a Research Fellow at Wolfson College, University of Oxford to undertake a study on the 
best measures currently available for obtaining consumer redress.  
In February 2016, Dr Yu, noted that research work was well underway and that the project has 
made considerable progress. Dr Yu observed however that no preliminary material resulting from 
the study is yet available and that this will be released at a seminar to be held in September 2016 in 
the UK. 
This section of the report provides an overview of the underlying purpose for the study and 
describes objectives and project plan. 
The functions of Consumer Protection Law include regulating business misconduct and providing 
redress for consumers when something goes wrong. However, providing redress for consumers is 
somewhat overlooked by both international and national consumer policy and law. The context to 
this research project is that consumers are not protected by the existence of a law, but resolution 
of problems in the simplest way. 
A case study comes from the Consumers International member survey carried out in 2012/131. CI 
members were asked: ‘Have any of the following enforcement actions been used in your country 
by the authorities in response to consumer protection violations?’ Among the measures listed, out 
of 62 countries responding, fines were imposed in 92% of cases, but compensation orders were 
granted in only 53%. The European Commission has estimated aggregate losses to consumers and 
to the economy: ‘In 2010 one in five European consumers experienced problems when buying 
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goods and services in the single market’2 and ‘The cost of unresolved consumer disputes is 
estimated at 0.4% of the EU’s GDP. This includes the money lost by European consumers due to 
problems when shopping from other EU countries, which is estimated between €500 million and €1 
billion.’ 
In the USA, it seems that Class Action is a very powerful tool to obtain redress for consumers by 
very punitive compensation. In contrast, US-style Class Action has been described as a ‘toxic 
cocktail’ by the EC which has placed emphasis rather on Consumer ADR (Alternative Dispute 
Resolution). Two new pieces of legislation, on Consumer ADR and Consumer ODR (Online Dispute 
resolution) have recently been adopted by EU on 21 May. Meanwhile, China is undertaking a 
reform of Consumer Protection Law with consumer redress as one of the most significant topics. 
Chinese legislators and consumer specialists anchor their hopes on introducing Class Action into 
Chinese consumer law to move away from the dilemmas caused by the present deficient consumer 
redress mechanisms. But whether Class Action will function well in every legal system is not known. 
The EU has already indicated its view that Class Action does not provide an effective way to redress 
consumer grievances in most cases, and that ADR does provide a more promising approach. 
In the area of financial services, the Financial Ombudsman Service in UK turns out to have been a 
very successful Consumer ADR mechanism, judging from the volume of adjudications. In 
E-commerce area, payment medium seems very effective to ensure the consumer redress. 
‘Chargeback’ for payment card holders originated from the USA as a legal right for consumers and 
was applied in the EU as a contractual right for consumers, and now functions as a very effective 
tool for consumer redress both in USA and EU. In China, Escrow is widely accepted by E-commerce 
consumers to guarantee their transactions, but is only a lex mercatoria not backed by legislation. It 
functions much better than statutory routes for consumer redress in China, but has been well 
developed in jurisdictions with a common law system for more than 500 years. 
One area of increasing importance is cross-border redress as the volume of cross-border 
transactions rises following the development of e-commerce, migration and tourism. Difficulties in 
resolving potential cross-border problems have been found to inhibit cross-border transactions for 
some years now. Networks such as the ECC-Net have been set up to coordinate responses by 
consumer protection agencies in different countries and to advise consumers affected. Such 
networks have limited judicial powers but merit investigation nonetheless. 
5.13.1  Objectives 
The objective of this research is to compare and analyse some of the best practices of effective 
consumer redress in different jurisdictions, and draw a clear picture of the circumstances under 
which the individual practices function well. This will help developing countries to reach an 
objective approach to the orientation of their consumer redress policy. Moreover, the research will 
come up with suggestions regarding the possibility and the practical approach to building up an 
ADR (ODR) Platform of Cross-Border Consumer Redress globally. 
5.13.1.1 Project plan 
• Phase 1: Investigate and select a few relevant and effective consumer redress tools as best 
practice models. Examples to be drawn from US, EC and China 
• Phase 2: Survey and analyse how and why the models function well. 
• Phase 3: Compare the results and try to synthesise an approach for a cross-border consumer 
redress platform. 
• Phase 4: Draft a report containing the conclusions and recommendations. 
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5.13.2  The European e-Justice Portal727 
The European e-Justice Portal benefits citizens, businesses, lawyers and judges with cross-border 
legal questions and boosts mutual understanding of different legal systems by contributing to the 
creation of a single European area of justice. 
An Italian consumer travelling in Germany needs a lawyer. A French entrepreneur wants to search 
the Hungarian land register. An Estonian judge has a question about the Spanish court system. 
Answers to all these questions — in 23 official EU languages — can be found on the European 
e-Justice Portal. 
With more than 12,000 pages of content, the portal provides a wealth of information and links on 
laws and practices in all EU countries. The resources range from information on legal aid, judicial 
training, European small claims and videoconferencing to links to legal databases, online insolvency 
and land registers. It also includes user-friendly forms for various judicial proceedings, such as the 
European order for payment. 
The portal is implemented by the Commission in very close cooperation with the EU countries. 
5.13.2.1 The portal 
Though not specifically designed as a means of access to justice for consumers, nonetheless, 
consumers will be able to get answers on how the 28 EU countries’ legal systems function. More 
than 10 million citizens face judicial procedures involving different EU countries every year. The 
Portal helps them find relevant information when dealing with events such as divorce, death, 
litigation, succession or even moving house. They can find a legal practitioner in another country 
and learn how to avoid costly court cases through mediation, where to bring a lawsuit, which 
country’s law applies to their case and whether they are eligible for legal aid. 
Consumers, traders, government official’s lawyers, notaries and judges can get access to legal 
databases, contact colleagues through judicial networks and find information on European judicial 
training. They can also find practical information on arranging multi-country videoconferences. 
Businesses can search in interconnected insolvency registers, find links to land registers, find 
information on cross-border proceedings and the laws that apply. 
5.13.2.2 Next steps 
The first release of the Portal in 2010 was just the first step in developing a multilingual online 
access point that makes life easier for citizens, businesses and practitioners in Europe. New 
information, tools and functions are being continuously added. For instance, the Portal will soon 
contain the following tools: 
• ECLI Search Engine which will allow legal practitioners to easily find case law as the adoption 
of the ECLI standard gradually gains ground; 
• businesses will also benefit from lower costs thanks to streamlined online legal procedures 
once business registers and land registers are accessible via the Portal; 
• soon citizens will have the possibility to apply for cross-border European orders for payment 
and Small claims electronically and receive communication from the courts online. 
                                                          
727  See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/european-e-justice/portal/index_en.htm. 
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5.13.3  Consumer Conditions Scoreboard  
Consumer Conditions Scoreboard: Consumer at home in the Single Market — 2015 edition728 
The Consumer Conditions Scoreboard tracks the situation and behaviour of consumers across 
Member States and over time. The 2015 edition brings together the latest consumer data based on 
an improved methodology with a fully revised conceptual framework for measuring consumer 
conditions. This edition has also a special focus on consumer conditions in the Digital Single 
Market. 
5.13.3.1 Highlights 
The Digital Single Market is emerging, but still faces constraints. The frequency of e-commerce 
transactions has been increasing. Half of Europeans bought goods or services over the internet in 
2014. Yet, consumers continue to feel considerably more confident buying online from their own 
country (61%) than from other EU countries (38%). 
While domestic online purchases are conducted considerably more frequently, accounting for 70% 
of most recent online purchases, the Scoreboard results suggests that the incidence of cross-border 
online purchases within the EU is considerably under-reported, since consumers are not always 
aware that they are buying from another EU country. 
Cross-border purchases cause a disproportionately high amount of problems. In particular, 
concerns about delivery and product conformity seem to be confirmed by actual consumer 
experience. Moreover, consumers continue to face discrimination linked to the country of 
residence in cross-border transactions. These issues also account for the majority of complaints 
about cross-border e-commerce received by European Consumer Centres. 
Further awareness raising on consumer rights is needed. Consumers’ and retailers’ awareness of 
some key consumer rights guaranteed by EU legislation remains limited. In the EU as a whole, only 
9% of consumers were able to answer all three knowledge questions correctly, with the lowest 
levels of knowledge among young people. 
Investing in enforcement does pay off. There is a high correlation between retailers’ perceptions of 
enforcement efforts on the one hand and their assessment of compliance and of the prevalence of 
unfair commercial practices on the other hand, which suggests that monitoring efforts do translate 
into better outcomes for consumers. 
Further development of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) promises more effective consumer 
redress. Still a quarter of all consumers encountering problems do not complain in case of a 
problem. The majority of consumers who did not take any action in case of a problem were 
discouraged by the perceived difficulties (e.g. low likelihood of success, lack of information, length 
of procedure). Satisfaction with complaint handling is highest amongst those consumers who 
complained to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) bodies, even though the use and knowledge of 
these bodies are still relatively low. 
5.13.4  Contribution of the Internal Market and consumer protection to 
growth  
The Contribution of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection to Growth Report729 presents 
the results of a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Internal Market 
                                                          
728  See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/consumer_scoreboards/11_edition/index_en.htm. 
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and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and carried out by Civic Consulting between July and September 
2014. The study concerns achievements in the area of the single market and consumer protection 
and related contributions to economic growth in the European Union, with a specific focus on the 
flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 strategy.  
The benefits of a single market for growth can be broadly subsumed into four separate categories: 
economies of scale; stronger competition; lower transaction costs; and better allocation of 
resources. In addition to benefits for growth, single market integration also induces other benefits, 
such as increased consumer choice and better quality, and innovative goods and services. 
Nonetheless, the single market may induce additional costs, including administrative costs, 
adjustment or transition costs, a widening in regional and distributional disparities, and an increase 
in environmental degradation. 
Many studies have tried to quantify the overall impact of single market integration on economic 
growth. One of the most-often quoted ex-ante studies is the Cecchini report, commissioned in 
1988 by the European Commission730. It estimated an impact of 4.25-6.5% increase in EU GDP for 
the EU-12. More recent studies assessing the effects of the elimination of intra-EU goods and 
services barriers have subsequently made even higher estimates, indicating that EU GDP could 
increase by 14% as early as 2020, depending on the assumptions made. 
However, ex-post analyses have since measured the observed impact of the single market on 
growth and have generally estimated the real gains to be smaller. Several factors may explain the 
differences noted between ex-ante and ex-post estimates identified, including the absence of a 
clear control group or counterfactual; difficulty in predicting the dramatic transformative effects of 
market liberalisation; difficulty in accounting for dynamic effects of integration related to gradual 
changes in productivity and efficiency; and other potential biases leading to an overestimation of 
the predicted gains of single market integration. 
Improving consumer protection and empowerment can also have positive effects on growth, 
through several channels including: consumers’ increased confidence and trust; consumers’ better 
decision-making and assertion of rights; lower consumer financial detriment from problems; and as 
a signal of high standards for third countries trading with the EU. However, while there is a 
significant body of literature confirming these benefits, little empirical evidence has been identified 
to support them. Nonetheless, a major EU-wide survey in 2010 concluded that total 
ex-post-consumer detriment — based on financial losses reported from problems experienced — 
was equivalent to 0.4% of EU GDP.  
A larger number of achievements have been made relevant to the single market and consumer 
protection within the scope of ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’, relating to electronic communications, 
e-commerce/online services and data protection. Major legislation proposed includes the 
Connected Continent Regulation and Data Protection Reform Package. Evidence suggests that 
completing the digital single market has significant potential to contribute to growth, with one 
estimate indicating a possible 2-4% increase in EU GDP by 2020.  
Relevant aspects of ‘Innovation Union’ relate to breaking down barriers to innovation, improving 
cross-border access to finance for SMEs and encouraging cross-border mobility of researchers, 
which may each have beneficial effects on growth. Key achievements include the establishment of 
a unitary patent system, expected to reduce costs of applying for a patent valid EU-wide by 80%. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
729  Available at: https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/d6de1e78-a18e-4c7a-a643-b5c61a15113e 
/att_20141027ATT91951-5076263125688467492.pdf. 
730  See www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/510981/EPRS_STU(2014)510981_REV1_EN.pdf. 
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Learning and employment mobility of young people constitute the key areas of relevance for the 
single market under ‘Youth on the Move’, for which available evidence indicates a potential 
positive impact on the EU economy. A major achievement is the regulation establishing Erasmus+, 
which combines the EU’s education, training, youth and sport schemes into one integrated 
programme. 
Significant achievements have been made within the scope of ‘Resource-efficient Europe’ relevant 
for the single market and consumer protection and empowerment in the energy and transport 
sectors. Major legislation adopted in the energy sector includes the Third Energy Package, while for 
several transport modes fresh single- market initiatives have been proposed, accompanied by a 
well-developed framework for passenger rights.731 
Relevant achievements as part of ‘An industrial policy for the globalisation era’ relate mainly to 
industrial products, as well as specific areas such as combating late payments, business services, 
and entrepreneurship. Major legislation proposed includes the Product Safety and Market 
Surveillance Package. Addressing the remaining barriers to intra-EU trade in goods could be highly 
beneficial; one estimate shows that full integration of goods markets could result in a 2.2-8.8% 
increase in EU GDP in the long run. 
Labour mobility is the main aspect relevant to the single market in ‘An agenda for new skills and 
jobs’. Major legislation adopted includes the revised Professional Qualifications Directive. Research 
suggests labour mobility stimulates growth: one study finds the immigration of four million people 
from eight of the countries acceding to the EU in 2004 could lead to a long-run increase of 0.6% in 
EU GDP.  
Finally, actions under ‘European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion’732 relevant to the 
single market relate primarily to social enterprise, which may also induce growth. A key 
achievement was the launch of the Social Business Initiative. 
 
                                                          
731  Significant growth potential is evident: according to estimates, liberalisation of gas and electricity markets could 
raise EU GDP by 0.6-0.8% over 2011-2020, while supply- and demand-side effects of air transport liberalisation 
could, respectively, raise EU GDP by 1.8% and 1.3% over 2005-2025.  
732  The European platform against poverty and social exclusion is one of seven flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. It is designed to help EU countries reach the headline target of 
lifting 20 million people out of exclusion. The platform was launched in 2010 and will remain active until 2020. 
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Part 6: MEASURES TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE  
Issue 4: Measures to facilitate access to justice (Associate Professor Jeannie 
Marie Paterson, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne) 
The fourth issue for analysis is: 
• Measures to facilitate access to justice, including: 
– early intervention and consumer empowerment; 
– support for consumers in accessing dispute resolution; and  
– institutional support (e.g. from regulators or other third party advocates). 
6.1 Introduction 
Governments should establish or maintain legal and/or administrative measures to 
enable consumers to or, as appropriate, relevant organisations to obtain redress 
through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive, and 
accessible. Such procedures should take particular account of the needs of low-income 
consumers.733 
If consumers cannot exercise and enforce their rights under the ACL, then those consumers may be 
left bearing the costs imposed by substandard and defective goods and services and the incentives 
for traders to comply with the law will be reduced.734 
Many consumers, particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged consumers, will not have the funds or 
expertise to hire lawyers and pursue a claim in court. 735 However, access to justice in a consumer 
context does not merely mean addressing this issue of the cost of lawyers and litigation.736 
Traditional litigation will not be appropriate in many consumer contexts. Most disputes between 
traders and consumers involve relatively small amounts of money, and the value of the claim will 
not justify the expense of seeking legal advice or going to court.737 Moreover, in many cases 
consumers and traders may prefer a quick resolution to their dispute over the long drawn-out 
process of litigation. They may also seek to maintain their relationship after the resolution of the 
                                                          
733  United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection GA Res 248, 39 UN GAOR (106th plen. Mtg), UN Doc 
A/Res/39/248 (1985). 
734  J Malbon, ‘Access to Justice for Small Amount Claims in the Consumer Marketplace: Lessons from Australia’ in 
M Trebilcock, A Duggan and Lorne Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 
page 328. 
735  M A Noone, ‘Public Interest Law and Access to Justice: the Need for Vigilance’ (2011) 37 Monash UL Rev 57.  
736  Ronald Sackville, ‘Law and Poverty in Australia’ (Parliamentary Paper No 294, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of 
Australia, 1975); Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, ‘Cost of Legal Services and 
Litigation’ (Discussion Papers No 1-7 Final Reports I and 2 (1991-1994); Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality 
before the Law, Report No 69 (1994); Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to Justice — An Action Plan 
(1994); Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report 
No 89 (2000); Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Legal Aid and Access 
to Justice (2004).  
737  See A Duggan, ‘Consumer Access to Justice in Common Law Countries: A Survey of the Issues from a Law and 
Economics Perspective’ in C Rickett and T Telfer (ed) International Perspectives of Consumers’ Access to Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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dispute or, at least in the case of traders, to maintain a good reputation for future consumer 
dealings.  
As the issue of access to justice is a multi-dimensional problem, promoting access to justice in 
consumer disputes will require a multi-faceted and tiered response.738 Ideally access to justice is 
promoted by a combination of strategies that respond to the different degrees of wrongdoing by 
traders that may have occurred and are sensitive to the different needs of the consumers affected 
by breaches of consumer law. This Part considers and compares five different categories of 
measures for promoting access to justice in six different countries, including Australia. These 
measures are not the only ways of facilitating to justice but are prominent elements of most 
responses. 
(1) The form of and content of legislation: 
First, the form and content of consumer protection legislation may have a role in promoting 
access to justice. This may be done through legislation being expressed in a simple and 
accessible form and also in affirming the value of consumer rights. 
(2) Information and education:  
Secondly, access to justice may be promoted through information and education initiatives 
that assist consumers in better understanding their rights and obligations under the law so as 
to avoid disputes arising in the first place.  
(3) Legal assistance and advice: 
Thirdly, access to justice may be facilitated by opportunities for consumers to obtain ‘self-help’ 
advice that assists them in resolving their own disputes, and also in providing legal 
representation to those consumers unable to pursue their own claim.739  
(4) Alternative dispute resolution: 
Fourthly, access to justice may be promoted by support for consumers in accessing low cost 
and informal forums for dispute resolution, such as through mediation, arbitration, specialist 
tribunals and ombudsman services, and also possibly by utilising new digital technologies in 
online dispute resolution.  
(5) Compliance and enforcement action by regulators:   
Fifthly, access to justice will require targeted compliance and enforcement action by 
regulators against rogue traders who show a systemic failure to comply with the law or 
deliberately set out to exploit vulnerable consumers or resist justified consumer claims. 
Regulatory action may also be needed to develop uncertain or controversial areas of the law.  
                                                          
738  See further M Trebilcock, A Duggan and Lorne Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 
2012) p 1 quoting Lorne Sossin, Research Priorities Report Submitted to the Board of Governors of the Law 
Commission of Ontario (2007).  
739  Class actions may also be used to litigate consumer claims. Class actions have the attraction of aggregating a bundle 
of claims in order to make litigation viable from a financial perspective. However, they do not always work 
effectively in a consumer context where the size of the initial claim may be so small that even a combined group of 
claims is unlikely to produce a sufficiently large damages award to justify the expense of litigation. See A Duggan 
and Iain Ramsay, Front End Strategies for Improving Consumer Access to Justice’ in M Trebilcock, A Duggan and 
Lorne Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 96; Justin Malbon, ‘Access to 
Justice for Small Amount Claims in the Consumer Marketplace: Lessons from Australia’ in M Trebilcock, A Duggan 
and Lorne Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 346-348. 
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The countries in which access to justice measures are considered are: 
• Australia, 
• Canada (British Columbia and Ontario),  
• Singapore,  
• South Africa,  
• United Kingdom, and 
• United States (California and New York).  
The emphasis in the comparison will not be on legislative frameworks and provisions but on the 
ways in which these countries use the identified measures to facilitate the ability of consumers to 
exercise their rights under consumer protection legislation. Not every measure for promoting 
access to justice is found in a meaningful form in all of these countries. Accordingly, the discussion 
below selects those features of the comparison regimes that illustrate particular access to justice 
strategies and highlights the similarities or differences to those used in Australia. The aim of the 
comparison is to identify approaches that may useful in thinking about how best to promote fair 
and accessible protection for consumers under the ACL.  
6.2 The form of and content of legislation 
The form and content of consumer protection legislation may have a role in promoting access to 
justice. Clearly expressed and logically structured legislation assists consumers in finding, 
understanding and asserting their rights under that legislation. Strong statements of support for 
consumer rights in legislation may perform an important rhetorical role in affirming the centrality 
and significance of those rights. Such statements may also act as a directive to courts and decision 
makers to interpret the legislation in a broad and generous manner conducive to the legislative 
objective of protecting the interests of consumers. 
6.2.1 Australia 
The importance of clear and accessible legislation informed some aspects of the changes to 
consumer protection in Australia introduced by the ACL. In particular, one of the reasons for 
introducing the regime of consumer guarantees in Part 3-2 was to clarify and simplify what was 
perceived to be an overly technical and difficult regime of contractual implied terms in the Trade 
Practices Act 1974.740 
More generally, in interpreting the ACL, Australian courts have acknowledged that the legislation 
gives effect to ‘matters of high public policy’741 and is to be ‘construed so as “to give the fullest 
relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow”‘.742 This imperative is also made explicit in 
South Africa. 
                                                          
740  Consumer Affairs Victoria, ‘Warranties and Refunds in the Electronic Goods, White Goods and Mobile Telephone 
Industries’ (2009), Research Paper No 17, 2-3; Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council, Department of 
Treasury, Consumer Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties — Final Report (2009), 127-8. 
741  Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494, 528 [99] (Gummow J), citing ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd 
v Trade Practices Commission (1992) 38 FCR 248, 256 (Lockhart J).  
742  Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd 1998) 196 CLR 494, 528 [99] (Gummow J), citing Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) 
(1913) 17 CLR 370, 384 (Isaacs J); Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 32, 44 (Mason CJ); Webb 
Distributors (Australia) Pty Ltd v Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15, 41 (McHugh J). 
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6.2.2 South Africa 
Access to justice is a particularly important aspect of consumer protection law in South Africa, in 
part due to that country’s pre-republican history of division and disenfranchisement. The South 
African Constitution enshrines a right of access to dispute resolution: 
Access to courts — Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by 
the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.743 
These sentiments are reinforced in the Consumer Protection Act 2008, the principal act for 
consumer protection in South Africa. The preamble to the Act emphasises the role of consumer 
protection law in protecting ‘historically disadvantaged persons’ and promoting their ‘full 
participation as consumers’.744 The Consumer Protection Act 2008 also instructs courts, in event of 
ambiguity, to favour consumer rights and interests.745  Section 4(3) provides that: 
if any provision of this Act, read in its context, can reasonably be construed to have 
more than one meaning, the Tribunal or court must prefer the meaning that best 
promotes the spirit and purposes of this Act, and will best improve the realisation and 
enjoyment of consumer rights generally, and in particular by [disadvantaged and 
vulnerable] persons. 
Consistently, in Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Dlamini the court noted that that ‘the 
[National Credit Act 34 of 2005] and the [Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008] are but two statutes 
on a raft of national legislation aimed specifically at consumers to reverse the historical 
socio-economic inequalities and adjust the imbalances’. 746 
6.3 Information and education 
An apparently simple and straightforward method of facilitating consumer access to justice is 
through information and education initiatives. These types of initiatives provide a ‘front end’747 
response to consumer protection, rather than an approach focused on merely picking up the pieces 
should something go wrong. Information and education initiatives aim to assist consumers in 
making better, more informed choices about the goods and services that they purchase. More 
informed choices mean that consumers are less likely to be disappointed with their purchases. In 
the event that something does go wrong, information and education initiatives seek to prevent 
disputes arising over how that problem should be resolved. If both parties understand their rights 
under the law, then they may be more likely to be able to negotiate a fair and equitable resolution 
to the problem.  
To be effective, information and education initiatives need to be carefully thought through and 
strategically targeted. The information should be presented in a range of different formats: online, 
in print and using both verbal and visual techniques so as to cater for different learning preferences 
and abilities.748 The information should be presented in clear and simple language, and provided in 
a number of different languages to be accessible to all members of the relevant community of 
                                                          
743   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 34. 
744  See also Consumer Protection Act 2008 s 3. 
745  Ibid s 4. 
746  (2013) (1) SA 219 (KZD), [32]. 
747  See A Duggan and Iain Ramsay,  ‘Front End Strategies for Improving Consumer Access to Justice’ in M Trebilcock, A 
Duggan and Lorne Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 96-7. 
748  See also A Duggan, A Remani and D Kao ‘Policy Options with Respect to Consumer and Debtor/Creditor Law’ in M 
Trebilcock, A Duggan and L Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 490. 
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consumers. Information and education initiatives need to be proactively promoted. Merely placing 
information about consumer rights on a web site will not assist consumers who do not know they 
have such rights or where to look for information about them.749 
It is also important to recognise that, while information and education initiatives are an 
undoubtedly useful tool in facilitating access to justice, their efficacy should not be over-estimated. 
Providing information to consumers about consumer protection issues will not overcome all 
information asymmetries in the market for goods and services. The characteristics of many goods 
and services are too complex and the preferences of consumers are too diverse for them to be met 
through general, publically provided information. Information and education initiatives may also 
not offset the behavioural biases shown by consumers in their purchasing decisions. Behavioural 
economics draws on psychology and economics to suggest that there are cognitive limitations on 
the ability of consumers to use information,750 and that consumers ‘will often process imperfectly 
even the information they do acquire.’751 
Moreover, access to information is not the only factor that determines the ability of consumers to 
assert their rights under law. Effective consumer ‘self help’ relies on consumers holding a requisite 
level of assertiveness and confidence, and may therefore be impacted by social and cultural 
factors. Studies suggest that in consumer disputes there may be a correlation between willingness 
to complain and socio-economic status and gender.752 Education will not therefore overcome all 
manifestations of the inevitable and often considerable power imbalance between traders and 
consumers. Information and education initiatives may also need to be buttressed by more 
interventionist strategies to ensure that consumers can enforce their rights under consumer 
protection law.  
6.4 Information provided by regulators and consumer advocates 
All of the countries under consideration have extensive programs for informing and educating 
consumers about their rights under consumer protection legislation. An issue facing all of these 
countries, particularly those with multiple enforcement agencies and consumer advocacy groups, is 
how to coordinate the various information and education initiatives so as to ensure that the 
information provided is coherent and consistent as between different providers. It is also important 
that the experiences of consumer advocates and regulatory agencies that have close connections 
with marginalised consumer groups are included, and even prioritised, in any conversation about 
coordinated education and information strategies. 
6.4.1 Australia 
In Australia, information and education about consumer purchases and consumer rights is provided 
through: 
• regulators charged with enforcing the ACL; 
• specialist community legal centres; 
                                                          
749  See generally Iain Ramsay, ‘Consumer Redress and Access to Justice’ in C Rickett and T Telfer (eds), International 
Perspectives on Consumers’ Access to Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 17. 
750  See generally, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law 
Review 211; Russell Korobkin, ‘Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability’ (2003) 70 
University of Chicago Law Review 1203;  Robert A Hillman and Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘Standard-Form Contracting in 
the Electronic Age’ (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 429. 
751  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 211, 214. 
752  Iain Ramsay, ‘Consumer Redress and Access to Justice’ in C Rickett and T Telfer (eds), International Perspectives on 
Consumers’ Access to Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 28. 
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• the peak body representing consumers, the Consumers Federation of Australia; 
• long standing consumer advocacy organisation, CHOICE; 
• various radio and television media and, in particular, the television show ‘The Check Out’. 
The regulatory agencies charged with enforcing the ACL provide extensive information on 
consumer protection directed to both consumers and traders. The Commonwealth regulatory 
agency, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), takes the lead in this 
regard. It provides information on a range of consumer topics, including consumer rights and 
guarantees, complaints and problems, misleading claims and advertising, prices and receipts, 
contracts and agreements, groceries, health, home and car, online shopping and internet and 
phone usage.753 Some of this information is aimed at informing consumers about relevant 
considerations in making purchasing decisions and other information is aimed at informing 
consumers about their rights and responsibilities should a problem arise after purchase.  
The information provided by the ACCC is most easily accessed online but is also available in various 
hard copy publications and brochures. The information is presented in traditional print format and 
also through various video presentations. Facebook and other social media are utilised. The ACCC 
also hosts sites aimed at particular issues, such as Scamwatch754 and Energy Made Easy.755  The 
ACCC provides information directed at certain typically vulnerable and disadvantaged groups: the 
indigenous community,756 people with a disability,757 people from non-English speaking 
backgrounds758 and seniors.759  The state and territory regulators provide similar information and 
also information on issues specific to their jurisdiction.  
Some state regulators provide information for primary and secondary teachers to use in lessons on 
consumer protection.760 No data was available on how widely these resources are used. 
Consumer protection information and education materials are also provided by the various 
consumer advocacy organisations in Australia, including the Consumers’ Federation of Australia,761 
Consumer Action Law Centre,762 Australian Communications Consumers Action Network763 and 
Caxton Legal Centre.764 A leading provider of specialist consumer law information, advice and 
assistance for consumers is the Consumer Action Law Centre (CALC). CALC provides: 
… free legal advice and pursues litigation on behalf of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
consumers across Victoria, and is the largest specialist consumer legal practice in 
Australia. As well as working with consumers directly, Consumer Action provides legal 
assistance and professional training to community workers who advocate on behalf of 
consumers … As a nationally recognised and influential policy and research body, 
Consumer Action pursues a law reform agenda across a range of important consumer 
issues at a governmental level, in the media, and throughout the community directly.765 
                                                          
753  See www.accc.gov.au/consumers. 
754  See www.scamwatch.gov.au/. 
755  See www.energymadeeasy.gov.au/. 
756  See www.accc.gov.au/about-us/information-for/indigenous-consumers. 
757  See www.accc.gov.au/about-us/information-for/people-with-a-disability. 
758  See www.accc.gov.au/about-us/information-for/non-english-speaking-background. 
759  See www.accc.gov.au/about-us/information-for/seniors. 
760   See e.g. www.consumer.vic.gov.au/resources-and-education/teacher-resources. 
761  See http://consumersfederation.org.au/topics/story-type/tips-and-advice/. 
762  See http://consumeraction.org.au/. 
763  See http://accan.org.au/. 
764  See https://caxton.org.au/. 
765  See http://consumeraction.org.au/about/. 
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Another long-standing and important source of information and advice for Australian consumers is 
CHOICE.766 Established in 1959, CHOICE is a consumer advocacy organisation that tests and reviews 
common consumer respects, investigates consumer issues and runs advocacy campaigns. CHOICE’s 
information and review material is restricted to members, although its advocacy work is conducted 
on behalf of all consumers.  
Information about products, purchasing decisions and consumer rights has been prominently 
promoted in Australia through the comedy consumer affairs television show ‘The Checkout’.767 
Clips and segments from this show are available online and cover a wide range of consumer topics 
in a light-hearted and humorous format. 
There is a degree of overlap in the information provided by the ACCC, State and Territory 
regulators and consumer advocates. While this may increase the opportunities for consumers to 
obtain useful and relevant information, it may also increase the work required by consumers to 
research their rights. Consumers may be faced with the task of sorting through and assessing the 
ultimately very similar pieces of information provided by these different sources in order to find a 
solution to a particular problem.  
6.4.2 Canada 
There are a number of information and education initiatives in Canada, largely aimed at assisting 
Canadian consumers in making more optimal purchasing decisions and having a better 
understanding of their rights as consumers. Operating on a national scale, the Consumer Measures 
Committee produces the Canadian Consumer Handbook, which provides advice on a wide range of 
issues relevant to consumer transactions. The Consumer Measures Committee is: 
… a joint federal/provincial/territorial committee which provides a forum for national 
cooperation to improve the marketplace for Canadian consumers, through the 
harmonisation of laws, regulations and practices and through actions to raise public 
awareness.768  
The Handbook provides consumers with information on their rights as consumers, and related legal 
issues, and also directed by the Handbook to various organisations they may seek help from if they 
encounter problems. This resource provides a useful ‘one stop shop’ for consumers seeking 
information and avoids the repetition and confusion that may eventuate from having multiple 
sources of information.  
In addition to this handbook, the Office of Consumer Affairs769 and the Consumers’ Association of 
Canada770 provides links to information on consumer products, consumer rights and how to 
progress consumer complaints. Consumer education initiatives and useful consumer information 
are also available through the provincial regulators such as Consumer Protection British 
Columbia771 and Consumer Protection Ontario.772 
These organisations all make extensive use of social media in performing their activities. It is 
unclear from these sources what strategies are in place for providing information to disadvantaged 
and vulnerable consumers.  
                                                          
766  See www.choice.com.au/. 
767  See www.abc.net.au/tv/thecheckout/. 
768  See www.consumerhandbook.ca/en/about. 
769  See www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/home. 
770  See www.consumer.ca/ . 
771  See www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/. 
772  See www.ontario.ca/page/consumer-protection-ontario. 
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6.4.3 Singapore 
The Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE) is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation 
formed to protect consumers’ interests ‘through information and education, and promoting an 
environment of fair and ethical trade practices’.773 CASE has taken a strongly proactive role in 
educating consumers and traders about their rights and responsibilities through a variety of media, 
including an online presence, education programs, pamphlets and cartoons.774 CASE also has a 
strong Facebook presence.775  
In addition, the Singapore Law Association produces the ‘Know the Law Now’ booklet, which is 
specifically targeted to laypeople and an easy to follow guide on consumer law.776 
Both the Singapore Law Association and CASE run a range of outreach education programs on 
consumer protection law.777 The Law Society of Singapore has launched education programs aimed 
at school students and the elderly.778 It is looking at providing the ‘Know the Law Now’ publication 
in different languages in the future: Mandarin, Malay and Tamil.779  
6.4.4 South Africa 
In South Africa, the Provincial Consumer Offices provide information and education activities in a 
variety of formats.780 The Consumer Goods and Services Ombudsman also provides information 
about consumer rights and obligations and about the complaint process.781 The Ombudsman is also 
working to develop and extend its education initiatives. This is on the basis that accessibility is 
increased though public awareness of the existence of the system. The Ombudsman promotes its 
activities through social media, traditional print media and through its website. It also takes the 
view that an effective way of increasing consumer awareness is though suppliers informing 
consumers of its existence.782 
6.4.5 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, Citizens Advice is a charity that provides training information and advice on 
a range of legal issues including consumer law.783 It has government funding to provide consumer 
education and works with the consumer regulator to promote consumer education and 
empowerment.784 It provides training resources on a variety of consumer topics such as energy, 
digital products and understanding contracts.785  
There was no prominent indication on the webpage of this organisation about outreach to 
vulnerable and disadvantaged consumer groups. Citizens Advice has a strong social media 
presence.  
                                                          
773  See www.case.org.sg/. 
774  See eg www.case.org.sg/publications.aspx.  
775  See www.facebook.com/casesg. 
776  See http://probono.lawsociety.org.sg/Pages/Community-Legal-Clinic.aspx. 
777  See www.case.org.sg/events.aspx. 
778  Law Society of Singapore Annual Report 2015, 80. 
779  Law Society of Singapore Annual Report 2015, 80. 
780  See www.southafrica.info/services/consumer/consumer.htm#.Vt62N5N95-X. 
781  See www.cgso.org.za/your-rights-explained/. 
782  Consumer Goods and Services Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014/15 pp 26-27. 
783  See https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/. 
784  See www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-us/how-we-provide-advice/our-prevention-work/citizens-advice- 
consumer-education/. 
785  See www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-us/how-we-provide-advice/our-prevention-work/education/education- 
resources/education-resources/. 
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Which? is a consumers’ association that advocates for consumer rights786 and also a company that, 
like Choice in Australia, provides members with reviews and comparisons of consumer products so 
as to improve purchasing decisions by consumers.787 
6.5 Information via traders 
Another potentially effective resource in educating and informing consumers about their rights 
under law is through traders. This approach requires traders to internalise some of the costs of 
providing relevant information to consumers and also may have advantages in providing 
information at the point of purchase when consumers may be specially focused on their rights and 
obligations associated with the sale. It should also be recognised that the emotional factors 
associated with the act of making a purchase may undermine the likelihood of consumers making 
efficient use of information provided at this time.788 
6.5.1 Australia 
The ACL imposes some obligations on traders to disclose information about consumers’ rights and 
remedial options. For example, for unsolicited sales, the ACL ss 78–79 require traders to provide 
consumers with specified information including the name and business address of the trader and 
information on termination rights.  
Where a trader provides a ‘warranty against defects’,789 consumers must be provided with 
specified information about the warranty, including details of who is giving the warranty, the 
period for which the warranty applies and how to claim under the warranty.790 In addition, the 
written document providing a warranty against defects must expressly advise consumers of the 
existence of the consumer guarantees under the ACL, as follows: 
Our goods come with guarantees that cannot be excluded under the Australian 
Consumer Law. You are entitled to a replacement or refund for a major failure and for 
compensation for any other reasonably foreseeable loss or damage. You are also 
entitled to have the goods repaired or replaced if the goods fail to be of acceptable 
quality and the failure does not amount to a major failure.791 
6.5.2 Singapore 
As a response to issues with unsolicited sales, Singapore legislation requires traders to disclose to 
specified information to consumers, and in particular their rights to terminate any contract made 
with the trader.792 
6.5.3 United Kingdom 
United Kingdom consumer protection legislation makes extensive use of disclosure requirements 
for traders to promote consumer awareness of their rights. For example the Consumer Contracts 
(Information and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 require traders to provide consumers with 
                                                          
786  See www.which.co.uk/about-which/who-we-are/overview/. 
787  See www.which.co.uk/about-which/what-we-offer/. 
788  See also Jeannie Marie Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 Journal of 
Contract Law 152. 
789  ACL s 102(3). 
790  Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 90.  
791  Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 90(2).  
792  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Cancellation of Contracts) Regulations regulation 4(6). 
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a range of information relevant to ensuring consumers are fully informed about who they are 
contracting with and their rights of redress, including information about cancellation rights, 
information about the seller, including their location and address and also ‘in the case of a sales 
contract, a reminder that the trader is under a legal duty to supply goods that are in conformity 
with the contract’.793  
6.6 Advice and assistance 
… if the rule of law is considered to be based on laws that are knowable and 
consistently enforced such that individuals are able to avail themselves of the law, then 
individuals must have the tools to access the systems that administer those laws.794 
In the event that a dispute between consumers and traders does eventuate, general information 
provided to consumers about their rights under consumer protection law may be insufficiently 
tailored to the particular issues raised the dispute or the steps needed for enforcement to assist 
the consumer. Genuine access to justice requires opportunities for consumers to obtain advice and 
assistance in enforcing their rights and resolving trader disputes.  
Typically, consumer disputes will involve relatively small amounts of money and so consumers may 
not feel justified in paying for legal representation, and may not have the funds to do so in any 
event. Legal aid is generally not available for consumer claims, being viewed as presenting a less 
compelling case for public subsidy than, for example, crimes of violence.795 Instead consumers are 
likely to seek some alternative form of free or subsidised assistance.  
Advice and assistance for consumers in resolving disputes with traders may be provided by 
regulators, specialist community legal centres and clinics or pro bono schemes. It may be provided 
in a variety of formats: online, by telephone or in person. It may range from general advice on how 
consumers can themselves enforce their consumer rights (which may overlap with the education 
initiatives above) to more specific legal advice on enforcement by a lawyer (and in some 
jurisdictions only a lawyer is qualified to give such advice).  
6.6.1 Australia 
In Australia regulators and specialist community legal services such as the Consumer Action Law 
Centre provide general advice on how to resolve a dispute and materials to assist consumers in 
that process.796 Consumers may also seek specific advice about what their rights are and how to 
resolve a dispute by telephone, in person or online from regulators, legal aid providers and 
community legal centres, as well as from the Consumer Action Law Centre.797 In most cases, 
general advice and assistance is available to all consumers. More specific advice and legal 
assistance through community legal centres and pro bono schemes is generally restricted to 
consumers who cannot pay for legal representation and/or meet the other access criteria of the 
relevant organisation.  
                                                          
793  Consumer Contracts (Information and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 schedule 1 for on premise contracts 
and schedule 2 for off premises contracts. 
794  M Trebilcock, Report of the Legal Aid Review 2008 www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/olar. 
795  See eg R Smith, ‘Middle Income Access to Civil Justice: Implication of Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in 
England and Wales in M Trebilcock, A Duggan and Lorne Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of 
Toronto Press, 2012) pages 187-188. 
796  See eg www.consumer.vic.gov.au/contact-us/resolve-a-dispute and 
http://consumeraction.org.au/help-for-consumers/ask-a-legal-expert/. 
797  See the resources listed for consumers seeking advice at 
http://consumeraction.org.au/help-for-consumers/who-else-can-help/. 
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6.6.2 Canada 
Provincial agencies such as Consumer Protection British Columbia and Consumer Protection 
Ontario provide a variety of resources to assist consumers resolve disputes. If these approaches do 
not work consumers can file complaints on areas within the jurisdiction of the agencies, or will be 
directed to the appropriate body to assist with matters outside that jurisdiction.798 
6.6.3 Singapore 
The Singapore Government has sought to encourage ‘greater consumer responsibility and 
pro-activity’ by empowering consumers to ‘seek civil remedies against errant traders without 
having to rely on or wait for the government to take action’.799 Consistently, Consumers 
Association of Singapore (CASE) provides legal advice and assistance to consumers seeking to 
resolve a claim with a trader, which may be provided over the phone, in person or online.800 CASE 
reports that most consumer complaints received by it are settled directly by consumers after 
receiving advice, letter writing assistance, and in some cases, mediation.801  
The Law Society of Singapore has established the Pro Bono Services Office, a charity that oversees 
the pro bono initiatives of the Law Society. The Pro Bono Services Office will provide legal advice to 
needy individuals unable otherwise to obtain legal advice and assistance.802 The Pro Bono Services 
Office reports that consumer related issues are around the fourth most common type of case taken 
on by participants in the scheme.803 
In addition the organisation Legal Help, a network on volunteer local lawyers, assists members of 
the public with ‘everyday’ legal questions.804  
6.6.4 South Africa 
In South Africa, the regulator charged with oversight and enforcement of the Consumer Protection 
Act 2008, the national Consumer Commission, will also provide assistance and advice to consumers 
in resolving disputes.805 Consumer advice and assistance services are also provided by Consumer 
Affairs Offices in each province.806 These offices may work in conjunction with community legal 
services and some have consumer helplines.807  
6.6.5 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, Citizens Advice provides advice on common legal problems through paid 
staff and volunteers in consultations that may occur face to face, by telephone, by email, on line 
and in print form.808 The assistance provided by Citizens Advice is extremely wide-ranging and its 
                                                          
798  See eg www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/consumers-other-businesses-home/how-to-make-a-complaint and 
www.ontario.ca/page/filing-consumer-complaint. 
799 See eg Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 November 2003) vol 76 at col 3352 (Mr Raymond Lim 
Siang Keat); Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 November 2003) vol 76 at col 3444 (Mr Raymond 
Lim Siang Keat). 
800  See www.case.org.sg/complaint.aspx. 
801  Rachel Au-Yeong, ‘Sick of Scams: But What is the Cure?’ The Straits Times (15 November 2014) online: The Straits 
Times www.straitstimes.com. 
802  See http://probono.lawsociety.org.sg/Pages/default.aspx. 
803  Law Society of Singapore Annual Report 2015 page 69.  
804  See www.legalhelp.com.sg/. 
805  See www.thencc.gov.za/. 
806  See eg Western Cape Office of the Consumer Protector Annual Report 2014-15. 
807  See www.legalhelp.com.sg/. 
808  See www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/. 
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coverage is no doubt assisted by the fact that the United Kingdom, unlike Australia, there is no 
restriction on non-lawyers from providing legal advice. In 2014–15, consumer issues were the third 
most advised on area (0.9 million issues).809  
The consumer association ‘Which?’ also provides an advice line, although this is limited to paying 
members.810 
6.6.6 United States 
The United States has a long tradition of initiatives designed to provide legal representation to 
consumers in pursing claims against traders who have contravened the law in some regard. This 
may be achieved through pro bono and volunteer programs and through contingency fee 
arrangements. Thus, for example, the New York State Courts Access to Justice Program seeks to 
ensure ‘access to justice in civil and criminal matters for New Yorkers of all incomes, backgrounds 
and special needs, by using every resource, including self-help services, pro bono programs, and 
technological tools, and by securing stable and adequate non-profit and government funding for 
civil and criminal legal services programs.’811 Utilising a different model, Consumer Attorneys of 
California is a professional organisation of lawyers who represent ‘plaintiffs seeking accountability 
from those who do wrong’.812 In this type of endeavour significant use is made of the contingency 
fee system under which the lawyer is paid ‘only if their clients achieve a successful result’.813  
6.7 Alternative dispute resolution 
Private enforcement through litigation has been superseded by redress delivered by 
new techniques involving public regulation and new(ish) [consumer dispute resolution] 
entities, incentivising voluntary compliance and negotiated solutions. The new 
techniques are preferred because they are quicker, more effective, and cheaper than 
litigation.814 
Alternative dispute resolution is usually understood as a dispute resolution procedure that takes 
place outside a court with the aid of a third party. The alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
available to consumers will be central to any bundle of initiatives aimed at facilitating access to 
justice.815 Traditional, formal litigation in a court is generally not well suited to the resolution of 
consumer disputes. In most cases dispute resolution in a consumer protection context will be 
better provided by mediation, specialist tribunals and ombudsman services, and also possibly by 
utilising digital technologies to provide online dispute resolution.  
6.8 Tribunals and small claims courts 
Specialist consumer tribunals and small claims courts promote access to justice by providing 
relatively low cost and informal dispute resolution accessible to traders and consumers alike.816 
Typically the opportunity of a tribunal hearing is preceded by a mediation process, which aims to 
                                                          
809  Citizens Advice, Annual Report, page 10. 
810  See www.which.co.uk/consumer-rights. 
811  See http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/nya2j/index.shtml. 
812  See www.caoc.org/. 
813  See eg www.caoc.org/. 
814  Christopher Hodges, ‘Mass Collective Redress: Consumer ADR and Regulatory Techniques’ (2015) 5 European 
Review of Private Law 829, 871-872. 
815  See D Rhode, Access to Justice (OUP 2004) 81. 
816  Tribunals are required to act with as little formality as the case permits. See eg Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 98; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) s 38(4). 
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increase the likelihood of a low cost and relatively straightforward resolution of the dispute, which 
fully engages with the perspectives and preferred outcomes of the parties involved. 
Perhaps the major challenge to consumer tribunals and small claims courts lies in balancing the 
goal of access to justice, through providing a cost effective and informal forum for dispute 
resolution, against the objective of substantive justice: that is, fair, impartial and consistent 
decision-making according to law. It is the informality of the tribunal system that makes it 
accessible to consumers and an overly legalistic approach erodes this element of accessibility. 
Individuals making use of the tribunal system arguably expect not only a resolution of their dispute 
according to the law but an opportunity to be heard and a respectful hearing of their claims.817 Yet 
at the same time the consumers seeking to assert their rights under consumer protection 
legislation have a legitimate expectation of decision-making that applies that body of law in a 
rigorous, coherent and consistent manner.818  There is a public interest in this type of 
decision-making as well, in ensuring that consumer protection law is publically and properly 
adjudicated.819 
Another real challenge faced by consumer tribunals and small claims courts is overcoming the 
hurdles to accessibility faced by marginalised consumers. Even a relatively informal and low cost 
dispute resolution forum such as offered by tribunals may still prove difficult to navigate by 
disadvantaged or vulnerable consumers who lack the experience, language skills or confidence to 
pursue a claim according to the rules of the tribunal.820 A genuine commitment to access to justice 
for all consumers will require some level of support through the throughout the entire hearing 
process provided to those consumers. Tribunals are sometimes criticised as a form of inexpensive 
decision-making that is used by traders against consumers, in particular to collect debts.821 
All of the jurisdictions being compared offer some form of tribunal or small claims court system. 
The Australian system of consumer tribunals is reasonably well developed and responsive to 
consumer needs. Singapore operates a similar tribunal system. The other jurisdictions being 
studied differ in placing a greater emphasis on other forms of alternative dispute resolution, such 
as online options or ombudsman services. 
6.8.1 Australia 
Most Australian states and territories have introduced tribunals to deal with small amount claims 
and most have a specific tribunal or division within a tribunal dealing with consumer claims.822 
Many if not most small to medium consumer/trader disputes that cannot be resolved by the 
parties and progress to a hearing are heard in a tribunal.823   
                                                          
817  K Bell, One VCAT: President’s Review of VCAT (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 2009) 46: I Ramsay, 
‘Consumer Redress and Access to Justice’ in C Rickett and T Telfer (ed) International Perspectives of Consumers’ 
Access to Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 37. 
818  K Bell, One VCAT: President’s Review of VCAT (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 2009) p 39. 
819  Federation of Community Legal Centres (Vic), Submission to Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, Inquiry 
into Alternative Dispute Resolution, 31 March 2008, 2.  
820  A Duggan, A Remani and D Kao ‘Policy Options with Respect to Consumer and Debtor/Creditor Law’ in M 
Trebilcock, A Duggan and L Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 2012) page 512. 
821  See eg Tania Sourdin, Dispute Resolution Processes for Credit Consumers (La Trobe University 2007). 
822  (ACT) ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal; (NSW) Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal and, from 2014, the 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal — Consumer and Commercial Division; (Vic) Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal; (SA) Magistrates Court of South Australia; (Tas) Magistrates Court of Tasmania; (Qld) Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal; (WA) Magistrates Court of Western Australia, Civil Division.  
823  K Bell, One VCAT: President’s Review of VCAT (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 2009) page 10. 
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A good illustrative example of the role of the tribunal in consumer/trader dispute resolution is 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). VCAT was established in 1998, to provide a 
‘one-stop shop for the handling of a range of disputes.’824 VCAT has jurisdiction to hear and 
determine a cause of action arising under any provision of the ACL (in its application to Victoria).825 
Fees range from $59.80 for claims of less than $500 to $174.10 for claims between $500 and 
$10,000.826 There is a possibility of fee waiver or reduction in some cases. 
VCAT aims to provide dispute resolution that is ‘cost effective, accessible, informal, timely, fair, 
impartial and consistent’.827 In order to be accessible to parties, VCAT is required to act with as 
little formality as possible.828 There is only a limited system of precedent and parties are usually 
taken through a mediation process,829 only going to a hearing if this is not successful.830 In most 
cases a lawyer will not represent the parties.831 
A review of VCAT in 2008 found that it had ‘generally improved access to justice and equitable 
outcomes for the community.’832 There had been some criticism of the quality of decision making 
within the tribunal.833  The review also identified concerns that VCAT was underutilized by 
‘culturally and linguistically diverse’ members of the community and by the indigenous community, 
who might together be described as vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers.834 VCAT has 
subsequently been working to broaden the scope of community involvement and engagement, 
including through opening regional centres and implementing a Koori engagement policy.835  
6.8.2 Singapore 
In Singapore, consumer disputes are heard before the Small Claims Tribunal. The fees payable for 
claimants are quite low. For consumer claims under $5000 the fee payable for a consumer is 
$10.836 The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear claims up to $10,000 (or $20,000 with the consent of 
the parties).837  
The primary function of the Small Claims Tribunals is to bring the parties to an agreeable 
settlement through an informal process.838 Parties are not bound by the rules of evidence and may 
seek out evidence as they see fit.839 Parties conduct their own case,840 unless they are unable to do 
so by reasons of ‘old age, infirmity of mind or body’ in which case an authorised or approved 
person may conduct the case on the consumer’s behalf.841 Mediation is a compulsory step in the 
                                                          
824  VCAT, 2014-15 Annual Report page 2. 
825  Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic) s 224. 
826  See www.vcat.vic.gov.au/system/files/vcat_fees_effective_1_july_2015_2.pdf. 
827  See www.vcat.vic.gov.au/about-vcat/service-charter-0. 
828  Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 98. 
829  Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 88. 
830  See eg www.vcat.vic.gov.au/about-vcat/how-vcat-resolves-cases. 
831  Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 62(1) and (2). 
832  K Bell, One VCAT: President’s Review of VCAT (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 2009) pages 1-2. 
833  K Bell, One VCAT: President’s Review of VCAT (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 2009) page 37. 
834  K Bell, One VCAT: President’s Review of VCAT (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 2009) pages 2-3. 
835  VCAT, 2014-15 Annual Report page 2. 
836  See www.statecourts.gov.sg/SmallClaims/Pages/GeneralInformation.aspx. 
837  See www.statecourts.gov.sg/SmallClaims/Pages/GeneralInformation.aspx. 
838  Small Claims Tribunals Act s 12(1). 
839  Small Claims Tribunals Act s 22 (2) and (3). 
840  Small Claims Tribunals Act s 23 (1). 
841  Small Claims Tribunals Act s 23 (2). 
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process.842 The Consumers Association of Singapore also operates a low cost mediation service to 
assist in resolving consumer/trader disputes.843 
6.8.3 South Africa 
In South Africa, disputes arising under the Consumer Protection Act 2008 are heard in the National 
Consumer Tribunal,844 as referred to it by parties or by the National Consumer Commission.845 The 
National Consumer Tribunal is required to conduct its hearings in a manner that is inquisitorial, 
expeditious, informal and in accordance with the principles of natural justice.846 It is seen as the 
last stage in consumer dispute resolution, with emphasis placed on the role of the Ombudsman 
(discussed below) in guiding parties through dispute relation process. 
6.8.4 United Kingdom 
Consumers pursing litigation to vindicate consumer rights may have access to a small claims track 
in the Court system.847 As in Australia concern has been expressed that plaintiffs in small claims 
courts are predominantly middle class professionals or businesses, and poorer consumers appear 
predominately as defendants in actions to recover a debt.848  
As with South Africa, the emphasis for consumer dispute resolution is not with the court system 
but through mediation and ombudsman services (discussed below). The parties must first have 
attempted to resolve their dispute before taking the claim to court. Parties will usually first be 
expected to attempt to resolve the claim through mediation, using an alternative dispute 
resolution scheme of their choice or a court appointed mediator.849  Many industries operating in 
the UK have their own recognised alternative dispute resolution schemes that are run through the 
Institute of Dispute Resolution Schemes, which is overseen by the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators.850 
6.8.5 Canada 
Consumers in Canada may seek to enforce their rights under consumer protection law through 
small claims courts. The processes and opportunities available to consumers vary between 
jurisdictions. In British Columbia, for example, consumers may pursue claims through the small 
claims courts851 but parties are encouraged to use Online Dispute Resolution to settle before going 
to court.852  
6.8.6 United States 
Small claims court options are found in many jurisdictions in the United States. Thus, for example, 
the California Small claims court provides a dispute resolution service for low value disputes (under 
$5,000 to $7,500) with low fees ($30–$75) and opportunities for legal advice and pre-trial 
                                                          
842  Small Claims Tribunals Act s 22(1). 
843  See www.case.org.sg/complaint_mediation.aspx. 
844  See www.thenct.org.za/mandate 
845  Consumer Protection Act 2008 ss 69 and 75. 
846  National Consumer Tribunal, Annual Report 2015 p 16. 
847  See www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part27. 
848  J Baldwin, Small Claims in the County Courts in England and Wales: the Bargain Basement of Civil Justice? (Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1997). 
849  See www.citizensadvice.org.uk/law-and-rights/legal-system/taking-legal-action/small-claims/. 
850  See www.cedr.com/idrs/. 
851    See eg www.smallclaimsbc.ca/ and http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/scc/. 
852  See www.smallclaimsbc.ca/user. 
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mediation.853 However, as noted below, the accessibility of these forums to consumers may be 
impeded by the extensive use of compulsory and exclusive arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts. 
6.9 Mediation 
Mediation is a negotiation process, led by an independent mediator, which aims to assist the 
parties to negotiate an agreement to resolve their dispute. Mediation is an alternative to a decision 
imposed on the parties by a court, tribunal or ombudsman. Mediation is commonly used as a 
precursor to a court or tribunal hearing, including in the consumer tribunals discussed in the 
section above. 
Mediation has the attraction of being private, informal and, ideally, driven by the parties 
themselves. Criticisms of mediation in a consumer context are that it ignores the power imbalance 
between consumers and traders and may proceed to a settlement without the parties fully 
understanding or vindicating their rights under law.854 Without proper support mediation can be a 
stressful and unsupported environment for consumers.855  
Consumer advocates have also expressed concern that  mediation does not develop a body of 
precedent that can be used to develop the law and respond to systematic abuses..856 
6.10 Compulsory arbitration 
Arbitration is a well-accepted means of resolving commercial disputes. In a consumer context it 
may have advantages in offering consumers quick and efficient dispute resolution. Consumer 
advocates have commonly expressed concern about contract terms that require consumers to 
submit to compulsory arbitration or make arbitration the exclusive form of dispute resolution. 
These provisions reduce consumer choice and may restrict consumers from pursuing other, more 
amenable dispute resolution options, such as for example where the arbitration precludes class 
actions. 
6.10.1  Australia 
In Australia, compulsory adjudication and arbitration clauses may be void as unfair terms under 
Part 2-3 of the ACL. Certainly, they would appear to fall within the example of the kinds of terms 
that may be unfair of ‘a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, one party’s right to sue 
another party’.857  
In some circumstances, compulsory arbitration clauses might also be void as attempts to limit the 
liability of a trader for a failure of goods or services to comply with the consumer guarantees in 
Part 3-2 of the ACL.858 
                                                          
853  See www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelp-smallclaims.htm.  
854  Richard Abel, The Politics of Informal Justice (Academic Press, 1982) vol 1, p 298; M A Noone, ‘Public Interest Law 
and Access to Justice: the Need for Vigilance’, (2011) 37 Monash UL Rev 57; T Sourdin, ‘Civil Dispute Resolution 
Obligations’ (2012) 5 UNSWLJ 889, 890. 
855  M A Noone, ‘Public Interest Law and Access to Justice: the Need for Vigilance’,  (2011) 37 Monash UL Rev 57, 75. 
856  M A Noone, ‘Public Interest Law and Access to Justice: the Need for Vigilance’,  (2011) 37 Monash UL Rev 57, 76. 
857  ACL s 25(1)(k).  
858  See ACL s 64. 
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6.10.2  United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom compulsory arbitration clauses may be void as unfair terms under the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 (previously Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999). The 
‘grey list’ of potentially unfair terms includes terms that have the effect of ‘excluding or hindering a 
consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy particularly by requiring 
the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions …’.859 This 
type of clause was also held to be unfair in Mylcrist Builders Ltd v Mrs G Buck.860 Moreover, under 
the Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information) 
Regulations 2015 an agreement between a consumer and a trader to submit ‘a cross-border 
dispute or domestic dispute to alternative dispute resolution is void to the extent that it 
was made before the dispute arose and would deprive the consumer of the opportunity to 
bring judicial proceedings.861 
6.10.3  United States 
In contrast to the European Union, the United States has long recognized parties’ ability 
to contract as they see fit, with few exceptions or limitations, even in the field of 
dispute resolution clauses. The wide support for parties’ ability to contract for dispute 
resolution has led to the growth of the dispute resolution industry. These entities 
provide dispute resolution services within the context of a business endeavour with no 
regulation, or oversight and few restrictions. In the United States, dispute resolution is a 
creature of contract, which allows for wide deference to be given to the parties’ 
agreement to resolve the dispute as the parties see fit. 862 
Many traders in the United States include terms in their standard form contracts requiring 
compulsory and often exclusive arbitration to resolve consumer disputes. 863 The approach has 
been widely criticised by consumer advocates.864 Nonetheless, this type of provision, excluding use 
of class actions in favour of arbitration was recently upheld by the Supreme Court.865  
6.11 Ombudsman services 
It is the design of the ADR system that is critical. … [U]nlike many arbitration-based or 
‘complaint to regulator’ facilities, an independent Ombudsman scheme can act not just 
as a dispute resolution function but also — critically — in a regulatory support 
function.866 
                                                          
859  Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2 Part 2(20). 
860  [2008] EWHC 2172. Arbitration clauses have been found not to be unfair where introduced by the consumer’s own 
agent: Lovell Projects v Legg & Carver [2003] BLR 452; Westminster Building Co Ltd v Beckingham [2004] 1 BLR 265; 
Allen Wilson Shopfitters v Buckingham [2005] EWHC 1165; Bryen & Langley Ltd v Boston [2005] EWCA 973; Heifer 
International Inc v Christiansen [2007] EWHC 3015 (TCC). 
861  Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information) Regulations 2015 
14B. 
862  Anjanette H. Raymond and Scott J Shackleford, ‘Technology, Ethics and Access to Justice: Should an algorithm be 
deciding your case?’ (2013-14) 35 Michigan Journal of International Law 485, 512. 
863  See www.consumerreports.org/cro/shopping/the-arbitration-clause-hidden-in-many-consumer-contracts. 
864  See eg http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/02/25/consumer-arbitration-will-the-two-different-worlds-across- 
the-ocean-converge/. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Margaret 
Jane Radin, Boilerplate: the Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013). 
865  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 
866  Christopher Hodges, ‘Mass Collective Redress: Consumer ADR and Regulatory Techniques’ (2015) 5 European 
Review of Private Law 829, 871-872, 836. 
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The use of an ombudsman in dispute resolution has its roots in the Scandinavian concept of a 
‘citizens defender’ and has now spread beyond a system merely responding to complaints against 
government departments to systems that cover a wide range of disputes.867 In the consumer 
context, Ombudsman services are industry funded but independently operated dispute resolution 
services, often introduced by industry in compliance with regulatory or licensing requirements laid 
down by legislation.868 The benefit to consumers is in the form of a free, informal, flexible and 
supportive dispute resolution scheme, and also through higher level of compliance with consumer 
law by industry participants. Dispute resolution through ombudsman services should have a higher 
level of transparency than mediation. Mediation is essentially a private method of dispute 
resolution. By contrast, ombudsman services generally have a variety of reporting requirements to 
stakeholders, a mandate to promote compliance with consumer protection law and obligations to 
report systematic transgressions to that law to the relevant regulator.  
The main challenges for such schemes are in maintaining a flexible but fair approach to dispute 
resolution and in avoiding any perception that the industry members in anyway influence the 
decision-making processes.869 Some form of external review is desirable to monitor the quality and 
consistency of decisions870 and to ensure accountability.871 
Australia has a range of ombudsman services in the consumer sector. Ombudsman services also 
play a prominent role in promoting access to justice in South Africa and the United Kingdom, both 
of which, unlike Australia, rely on a general consumer ombudsman. 
6.11.1  Australia 
Australia makes extensive use of ombudsman services in regard to certain essential or socially 
significant services, including through the: 
• Telecommunications Ombudsman; 
• Financial Ombudsman Service; 
• Credit and Investments Ombudsman; 
• Energy and Water Ombudsman NSW; 
• Utilities Commission of the Northern Territory; 
• Energy and Water Ombudsman Queensland; 
• Energy Industry Ombudsman SA; 
• Energy Ombudsman Tasmania; 
• Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria); 
• Energy Ombudsman Western Australia. 
                                                          
867  See C Harlow, ‘Ombudsmen in Search of a Role’ (1978) 41 Modern Law Review 446.  
868  J Malbon, ‘Access to Justice for Small Amount Claims in the Consumer Marketplace: Lessons from Australia’ in 
M Trebilcock, A Duggan and Lorne Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 
page 345. 
869  M Donnelly, ‘Financial Services Ombudsman: Asking the ‘Existential Question’ (2012) 35 Dublin U LJ 229, 230;  A 
Duggan, ‘Consumer Access to Justice in Common Law Countries: A Survey of the Issues from a Law and Economics 
Perspective’ in C Rickett and T Telfer (ed) International Perspectives of Consumers’ Access to Justice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) p 62. 
870  M Donnelly, ‘Financial Services Ombudsman: Asking the ‘Existential Question’ (2012) 35 Dublin U LJ 229, 245. 
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The Financial Ombudsman Service provides a good model of the operation of an Ombudsman in 
Australia, albeit one dealing with financial services rather than goods and services regulated under 
the ACL. The Financial Ombudsman Service aims to resolve disputes in a timely manner with 
‘minimum formality and technicality’ and ‘as transparently as possible, taking into account our 
obligations for confidentiality and privacy’.872 Disputes are usually resolved through negotiation 
and conciliation and, where necessary a decision is made.873 If necessary The Financial Ombudsman 
Service can award compensation or other redress to bank customers.874 
The process requires the financial service provider first to be offered an opportunity to resolve the 
dispute within a specified time. If this is not successful the service provider must explain its position 
to the Financial Ombudsman. The dispute then progresses to a case management stage during 
which issues will be clarified and negotiation or conciliation process attempted. If this stage does 
not resolve the dispute it will progress to a decision. Decisions are based on the circumstances of 
the case, the relevant law and industry code and a standard of good industry practice.875 The 
applicant consumer can choose to either accept or reject the decision. Significantly, this choice is 
not available to the financial services provider. If acted on by the consumer the determination 
becomes binding. If it is not accepted then the consumer may take other available action, including 
through the courts.876 
6.11.2  South Africa 
In South Africa, the Consumer Goods and Services Ombudsman plays a central role in the 
protection of consumers and resolution of consumer disputes. The Consumer Goods and Services 
Ombudsman is regulated by the Consumer Goods and Services Code of Conduct, made pursuant to 
s 82 of the Consumer Protection Act 2008.877  It provides an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism and also aims to offer guidance to participants and consumers as to their rights and 
responsibilities under the Consumer Protection Act 2008.878 The central role of the Ombudsman 
arises from the requirement in the Consumer Goods and Services Code of Conduct for suppliers of 
consumer goods to register as participants (with some exceptions, for example for electronic 
communication service providers and the automotive industry).879  
All complaints that are received by the Consumer Goods and Services Ombudsman and determined 
to fall within its jurisdiction are referred to the supplier involved. The aim of this process is to give 
the supplier a last opportunity to resolve the complaint directly with the consumer concerned. 
Consumer complaints that are not resolved by the parties are considered by the Consumer Goods 
and Services Ombudsman. Some of them are referred for formal mediation while in others, more 
informal third party facilitation takes place.880 The vast majority of complaints are finalised through 
these processes.881 
Where a case is not resolved through mediation, the Consumer Goods and Services Ombudsman 
further investigates the matter using correspondence with the parties or with the assistance of 
independent experts. After considering all the information provided by the parties, a written 
                                                          
872  See www.fos.org.au/about-us/what-we-do/. 
873  See www.fos.org.au/resolving-disputes/dispute-resolution-process-in-detail/#id=undefined. 
874  Financial Ombudsman Service, Terms of Reference cl 9.1. 
875  See www.fos.org.au/resolving-disputes/dispute-resolution-process-in-detail/#id=undefined 
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877  See www.cgso.org.za/about-us/. See also the recognition of consumers’ right to alternative dispute resolution in 
the Consumer Protection Act s 70.  
878  See www.cgso.org.za/your-rights-explained/. 
879  Consumer Goods and Service Industry, Code of Conduct, 4.4. 
880  Consumer Goods and Service Industry, Code of Conduct, 9.1.2 
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assessment is compiled by the Consumer Goods and Services Ombudsman, setting out its findings 
and recommendations for the settlement of the dispute.882 This assessment is based both on the 
relevant law and fairness considerations. The parties then have the opportunity to accept the 
recommendation or respond to the findings and recommendation. If settlement is reached through 
any of the above means, this may at the request of one of the parties be recorded in the form of an 
order and made an order of a court or the Tribunal.883 A party who is not satisfied with the 
outcome under this process can approach the Consumer Tribunal to reconsider the matter.884 The 
Consumer Goods and Services Ombudsman cannot make binding declarations but may refer 
matters to the National Consumer Commission, which has investigation and enforcement 
powers.885  
6.11.3  United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom ‘Ombudsman Services’ acts as ombudsman for a range of industries, 
including, including energy, communications, property, veterinary surgeons, glazing, copyright, 
green deals, removalists and Which? Trusted Traders.886 Ombudsman Services now operates a 
general Consumer Ombudsman.887 The Consumer Ombudsman is an authorised alternative dispute 
resolution scheme, pursuant to the Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes 
(Competent Authority and Information) Regulations 2015 and certified by the Chartered Institute of 
Trading Standards. It is designed to reach a resolution of unresolved disputes between consumer 
and traders who are members of the scheme (or agree to the dispute resolution service). It covers 
goods and services purchased after 1 January 2015, including online purchases.888  
The role of ombudsman services in the United Kingdom is supported by the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent Authority and Information) Regulations 2015. These 
regulations provide for the approval and oversight of alternative dispute resolution schemes. They 
also impose obligations on traders, where it is unable to settle a dispute with a consumer, to 
inform the consumer in a durable medium: 
(a) that the trader cannot settle the complaint with the consumer;   
(b) of the name and website address of an ADR entity which would be competent to 
deal with the complaint, should the consumer wish to use alternative dispute 
resolution; and   
(c) whether the trader is obliged, or prepared, to submit to an alternative dispute 
resolution procedure operated by that ADR entity.889  
Ombudsman Services has accreditation to provide alternative dispute resolution procedures in 
relation to all types of consumer disputes. Some industries and trade organisations require trader 
members to offer alternative dispute resolution, while other traders are voluntary members of the 
scheme. If a trader refuses to work with the Ombudsman, it has no jurisdiction but will give advice 
to the consumer.890  
                                                          
882  Consumer Goods and Service Industry, Code of Conduct, 2015 9.1.3. 
883  Consumer Protection Act s 70(3) (SA). 
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The decisions of the Consumer Ombudsman are to be made ‘in accordance with what is fair and 
reasonable in all the circumstances having regard to principles of law, good practice, equitable 
conduct and good administration’.891  The Ombudsman is not bound by the rules of evidence.892  
The Ombudsman has a power to give remedies and redress where it makes a determination on an 
unresolved dispute.893 The total remedies that can be ordered cannot exceed £25,000.894 
In terms of process, the Consumer Ombudsman will only consider a complaint by a consumer after 
the trader has had a reasonable opportunity to resolve the issue.  It then seeks to resolve the 
complaint within 90 days.895 On accepting a complaint, the Consumer Ombudsman will allow both 
parties to provide information about the complaint and may if necessary request further 
information.896 After considering the information provided by the parties, if the Ombudsman 
considers that the trader is offering a fair settlement or that no settlement is requires, it may 
terminate the dispute.897  Otherwise the Consumer Ombudsman proposes a conclusion to the 
dispute and invite comments from the parties.898  This suggested conclusion may be accepted or 
rejected by the parties. If rejected, the Ombudsman will make a Final Decision899 and may impose 
remedies.900  
The Ombudsman may also make recommendations to the trader about changing its policies or 
procedures.901 If accepted by the consumer, the Final Decision is binding on both parties.902 If it is 
rejected by the consumer, the consumer may pursue other redress such as through a court.903 If 
the trader does not provide the required remedy, the Ombudsman may notify the Regulator or 
Trade body, and advise the consumer of any rights to pursue the remedy independently.904 The 
Consumer Ombudsman has duties of liaison with consumers, traders and other relevant bodies905 
and to make recommendations of changes within particular service sectors.906 
As the Consumer Ombudsman was only recently established, it is not possible to measure its 
success. However, its existence reflects the increased emphasis throughout the EU on providing 
independent alternative dispute resolution services for consumer/trader disputes and also success 
of industry specific ombudsman services that have been operating for some time in the United 
Kingdom.907 In 2014–15, Ombudsman Services reported 215,969 initial enquiries from 
complainants, of which a significant 63% where outside its terms of reference.908  It is unclear what 
percentage of these cases will be caught by the new general Consumer Ombudsman. Of the cases 
accepted, a fairly high number were resolved: 62,806.909  While complainants were generally 
satisfied with procedures and processes offered by Ombudsman Services, only 57% of 
complainants were satisfied with the outcome achieved and almost half of complainants (48%) 
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expressed dissatisfaction with the participating trader’s response to the recommended remedy.910 
It may be that the scheme would usefully be strengthened by a legislative requirement for traders 
to belong to an alternative dispute resolution scheme.911 
6.12 Online dispute resolution 
[The expansion of Online Dispute Resolution in a consumer context] is ‘mostly about 
finding innovative ways to settle niche disputes which otherwise would remain 
unresolved due to the high costs of litigation’.912 
Online dispute resolution is increasingly seen as a way of promoting access to justice goals by 
combining ideals of alternative dispute resolution in terms of a collaborative flexible and informal 
process for resolving disputes with the innovations for processing and using information options 
offered by online digital technology.913  As with other alternative dispute resolution processes, any 
online system must have a robust strategy for ensuring access by disadvantaged groups. 
Additionally an access to justice strategy that relies on online dispute resolution must avoid 
entrenching a ‘digital divide’ between those with the skills and resources to access the technology 
and those without.  
The use of online digital technology in resolving consumer disputes is also discussed at 40.16. This 
section notes the progress made in this area in Canada and the United Kingdom. 
6.12.1  Canada (British Columbia) 
Consumer Protection British Columbia has been trialling an Online Dispute Resolution platform to 
resolve consumer debt disputes.914 Consumer Protection British Columbia has also been developing 
a new Civil Resolution Tribunal,915 a fully online tribunal, open 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. 916 
The Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) will come into use in 2016 and will likely move from a voluntary 
to a mandatory system in 2017. The CRT is promoted as dispute resolution that is a ‘more 
straightforward, convenient, timely and affordable option’ than traditional methods.917  
The CRT aims to be collaborative and to promote resolution by agreement but also factors in an 
adjudication stage where needed. Under the CRT, parties will navigate the initial stages of a 
consumer dispute using an online interface. An expert system will help users diagnose problems 
and disputes, provide specific information, offer self help tools, then triage and stream disputes 
into a subsequent phase if necessary. The next stage will involve party-to-party negotiation. If after 
this stage, no resolution of the dispute is reached then a Tribunal member/case manager will 
                                                          
910  Ombudsman Services, Annual Report 2015, 27. 
911  See also Pablo Cortés, ‘A new regulatory framework for extra-judicial consumer redress: where we are and how to 
move forward’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies 114 
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conduct a facilitative dispute resolution process, along the lines of mediation, though 
teleconferences and/or in person. Failing a resolution of the dispute at this stage the Tribunal can 
reach a decision binding on the parties.918 
The CRT program is still being developed but is alive to the issue of ensuring that it is accessible to a 
wide-ranging group of consumers, and relies on the already existing high level of Internet use 
among British Columbia’s residents.919  
6.12.2  United Kingdom 
Consumers in the United Kingdom may currently use Money Claim Online to resolve a dispute 
concerning money. Money Claim Online is a court run Internet service for making claims 
corresponding to a monetary remedy.920  Claims may be lodged for compensation for a fixed 
amount of money under £100,000 against no more than two defendants with an address in 
England or Wales.921 The cost is scaled according to the size of the claim, for example £25 for a 
claim of up to £300 and £105 for a claim of between £1500 and £3000.922 
Pursuant to the European Union’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive (Directive 2013/11/EU) 
and the Online Dispute Resolution Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 524/2013),923 the United 
Kingdom is also proceeding with online dispute resolution.924 The EU Online Dispute Resolution 
(ODR) became available for consumer disputes about goods and services bought online, including 
cross border disputes, in early 2016.925 Essentially the ODR Platform provides a portal for 
consumers to submit a complaint to a registered alternative dispute resolution provider with 
the aim of resolving the dispute926 through a process conducted entirely online.927 Notably, the 
Regulation requires the ODR platform to be accessible to all consumers, including vulnerable 
consumers. 
In the United Kingdom, the regulatory framework supporting the new ODR platform, the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information) 
Regulations 2015, requires online traders to provide a link to the ODR platform on its website and 
in any terms and conditions of business.928  
6.13 Compliance and enforcement action by regulators 
Even where other measures adopted to facilitate access to justice are effective, the goal of 
improved access to justice will still require targeted compliance and enforcement action by 
regulators. Robust and vigilant regulatory action will be needed to deal with rogue traders who 
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deliberately set out to exploit vulnerable consumers, with traders who show a pattern of resisting 
consumer claims and also, in some cases, to clarify uncertain or controversial areas of the law. In 
comparing the regulatory approaches in the different countries considered, a major difference is in 
how responsibilities are divided between regulators.  
Australia has a federal system but has resolved some of the coordination problems inherent in such 
a system through agreement on uniform legislation, the ACL, and a division of responsibilities 
between Commonwealth and State and Territory regulators. Also a federal system, Canada has a 
division of regulators based on the scope of the relevant Federal and Province legislation. By 
contrast, in the United Kingdom, the main division is between the peak regulator and those 
responsible for specific industry sectors, which some regulatory oversight also provided by the 
Consumers Association. Singapore is unique in not having a regulator responsible for monitoring 
and enforcing its consumer protection legislation. 
6.13.1  Australia 
In Australia, both Commonwealth and State/Territory consumer protection agencies, together 
defined as the ‘regulator’, are responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the ACL. 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is responsible for enforcing the ACL 
at the Commonwealth level (except in relation to financial services and products). The various State 
and Territory consumer agencies also have responsibility for enforcement of the ACL as enacted 
within their respective jurisdictions: 
• ACT — Office of Regulatory Services; 
• New South Wales — NSW Fair Trading; 
• Northern Territory — Consumer Affairs; 
• Queensland — Office of Fair Trading; 
• South Australia — Consumer and Business Services; 
• Tasmania — Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading; 
• Victoria — Consumer Affairs Victoria; 
• Western Australia — Department of Commerce. 
The ACCC has engaged in processes of review and consultation with relevant stakeholders in 
various industries and, where it considers necessary,929 taken enforcement action against 
transgressing companies.930 In this task the ACCC has set out the principles guiding its approach to 
enforcement.931 These involve giving priority to matters involving the following factors: 
• conduct of significant public interest or concern; 
• conduct resulting in a substantial consumer (including small business) detriment; 
                                                          
929  ACCC, Unfair Contract Terms — Industry Review Outcomes (2013). 
930  See eg Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hewlett-Packard Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 653; 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Launceston Superstore Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1315; Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v HP Superstore Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1317; Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission v Camavit Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1397; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 
Avitalb Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 222; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Gordon Superstore Pty Ltd 
[2014] FCA 452; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mandurvit Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 464.  
931  See further ACCC, Enforcement and Compliance Policy 2015. 
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• unconscionable conduct, particularly involving large national companies or traders, which 
impacts on consumers and small businesses; 
• conduct demonstrating a blatant disregard for the law; 
• conduct involving issues of national or international significance; 
• conduct involving essential goods and services; 
• conduct detrimentally affecting disadvantaged or vulnerable consumer groups; 
• conduct in concentrated markets which impacts on small businesses or suppliers; 
• conduct involving a significant new or emerging market issue; 
• conduct that is industry-wide or is likely to become widespread if the ACCC does not 
intervene; 
• where ACCC action is likely to have a worthwhile educative or deterrent effect, and/or; 
• where the person, business or industry has a history of previous contraventions of 
competition, consumer protection or fair trading laws.932 
These priorities clearly have important access to justice dimensions. They focus on cases of 
considerable widespread significance to consumers and small businesses and also recognise the 
needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged consumer groups. 
6.13.2  Canada 
Responsibility for consumer issues in Canada is divided between federal and provincial regulators 
differently than in Australia. The federal agency, the Canadian Completion Bureau is responsible for 
enforcing and ensuring compliance with the Competition Act, which contains criminal and civil 
provisions to address false or misleading representations and deceptive marketing practices in 
promoting the supply or use of a product.933 In this task the Bureau adopts a variety of strategies 
that aim to balance voluntary compliance and necessary enforcement.934 
Provincial regulators are responsible for the various provincial acts and regulations that govern 
other aspects of consumer protection in Canada. Thus, for example, Consumer Protection British 
Columbia is responsible for administrating British Columbia’s consumer protection laws (Consumer 
Protection Act, the Cremation, Interment and Funeral Services Act and the Motion Picture Act along 
with a range of regulations).935 Consumer Protection British Columbia responds to inquiries and 
complaints, educates consumers and businesses, licenses specific businesses and occupations, 
inspects licensed businesses, investigates alleged violations of consumer protection laws and 
follows up with enforcement actions, and provides recommendations to government regarding 
enhancements to British Columbia’s consumer protection laws.936 Its strategies include random 
selection of businesses to review compliance with consumer protection laws.  
                                                          
932  See www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/compliance-enforcement-policy. 
933  See www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00529.html. 
934  See www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00149.html. 
935  See also the similar role performed by Consumer Protection Ontario: 
www.ontario.ca/page/consumer-protection-ontario. 
936  Consumer Protection British Columbia, Annual Report (2014) page 6 
www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/corporate-news/1246-2014-annual-report. 
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6.13.3  United Kingdom 
The main consumer protection regulator in the United Kingdom is the Competition and Markets 
Authority.937 The Competition and Markets Authority has powers to enforce a range of consumer 
protection law such as the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, the Consumer 
Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 and under the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 can take civil proceedings or criminal prosecutions against appropriate 
breaches. In contrast to Australia, the Competition and Markets Authority, a variety of sectoral 
regulators and also consumer advocate ‘Which?’ are also able to take enforcement action under 
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, now the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
part 2.938 As with the Australian regulators the United Kingdom regulators have identified strategic 
priorities about the types of cases they will pursue and the enforcement action taken, which 
include regard to the national impact of the alleged wrongdoing and the effect on consumer 
welfare. These strategies are integrated with a wider policy directed at consumer education and 
empowerment.939 
6.13.4  Singapore 
The stated preference of the Singapore government in enacting a comprehensive consumer 
protection regime was to balance regulatory action and consumer responsibility.940 Consistently, 
there are only limited opportunities for representative action to enforce consumers’ rights under 
consumer protection legislation. There is no independent entity administering the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003. The Act provides for ‘specified bodies’ which are empowered to 
invite errant traders to enter into a voluntary compliance agreement.941 Only specified bodies may 
apply to the court for a declaration that a supplier has engaged in, or is about to be engaged in, 
unfair practice or for an injunction to restrain an errant supplier.942 Currently, the Consumers 
Association of Singapore and the Singapore Tourism Board have been appointed as ‘specified 
bodies’.943 However, prior to applying to the court, they are required to first seek endorsement of 
the Injunction Proposals Review Panel,944 which has to be satisfied that there is a public interest to 
be safeguarded through the declaration or injunction.945  
6.14 Comparison and analysis 
An overarching theme in considering access to justice is that the commitment requires a diverse 
range of measures in other to address the different types of trader disputes and different 
consumer experiences. A focus on traders recognises that some need to be addressed by 
regulatory action while other trader-related problems may be resolved through informal 
conversations and negotiations. A focus on consumers recognises the need to address  the hurdles 
to access to justice faced by all consumers and especially the most disadvantaged and vulnerable 
consumers.  
                                                          
937  See www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority. 
938  Consumer Rights Act 2015, schedule 3. 
939  See eg www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/288624/CMA7_Consumer_ 
Protection_guidance.pdf 
940  Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, ‘Singapore: Public Consultation on the Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act’ (2008) 34(1) Common LB 149, 149. See also Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Bill 2nd Consultation Paper (July 2003) at 1. 
941  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act s 8.  
942  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act s 9. 
943  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act s 8(10). 
944  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act ss 9(4), 10. 
945  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act s 10(5). See also Consumers Association of Singapore v Garraway 
Enterprises Limited Singapore Branch [2009] SGDC 193. 
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In taking measures to facilitate access to justice under the ACL, Australia performs relatively well in 
comparison to other countries surveyed within the confines of the available resources available to 
the relevant stakeholders involved. Australia has a broad range of strategies for promoting access 
to justice and stakeholders are generally aware of the need to tailor these strategies to consumer 
groups with different experiences and expertise. There are nonetheless lessons that can be learned 
from comparison with other countries.  
(1) The form of and content of legislation 
The form and content of legislation are often forgotten but important tools in facilitating 
consumers’ access to justice. Clearly expressed and logically structured legislation provides the 
best opportunity for both consumers and traders to understand and apply their statutory 
rights and obligations. Legislation can also play an important role in proclaiming and 
reinforcing the importance of consumer rights to society. These considerations should be at 
the forefront of any reform process affecting the provisions of the ACL. 
(2) Information and education 
A relatively straightforward measure for promoting access to justice is through the provision 
of information and education about consumer rights, which can be presented in a variety of 
formats and topics and then made available to any consumer with access to a search engine. 
Australia and the other jurisdictions considered provide good quality information to 
consumers in range of formats. Australia might look at harmonisation measures between 
sources of information and education strategies to reduce duplication. It might also consider 
developing a single (online) directory of available resources, similar to the Canadian Consumer 
Handbook, to assist consumers and to reduce the risks of consumers being confused by the 
volume of material available. 
It is also important to remember that information has limitations in empowering consumers to 
assert and defend their consumer rights. This is because the imbalance in bargaining power 
between traders and consumers that influences the extent to which consumers can insist on 
their rights under law is influenced by factors other than merely the information available to 
consumers. Consumers’ ability to assert their rights is also influenced by a variety of 
socio-economic and cognitive factors that need to be taken into account in designed measures 
to facilitate access to justice.  
(3) Legal assistance and advice 
Legal advice and assistance are essential in facilitating access to justice. Such measures need 
to be properly funded to be effective; they also must be tailored to the needs of all affected 
consumer groups, and in particular to the circumstances of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
consumers.  
(4) Alternative dispute resolution 
Cost effective, time efficient and fair forums for dispute resolution that provide an alternative 
to court based litigation are essential to ensuring access to justice. Consumer disputes typically 
do not involve sufficiently large sums of money to justify traditional litigation relying on 
lawyers and taking place in court, and this is not a process amenable to many consumers in 
any event. In this regard, Australia might consider the introduction of a general consumer 
ombudsman as found in South Africa and in the United Kingdom and an industry funded, 
proactive and consumer friendly model for alternative dispute resolution.  
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In addition, Australia might look to the experience of British Columbia and the United 
Kingdom, or more broadly the European Union, where advances in online dispute resolution 
have taken place. Online dispute resolution using both intelligent systems and human 
expertise has the potential to provide quick, neutral and consistent dispute resolution in the 
consumer context. Any foray into online dispute resolution for consumer matters must include 
a strategy for ensuring that the use of this technology does not exclude vulnerable and 
disadvantaged consumers, so widening the digital divide.  
(5) Compliance and enforcement action by regulators 
Finally regulatory oversight and enforcement is vital to ensuring that consumer law is effective 
across the field and not merely in the high profile areas promoted by the media or among 
particularly affluent or vocal consumer groups. 
Overall, successful progress in facilitating access to justice in the Australian context will accordingly 
require carefully conceived and targeted strategies and good communication between all 
stakeholders, along with a process of research and review to assess the success of those strategies 
that are implemented.  
